

Asset Collateralizability and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns*

Hengjie Ai¹, Jun Li^{2,4}, Kai Li³, and Christian Schlag^{2,4}

¹University of Minnesota

^{2,4}Goethe University Frankfurt and SAFE

³Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

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Abstract

This paper studies the implications of credit market imperfections for the cross-section of stock returns. Theory implies that the tightness of financing constraints is countercyclical. As a result, collateralizable capital provides insurance against aggregate shocks, because it can be used to relax financing constraints. We present a production-based general equilibrium model to quantify the effect of the above channel on the cross-section of expected returns. Consistent with the predictions of our model, we find in the data that stock returns for firms with a larger share of non-collateralizable capital are on average 4.8% higher annually than those for firms with a lower share. Our model can quantitatively reproduce the magnitude of the return spread as observed in the data.

JEL Codes: E2, E3, G12

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*Hengjie Ai (hengjie.ai@umn.edu) is at the Carlson School of Management of University of Minnesota; Jun Li (junli.econ@gmail.com) is at Goethe University Frankfurt and SAFE; Kai Li (kaili@ust.hk) is at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; and Christian Schlag (schlag@finance.uni-frankfurt.de) is at Goethe University Frankfurt and SAFE. We thank Frederico Belo, Bob Goldstein, and the seminar participants at University of Minnesota (Carlson) and Goethe University Frankfurt for their helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.

1 Introduction

A large volume of literature in economics and finance emphasizes the importance of credit market frictions in affecting macroeconomic fluctuations.¹ Although models differ in details, a common prediction is that financial constraints exacerbate economic downturns because they are more binding in recessions. As a result, theories of financial frictions predict that assets that relax financial constraints should provide insurance against aggregate shocks. We evaluate the implication of this mechanism on the cross-section of equity returns.

To formalize the above observation, we present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with financial constraints and the production involving the heterogeneity in assets based on their collateralizability. The entrepreneurs borrow risk-free bond from the workers, and invest into the production technology of the non-financial firms. In the same spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the credit constraint is motivated by a limited enforcement story, and it provides a need for entrepreneurs to use collateral to obtain loans. In order to study the cross-sectional asset pricing implications, we allow for two types of assets as the inputs of the production technology. The major difference of them lies in that one asset can be used as collateral against debt, while the other type cannot. We argue that different collateralizability is the key driver of the cross-sectional return pattern that we observe in the data. Comparing with non-pledgable asset, the collateralizable asset not only produces output, but also helps to relax the credit constraint. Since the constraint tends to bind more severely in the bad times, collateralizable asset's value of loosening the constraint is counter-cyclical and thus makes it to be less risky. Calibrated to the aggregate moments from the aggregate production side, we use this model framework to explicitly quantify such a channel on the cross-section of asset returns across assets with different collateralizability.

In order to study the empirical relation between asset collateralizability and risk premia, we construct a measure of collateralizability based on asset tangibility. We use intangible capital as a proxy for non-collateralizable capital at firm level. By the nature of intangible capital, it is hard to quantify its value, therefore intangible capital can hardly be pledged as collateral².

Consistent with our theory, we document that firms with more collateralizable capital have on average lower stock returns in the data. We construct a high minus low portfolio by long firms with more non-collateralizable capital and short firms with less

¹Quadrini (2011) and Brunnermeier et al. (2012) provide comprehensive reviews of this literature.

²We call collateralizable asset as physical capital, non-collateralizable as intangible capital interchangeably through this paper.

non-collateralizable capital. The portfolio has average annualized return 4.8% per year. The spread is still significant even after controlling for market portfolios, size, value, momentum, profitability risk factors.

Additionally, we empirically test the key mechanism of our model. Our theory implies that collateralizable capital is more valuable in bad times. We show in the data, the price of collateralizable capital responses less to aggregate economic conditions. The model also suggests the return spread between the two types of assets should be high when the economy is more constrained. We use TED spread as the proxy for funding liquidity measure, it positively correlates with our high minus low portfolio. TED spread also positively predicts future high minus low portfolio.

