

# Liquidity Constraints in the U.S. Housing Market\*

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First draft: May 2015. This draft: February 2017

## Abstract

We study the severity of liquidity constraints in the U.S. housing market using a life-cycle model with uninsurable idiosyncratic risks in which houses are illiquid, but agents have the option to refinance their long-term mortgages or extract home equity. The model reproduces well the distribution of individual-level balance sheets – the fraction of housing, mortgage debt and liquid assets in a household’s wealth, the fraction of hand-to-mouth homeowners ([Kaplan and Violante, 2014](#)), as the well as the frequency of housing turnover and home equity extraction in the 2001 data. The model implies that 75% of homeowners are liquidity constrained and willing to pay an average of 9 cents to extract an additional dollar of liquidity from their home. Liquidity constraints imply sizable welfare losses that amount to a 1.2% permanent drop in consumption, despite the relatively high frequency of home equity extraction observed in the data.

*Keywords:* Home Equity Extraction, Liquidity Constraints, Mortgage Refinancing.

*JEL classifications:* E21, E30.

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\*We thank Sonia Gilbukh for excellent research assistance, VV Chari, Morris Davis, Greg Kaplan, Ellen McGrattan, Karel Mertens, Kristoffer Nimark, Yaz Terajima and Gianluca Violante for helpful suggestions, as well as Neil Bhutta for kindly sharing his data with us.

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# 1 Introduction

Housing wealth is the most important savings instrument for a large fraction of U.S. households. According to the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), about 70 percent of U.S. households own a home. Housing equity is by far the largest component of these individuals' balance sheets: it accounts for about 80% of the median homeowner's wealth. Housing, however, is a special type of asset because selling or buying a home involves substantial transaction costs. This set of observations led [Kaplan and Violante \(2014\)](#) and [Kaplan et al. \(2014\)](#) to argue that many households in the U.S. are wealthy, yet *hand-to-mouth*, with relatively large holdings of illiquid assets (housing) and relatively low holdings of liquid assets.

The question we ask in this paper is: How liquid is housing wealth in the U.S.? That is, to what extent can homeowners tap equity in their homes to smooth consumption fluctuations in response to income shocks? We answer this question using a quantitative life-cycle model with uninsurable idiosyncratic risks in which we explicitly model the key institutional details of the U.S. housing market. The model, parameterized to match salient characteristics of U.S. household balance sheets and frequency and size of home equity withdrawals, predicts sizable losses from liquidity constraints. Three quarters of homeowners in our model are liquidity constrained and would be willing to pay 9 cents, on average, for an additional dollar of liquidity extracted from their homes.

Agents in our model face persistent and transitory income shocks and can save in a liquid asset at a relatively low interest rate. They can either rent or purchase housing subject to non-convex transaction costs. Agents can borrow against the value of their home, at a relatively high interest rate, and are subject to loan-to-value and payment-to-income constraints. Mortgage loans are long-term securities which require payment of interest and principal over time. Finally, agents have two means of home equity extraction: *refinancing*, which entails a relatively large cost and *home equity loans*, which are relatively cheaper but are subject to more stringent debt limits. We think of these two options as capturing cash-out refinances and second-lien mortgage contracts in the data, respectively.

We confront the model with data from the SCF on the poorest 80% of households and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and use it to measure the severity of liquidity constraints of individual homeowners.<sup>1</sup> As we argue, data on household balance sheets and

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<sup>1</sup>As we show below, agents in the top 20% of the wealth distribution have very large holdings of liquid assets and are unlikely to be liquidity constrained.

income processes is not sufficient to inform about the severity of liquidity constraints. If refinancing one's mortgage or other means of home equity extraction are relatively cheap, homeowners will purposefully choose to hold low amounts of the lower-return liquid asset and tap home equity whenever the need arises. Indeed, homeowners in the U.S. have access to a number of different options to extract home equity by cash-out refinancing or taking on a second-lien mortgage, such as a home equity loan. We therefore also confront our model with data on the frequency and amount of home equity extraction assembled by [Bhutta and Keys \(2016\)](#) using a large panel of consumer credit records. These researchers find that about 12.5% of mortgage borrowers have extracted home equity in 2001, the year prior to the boom and bust episode in the U.S. housing market. The median amount extracted was about \$23,000. These numbers suggest that homeowners extract a fairly large amount of home equity, and we explicitly target these facts in our calibration.

An additional factor that shapes the severity of liquidity constraints is the maturity of the mortgage contract. The shorter this maturity is, the faster must agents repay the principal on their mortgage and accumulate home equity over time. Repaying principal may be quite costly for homeowners that experience a string of negative income shocks, a force that exacerbates liquidity constraints. We thus calibrate the model to match the duration of the most widely-used mortgage contract in the U.S., the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage.

We find that liquidity constraints in the housing market are quite severe. About 20% of homeowners are hand-to-mouth, that is, at the kink in their Euler equation for liquid assets, consistent with the findings of [Kaplan and Violante \(2014\)](#). What this number implies for the severity of liquidity constraints depends on the magnitude of the costs of home equity extraction. We show that accounting for the [Bhutta and Keys \(2016\)](#) facts requires fairly high fixed costs of refinancing – about 5.5% of the value of one's home, and somewhat smaller costs of home equity extraction – about 2% of the value of one's home, consistent with other direct estimates. These costs imply that it is quite expensive for homeowners to tap housing equity to respond to negative income shocks.

Indeed, our model predicts that about 75% of homeowners are liquidity constrained, a number much greater than the fraction of hand-to-mouth homeowners. We define a homeowner as liquidity constrained if she would be better off with a more liquid wealth portfolio. This group includes not only the hand-to-mouth homeowners, but also the marginal homeowners who are forced to sell their home or tap home equity and who would benefit from additional liquidity by exercising the option value of waiting. In addition, this group

includes homeowners who are not hand-to-mouth, yet keep their consumption low for precautionary reasons, anticipating the possibility of negative income shocks and the need to make mortgage payments in the future. Overall, liquidity constrained agents in our model are willing to pay 9 cents on average for every dollar of liquidity they are able to extract. Absent costs of home equity extraction, the welfare of agents in our model would increase by 1.2% consumption equivalent units, a sizable number.

The requirement that mortgage borrowers build equity in their homes over time is quite onerous for agents in our model. Eliminating this requirement by replacing 30-year mortgages with interest-only perpetuities would eliminate about one-third of the welfare costs of liquidity constraints. Another factor that amplifies the severity of liquidity constraints is the wedge between the mortgage rate and the return on the liquid assets. Because of this wedge, some agents in our model choose to pay some of their mortgage debt sooner than required by their mortgage contract or not borrow at all, thus choosing to maintain a relatively illiquid position. Eliminating the 2.5% real after-tax wedge between the mortgage rate and liquid savings rate observed in the data would reduce the welfare costs in half.

We also find that liquidity constraints are almost as severe in our model as they would be absent home equity loans. Eliminating home equity loans would significantly reduce the frequency of home equity extraction in our model, yet it would not greatly reduce welfare, the homeownership rate, or the portfolio composition of households. We thus conclude that the 12.5% home equity extraction rate documented by [Bhutta and Keys \(2016\)](#) is, in fact, indicative of very severe constraints on U.S. homeowner's ability to tap home equity.

Interestingly, we find that agents in our model have a smoother consumption profile than agents in an otherwise identical Bewley version of the model without housing, even though our model predicts a higher fraction of hand-to-mouth agents. Thus, the option to sell one's home and extract home equity does provide an important cushion that allows agents to smooth consumption fluctuations, relative to that available in the one-asset model.

Our observation that liquidity constraints are particularly severe in the U.S. housing market has important normative and positive implications. We illustrate the normative implications by considering the effect of mortgage forbearance policies which reduce mortgage payments for homeowners experiencing a temporary spell of low income. Many lenders in the U.S. have such programs, but these are fairly limited in scope. We find that introducing such a policy in our model would have a sizable, yet limited impact, owing to the fact that liquidity constraints mostly bind for agents with low mortgage balances whose required

mortgage payments are relatively low.

In our model many homeowners are liquidity constrained, yet not hand-to-mouth, reflecting a strong precautionary savings motive that leads them to save in the liquid asset in order to guard against negative income shocks in the future. This finding has important implications for how agents in our model respond to an unanticipated credit shock that loosens constraints on home equity borrowing. In our model aggregate consumption increases by about 15 cents for every dollar of increase in debt in the aggregate, with the rest used to replenish agents' liquid asset holdings. In contrast, models in which liquidity constraints are less severe imply much larger marginal propensities to consume out of additional debt. Liquidity constraints thus help rationalize the [Midrigan and Philippon \(2016\)](#) observation that the large expansion of household debt during the 2001-2007 boom was accompanied by a much smaller increase in consumption spending across U.S. states.

We focus most of our analysis on studying the steady-state implications of liquidity constraints, and purposefully abstract from introducing aggregate dynamics. Although the question of how liquidity constraints vary over the business cycle is an important one, we do not pursue it here. Whether liquidity constraints bind more or less during a downturn accompanied by a large decline in house prices critically depends on the source of shocks triggering such dynamics. We have shown, in an earlier version of this paper,<sup>2</sup> that a decline in house prices may, in fact, trigger a relaxation of liquidity constraints since households reduce consumption due to a decline in their overall wealth. Since generating realistic time-series variation in equilibrium returns on housing is a challenging task even in the absence of frictions on home equity extraction,<sup>3</sup> and since frictions on home equity extraction introduce important non-convexities that are challenging to handle even in our partial equilibrium setting, we leave such extensions for future work.

**Related Work** This paper is part of a wider research agenda, developed by [Hurst and Stafford \(2004\)](#), [Khandani et al. \(2013\)](#), [Mian and Sufi \(2011, 2015\)](#) and [Beraja et al. \(2016\)](#), among others, studying liquidity management in the housing market.

In addition to [Kaplan and Violante \(2014\)](#), our paper is most closely related to the work of [Chen et al. \(2013\)](#) and [Kaplan et al. \(2015\)](#). Both of these papers study models of the housing market in which houses are illiquid, mortgages have long durations and households

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<sup>2</sup>[Gorea and Midrigan \(2015\)](#).

<sup>3</sup>See [Favilukis et al. \(2013\)](#).

can extract equity from of their homes. Unlike these papers, which study the comovement of consumption, house prices and income at business cycle frequencies, our work focuses solely on measuring the severity of liquidity constraints in a stationary environment.