When calibrated to standard statistics of the dynamics of macroeconomic quantities, our model is able to reproduce the key features of asset returns data, including the equity premium and, more importantly, the difference in the average return on assets with different collateralizability. Our model generates a high equity premium 3.5% per year with a relative risk aversion of 10 and a low and smooth risk-free interest rate. The simulated aggregate quantities are comparable to those obtained by the standard real business cycle models in terms of the second moments of aggregate output, consumption, as well as tangible and intangible investments. Furthermore, the model generates annualized return on collateralizable capital 5.1% higher than that on non-collateralizable capital, in line with the data.

In summary, our work emphasizes the credit market frictions have strong implications on cross-section of expected returns. From the perspective of shareholders, investing in firms with more non-collateralizable assets is risky than firms with more pledgeable physical assets, because unlike the physical capital, non-collateralizable capital does not offer benefits from the countercyclical value of relaxing the credit constraint. Consequently, it has risk characteristics distinct from those of physical capital, and the risk inherent in this type of capital requires significant risk premia.

Related Literature This paper builds on the growing literature of macroeconomic models focusing on the role of credit market frictions, but we do not attempt to summarize it here. A partial list of papers most related to ours include Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (2012), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), He and Krishnamurthy (2014), and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), where financial frictions plays an important role of exacerbating the negative aggregate shocks to the economy, because the financial constraints are more binding in recessions. Our paper differs from the prior literature by emphasizing the implications of credit market frictions on the cross-section of asset returns, rather than macroeconomic quantities and the aggregate

stock market. To study the cross-section, we introduce two different types of capital into this economy, one is collateralizable while the other one is not. our theory predicts that collateralizable assets that relax financial constraints should provide insurance against aggregate shocks and therefore earn lower average return. We document the consistent empirical evidence, and quantify the implications of this mechanism.

Our paper connects to the production based asset pricing literature, which was surveyed by Kogan and Papanikolaou (2012). Our study differs from previous literature in two important dimensions. First, our model generates the equity premium puzzle, as does the rest of the literature, but more importantly we study the return spread between assets with different collateralizability. Second, we focus on the interplay of financial frictions and collateralizability. In particular, the endogenous countercyclical tightness of the collateral constraint makes the collateralizable asset to be an insurance for aggregate shocks, and therefore less risky than the non-collateralizable asset.

This study builds on the intangible capital literature. The measure of non-collateralizable capital is based on intangible capital. We measure intangible capital following Falato et al. (2013), Peters and Taylor (2016), Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013). Falato et al. (2013) documents that only 3% of total loan value have patents or brands as collateral, and they show that when firms have more intangible capital, they have less physical capital as collateral, this will decrease their debt capacity, therefore firms will increase cash holding to preserve their financial flexibility. Our paper differs from Falato et al. (2013), as we are focusing on the implications of cross-section of stock returns. Additionally, our empirical finding suggests that firms with more intangible capital have higher returns is in line with previous empirical asset pricing literature as in Chan et al. (2001), Li (2011) and Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013). Chan et al. (2001) shows that firms with higher R&D expenditure to market value have higher stock returns. Li (2011) shows that if firms are more constrained, then firms with more R&D capital³ have higher stock return. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) interprets organizational capital as human capital, the firms key talents' outside option will make the firm more risky, therefore investors demand higher risk premium. Our study has a different interpretation on the risk profile of intangible capital, based on the fact that it cannot easily serve as collateral.

The rest of the paper is organized as the following: in Section 2, we describe our model setup. In Section 3 we provide a quantitative study of our model. In particular, in Section 3.1, we lay down the detailed calibration procedure. We study the model implications through impulse response functions as in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we

³Accumulation of past 5 years R&D expenditure net of depreciation rate 20%.

bring forward several important testable implications and confirm them in the data. We present the model simulation results in Section 3.4, and show that the model can successfully reproduce important moments both in the macroeconomic quantity and asset pricing side. Section 4 concludes.

2 The Model

In this section, we describe a production based general equilibrium with collateral constraints in the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and two types of capitals in the production technology, differing in their collateralizability. The economy is of infinite horizon and time is discrete.

2.1 Households

There is a continuum of identical households of measure one in this economy. Each household is consist of two members, a worker and a entrepreneur. Workers supply labor inelastically to firms and obtain wage payments each period. Each entrepreneur operates a non-financial firm and transfers dividends back to the household subject to its flow of fund constraint. To make the entrepreneur's problem to be non-trivial, we follow Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and assume incomplete market between the worker and the entrepreneur. That is, the worker do not have access to the capital market, where state contingent securities are traded, they can only save through the short-term bond issued by the entrepreneur. Only entrepreneurs get access to the asset market in this economy. Like in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), we assume that there is perfect consumption insurance between two members within each household. This assumption permits the tractability of the representative agent approach, it implies that entrepreneurs evaluate future cash flows using the “stochastic discount factor” implied by the marginal utility of the household.

The households in this economy is endowed with recursive preference as Epstein and Zin (1989),

$$U_t = \left\{ (1 - \beta)C_t^{1-\frac{1}{\psi}} + \beta(E_t[U_{t+1}^{1-\gamma}])^{\frac{1-\frac{1}{\psi}}{1-\gamma}} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\psi}}}, \quad (1)$$

where β is the time discount rate, ψ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, γ is the relative risk aversion.

The household make consumption and saving decisions, which are financed by the

income from the following sources: wages W_t , the debt repayment, $R_{t-1}^f B_{t-1}$, and payout from the ownership of firms Π_t^B each period. The budget constraint reads,

$$C_t + B_t = R_{t-1}^f B_{t-1} + W_t L_t + \Pi_t^B.$$

The first order condition for short-term household loan is given by the following equations, in which M_{t+1} is the stochastic discount factor, or intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, between time period t and $t + 1$

$$R_t^f = \frac{1}{E_t[M_{t+1}]},$$

$$M_{t+1} = \beta \left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\psi}} \left(\frac{U_{t+1}}{E_t[U_{t+1}^{1-\gamma}]^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\psi}-\gamma}.$$

2.2 Nonfinancial Firms

There are two types of non-financial firms: goods producers and capital producers.

2.2.1 Final Goods Producer

Final goods producers are equipped with constant return to scale technology with two types of capital and labor as inputs. Entrepreneurs hold both types of capital. Final goods producers only make static labor choice, and pay all the remaining cash flow net of wage bill to entrepreneurs every period. The production technology is specified as

$$Y_t = A_t (K_t^\phi H_t^{1-\phi})^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha}, \quad (2)$$

where K_t is collateralizable capital, H_t is non-collateralizable capital, and ϕ is the share of collateralizable capital in production. As will be discussed in Section 3.3.1, we empirically measure non-collateralizable capital based on intangible assets, therefore, hereafter we will call collateralizable asset as physical capital, non-collateralizable as intangible capital interchangeably. In this economy, we assume learning by doing, that is, TFP is augmented by the capital stocks of the economy,

$$A_t = \tilde{A}_t (K_t^\phi H_t^{1-\phi})^{1-\alpha}.$$

This specification follows Frankel (1962) and Romer (1986) and is a parsimonious way to inject endogenous long-run growth.

The exogenous component of TFP process $\tilde{a}_t = \log \tilde{A}_t$, follows an autoregressive process,

$$\tilde{a}_t = (1 - \rho^A)\bar{a} + \rho^A\tilde{a}_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^A,$$

where $\bar{a}$ is the productivity in steady state.

The optimization problem of the firm is

$$\max_{L_t} Y_t - W_t L_t.$$

Thanks to the assumption of constant return to scale production technology, profits generated by two types of assets paid out to the entrepreneurs per unit of capital can be represented by marginal productivity of two types of capital respectively.

$$MPK_t^K = \frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial K_t} = \alpha \phi \frac{Y_t}{K_t} \quad (3)$$

$$MPK_t^H = \frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial H_t} = \alpha(1 - \phi) \frac{Y_t}{H_t}. \quad (4)$$

After depreciation, at the end of each period t , both of the two types of capital are sold in the competitive market, with price q_t for collateralizable asset and p_t for non-collateralizable asset. Therefore the total returns on the two types of capital paid to the entrepreneurs are

$$R_t^K = \frac{MPK_t^K + q_t(1 - \delta_K)}{q_{t-1}} \quad (5)$$

$$R_t^H = \frac{MPK_t^H + p_t(1 - \delta_H)}{p_{t-1}}, \quad (6)$$

where δ_K and δ_H are the depreciation rates for collateralizable and non-collateralizable capital respectively.