Our work is also related to a number of papers that study the housing market: [Davis and Heathcote \(2005\)](#), [Ríos-Rull and Sánchez-Marcos \(2008\)](#), [Kiyotaki et al. \(2011\)](#), [Iacoviello and Pavan \(2013\)](#), [Justiniano et al. \(2014, 2015\)](#), [Landvoigt et al. \(2015\)](#), and [Favilukis et al. \(2013\)](#). In contrast to these papers, which typically assume one-period-ahead mortgage contracts and no costs of refinancing, our analysis explicitly introduces long-term mortgages that are costly to refinance and is thus more suitable for understanding the role of liquidity constraints. [Chambers et al. \(2009a,b\)](#) study rich models of the mortgage and housing market but unlike us focus on understanding changes in the homeownership rates and optimal mortgage choice, as do [Campbell and Cocco \(2003\)](#). [Chatterjee and Eyigungor \(2015\)](#) and [Corbae and Quintin \(2015\)](#) study models of the housing market with long-term mortgages but unlike us focus on understanding the foreclosure crisis. Finally, [Greenwald \(2015\)](#) proposes a tractable New Keynesian model of long-term fixed-rate mortgages and studies the aggregate implications of mortgage refinancing.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some evidence that motivates our modeling choices. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 discusses the data we have used and our empirical strategy. Section 5 studies the severity of liquidity constraints and discusses several additional implications of the model. Section 6 presents several robustness checks we have conducted. Section 7 concludes.

## 2 Motivating Evidence

We use data from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to document that a large fraction of U.S. homeowners hold most of their wealth in the form of housing equity. Though this fact is relatively well-established,<sup>4</sup> we report, for completeness, several statistics that we later use to evaluate our quantitative model. We also summarize the evidence on the amount and frequency of home equity withdrawals and housing turnover.

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<sup>4</sup>See [Kaplan and Violante \(2014\)](#).

## 2.1 Data

We use the 2001 wave of the SCF to compute our measures of the various components of household wealth. Here we briefly discuss several details about the construction of the data.<sup>5</sup>

The measure of housing we use is the value of the primary residence owned by each household. We calculate mortgage debt by summing up the remaining principal on all mortgages secured by the primary residence, including home equity loans and other second-lien loans.

Our measure of liquid assets sums up balances on all checking and savings accounts, money market deposits and mutual funds, certificates of deposit, directly held pooled investment funds, bonds, stocks, as well as secondary residential real estate. We subtract from these the amount owed on credit cards, installment loans as well as debt secured by secondary properties. Our inclusion of secondary properties in our measure of liquid assets is motivated by the observation that these are transacted quite often and are thus relatively liquid.<sup>6</sup> Most households do not own such properties, so this choice does not greatly affect our results.

We define total wealth as the sum of liquid assets and housing, net of mortgage debt. Importantly, our measure of wealth excludes retirement accounts. We account for the latter in our model by directly subtracting transfers into and out of these accounts from the household's measure of disposable income. As [Kaplan and Violante \(2014\)](#) point out, retirement accounts make up less than 2% of the median household's wealth in the U.S., so our choice to exclude these from our definition of wealth does not change our statistics considerably.

## 2.2 Stylized Facts

Table 1 reports several key features of the data. We report statistics for the entire sample, as well as separately for those in the top 20% and bottom 80% of the wealth distribution.

The aggregate stock of liquid assets is quite high: its per-capita average is equal to \$114,000, or about 2/3 of the overall wealth of \$178,000.<sup>7</sup> As a comparison, the average per-capita income in this period was \$36,000. These averages mask, however, a great deal of heterogeneity in the households' portfolio composition. The richest 20% of households have an average stock of liquid assets of about \$494,000, seven times their annual income. The poorest 80% of households, in contrast, have an average stock of liquid assets of only \$13,000,

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<sup>5</sup>See our Appendix for a more detailed description of our measures of wealth and disposable income.

<sup>6</sup>See our Appendix for evidence that secondary properties are more liquid than primary ones.

<sup>7</sup>We have adjusted all variables for household size using the OECD equivalent scales. All numbers are expressed in 2001 USD.

less than half their average annual income.

The lower tail of the distribution of liquid assets reveals an even more striking pattern. The richest 20% of households have sizable amounts of liquid assets even at the low end of the distribution: the 10th percentile is equal to \$23,700. In contrast, the poorest 80% of households have very few liquid assets. Among households in this group, the 10th percentile of liquid assets is equal to -\$1,200, the 25th percentile is equal to zero, while the 50% percentile is equal to only \$2,000, less than one-tenth of the average annual income of these households.

We find a similar pattern when we restrict our calculations to the sample of households who own a home. As Table 1 indicates, about 71% of all households own a home, including 97% of the agents in the wealthier group and 64% of those in the bottom 80% of the wealth distribution. For this latter group, the 25th percentile of liquid assets is equal to \$278, thus about 1% of the average income of these homeowners. The median homeowner's liquid assets are also relatively small, about \$4,200.

Consider finally the share of housing equity (housing net of mortgage debt) in the households' total wealth. Table 1 shows that for the population of homeowners overall, the median share of housing equity in total wealth is 77%. This pattern is even more pronounced when we focus on the poorest 80% of households: housing wealth accounts for 87% of all of the wealth of the median homeowner in this group.

**Frequency of Housing Turnover and Home Equity Extraction.** Whether housing wealth is liquid or not depends on the availability of opportunities to extract home equity. These include the option to sell one's home, as well as to withdraw equity from an existing home, by cash-out refinancing or taking on a second mortgage, such as a home equity loan.

Bhutta and Keys (2016) report the frequency and amount of home equity withdrawals using a large, nationally representative panel of consumer credit records. They find that about 12.5% of individuals who have mortgage debt have extracted home equity in 2001. The median amount by which these individuals' mortgage balance has increased was about 23% of the initial balance, or about \$23,000. Berger and Vavra (2015) report that about 5% of homes were sold in 2001, a statistic they compute using data from the National Association of Realtors. We target each of these numbers, as well as those reported above, in our quantitative analysis below.



### 3 Model

This is an overlapping generations endowment economy. Agents live for a finite number of periods, are subject to idiosyncratic income shocks, derive utility from consumption and housing services, and can save either using a one-period liquid asset or by purchasing a home. We study a partial equilibrium setting, so that the interest rates agents face are exogenously given, as is the price of housing, which we normalize to unity. Agents can either rent or own a home. Selling one's house entails a fixed transaction cost. Agents can choose to borrow against the value of their home by taking on a mortgage, but doing so requires a fixed borrowing cost. There is no aggregate uncertainty. We next describe preferences, the income process, and the assets available for trade.

**Preferences.** Agents live for  $T$  periods, of which they work for the first  $R$  periods. There is no bequest motive. The utility function is time-separable, with an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution equal to one, a preference weight on consumption equal to  $\alpha$  and a discount factor  $\beta$ . We let  $c$  denote the consumption of the endowment good and  $h$  denote the amount of housing the agent consumes. The life-time utility of a  $t$ -year old agent is

$$V_t = \alpha \log(c_t) + (1 - \alpha) \log(h_t) + \beta \mathbb{E}_t V_{t+1}, \quad t < T,$$

$$V_T = \log(c_T).$$

**Income.** An agent  $i$  at age  $t$  receives income

$$y_{i,t} = \lambda_t z_{i,t} e_{i,t},$$

where  $\lambda_t = 1$  during the first  $R$  years of one's life (working period), and  $\lambda = \lambda_R < 1$  during the last  $T - R$  years, capturing the drop in income after retirement. Agents face both persistent and transitory shocks to their income. The persistent component,  $z$ , is drawn at birth from  $\mathbb{N}\left(\mu_z, \frac{\sigma_z^2}{1 - \rho_z^2}\right)$  and evolves over time according to an AR(1) process:

$$\log(z_{i,t+1}) = \rho_z \log(z_{i,t}) + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad \varepsilon_{i,t} \sim \mathbb{N}(0, \sigma_z^2).$$

The transitory component  $e$  is i.i.d and drawn each period from  $\mathbb{N}(0, \sigma_e^2)$ .

**Assets.** Agents can save or borrow using a one-period risk-free asset  $a$  at an interest rate  $r_L$ . We refer to the one-period asset as the *liquid asset*. We assume a liquid asset borrowing limit, so that

$$a' \geq -\underline{a},$$

where  $\underline{a}$  is the maximum amount an agent can borrow. For simplicity, we assume no difference between the borrowing and lending rate on the liquid asset. See our Robustness section for an extension in which the borrowing rate is greater than the savings rate in which we find nearly identical results.

Households can also save using housing wealth. Housing is subject to transaction costs equal to  $F_S h$ . These costs are incurred whenever one sells their home. We assume, in our computations, that the stock of houses is indivisible, but have chosen a grid size sufficiently large so that these indivisibilities do not have much impact on the agents' decision rules.

**Mortgages.** Agents can borrow against the value of their homes using mortgages. We follow [Hatchondo and Martinez \(2009\)](#) and [Chatterjee and Eyigungor \(2015\)](#) in assuming, for computational tractability, that mortgages are perpetuity contracts with geometrically decaying coupon payments. We let  $b$  denote the face value of the mortgage. The mortgage is characterized by an interest rate,  $r_M$ , greater than the return on the liquid asset,  $r_L$ , as well as a parameter  $\gamma \in [0, 1]$  that stipulates the minimum fraction of principal that the borrower needs to repay each period. This parameter determines the duration of the mortgage.

A borrower with a remaining mortgage debt of size  $b$  must make a minimum payment of  $(1 - \gamma + r_M)b$ , of which a fraction is the interest payment, and the rest is the principal payment. By varying  $\gamma$ , we can trace out mortgages with different durations, ranging from one-period loans to perpetuities.

We assume no curtailment penalties so borrowers can choose to repay a greater fraction of the principal than stipulated by the mortgage contract.<sup>8</sup> Thus, a borrower who does extract home equity chooses a new loan balance  $b'$  subject to the borrowing constraint

$$b' \leq \gamma b, \tag{1}$$

reflecting the requirement that the borrower repay a fraction  $1 - \gamma$  of the loan balance.

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<sup>8</sup>Although some lenders do impose curtailment penalties, they typically apply them only in the first few years in the life of the mortgage and only if a borrower pre-pays more than 20% of the loan balance in any given year. [McCollum et al. \(2015\)](#) report that these limits rarely bind.

**Home Equity Extraction.** Agents have the option to relax the borrowing constraint in (1) by either refinancing their mortgage or by taking on a home equity loan. *Refinancing* entails paying down the entire balance on the original loan and obtaining a new mortgage, at a cost equal to  $F_M h$ . We assume that this cost is the same whether the agent finances the purchase of a new home or refinances a mortgage on an existing home.

Agents who take on a new mortgage face two constraints on the amount they can borrow: a loan-to-value (LTV) constraint that restricts the total amount of debt below a fraction  $\theta_M$  of the value of the home:

$$b' \leq \theta_M h, \quad (2)$$

as well as a payment-to-income (PTI) constraint that requires that the required mortgage payment not exceed a fraction  $\theta_Y$  of the household's permanent income

$$(1 - \gamma + r_M)b' \leq \theta_Y \lambda_{t+1} z. \quad (3)$$

This constraint only applies at mortgage origination.

A second option agents can use to extract home equity is a *home equity loan*. This option entails another fixed cost,  $F_X h$ , which is lower than the refinancing cost,  $F_M h$ . Though home equity loans are cheaper, they are subject to an additional limit: they cannot exceed a fraction  $\theta_X$  of the value of one's home. Agents who exercise this option face a borrowing constraint

$$b' - \gamma b \leq \theta_X h, \quad (4)$$

in addition to (2) and (3).

We think of these two options, refinancing and home equity loans, as loosely capturing two types of home equity withdrawals in the data. One option is cash-out refinancing, which entails taking on a new first-lien mortgage, at a relatively large closing cost, but a relatively low interest rate. A second option is a second-lien mortgage, such as a home equity loan or a home equity line of credit. In the data such an option entails relatively low closing costs, but relatively higher interest rates and therefore smaller loan amounts.<sup>9</sup> For computational tractability, we have opted to model the relatively small balances on second-lien loans as arising from exogenous limits on home equity loans, rather than interest rate differences between first and second-lien loans. Our approach saves an additional state variable and

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<sup>9</sup>The median balance on first-lien mortgage loans in the 2001 SCF data is equal to \$85,000, while the median combined balance on second-lien loans is equal to \$17,000.

thus considerably simplifies computations. Importantly, assuming that agents have access to home equity loan allows the model to match the relatively high frequency and low amounts of home equity withdrawals documented by [Bhutta and Keys \(2016\)](#).

**Rental Market** An agent who does not own a home can rent  $h$  units of housing services at an exogenously given rental rate  $R$ . Rental housing is not subject to adjustment costs or indivisibilities. In our quantitative section we calibrate  $R$  in order to match the home-ownership rates in the data. We interpret the difference between the rental rate of housing and the user cost of owner-occupied housing as capturing a number of reasons that make housing ownership preferable to renting, including moral hazard problems that exacerbate maintenance costs of rental property.<sup>10</sup>

**Budget Constraints.** Consider an agent who enters the period with a house of size  $h$ , outstanding mortgage debt  $b$ , liquid assets  $a$  and income  $y$ . The budget constraint of the agent depends on whether she chooses to become a renter, purchase a new home or remain in the existing home, as well as on whether she chooses to refinance her mortgage or obtain a home equity loan.

Agents who rent face the budget constraint

$$c + a' + Rh' = y + (1 + r_L)a - (1 + r_M)b + (1 - F_S)h. \quad (5)$$

The right-hand side represents the agent's liquid wealth after she sells the house, incurring the selling cost  $F_S h$ , repays the principal and interest on the outstanding mortgage debt,  $(1 + r_M)b$ , receives income  $y$  and interest and principal on the liquid account,  $(1 + r_L)a$ . The left-hand side sums the agent's consumption,  $c$ , liquid savings,  $a'$ , and rental spending,  $Rh'$ .

Agents who purchase a new home face

$$c + a' + h' - b' + F_M h \mathbb{I}_{b' > 0} = y + (1 + r_L)a - (1 + r_M)b + (1 - F_S)h. \quad (6)$$

The right-hand side is identical to that of the renter. The left-hand side sums the agent's consumption and liquid savings, the cost of the new home,  $h'$ , net of the new mortgage debt,  $b'$ , if the agent chooses to borrow. If the agent does borrow, she incurs the fixed mortgage closing cost  $F_M h$  and faces the borrowing constraints in (2) and (3).

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<sup>10</sup>See, for example, [Chambers et al. \(2009a,b\)](#).

Homeowners who neither transact their house, nor extract home equity are subject to

$$c + a' = y + (1 + r_L)a - (r_M b + b - b'), \quad (7)$$

as well as the requirement that they pay down a fraction  $\gamma$  of their existing loan balance, summarized by (1). These agents, who we refer to as *inactive*, can consume or save their income and the balance on their liquid account, net of the payments on their mortgage. These payments include interest,  $r_M b$ , as well as principal,  $b - b'$ .

Agents who refinance their mortgage face

$$c + a' - b' + F_M h = y + (1 + r_L)a - (1 + r_M)b. \quad (8)$$

These agents pay back the entirety of their original mortgage,  $(1 + r_M)b$ , and take on a new mortgage  $b'$ , the size of which is limited by the LTV and PTI constraints. Mortgage refinancing entails the fixed cost  $F_M h$ .

Finally, agents who obtain a new home equity loan face

$$c + a' - b' + F_X h = y + (1 + r_L)a - (1 + r_M)b, \quad (9)$$

which is similar to the budget constraint of agents who refinance, but entails a lower fixed cost  $F_X h$ . The additional constraint these agents face is on the amount of the loan in (4).

**Recursive Formulation.** Let  $m$  denote an agent's total wealth, including her income, liquid assets and the resale value of the home, net of the mortgage debt:

$$m = y + (1 + r_L)a + (1 - F_S)h - (1 + r_M)b. \quad (10)$$

The other state variables are the household's age,  $t$ , the permanent income component,  $z$ , the size of the house,  $h$ , as well as the mortgage debt,  $b$ . The value function satisfies

$$V_t(m, z, b, h) = \max_{a', b', h'} u(c, h') + \beta \mathbb{E}_{z', e'} V_{t+1}(m', z', b', h'), \quad (11)$$

where the maximization operator includes the choice of two continuous variables,  $a'$  and  $b'$ , as well as the discrete choices of what house size to purchase, whether to rent, and whether to refinance into a new mortgage or take a home equity loan.

**Value of Liquidity** In this formulation of the problem, for any given level of wealth  $m$  and housing stock  $h$ , the state variable  $b$  summarizes how liquid a household's portfolio is. A greater level of mortgage debt  $b$ , holding wealth and housing constant, implies that the household has a greater stock of liquid assets,  $a$ , and therefore less home equity. We say that a homeowner *values liquidity* if the value function increases in  $b$ , that is, if  $\partial V_t(\cdot)/\partial b > 0$ . We therefore let

$$p = \frac{\partial V_t(\cdot)}{\partial b} / u_c \quad (12)$$

denote a household's marginal valuation of liquidity, where  $u_c$  is the marginal utility of consumption. This object gives the household's willingness to pay to exchange one unit of housing wealth for an additional unit of liquid assets, by increasing one's mortgage debt by an additional unit. We refer to agents for which  $p > 0$  as *liquidity constrained*, since such agents would be better off with a more liquid portfolio.

Three groups of homeowners value liquidity. The first group are the *marginal* homeowners who are near the thresholds for home equity extraction. Since home equity extraction entails a fixed cost, marginal homeowners benefit from additional liquidity because it allows them to exercise the option value of waiting.

The second group of homeowners are the inactive ones. These homeowners maximize the value function in (11) subject to the budget constraint

$$c = m - (1 - F_S)h + b' - a', \quad (13)$$

and the borrowing constraint in (1). Since the outstanding mortgage debt  $b$  only appears in the borrowing constraint of these agents' problem, their marginal valuation of liquidity,  $\partial V/\partial b$ , is simply equal to  $\gamma$  times the multiplier on that constraint. Inactive agents are therefore liquidity constrained whenever the minimum mortgage payment constraint binds.

The third group of homeowners are those who take on a home equity loan. Recall that these agents face the limit in (4) on the size of the loan they can obtain. Their budget constraint is

$$c = m - (1 - F_S)h - F_X h + b' - a'. \quad (14)$$

Once again, their outstanding mortgage debt only enters these agents' problem through the borrowing constraint. Hence, the marginal value of liquidity for these agents is also proportional to the multiplier on the borrowing constraint in (4).

All other homeowners do not value liquidity. This group includes homeowners who sell their home or refinance and thus must repay all their initial outstanding debt, as well as

inactive homeowners who repay a larger fraction of their principal than required by the mortgage contract.

**Decision Rules** The Euler equation for liquid savings is

$$u_{c,t}(m, z, h, b) = \beta(1 + \tilde{r}(m, z, h, b))\mathbb{E}_{z',e'}u_{c,t+1}(m', z', h', b'), \quad (15)$$

where  $\tilde{r}$  is the shadow interest rate faced by the agent and is equal to the interest rate on the liquid asset,  $r_L$ , plus the multiplier on the  $a' \geq -\underline{a}$  constraint. We follow [Kaplan and Violante \(2014\)](#) in referring to households for whom this constraint binds as *hand-to-mouth* households. These households borrow up to the limit on their liquid asset and thus have a marginal propensity to consume out of a transitory income shock equal to one.

The Euler equation for mortgage debt is

$$\mathbb{E}_{z',e'} \frac{\partial V_{t+1}(m', z', h', b')}{\partial b'} \geq (r_M - \tilde{r}(m, z, h, b))\mathbb{E}_{z',e'}u_{c,t+1}(m', z', h', b'), \quad (16)$$

and is satisfied with equality if the borrowing constraints do not bind. The left-hand side of this expression is the expected marginal valuation of liquidity next period. The right-hand side is the cost of borrowing, given by the difference between the mortgage rate  $r_M$  and the effective return on the liquid asset,  $\tilde{r}$ . In choosing how much to borrow, the agent thus trades off the interest cost of mortgage debt against the value of liquidity.

Figure 1 illustrates the mortgage debt choice by showing how the two sides of (16) vary with the amount borrowed. As  $b'$  increases, the agent has more liquidity and faces a lower shadow rate on the liquid asset,  $\tilde{r}$ . The intersection of the two curves pins down the optimal amount the agent would like to borrow, provided the borrowing constraint does not bind. Also notice that the expected marginal valuation of liquidity,  $\partial V_{t+1}/\partial b'$  is non-monotone in  $b'$ , owing to non-convexities in the agent's choice set. When  $b'$  is low, the marginal valuation of liquidity is increasing in  $b'$ . In this region additional liquidity raises the probability that the agent will be able to exercise the option to postpone a costly equity withdrawal. In contrast, when the  $b'$  is sufficiently high, the marginal value of liquidity falls owing to a drop in the likelihood of a binding liquidity constraint. Indeed, since homeowners have multiple options of home equity extraction, there are multiple solutions to the Euler equation in (16), which require use of global optimization methods.

Figure 2 illustrates an example of an individual household's lifecycle. This household purchases a smaller home at age 30, a larger one at age 50, and then downsizes during retirement before finally becoming a renter. Consumption tracks her income, though consumption

is less volatile owing to the buffer of liquid assets. The loan-to-value ratio starts high when the household first purchases a house and falls gradually in most periods, as the household makes the minimum principal payments, setting  $b' = \gamma b$ . Thus, throughout most of her life, this household is liquidity constrained. Notice also the few periods in which the homeowner run her debt down faster than required by the mortgage contract (for example at age 42). In these periods her income is unusually high, so she finds it optimal to pay off a portion of her mortgage to reduce her interest payments. Finally, notice that in several periods (for example at age 34) the household raises her LTV by taking a new home equity loan.

## 4 Quantification

We choose parameters by requiring that the model replicates salient features of the households' portfolio compositions described in Section 2, as well as the frequency of housing turnover and home equity extraction and moments of the income process. We next describe how we have constructed the income moments, our calibration strategy, compare the empirical and model-based moments, as well as evaluate our model along a number of dimensions not explicitly targeted in our calibration. Given our focus on the steady-state implications of liquidity constraints, the statistics we target are those for 2001, the year prior to the boom-bust episode in the U.S. housing market.