2.2.2 Capital Goods Producer

After production taken place, at the end of each period t , capital goods producers convert investment goods into new capital goods together with depreciated old capital to form new capital for production in period $t + 1$. Let I_t and J_t be the investment of collateralizable and non-collateralizable asset respectively. The optimization problems of collateralizable capital goods producer can be described as

$$\max_{I_t} \quad q_t G^K \left(\frac{I_t}{K_t} \right) K_t - I_t,$$

where q_t is the value of a unit of new capital. By solving the static problem we obtain

$$q_t = 1/G^{K'} \left(\frac{I_t}{K_t} \right).$$

The law of motion of collateralizable capital is $K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta_K)K_t + G^K \left(\frac{I_t}{K_t} \right) K_t$.

The production of non-collateralizable capital goods is similar,

$$\max_{J_t} \quad p_t G^H \left(\frac{J_t}{H_t} \right) H_t - J_t,$$

where p_t is the value of a unit of new capital. The solution to the optimization problem yields

$$p_t = 1/G^{H'} \left(\frac{J_t}{H_t} \right).$$

The law of motion of non-collateralizable asset is $H_{t+1} = (1 - \delta_H)H_t + G^H \left(\frac{J_t}{H_t} \right) H_t$.

The functional form of capital goods producers' technology is specified as

$$G_t^K \left(\frac{I_t}{K_t} \right) = \frac{a_1^K}{1 - 1/\xi^K} \left(\frac{I_t}{K_t} \right)^{1-1/\xi^K} + a_2^K, \quad (7)$$

$$G_t^H \left(\frac{J_t}{H_t} \right) = \frac{a_1^H}{1 - 1/\xi^H} \left(\frac{J_t}{H_t} \right)^{1-1/\xi^H} + a_2^H. \quad (8)$$

The specifications here follow Jermann (1998) and allow for the convex adjustment costs.

2.3 Entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs fund their capitals through their own net worth as well as the loans obtained from households. Due to the credit market frictions, entrepreneurs may be constrained in their ability to obtain loans from households. To the extent entrepreneurs face credit market frictions, they will attempt to save their way out of the financing constraint by accumulating retained earnings in order to move toward one hundred percent of equity financing. To limit this possibility in the long run, we follow Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and assume they operate firms with i.i.d. survival rate λ , with probability $1 - \lambda$ they are forced to be liquidated, paying remaining net worth to households as dividends.

We first introduce the optimization problem for an individual entrepreneur, indexed by j , and then we discuss the aggregation across all the entrepreneurs in Section 2.4. At the end of each period t , entrepreneur j purchases two types of capital, K_{t+1}^j and H_{t+1}^j , from the competitive market and supply them to final goods producers. The producers take the capitals into production in $t + 1$ and then pay back all the cash flow generated by capital, which includes the capital income plus the remaining market value of depreciated capitals, to the entrepreneurs. Therefore, entrepreneurs receive returns R_{t+1}^K and R_{t+1}^H from capital each period.

Let N_t^j denote net worth, or the equity, at the end of period t , B_t^j denote the bond they issued, q_t and p_t are the prices of collateralizable and non-collateralizable asset respectively. The net worth of entrepreneur j is given by

$$N_t^j = q_t K_{t+1}^j + p_t H_{t+1}^j - B_t^j. \quad (9)$$

The entrepreneur receives capital returns after the production takes place, and she pays back the debt with interest R_t^f . The remaining earning constitutes the net worth for the next period.

$$\begin{aligned} N_{t+1}^j &= R_{t+1}^K q_t K_{t+1}^j + R_{t+1}^H p_t H_{t+1}^j - R_t^f B_t^j \\ &= (R_{t+1}^K - R_t^f) q_t K_{t+1}^j + (R_{t+1}^H - R_t^f) p_t H_{t+1}^j + R_t^f N_t^j. \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

The entrepreneurs share the same stochastic discount factor as the workers due to the within-household perfect consumption insurance assumption. Entrepreneur j is maximizing the discounted dividends by optimally choosing capital and bond next period subject to the flow budget constraints equation (9), (10) and collateral constraint as equation (12)

$$V_t^j = \max_{K_{t+1}^j, H_{t+1}^j, N_{t+1}^j} E_t [M_{t+1} \{ (1 - \lambda) N_{t+1}^j + \lambda V_{t+1}^j \}], \quad (11)$$

where the right hand side represents the discounted dividend payment and the continuation value of the entrepreneur, weighted by survival probability.