### 4.1 Income Process

We use data from the 1999-2007 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to parameterize the idiosyncratic income process. We compute taxable income for each household by adding wages (net of pension contributions), social security income, pension income, unemployment compensation and other transfers. We then subtract federal and state income taxes and deflate the resulting data using the CPI and the OECD equivalence scales. The Appendix contains a more detailed description of our computations.

Notice that our notion of income captures disposable income net of contributions or withdrawals from the retirement accounts. This notion allows us to focus our analysis on a household's choice between housing and liquid wealth, and therefore abstract from the choice of saving into yet another illiquid retirement account. We conjecture that this choice is fairly innocuous since, as [Kaplan and Violante \(2014\)](#) document, the median household's holdings of retirement assets are very small, around \$950.



## 4.2 Parameterization

A period in the model is 1 year. Agents enter at age 25 and live for  $T = 66$  periods, that is, up to age 90. They work for  $R = 40$  years, up to age 65, at which point they retire and experience a fall in income, which we capture using a discrete fall in  $\lambda_t$ .

We divide the rest of the parameters into two groups. The first includes parameters that can be assigned without solving the model. The second includes parameters that are chosen in order to minimize the distance between a number of moments in the model and in the data. We next describe each set of parameters.

### 4.2.1 Assigned Parameters

We report these parameters in the left column of Panel B of Table 2.

**Mortgage Debt.** The mortgage contract is characterized by four parameters, the interest rate  $r_M$ , the fraction of principal to be repaid each period,  $\gamma$ , the maximum loan-to-value ratio,  $\theta_M$ , as well as the maximum payment-to-income ratio,  $\theta_Y$ .

The average 30-year fixed mortgage rate in 2001 was equal to 6.97%. We multiply this number by  $1 - 0.239$ , the average marginal subsidy on mortgage interest. We finally subtract the 2.8% inflation rate in 2001, which gives us a real after-tax interest rate of  $r_M = 2.5\%$ .<sup>11</sup>

We choose the parameter governing the duration of mortgages,  $\gamma$ , to match the *mortgage half-life*: the number of periods required for homeowners to pay down half of the present value of their mortgage obligations. In the U.S. data, the typical mortgage is a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage in which the borrower repays a constant amount each period. The half-life of such a mortgage is the scalar  $\tau$  which solves

$$\frac{1 - (1 + r_M)^{-\tau}}{1 - (1 + r_M)^{-30}} = \frac{1}{2}.$$

This equation implies a mortgage half-life of  $\tau = 12.28$  years. In contrast, in our model mortgages are geometrically decaying perpetuities and the half-life satisfies

$$\left( \frac{\gamma}{1 + r_M} \right)^\tau = \frac{1}{2}.$$

Matching the half-lives in the model and the data thus requires that we set

$$\gamma = (1 + r_M) \left( \frac{1}{2} \right)^{\frac{1}{12.28}} = 0.969.$$

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<sup>11</sup>See our Appendix for the data sources underlying these numbers.

We report below on how our results change for alternative values of this parameter.

We set the maximum LTV equal to the highest possible value that can be sustained in our model without introducing a cost of default,

$$\theta_M = \frac{1 - F_S}{1 + r_M} = 0.917.$$

This value ensures that all homeowners have positive home equity and is consistent with the 90th percentile of the LTV distribution in the data of 0.92. Finally, we set the maximum payment-to-income ratio,  $\theta_Y$ , equal to 0.35, consistent with the evidence in [Greenwald \(2015\)](#).

**Liquid Asset.** We use the evidence in [Davis et al. \(2006\)](#) to calibrate the return on the liquid asset,  $r_L$ . These researchers report an after-tax return on 3-year Treasuries of 2.9% for 2001, from which we subtract the 2.8% CPI inflation to arrive at  $r_L = 0.1\%$ . Below we report how our results change for alternative values of this parameter.

Finally, we set the unsecured credit limit on the liquid asset,  $\underline{a}$ , equal to 0.036 times the per-capita annual income, in order to match the 10th percentile of the liquid asset distribution in the Survey of Consumer Finances.

**Income Process.** We use the PSID to pin down the income process. We set the mean of the initial permanent income component,  $\mu_z = -0.295$ , by targeting a 0.21 log-point difference between the average income of households aged 45 to 55 and those aged 25 to 35. We set  $\lambda_R = 0.717$  to match the 0.33 log-point difference between the average income of retirees and workers. This difference is relatively small owing to the inclusion of withdrawals from retirement accounts in our measure of income for retirees.

We calibrate the persistence and standard deviation of the two income components by first regressing the log of a household's income on a quadratic polynomial in age. We then calculate the variance (0.43), as well as the first and second autocovariances (0.32 and 0.29, respectively) of the residuals from this regression. We then set  $\rho_z = 0.938$ ,  $\sigma_z = 0.200$  and  $\sigma_e = 0.307$  to exactly match these moments. These numbers are in line with existing estimates from the PSID data.<sup>12</sup>

## 4.2.2 Calibrated Parameters

We have a total of 7 remaining parameters that we choose by minimizing the distance between a number of moments in the model and in the data. The parameter values are reported in the

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<sup>12</sup>See for example, [Floden and Lindé \(2001\)](#) and [Storesletten et al. \(2004\)](#).

right column of Panel B of Table 2. These are the fixed costs of selling a home,  $F_S$ , the fixed cost of obtaining a home equity loan,  $F_X$ , the fixed cost of obtaining a new mortgage,  $F_M$ , the limit on home equity loans,  $\theta_X$ , the discount factor  $\beta$ , the preference weight on housing,  $\alpha$ , as well as the rental rate of housing,  $R$ .

We choose these parameters so as to minimize the distance

$$\sum_{i=1}^9 \left( \frac{\text{moment}_i^{\text{model}} - \text{moment}_i^{\text{data}}}{\text{moment}_i^{\text{data}}} \right)^2$$

between 9 moments in the model and in the data. Panel A of Table 2 reports the values of the moments we target. These moments characterize the composition of aggregate wealth into liquid and illiquid assets, the fractions of homeowners and mortgage borrowers, as well as the frequency with which homeowners sell their homes and extract home equity. In addition, we target the median amount by which a homeowner increases her mortgage balance whenever refinancing. Recall from our discussion in Section 2 that [Bhutta and Keys \(2016\)](#) find that 12.5% of homeowners that have mortgage debt extract home equity. Since one-third of homeowners have no mortgage debt, the sample of individuals with mortgage debt who extract home equity represents about 8.6% of all homeowners. We target this latter moment in our calibration.

Importantly, we target statistics for the poorest 80% of the households in the SCF sample. It is clear from Table 1 that the wealthier group of households have very large holdings of liquid assets and are thus unlikely to be liquidity constrained. Accounting for the large liquid holdings of the richer households would require adding additional sources of heterogeneity in the model (say in the discount rates, or returns on liquid assets or income processes), which would complicate the model, without substantially changing any of our conclusions given the partial equilibrium nature of our exercise.<sup>13</sup>

**Model Fit.** Panel A of Table 2 shows that the ratio of the aggregate wealth to aggregate annual income is equal to 1.45 in the data and 1.55 in the model. The value of the aggregate housing stock is equal to 1.82 times annual income in the data and 1.83 in the model. Aggregate mortgage debt is equal to 0.83 times aggregate income in the model and 0.61 in the data. Aggregate liquid assets amount to 0.46 times their annual income in the data and 0.33 in the model.

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<sup>13</sup>See the earlier draft of this paper, [Gorea and Midrigan \(2015\)](#), for an extension along these lines.

The model is unable to match the aggregate stocks of mortgage debt and liquid assets because of the exogenously-imposed wedge between the interest rates on the mortgage debt and liquid assets (2.5% vs. 0.1%). This leaves us with one single parameter, the discount factor, to match a combination of these statistics, including aggregate wealth, but not each in isolation. As we show below, the model reproduces well the lower tails of the liquid asset distribution. Its failure to reproduce the aggregate thus stems from its inability to match the distribution of liquid assets at the upper tail, which is less consequential given our focus on the severity of liquidity constraints. In the robustness section below we reduce the wedge between the mortgage and liquid interest rates and show that doing so allows us to reproduce both the aggregate level of mortgage debt and liquid assets in the data.

The model reproduces well all other statistics that we have targeted: the homeownership rate of 64% (63% in the model), the fraction of homeowners who borrow of 71% (72% in the model), the frequency of home sales of 0.051, the 8.6% fraction of extractors, and the median amount extracted relative to the initial mortgage balance of 0.23. These last three statistics are identical in the model and in the data. We match these statistics well because we have introduced a parameter aimed at reproducing each in isolation. Intuitively, the rental rate  $R$  pins down the homeownership rate, the fixed cost of obtaining a new mortgage  $F_M$  pins down the fraction of borrowers, the fixed cost of obtaining a home equity loan  $F_X$  pins down the fraction of homeowners that extract equity, while the limit on home equity loans  $\theta_X$  pins down the median amount extracted by those that do so.

Recall from our earlier discussion of [Bhutta and Keys \(2016\)](#) that the 8.6% number is the fraction of homeowners who extract home equity and have a positive mortgage balance. This statistic does not include those homeowners that start out without a mortgage but choose to take on a new housing-backed loan. When we include this latter group, the overall fraction of homeowners who extract equity increases to 11.1% in our model. Of these, 9.1% take home equity loans and thus borrow relatively little and 2% refinance their mortgage and borrow relatively large amounts.

**Parameter Values.** Panel B Table 2 reports the parameter values we obtain. The fixed cost of selling a home is equal to 6% of the value of the house, in line with typical estimates of seller commission fees. The fixed cost of obtaining a new home equity loan is 2.1% of the value of one's home, while the fixed cost of obtaining a new mortgage is equal to 5.5%. Although there is quite a bit of variation in how much individual homeowners pay in closing

costs and other fees when borrowing against their home, these estimates are in line with those reported elsewhere.<sup>14</sup>

Matching the median amount extracted in the data requires a limit on home equity loans of  $\theta_X = 14.3\%$  of the value of one’s home. The discount factor necessary to match the aggregate wealth in the data is equal to  $\beta = 0.947$ , while the preference weight on consumption is equal to  $\alpha = 0.92$ , a number necessary to match the value of the aggregate housing stock. Finally, the model requires a rental rate of housing of  $R = 0.036$ , thus quite a bit higher than the 2.5% interest rate on mortgages. The rental rate of housing is thus about 40% higher than the user cost of owner-occupied housing, a number necessary to match the homeownership rates in the data. This premium compensates homeowners for the multiple types of transaction costs and liquidity constraints they face and is in line with the evidence.<sup>15</sup>

**Additional Moments not Targeted in Calibration.** We next evaluate the model’s ability to account for a number of additional features of the data, notably various quantiles of the distribution of individual household balance sheets. Since our focus is on measuring the severity of liquidity constraints faced by individual homeowners, it is imperative that the model reproduces well the distribution of liquid assets among homeowners, as well as the share of housing in their wealth. Table 3 reports these additional statistics.