The key assumption in the model is that only collateralizable asset, or we call it physical capital, can be pledged as collateral, whereas non-collateralizable asset has zero value to the lender. To acquire loans B_t^j from the market, at the end of each period t , the entrepreneur can pledge all the collateralizable asset $q_t K_{t+1}^j$ to the lender,

therefore the collateral constraint in this economy reads,

$$B_t^j \leq \zeta q_t K_{t+1}^j, \quad (12)$$

where ζ reflects the fact that only a fraction of the value of collateral can be recovered upon default. The collateral constraint is in the same spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and can be motivated by a limited commitment argument.

This assumption makes collateralizable capital more valuable in the bad states of the world. The intuition follows the literature of macroeconomic models with collateral constraint, e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), where the tightness of collateral constraint is counter-cyclical. In the bad states, the collateral constraint is more binding. If an entrepreneur has more collateralizable capital, she can use more collateral to acquire additional loans to relax the collateral constraint, and this makes collateralizable capital more valuable in bad states of the world. More collateralizable assets can provide the entrepreneurs an insurance to hedge the bad state of the world. On the other hand, one additional unit of non-collateralizable asset cannot alleviate the collateral constraint, therefore it is less favorable, especially in the bad states.

As in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), we assume that entrepreneurs' net worth can be freely traded at the end of each period, it implies that marginal value of net worth must be equalized across all the entrepreneurs at the end of every period. This feature of the model implies that all the equity return of different entrepreneurs are the same after the net worth redistribution, and the choice of leverage is the same across different entrepreneurs. The assumption allows us to have an aggregation result without the need to keep track of the distribution of the net worth among individual entrepreneurs.

2.4 Aggregation and Markets Clear

In this section, we introduce the aggregation results and market clearing conditions. First, the aggregate stocks of two types of capital are the sum of those across all the entrepreneurs, which are denoted as K_t and H_t , respectively. Next, we will describe the aggregation of the net worth. At the beginning of each period $t + 1$, there is a group of new entrepreneurs entering the economy with measure $1 - \lambda$, they replace the liquidated entrepreneurs, therefore the population of the economy remain unchanged over time. They are funded by household, using a fraction of the value of assets from the liquidated entrepreneurs, $\chi(1 - \lambda)(q_t K_{t+1} + p_t H_{t+1})$. The aggregate law of motion

of entrepreneurs' net worth therefore is

$$N_{t+1} = \lambda \{ (Q_{t+1} - R_f q_t) K_{t+1} + (P_{t+1} - R_f p_t) H_{t+1} + R_f N_t \} + \chi(1-\lambda)(q_t K_{t+1} + p_t H_{t+1}). \quad (13)$$

The variables without superscript denote the aggregate quantities. We assume that consumption goods and investment goods can be converted one to one without any frictions, therefore, the market clearing condition of the goods market for this economy is

$$Y_t = C_t + I_t + J_t. \quad (14)$$

2.5 Equilibrium Conditions and Asset Pricing Implications

In this section, we describe the equilibrium conditions and their asset pricing implications. As we discussed in Section 2.3, all entrepreneurs are making the same choice, therefore we can solve a representative entrepreneur's problem. Since both the objective and the budget constraint of the entrepreneur are linear, taking equilibrium prices as given, we conjecture the value function is linear in the state variable, $V(N_t) = \mu_t N_t$, where μ_t is the marginal value of net worth. The representative entrepreneur's problem is

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_t N_t = \max_{K_{t+1}, H_{t+1}, N_{t+1}} & E_t M_{t+1} [\lambda \mu_{t+1} N_{t+1} + (1-\lambda) N_{t+1}], \\ \text{s.t.} & (9), (10) \text{ and } (12). \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