Panels A and B of Table 3 report the distribution of liquid assets for renters and homeowners. The model reproduces the 10th, 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of these distributions reasonably well. For example, the median renter has liquid assets of about 1% of per-capita aggregate income in the data and 3% in the model, while the median homeowner has liquid assets of about 15% of per-capita annual income in the data and 22% in the model. The 75th percentile of the renter’s liquid asset distribution is equal to 15% in both the model and in the data, while the 75th percentile for homeowners is equal to 68% in the data and 58% in the model. Importantly, the model matches well the lower tails of the liquid asset distribution of homeowners. The 10th percentile is equal to -4% in both the model and in the data, while the 25th percentile is equal to 1% in the data and -1% in the model. Overall, these numbers suggest that about 25% of households have essentially no liquid assets, consistent with the findings of Kaplan and Violante (2014).

The model fails to match the 90th percentile of these distributions, which are substan-

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<sup>14</sup>See [www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/refinancings/](http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/refinancings/), as well as our Appendix.

<sup>15</sup>See <https://www.trulia.com/blog/trends/rent-vs-buy-oct-2016/>, as well as our Appendix.

tially greater in the data (1 and 1.69 for renters and homeowners, respectively) than in the model (0.34 and 1.21, respectively). Since we focus on measuring liquidity constraints, which bind for the relatively poor, whose liquid holdings we match well, we conjecture that this discrepancy does not greatly affect our conclusions.

Panel C of Table 3 reports the distribution of housing values across agents in our model. The model reproduces this distribution reasonably well, though it does understate slightly the dispersion in house sizes across homeowners. The model also matches well the distribution of loan-to-value ratios for those who borrow (Panel D): the 25th percentile is 0.40 in the data (0.37 in the model), the median is 0.64 in the data (0.67 in the model), while the 75th percentile is 0.79 in the data (0.80 in the model). Given that the model reproduces well the distribution of liquid assets, housing values and LTVs, it also matches well statistics derived from these. Panel E and F of Table 3 show that the model reproduces well the housing share of homeowner’s wealth – housing equity accounts for 87% of the median homeowner’s wealth in the data and 84% in the model, as well as the wealth distribution.

To summarize, our model successfully reproduces salient features of the distribution of households’ liquid assets, mortgage debt and housing. A large fraction of homeowners have small holdings of the liquid asset and thus concentrate a substantial fraction of their wealth in the housing market. We assess below the extent to which these homeowners can use their housing wealth to smooth consumption fluctuations.

## 5 Importance of Liquidity Constraints

We next study the model’s predictions about the severity of liquidity constraints. We find that the welfare costs of these constraints are sizable, about 1.2% consumption-equivalent losses. We then ask: what institutional features of the housing market in the U.S., as captured by our parameterization, are most responsible for the severity of these constraints? We also evaluate the role of mortgage forbearance policies and discuss how liquidity constraints shape the model’s implications for the consumption responses to an unanticipated credit shock.

### 5.1 Severity of Liquidity Constraints

**Borrowing Constraints.** Panel A. of Table 4 shows that 86% of all homeowners are borrowing constrained. Consider next how this fraction varies across groups of homeowners who undertake various discrete choices. The vast majority of homeowners (83.5%) are the

inactive ones. Among these, 87% face a binding  $b' \leq \gamma b$  constraint and thus make only the minimum required mortgage payment. Very few households in our model thus choose to curtail their mortgage, a feature consistent with the U.S. evidence.<sup>16</sup>

The second largest group of homeowners (9.1%) are those who take a home equity loan. Since these loans are subject to a fairly tight limit, the majority of these agents are constrained as well. The third group of homeowners (4.7%) are those who obtain a new mortgage. Since the maximum LTV ratio on new mortgage loans is quite high, and since mortgages have a relatively high interest rate, only a small fraction of these agents (39%) are constrained.

**Consumption Smoothing.** How do these borrowing constraints shape homeowners' consumption? Panel B. of Table 4 shows that about one-quarter of households in the ergodic steady state of our model are at the unsecured debt limit  $\underline{a}$  and are thus hand-to-mouth. For these households, the median effective shadow interest rate  $\tilde{r}$  is equal to about 15%, thus much greater than the actual interest rate on the liquid asset of 0.1%. Since homeowners are wealthier than renters, a smaller fraction of them, 21%, are hand-to-mouth, with a median shadow interest rate of 12.6%.

We next report the implications of these constraints for agents' ability to smooth consumption in response to income shocks. The metric we use are the insurance coefficients

$$\phi^P = 1 - \frac{\text{cov}(\Delta \log c_{it}, \varepsilon_{it})}{\text{var}(\varepsilon_{it})} \quad \text{and} \quad \phi^T = 1 - \frac{\text{cov}(\Delta \log c_{it}, e_{it})}{\text{var}(e_{it})},$$

where  $\varepsilon_{it}$  and  $e_{it}$  are the persistent and transitory income shocks. These insurance coefficients range from 0 (consumption tracks income) to 1 (perfect consumption smoothing) and are widely used to assess the ability of households to smooth consumption fluctuations.<sup>17</sup>

Panel C. of Table 4 shows that the insurance coefficient for persistent income shocks is equal to 0.27 (0.32 for homeowners), and that to transitory shocks is equal to 0.72 (0.79 for homeowners). These numbers are somewhat larger for homeowners, who are richer on average. To interpret these coefficients, we next compare them to those in an otherwise identical one-asset Bewley model in which all parameters (including the interest rate on the liquid asset) are the same as in our Benchmark model.

Table 6 shows that the insurance coefficients for the two types of shocks fall to 0.22 and 0.67 in the Bewley model, despite the lower fraction of hand-to-mouth households (14% vs.

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<sup>16</sup>See Amromin et al. (2007) who find that only about 16% of homeowners that have a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage are ahead of schedule on their mortgage payments, and the references therein.

<sup>17</sup>See for example Kaplan and Violante (2010).

25%), and larger average holdings of the liquid asset (0.69 vs. 0.33 of per-capita income) in that model. Achieving the same degree of consumption smoothing in the Bewley model as in our model would require raising the interest rate on liquid assets to 1.25%, in which case the average holdings of liquid assets would be about three times larger than in our benchmark model. Intuitively, the presence of a higher return asset, housing wealth, allows agents in our model to accumulate a larger cushion of wealth than in the Bewley model. Even though this wealth is partially illiquid, agents can nevertheless tap it to respond to unusually large shocks.

**Implications for Welfare.** What are the welfare costs of frictions that prevent agents from tapping home equity? We answer this question by comparing the expected life-time value at birth in our economy to that in an economy in which there is no fixed cost or limit on home equity loans ( $F_X = 0$  and  $\theta_X = \infty$ .) As Panel C. of Table 4 reports, this difference is equal to 1.19% consumption equivalent units. Liquidity constraints thus generate welfare losses equal to those implied by a permanent 1.19% drop in consumption.

## 5.2 Value of Liquidity

How much do homeowners value liquidity? Recall that we have defined the value of liquidity in (12) as a homeowner’s marginal willingness to pay to exchange one unit of housing equity for one unit of liquid assets.

We answer this question by conducting a series of experiments which we refer to as *liquidity injections*. We increase all homeowners’ initial liquid assets and mortgage debt by some amount,  $\Delta b$ , keeping their overall wealth unchanged, thus offering homeowners a one-time opportunity to extract home equity for free by relaxing their borrowing constraints. Due to non-convexities in the homeowners’ choice sets, their response to and valuation of such liquidity injections depend on their size. We thus report results for three different sizes of the liquidity injection, ranging from 1% to 10% of the value of one’s home.

Panel A of Table 5 shows that about 70% of all homeowners benefit from a liquidity injection equal to 1% of the value of one’s home. This fraction increases as we increase the size of the injection: 76% of all homeowners benefit from an injection equal to 10% of the value of one’s home. The additional 6% of homeowners are the marginal homeowners who postpone selling their house or withdrawing home equity when receiving a sufficiently large amount of liquidity.



The table also reports these homeowners' valuation of liquidity, which we compute using the discrete counterpart of (12). The average valuation of liquidity among all those who benefit from a 1% injection is equal to 10.2%. This number ranges from 1.2% at the 10th percentile to 24.3% at the 90th percentile and declines with the size of the injection, but is nevertheless quite high on average, about 7.9%, even for an injection equal to 10%.

Three groups of homeowners benefit from additional liquidity: the marginal homeowners who use the liquidity to exercise the option value of waiting, the hand-to-mouth homeowners, as well as homeowners who are neither hand-to-mouth nor marginal. Panel B of Table 5 reports several statistics for each of these groups.

Marginal homeowners value liquidity the most. This group accounts for 2.5% of all those who benefit from an injection equal to 1% of the value of one's home and 15% of those who benefit from a much larger injection of 10%. Because additional liquidity allows these agents to avoid paying the fixed costs of home equity extraction, their valuation of liquidity is quite high, about 19% on average. Notice that these agents *reduce* consumption in response to the liquidity injection: additional liquidity allows them to avoid tapping home equity which would have raised their consumption.

The second group are the hand-to-mouth homeowners. These agents account for about a quarter of those who benefit, have a median valuation that ranges from 10% to 19% and consume a large fraction of the additional liquidity received. Clearly, these agents value liquidity because it allows them to raise current consumption. The third, most sizable group of homeowners are neither marginal nor hand-to-mouth. These homeowners only raise consumption by about 9 cents for every additional dollar of liquidity and have a median value of liquidity of about 4% to 5%, depending on the size of the injection. These homeowners value liquidity for precautionary reasons, anticipating to be constrained in the future.

Figure 3 illustrates this precautionary-savings motive by showing the distribution of the marginal propensities to consume,  $\Delta c_{t+j}/\Delta b_t$ , during the first ten periods after a 1% injection for homeowners who are not marginal. Panel A shows the consumption responses of those homeowners who are hand to mouth in the period of the injection, while Panel B shows the responses of those who are not. Both panels report the median as well as the 7.5th, 25th, 75th and 92.5th percentiles of the distribution of consumption responses at each date after the injection, scaled by the amount of liquidity a homeowner receives initially. Clearly, hand-to-mouth households increase their consumption nearly one-for-one immediately. They then gradually repay the additional debt by cutting consumption by a small amount in all

future periods.

Non-hand-to-mouth agents, in contrast, consume very little of the initial injection on impact. Notice, however, that the distribution of their marginal propensities to consume fans out in the periods following the injection, with a sizable group of these agents experiencing a large increase in consumption at some point in the next few periods. Overall, about 50% of those in this second group experience an increase in consumption that is greater than half of the amount of liquidity received in the the first five years after the injection. Hence, the anticipation of being hand-to-mouth in future periods leads most homeowners to save the additional liquidity at the relatively low liquid interest rate, rather than use it to pay down the higher-interest mortgage debt.

### 5.3 Role of Various Frictions

Homeowners in our model face multiple frictions that prevent them from using housing wealth to smooth consumption fluctuations: a fixed cost of obtaining a home equity loan, a limit on the size of the home equity loan, a payment-to-income constraint, as well as the requirement that they build equity in their home over time by paying back principal. We next study the relative importance of each of these frictions by tracing out the effect of changing each parameter in isolation on the model’s steady state implications.