Take first order conditions with respect to $N_{t+1}, K_{t+1}, H_{t+1}$, we arrive at the optimality conditions

$$\mu_t = E_t \left[\tilde{M}_{t+1} \right] R_t^f + \eta_t, \quad (16)$$

$$\mu_t = E_t \left[\tilde{M}_{t+1} R_{t+1}^K \right] + \zeta \eta_t, \quad (17)$$

$$\mu_t = E_t \left[\tilde{M}_{t+1} R_{t+1}^H \right], \quad (18)$$

where

$$\tilde{M}_{t+1} = M_{t+1} [\lambda \mu_{t+1} + (1-\lambda)].$$

We use η_t to denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with collateral constraint. It is the marginal value of relaxing the constraint by reducing one additional unit of

household loan. Following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), we define $\tilde{M}_{t+1}$ as the “augmented stochastic discount factor” as the stochastic discount factor M_{t+1} weighted by the expected marginal value of net worth at period $t + 1$, which is $\lambda\mu_{t+1} + (1 - \lambda)$. The marginal value of net worth at period $t + 1$ itself is a weighted average of marginal values of the exiting and continuing entrepreneurs. For the exiting entrepreneur at $t + 1$, which occurs with probability $1 - \lambda$, the marginal value of an additional unit of net worth is unity, while for the continuing entrepreneur the marginal value is μ_{t+1} .

The first order condition (16) reflects the intertemporal saving decision through risk-free household loan. As in equation (16), by saving through one additional unit of net worth through risk-free household loan, it will deliver R_t^f units of net worth at period $t+1$, and provide instantaneous-period relaxation of the collateral constraint, therefore, at the optimum, the discount payoff evaluated by the “augmented stochastic discount factor” $\tilde{M}_{t+1}$, together with the marginal value of relaxing the constraint η_t is equal to the marginal value of net worth today.

The first order conditions (17) and (18) are reflecting the saving decisions through holding physical and intangible capitals, respectively. They have the analogous interpretations. It is important to note that, by assumption, physical capital can be used as collateral up to a ζ fraction, while the intangible capital cannot, therefore by holding an additional unit of physical capital rather than holding the intangible capital, it not only delivers the gross return R_{t+1}^K , but also gives the benefit of relaxing the constraint at current period t , which is reflected in the term $\zeta\eta_t$ as in equation (17). This is the key margin that we emphasize to generate different return pattern between assets with different collateralizability in the paper. As the tightness of the collateral constraint, measured by the Lagrangian multiplier η_t is countercyclical, thus physical capital which helps relaxing the constraint can deliver marginal value of $\zeta\eta_t$, effectively provides an insurance against the aggregate shock. Therefore physical capital is expected to be less risky than intangible capital. As a further note, only when the collateral constraint is binding, i.e. $\eta_t > 0$, the asymmetry between these two assets due to the collateralizability channel will be in effect.

In this economy, we also want to introduce the market return and target it to the market equity index as we observed in the data. In this economy, we consider the entrepreneurs are the marginal investors for trading risky assets, and the market equity return is effectively the equity return of entrepreneurs. By looking at the value function of entrepreneurs (15), we normalize both sides of equation by N_t ,

$$E_t[\tilde{M}_{t+1}R_{t+1}^M] = \mu_t,$$

where the market return is defined as $R_{t+1}^M \equiv \frac{N_{t+1}}{N_t}$. Note that the definition of market equity return R_{t+1}^M is a levered position of the weighted average of the physical and intangible capitals, held by the entrepreneurs. To see this, we have

$$R_{t+1}^M \equiv \frac{N_{t+1}}{N_t} = \frac{R_{t+1}^K q_t K_{t+1} + R_{t+1}^H p_t H_{t+1} - R_t^f B_t}{q_t K_{t+1} + p_t H_{t+1} - B_t}.$$

As we will show in the Section 3.1, we calibrate the steady state leverage ratio to approximately match that of the non-financial corporate sector in the data. In order to make consistent quantitative comparisons, in the quantitative results, we also lever the returns on two types of assets R_t^K and R_t^H by the same leverage ratio accordingly.

Additional to the market return, we assume there is a one-period inter-entrepreneur borrowing and lending market among the entrepreneurs. Following the same argument like in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), we consider that entrepreneurs have perfect monitoring ability on other entrepreneurs, therefore can enforce the repayment of the inter-entrepreneur's loan contract without requiring the collateral. The entrepreneurs are ex ante identical, hence in equilibrium no such loan is traded, the shadow rate of return R_t^f is priced as follows,

$$E_t[\tilde{M}_{t+1}]R_t^f = \mu_t. \quad (19)$$

Comparing the equation (19) with equation (16), we learn that when the collateral constraint is not binding, i.e. $\eta = 0$, return on household and the inter-entrepreneur's loan are identical to each other; when the constraint becomes binding, then there will be positive wedge between the two, due to the fact that inter-entrepreneur loan does not require collateral while household loan does. Limits to arbitrage due to the binding collateral constraint will emerge and maintain the positive interest rate spread. We consider this spread to provide a benchmark proxy for the TED spread we observe in the data, as implicitly in this model we do not really distinguish the roles of financial intermediary and the non-financial firms, instead we consider the entrepreneurs play a hybrid role of both. As we will discuss in Section 3.1, this moment is very important to help us to discipline the amount of financial frictions to calibrate, which we do not directly observe.

Our model predicts that the collateralizable asset has lower returns than non-collateralizable asset. The intuition is the following: when a bad shock hits the economy, asset prices go down, the collateral constraint becomes more binding, one additional unit of physical asset can provides more collaterals to the entrepreneur such that she can borrow more in the bad states to relax the constraint, hence it is more valuable in bad states of the world. For intangible asset, it cannot be used as collateral, one ad-

ditional unit of it would not relax the collateral constraint. Therefore, physical capital can be seen as an insurance against the states when the collateral is binding, it is less risky compare to intangible asset from the perspective of entrepreneurs.

We derive the analytical form of the return spread in the model, by combining equation (17) and (18).

$$\begin{aligned}
E_t[\tilde{M}_{t+1}(R_{t+1}^H - R_{t+1}^K)] &= \zeta\eta_t, \\
E_t[R_{t+1}^H - R_{t+1}^K] &= \underbrace{\frac{\zeta\eta_t}{E_t[\tilde{M}_{t+1}]} }_{\text{liquidity premium}} - \underbrace{\frac{1}{E_t[\tilde{M}_{t+1}]}Cov_t(\tilde{M}_{t+1}, R_{t+1}^H - R_{t+1}^K)}_{\text{risk premium}}. \quad (21)
\end{aligned}$$

We call the first component as the liquidity premium, since it is associated with the collateral constraint. When the collateral constraint is more binding, which is higher η_t in our case, the illiquid asset is more risky, the liquidity premium increases. When more fraction of collateralizable capital can be pledged, controlled by parameter ζ , it will make collateralizable capital more liquid compare to non-collateralizable capital, it will also increase the liquidity premium. Investors demand positive liquidity premium because illiquid asset is more risky.

The second component has the form of standard risk premium, defined by the covariance between return spread and stochastic discount factor. Given our intuition, the collateralizable capital is more valuable in the bad times, and stochastic discount factor is counter-cyclical, therefore the covariance between SDF and return on collateralizable capital should be less negative than the one with non-collateralizable capital, hence the risk premium component should also be positive.

From the discussion above, our model predicts that both of the two components of the expected return spread are positive. Additionally, by the definition of non-collateralizable capital and especially when the collateral constraint is binding, more of this type of capital will decrease debt capacity and lower financial leverage.

3 Quantitative Results

In this section, we calibrate our model and explore its predictions in the data. We show that our model can match both the asset prices and macroeconomics variables in the data.