**Fixed Cost of Home Equity Loans.** Figure 4 reports how some of the key implications of the model change as we vary the fixed cost  $F_X$ . The vertical lines show the corresponding values in our Benchmark parameterization. Notice that eliminating the fixed cost visibly increases the fraction of homeowners that extract home equity – to about 60% as opposed to 8.6% in our benchmark, the fraction of homeowners – to 90% as opposed to 63%, as well as the aggregate mortgage debt to income ratio – to about 1.05 as opposed to 0.60.

Also notice that absent this fixed cost, agents would hold much fewer liquid assets, one-third as much as in our benchmark model, owing to their relatively lower return. The fraction of hand-to-mouth homeowners would consequently increase from 21% in our benchmark to 44% absent the cost.<sup>18</sup> Not all these HtM homeowners have unit MPCs out of transitory income shocks, however. Rather, some of them use the additional income to pay down the mortgage debt, rather than consume. The fraction of unit MPC homeowners is virtually unchanged, 23% absent the fixed cost as opposed to 21% in our benchmark, owing to the

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<sup>18</sup>As earlier, we define an HtM homeowner as one for whom the  $a' \geq -\underline{a}$  constraint binds.

LTV and PTI constraints that bind for a subset of homeowners. These constraints make it optimal for homeowners to hold some amount of liquid assets for precautionary reasons.

Overall, eliminating the fixed cost would increase welfare by about 1.2% consumption equivalent units, primarily by raising the effective return on savings. If anything, consumption becomes less smooth as we reduce the fixed cost: the insurance coefficients for homeowners fall to 0.27 and 0.77 for the two types of shocks, compared to 0.32 and 0.79 in our benchmark, partly reflecting selection as many more agents now become homeowners.

We also note that housing in our model is almost as illiquid as it would be absent home equity loans altogether. Doubling the fixed cost reduces the fraction of homeowners that extract home equity to almost zero, but does not greatly reduce welfare, the homeownership rate or the portfolio compositions of households. We thus conclude that the 8.6% home equity extraction rate reported by [Bhutta and Keys \(2016\)](#), which our model matches by design, is indicative of fairly severe constraints on U.S. homeowner’s ability to tap home equity.

**Limit on Size of Home Equity Loans.** Figure 5 traces out the effect of varying the limit on home equity loans,  $\theta_X$ . Notice that this limit has relatively little impact on the model’s implications. A limit above 25% does not bind much – the model’s implications are nearly identical for values of  $\theta_X$  above this cutoff. Eliminating the limit on home equity loans altogether raises the homeownership rate from 63% in our benchmark to 71%, the mortgage debt to income ratio from 0.60 in our benchmark to 0.75, and reduces the liquid asset to income ratio from 0.33 to 0.30, raising welfare by only about 0.12%. We thus conclude that the limit on home equity loans does not greatly distort the decision rules of homeowners in our model. Intuitively, the wedge between the interest rate on debt and the liquid asset prevents homeowners from extracting too much home equity even when they eliminate the limit on home equity loans altogether.

**Payment to Income Constraint.** The payment to income constraint,  $\theta_Y$ , limits a homeowner’s ability to extract home equity, either when refinancing a new mortgage or taking on a new home equity loan. Figure 6 shows, however, that this constraint does not bind much in the vicinity of the 0.35 ratio we have assumed in our benchmark model. Even reducing the payment to income constraint to 0.15 only reduces welfare by about 0.05% and has a fairly limited effect on all other variables.

**Mortgage Duration.** Increasing  $\gamma$  raises the duration of the mortgage by reducing the amount of principal the homeowner must repay each period. Figure 7 shows that varying  $\gamma$  from 0.92 to 1 raises the half-life of a mortgage from 6.5 to 28 years, raises the homeownership rate significantly, from 45% to almost 90%, raises the mortgage debt to income ratio from 0.25 to 1.05, but has a fairly limited impact on the households' liquid assets. Household welfare increase by about 0.4% units of consumption when we replace the mortgage contracts in our benchmark model ( $\gamma = 0.97$ ) with interest-only mortgages ( $\gamma = 1$ ). The requirement that homeowners pay down their principal over time thus substantially exacerbates the severity of liquidity constraints. This requirement is particularly onerous for agents who experience unusually large income declines and are unable to keep up with the payments on their mortgages.

## 5.4 Additional Implications of the Model

We have shown that a substantial number of homeowners in our model are liquidity constrained. This finding has important normative and positive implications, both for the design of policies aimed at alleviating such constraints, as well as for how homeowners respond to credit shocks. We next illustrate these implications by studying the effect of mortgage forbearance policies, as well as the economy's responses to a credit shock.

**Mortgage Forbearance Policies.** Such a policy temporarily reduces mortgage payments for homeowners experiencing a temporary spell of low income. Although most lenders in the U.S. have such programs, these are limited in scope.<sup>19</sup> This observation motivated a 2010 proposal by the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) that requested federal funding for a program that would have reduced required mortgage payments to at most 31% of a homeowner's income for a period of up to 9 months. Under this proposal, the arrears would be added to the mortgage principal and thus extend the mortgage duration.<sup>20</sup> We next evaluate the effect of introducing such a policy on the steady-state implications of our model, by changing the minimum payment on the mortgage to

$$\min(\nu y_{i,s}, (1 - \gamma + r_M)b_{i,s}),$$

thus limiting required mortgage payments to a fraction  $\nu$  of one's income,  $y_{i,s}$ . Table 7 shows the impact of varying  $\nu$  from 30% to 10% on the model's steady state implications.

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<sup>19</sup>See our Appendix for more details on existing forbearance policies.

<sup>20</sup>See [http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/24/real\\_estate/forbearance\\_for\\_unemployed/](http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/24/real_estate/forbearance_for_unemployed/).

The table shows that the policy has a limited impact for values of  $\nu$  equal to 30% or 20%, simply because too few agents choose a house size sufficiently large for the payment-to-income ratio to exceed 30% or 20% too often. When, in contrast, the mortgage forbearance policy is sufficiently generous so that  $\nu = 10\%$ , it has a non-negligible impact: it increases the steady state homeownership rate from 63 to 77% and overall welfare by 0.2%. We also note that these particular values of  $\nu$  are not directly comparable to the MBA proposal of a 31% minimum payment. In our model mortgage payments are net of the income tax deduction as well as inflation, whereas the MBA proposal refers to pre-tax and pre-inflation payments, which are much larger. Our model therefore implies non-negligible, but fairly limited gains from such policies. Intuitively, liquidity constraints mostly bind in our model for agents with relatively low mortgage balances whose required mortgage payments are relatively low. For example, the average valuation of liquidity is about 60% larger for homeowners in the lower half of the LTV distribution relative to those in the upper half.

**Response of Consumption to Credit Shocks** Motivated by the 2001-2009 boom-bust episode in the U.S. mortgage market, a number of researchers have studied the response of consumption to credit shocks, both empirically and theoretically.<sup>21</sup> We next study how liquidity constraints shape the response of consumption to a credit shock in our model.

We study the response of our model economy to a one-time unanticipated doubling of the home equity limit  $\theta_X$  starting from the steady-state of the model, an experiment motivated by the [Mian and Sufi \(2011\)](#) observation that home equity-based borrowing was an important determinant of the rise of household leverage from 2002 to 2006. Here we do not explicitly model the source of the increase in home equity limits, but rather refer the reader to an earlier draft of this paper, [Gorea and Midrigan \(2015\)](#), in which we have explicitly modeled the change in credit limits as arising from increases in the equilibrium price of houses.

Figure 8 shows how the impact response of consumption and debt in the aggregate varies with the cost of home equity loans,  $F_X$ . Clearly, as this cost increases, consumption responds less to the credit shock. The increase in consumption is equal to 1.25% absent costs of home equity extraction and less than 0.1% when the cost of home equity extraction is equal to 4% of the value of one's home. This effect is mechanical: the larger the fixed cost, the fewer the homeowners that extract equity and increase consumption.

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<sup>21</sup>[Mian and Sufi \(2011, 2015\)](#), [Eggertsson and Krugman \(2012\)](#), [Huo and Ríos-Rull \(2014\)](#), [Kaplan et al. \(2015\)](#), [Lorenzoni and Guerrieri \(2015\)](#), [Berger et al. \(2015\)](#) and [Midrigan and Philippon \(2016\)](#).

Notice also that the response of debt to the credit shock is hump-shaped in the size of the cost of home equity extraction. This non-monotonicity arises because of two conflicting forces that shape the household’s choices of how much to borrow. Raising the fixed cost increases the homeowners’ valuation of liquidity and makes them borrow not just for current consumption, but also to replenish their stocks of liquid assets. This increases the amount agents borrow in response to a relaxation of credit limits, an effect that dominates when the cost of home equity loans is sufficiently low. As the fixed cost increases, fewer and fewer homeowners extract home equity and take advantage of the larger loan limits, which depresses the increase in debt.

The third panel in Figure 8 reports how the elasticity of consumption to debt  $\Delta C/\Delta \text{Debt}$  varies with the cost of home equity extraction. Clearly, this elasticity is the highest, 0.6, when the fixed costs is equal to 0, and falls to about 0.15 in the neighborhood of our benchmark parameterization. A 100 dollar increase in household mortgage debt is thus accompanied by a 15 dollar increase in consumption spending. Liquidity constraints thus help rationalize the observation in [Midrigan and Philippon \(2016\)](#) that the large expansion of household debt during the 2001-2007 boom was accompanied by a much smaller increase in consumption spending across U.S. states.

## 6 Robustness

We have assigned, in our Benchmark parameterization, values to two critical parameters that shape the household’s savings and consumption choices: the return on the liquid asset, as well as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Since there is quite a large degree of disagreement about these two parameters, we next study how our model’s predictions change as we vary these. We also show that introducing a wedge between the interest rate at which agents borrow and save using the liquid asset has a negligible effect on our model’s results.

### 6.1 Return on Liquid Asset

We report, in Panels A and B of Table 8, how the moments and parameter values in our calibration change when increase the interest rate on liquid assets from 0.1% in our benchmark to 1.25% and 2.5%. We keep all the assigned parameters unchanged here, but re-calibrate the endogenous ones by targeting the same set of moments used earlier.

Several results stand out. First, as the interest rate on liquid assets increases, both

aggregate mortgage debt and liquid assets increase, to levels much closer to those in the data. Overall wealth, in contrast, changes little. Reducing the wedge between the mortgage and liquid rates thus allows us to match the aggregate balance sheets of homeowners much better. With a higher interest rate on liquid assets, agents find it optimal to borrow larger amounts and thus own more liquid portfolios.

Panel C shows, however, that increasing the return on liquid assets substantially worsens the model’s ability to match the lower tail of the distribution of liquid assets, which our Benchmark model matches well. For example, the median liquid assets of homeowners are equal to 0.15 of aggregate per-capita income in the data (0.22 in our benchmark), but increase to 0.30 and 0.44 when we increase the return on liquid assets to 1.25% and 2.5%, respectively. Moreover, as Panel A of Table 10 shows, the fraction of hand-to-mouth households falls almost in half. Versions of the model with a high return on the liquid asset cannot reproduce the [Kaplan and Violante \(2014\)](#) facts, despite their ability to match aggregate liquid asset holdings.

Panel A of Table 10 also reports these different models’ predictions for the welfare costs of liquidity constraints. As the interest rate on liquid assets increases, more agents are borrowing constrained, owing to the lower wedge between the borrowing rate and the return on liquid assets. In contrast, the welfare costs of liquidity constraints fall from 1.19% in our Benchmark calibration to 0.96% and 0.61%, respectively, reflecting the counterfactually higher liquid asset holdings at the lower end of the distribution.

**Wedge Between Borrowing and Savings Rate on the Liquid Asset.** We also report on how our results change when we introduce a wedge between the rate at which agents can borrow on the liquid asset,  $r_H$ , and the rate at which they can save,  $r_L$ . We set  $r_H = 6.5\%$  based on the evidence in [Davis et al. \(2006\)](#) on the after-tax real credit card borrowing rates and leave  $r_L = 0.1\%$  and all other parameters unchanged at their original values in the Benchmark model. The last set of columns of Table 8 show that our model’s predictions are virtually unchanged in this experiment. Although liquid asset holdings increase slightly, owing to a mass of agents with zero liquid assets due to this additional kink in the budget constraint, the effect is negligible. For example, the 25th percentile of the liquid asset distribution increases from -0.01 of mean per-capita income to 0.01. Similarly, the average liquid asset holdings increase from 0.33 to 0.34.

Table 10 shows that the model’s implications for the severity of liquidity constraints

change little as well. The fraction of hand-to-mouth homeowners falls slightly, from 21% to 19%, of which 14% are at the debt limit  $\underline{a}$ , and 5% are at the kink with zero liquid assets. All other statistics that capture the severity of liquidity constraints are virtually unchanged, as are the welfare losses, which are equal to 1.19%, the same value as in our Benchmark model. We thus conclude that adding a wedge between the borrowing and savings rate on the liquid asset does not change our results much. Intuitively, the liquid debt limit is fairly tight in our parameterization, implying that the rate at which agents can borrow does not significantly alter their behavior.

## 6.2 Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution

Recall that in our Benchmark parameterization we have assumed logarithmic preferences and thus a unitary EIS. We next consider the effect of reducing the EIS in half, by assuming  $u(c, h) = (c^\alpha h^{1-\alpha})^{1-\sigma} / (1 - \sigma)$ , and setting  $\sigma = 2$ . We keep all other exogenously assigned parameters unchanged and recalibrate the endogenous ones by requiring the model to match the original set of moments in the data. Table 9 reports the moments and new parameter values in this experiment.

With a higher value of  $\sigma$  agents prefer a smoother consumption path and find it optimal to hold a more liquid portfolio of assets: notice in Panel A of Table 9 that the model is now capable of matching better the high average holdings of mortgage debt and liquid assets. As in the interest rate experiment, however, the better fit in the aggregate comes at the expense of a worse fit at the lower end of the liquid asset distribution. For this reason, as Panel B of Table 10 shows, the model now predicts a smaller fraction of hand-to-mouth homeowners: 14% as opposed to 21% in our benchmark.

Interestingly, the welfare costs of liquidity constraints actually fall slightly, from 1.19% to 0.98%, when we reduce the EIS in half. This drop reflects the change in all other endogenously chosen parameters needed to allow the model to match the data. For example, with a lower  $\sigma$  the model requires a much lower discount factor (0.90 vs. 0.95 originally) and lower weight on consumption in preferences (0.91 vs. 0.92), effects that reduce the welfare loss of liquidity constraints.



## 7 Conclusions

We have studied the severity of liquidity constraints in the U.S. housing market. We found that frictions that prevent homeowners from tapping into housing wealth are sizable: about 75% of homeowners are liquidity constrained and are willing to pay an average of 9 cents for the right to extract an additional dollar from their home. Removing constraints on home equity extraction would raise welfare by the equivalent of a 1.2% permanent increase in consumption, by significantly raising the return on households' wealth. The requirement that agents build equity in their homes by repaying principal on their mortgage, as well as the wedge between the interest rate on liquid assets and mortgage debt, are responsible for one-third and one-half of these losses, respectively.

Agents in our model have a smoother consumption profile than those in an otherwise identical Bewley version of the model without housing, even though there are more hand-to-mouth agents in our model. The option to sell one's home and extract home equity therefore does provide an important cushion that allows agents to smooth consumption fluctuations. Mortgage forbearance policies would have sizable, yet limited impact, owing to the prevalence of such constraints among homeowners with low mortgage payments. Liquidity constraints also shape the response of consumption to aggregate credit shocks: consumption in our model comoves much less with household debt than in economies without constraints on equity extraction.

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Table 1: Liquid Assets of US Households. 2001 SCF

|                                                                    | All HHs | Richest 20% | Poorest 80% |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|-------------|
| mean income                                                        | 36,000  | 68,000      | 27,500      |
| mean wealth                                                        | 177,700 | 696,900     | 39,800      |
| mean liquid assets                                                 | 113,800 | 494,100     | 12,600      |
| fraction homeowners                                                | 0.71    | 0.97        | 0.64        |
| <i>Lower tail of distribution of liquid assets. All households</i> |         |             |             |
| 10th percentile                                                    | -656    | 23,700      | -1,200      |
| 25th percentile                                                    | 154     | 71,300      | 0           |
| 50th percentile                                                    | 5,110   | 171,200     | 2,000       |
| <i>Lower tail of distribution of liquid assets. Homeowners</i>     |         |             |             |
| 10th percentile                                                    | -386    | 22,600      | -1,060      |
| 25th percentile                                                    | 1,170   | 69,800      | 278         |
| 50th percentile                                                    | 11,500  | 165,900     | 4,230       |
| <i>Share of housing equity in homeowner's wealth</i>               |         |             |             |
| 25th percentile                                                    | 0.46    | 0.24        | 0.64        |
| 50th percentile                                                    | 0.77    | 0.43        | 0.87        |
| 75th percentile                                                    | 0.96    | 0.70        | 0.99        |

Note: All statistics adjusted for HH size using OECD equivalence scales. 2001 USD

Table 2: Parameterization

**A. Moments Used in Calibration**

|                                                | Data  | Model |
|------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|
| Aggregate wealth to income                     | 1.45  | 1.55  |
| Aggregate housing to income                    | 1.82  | 1.83  |
| Aggregate mortgage debt to income              | 0.83  | 0.61  |
| Aggregate liquid assets to income              | 0.46  | 0.33  |
| Fraction homeowners                            | 0.64  | 0.63  |
| Fraction homeowners with a mortgage            | 0.71  | 0.72  |
| Fraction homeowners who sell house             | 0.051 | 0.051 |
| Fraction homeowners who extract equity         | 0.086 | 0.086 |
| Mean amount extracted relative initial balance | 0.23  | 0.23  |

**B. Parameter Values**

| <i>Assigned</i> |        |                                        | <i>Calibrated</i> |       |                                |
|-----------------|--------|----------------------------------------|-------------------|-------|--------------------------------|
| $T$             | 66     | Number of years to live                | $F_S$             | 0.060 | Fixed cost of selling house    |
| $R$             | 40     | Period of retirement                   | $F_X$             | 0.021 | Fixed cost of home equity loan |
| $r_M$           | 0.025  | Mortgage interest rate                 | $F_M$             | 0.055 | Fixed cost of new mortgage     |
| $\gamma$        | 0.969  | Coupon depreciation                    | $\theta_X$        | 0.143 | Limit on home equity loan      |
| $\theta_M$      | 0.917  | Maximum LTV                            | $\beta$           | 0.947 | Discount factor                |
| $\theta_Y$      | 0.35   | Maximum PTI                            | $\alpha$          | 0.920 | Preference weight consumption  |
| $r_L$           | 0.001  | Liquid interest rate                   | $R$               | 0.036 | Rental rate on housing         |
| $\underline{a}$ | 0.036  | Liquid credit limit (rel. aggregate y) |                   |       |                                |
| $\mu_z$         | -0.295 | Mean log initial income draw           |                   |       |                                |
| $\lambda_R$     | 0.717  | Relative income in retirement          |                   |       |                                |
| $\rho_z$        | 0.938  | AR(1) persistent income component      |                   |       |                                |
| $\sigma_z$      | 0.200  | S.D. persistent income component       |                   |       |                                |
| $\sigma_e$      | 0.307  | S.D. transitory income shocks          |                   |       |                                |

Table 3: Additional Moments Not Used in Calibration

|                                                      | Data  | Model |                                                        | Data  | Model |
|------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|--------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|
| <i>A. Liquid assets / Aggregate income. Renters</i>  |       |       | <i>B. Liquid assets / Aggregate income. Homeowners</i> |       |       |
| 10th percentile                                      | -0.05 | -0.04 | 10th percentile                                        | -0.04 | -0.04 |
| 25th percentile                                      | 0.00  | -0.04 | 25th percentile                                        | 0.01  | -0.01 |
| 50th percentile                                      | 0.01  | 0.03  | 50th percentile                                        | 0.15  | 0.22  |
| 75th percentile                                      | 0.15  | 0.15  | 75th percentile                                        | 0.68  | 0.58  |
| 90th percentile                                      | 1.00  | 0.34  | 90th percentile                                        | 1.69  | 1.21  |
| <i>C. Housing value / Mean income homeowners</i>     |       |       | <i>D. LTV ratio. Borrowers</i>                         |       |       |
| 10th percentile                                      | 0.67  | 0.87  | 10th percentile                                        | 0.19  | 0.13  |
| 25th percentile                                      | 1.30  | 1.21  | 25th percentile                                        | 0.40  | 0.37  |
| 50th percentile                                      | 2.18  | 1.74  | 50th percentile                                        | 0.64  | 0.67  |
| 75th percentile                                      | 3.33  | 2.47  | 75th percentile                                        | 0.79  | 0.80  |
| 90th percentile                                      | 4.93  | 4.16  | 90th percentile                                        | 0.92  | 0.88  |
| <i>E. Share housing equity in homeowner's wealth</i> |       |       | <i>F. Wealth / Aggregate Income</i>                    |       |       |
| 10th percentile                                      | 0.36  | 0.54  | 10th percentile                                        | 0.00  | -0.04 |
| 25th percentile                                      | 0.64  | 0.69  | 25th percentile                                        | 0.04  | 0.09  |
| 50th percentile                                      | 0.87  | 0.84  | 50th percentile                                        | 0.73  | 0.61  |
| 75th percentile                                      | 0.99  | 1.01  | 75th percentile                                        | 2.34  | 2.08  |
| 90th percentile                                      | 1.04  | 1.06  | 90th percentile                                        | 3.94  | 4.60  |

Table 4: Severity of Liquidity Constraints

**A. Borrowing Constrained Homeowners**

|                                   | % all owners | % constrained |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|---------------|
| All homeowners                    | 100          | 86.0          |
| Inactive & no home equity loan    | 83.5         | 87.2          |
| Inactive & take home equity loan  | 9.1          | 94.9          |
| New mortgage (buyers & refinance) | 4.7          | 39.0          |
| New house, no mortgage            | 2.7          | 100           |

**B. Hand-to-Mouth Households**

|                                | All agents | Homeowners | Renters |
|--------------------------------|------------|------------|---------|
| Fraction hand-to-mouth         | 0.25       | 0.21       | 0.33    |
| Median shadow i-rate if HtM, % | 14.7       | 12.6       | 18.5    |

**C. Insurance Coefficients and Welfare Loss**

|                                      | All agents  | Homeowners | Renters |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|------------|---------|
| Persistent shocks, $\phi^P$          | 0.27        | 0.32       | 0.17    |
| Transitory shocks $\phi^T$           | 0.72        | 0.79       | 0.55    |
| <b>Welfare loss, % CEV, at birth</b> | <b>1.19</b> |            |         |



Table 5: Value of Liquidity

**A. Value of Liquidity**

|                                                                 | $\Delta b \leq 0.01h$ | $\Delta b \leq 0.05h$ | $\Delta b \leq 0.10h$ |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Fraction who value injection                                    | 0.70                  | 0.73                  | 0.76                  |
| <i>Value of liquidity, conditional on <math>p &gt; 0</math></i> |                       |                       |                       |
| Mean, %                                                         | 10.2                  | 8.8                   | 7.9                   |
| 10th percentile, %                                              | 1.2                   | 1.0                   | 1.0                   |
| 25th percentile, %                                              | 3.2                   | 2.9                   | 2.9                   |
| 50th percentile, %                                              | 6.8                   | 6.6                   | 6.4                   |
| 75th percentile, %                                              | 13.4                  | 12.1                  | 11.4                  |
| 90th percentile, %                                              | 24.3                  | 20.7                  | 16.8                  |

**B. Value of Liquidity by Type of Homeowner**

|                                                     | $\Delta b \leq 0.01h$ | $\Delta b \leq 0.05h$ | $\Delta b \leq 0.10h$ |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <i>I. Marginal: postpone home equity withdrawal</i> |                       |                       |                       |
| percent of those who benefit                        | 2.5                   | 9.9                   | 15.3                  |
| median value of liquidity, %                        | 19.2                  | 19.1                  | 15.9                  |
| median $\Delta c/\Delta b$                          | -5.3                  | -0.73                 | -0.14                 |
| <i>II. Not marginal and hand-to-mouth</i>           |                       |                       |                       |
| percent of those who benefit                        | 26.5                  | 24.3                  | 20.8                  |
| median value of liquidity                           | 19.1                  | 12.6                  | 10.4                  |
| median $\Delta c/\Delta b$                          | 1                     | 0.75                  | 0.47                  |
| <i>III. Not marginal and not hand-to-mouth</i>      |                       |                       |                       |
| percent of those who benefit                        | 71.0                  | 65.9                  | 63.9                  |
| median value of liquidity                           | 5.0                   | 4.4                   | 4.3                   |
| median $\Delta c/\Delta b$                          | 0.08                  | 0.09                  | 0.09                  |

Table 6: Comparison with Bewley Model

|                      |           | Bewley (vary $r_L$ ) |      |       |
|----------------------|-----------|----------------------|------|-------|
|                      | Benchmark | -1.25%               | 0.1% | 1.25% |
| mean liquid assets   | 0.33      | 0.47                 | 0.68 | 0.98  |
| median liquid assets | 0.10      | 0.11                 | 0.19 | 0.27  |
| fraction HtM         | 0.25      | 0.20                 | 0.14 | 0.12  |
| $\phi$ persistent    | 0.27      | 0.19                 | 0.22 | 0.26  |
| $\phi$ transitory    | 0.72      | 0.61                 | 0.67 | 0.72  |

Table 7: Effect of Mortgage Forbearance Policies

|                                   |           | $\nu$ |       |       |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|
|                                   | Benchmark | 0.3   | 0.2   | 0.1   |
| aggregate housing to income       | 1.83      | 1.86  | 1.92  | 2.16  |
| aggregate mortgage debt to income | 0.60      | 0.63  | 0.70  | 0.95  |
| fraction homeowners               | 0.63      | 0.64  | 0.66  | 0.77  |
| fraction homeowners who extract   | 0.086     | 0.086 | 0.085 | 0.069 |
| welfare gains, CEV $\times 100$   | -         | 0.01  | 0.03  | 0.20  |

Table 8: Vary Interest Rate on Liquid Asset

**A. Moments Used in Calibration**

|                                    | Data  | $r_L = 0.1\%$ | $r_L = 1.25\%$ | $r_L = 2.5\%$ | $r_H = 6.5\%$ |
|------------------------------------|-------|---------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| aggregate wealth to income         | 1.45  | 1.55          | 1.59           | 1.52          | 1.56          |
| aggregate housing to income        | 1.82  | 1.83          | 1.82           | 1.77          | 1.82          |
| aggregate mortgage debt to income  | 0.83  | 0.61          | 0.67           | 0.84          | 0.61          |
| aggregate liquid assets to income  | 0.46  | 0.33          | 0.43           | 0.59          | 0.34          |
| fraction homeowners                | 0.64  | 0.63          | 0.64           | 0.64          | 0.62          |
| fraction homeowners with mortgage  | 0.71  | 0.72          | 0.74           | 0.80          | 0.72          |
| fraction homeowners who sell house | 0.051 | 0.051         | 0.051          | 0.053         | 0.051         |
| fraction homeowners who extract    | 0.086 | 0.086         | 0.085          | 0.086         | 0.083         |
| median extracted / initial balance | 0.23  | 0.23          | 0.23           | 0.22          | 0.23          |

**B. Parameter Values**

|                                     | $r_L = 0.1\%$ | $r_L = 1.25\%$ | $r_L = 2.5\%$ | $r_H = 6.5\%$ |
|-------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| discount factor, $\beta$            | 0.947         | 0.946          | 0.941         | 0.947         |
| cost of selling home, $F_S$         | 0.060         | 0.046          | 0.024         | 0.060         |
| cost of new mortgage, $F_M$         | 0.055         | 0.063          | 0.087         | 0.055         |
| cost of extracting, $F_X$           | 0.021         | 0.019          | 0.018         | 0.021         |
| limit on amount extract, $\theta_X$ | 0.143         | 0.157          | 0.162         | 0.143         |
| preference housing, $\alpha$        | 0.920         | 0.921          | 0.918         | 0.920         |
| rental rate housing, $R$            | 0.036         | 0.036          | 0.039         | 0.036         |

**C. Distribution Liquid Assets Owners. Scaled by Aggregate Income**

|                 | Data  | $r_L = 0.1\%$ | $r_L = 1.25\%$ | $r_L = 2.5\%$ | $r_H = 6.5\%$ |
|-----------------|-------|---------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| 10th percentile | -0.04 | -0.04         | -0.04          | -0.04         | -0.04         |
| 25th percentile | 0.01  | -0.01         | 0.04           | 0.10          | 0.01          |
| 50th percentile | 0.15  | 0.22          | 0.30           | 0.44          | 0.24          |
| 75th percentile | 0.68  | 0.58          | 0.75           | 1.14          | 0.60          |
| 90th percentile | 1.69  | 1.21          | 1.48           | 2.24          | 1.23          |

Table 9: Vary Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution

**A. Moments Used in Calibration**

|                                    | Data  | $\sigma = 1$ | $\sigma = 2$ |
|------------------------------------|-------|--------------|--------------|
| aggregate wealth to income         | 1.45  | 1.55         | 1.55         |
| aggregate housing to income        | 1.82  | 1.83         | 1.82         |
| aggregate mortgage debt to income  | 0.83  | 0.61         | 0.66         |
| aggregate liquid assets to income  | 0.46  | 0.33         | 0.39         |
| fraction homeowners                | 0.64  | 0.63         | 0.64         |
| fraction homeowners with mortgage  | 0.71  | 0.72         | 0.77         |
| fraction homeowners who sell house | 0.051 | 0.051        | 0.051        |
| fraction homeowners who extract    | 0.086 | 0.086        | 0.086        |
| median extracted / initial balance | 0.23  | 0.23         | 0.23         |

**B. Parameter Values**

|                                     | $\sigma = 1$ | $\sigma = 2$ |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| discount factor, $\beta$            | 0.947        | 0.902        |
| cost of selling home, $F_S$         | 0.060        | 0.065        |
| cost of new mortgage, $F_M$         | 0.055        | 0.059        |
| cost of extracting, $F_X$           | 0.021        | 0.024        |
| limit on amount extract, $\theta_X$ | 0.143        | 0.145        |
| preference housing, $\alpha$        | 0.920        | 0.908        |
| rental rate housing, $R$            | 0.036        | 0.039        |

**C. Distribution Liquid Assets Owners. Scaled by Aggregate Income**

|                 | Data  | $\sigma = 1$ | $\sigma = 2$ |
|-----------------|-------|--------------|--------------|
| 10th percentile | -0.04 | -0.04        | -0.04        |
| 25th percentile | 0.01  | -0.01        | 0.04         |
| 50th percentile | 0.15  | 0.22         | 0.31         |
| 75th percentile | 0.68  | 0.58         | 0.68         |
| 90th percentile | 1.69  | 1.21         | 1.36         |

Table 10: Welfare Costs of Liquidity Constraints

**A. Vary Interest Rate on Liquid Asset**

|                                   | $r_L = 0.1\%$ | $r_L = 1.25\%$ | $r_L = 2.5\%$ | $r_H = 6.5\%$     |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Fraction hand-to-mouth            | 0.21          | 0.16           | 0.12          | 0.19 (0.14, 0.05) |
| Fraction borrowing constrained    | 0.86          | 0.92           | 1             | 0.84              |
| Fraction who value 1% injection   | 0.70          | 0.75           | 0.92          | 0.70              |
| Mean valuation of 1% injection, % | 10.2          | 8.3            | 7.6           | 10.1              |
| Welfare cost, CEV $\times 100$    | 1.19          | 0.96           | 0.61          | 1.19              |

**B. Vary Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution**

|                                   | $\sigma = 1$ | $\sigma = 2$ |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Fraction hand-to-mouth            | 0.21         | 0.14         |
| Fraction borrowing constrained    | 0.86         | 0.83         |
| Fraction who value 1% injection   | 0.70         | 0.69         |
| Mean valuation of 1% injection, % | 10.2         | 11.5         |
| Welfare cost, CEV $\times 100$    | 1.19         | 0.98         |

Figure 1: Optimal Choice of Mortgage Debt




Figure 2: Example of Individual Life-Cycle




Figure 3: Consumption Response to Liquidity Injection




Figure 4: Vary Fixed Cost of Home Equity Extraction,  $F_X$




Figure 5: Vary Limit on Home Equity Extraction,  $\theta_X$




Figure 6: Vary Payment-to-Income Constraint,  $\theta_Y$






Figure 7: Vary Mortgage Duration,  $\gamma$




Figure 8: Response to a Credit Shock