3.1 Calibration

We calibrate our model at quarterly frequency, the parameters are listed in Table 1. Our calibration procedure is divided into three steps, and the parameters are divided into three groups. The first group (top panel) are the ones which can be directly determined by previous literature or directly measured in the data, including household's relative risk aversion γ , intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) ψ , the capital share in firm production α , and the depreciation rates of tangible and intangible capitals, δ_K and δ_H , respectively. We set the relative risk aversion $\gamma = 10$, intertemporal elasticity of substitution $\psi = 1.5$, in line with the long-run risks literature. Capital share in production α is set to 0.33, as in standard RBC literature. The depreciation rate of physical capital δ_K is 0.025, corresponding to a 10% annual depreciation rate. The depreciation rate of non-collateralizable capital is set to 0.0375, which is 15% at the annual rate, and this number is in line with Peters and Taylor (2016), Falato et al. (2013) and Li and Hall (2016). Li and Hall (2016) estimates the depreciation rates of R&D capital for different industries, when the depreciation rate is not estimated for an industry, 15% is recommended.

The second group of parameters can be directly pinned down by matching a set of first moments at the deterministic steady state to the counterparts in the data. These parameters are listed in the middle panel of Table 1, and they include the mean productivity level as $E(\tilde{a})$, discount factor β , the liquidation value of collateral, ζ , survival rate of entrepreneurs, λ , share of physical capital, ϕ , and transfer to entering entrepreneurs, χ . We set $E(\tilde{a})$ to match a mean growth rate of U.S. economy of 2% per year. We set β to match the real risk free rate of 1% per year. We calibrate the remaining four parameters to jointly match a non-financial corporate sector leverage ratio of 2.3, the consumption to investment ratio $E(C/I) = 5$, the ratio of two investments $E(J/I) = 0.7$, and the TED spread of 0.7% per year. The leverage ratio we target is roughly in line with the asset to book equity ratio of non-financial firms in COMPUSTAT with mean 2.8 and median 2.2. The investment ratio $E(J/I)$ we target is also consistent with the data. The two depreciation rates δ_k and δ_H together with the investment ratio $E(J/I)$ used here can determine the capital ratio between the two capital in steady state, $E(H/K)$, at 41%, which is in close to data counterpart of 40%. As we discuss in Section 2.5, we introduce a shadow inter-entrepreneur loan. Because ex-ante all entrepreneurs are identical, therefore the loan is not traded but its shadow price can be determined by the Euler equation. We set the annual shadow rate of return of this loan to be 0.08% per annum, which is roughly the same as interbank borrowing rate. This is due to the fact that, in our economy, the entrepreneurs can be considered

as the combination of non-financial and financial sector. In steady state, the shadow rate of return is $\mu_t/E[\tilde{M}]$, given our definition $\tilde{M}_{t+1} = M_{t+1}[\lambda\mu_{t+1} + (1 - \lambda)]$, therefore this condition is very informative on the survival probability λ . We calibrate λ to be 0.986, it implies an average firm survives around 20 years.

The last group of parameters (bottom panel) are not related to the deterministic steady states of the economy, instead they need to be determined by the second moments in the data. The persistence parameter ρ and the standard deviation σ^A is chosen to match the first-order autocorrelation and the volatility of the aggregate output growth. The elasticity parameters of the adjustment cost functions, ξ_K and ξ_H are set to target the volatilities of the tangible and intangible investments, respectively.

Based on our calibrated parameters, the collateral constraint is binding at the steady state. Therefore, following the macroeconomic literature, for instance, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), we assume the constraint is binding on the narrow region around the steady state, and the local approximation solution method is a good approximation. We therefore solve the model using a second-order local approximation computed using the `dynare` package.

3.2 Impulse Responses

In order to understand the mechanism in the model, we plot the impulse responses with respect to a one-standard deviation negative shock to the aggregate productivity in Figure 1. The horizontal axis is the quarters after the shock, and the vertical axis represents the percentage deviations of quantities (left column) and prices (right column) from the steady state.

We make several observations. First, with respect to a negative productivity shock, both physical and intangible investments (third row, left column) decrease on impact. The intangible investment decreasing by slightly less, consistent with the evidence that intangible capital investment is less volatile than that of the physical investment. Second, the Lagrangian multiplier of the collateral constraint (first row, right column) increases with a negative productivity shock. This reflects a general prediction of this type of the model: the constraint becomes more binding in the bad time. Since the physical capital can serve as the collateral, and the countercyclical value of the Lagrangian multiplier implies that collateralizable asset's marginal value relaxing the constraint is also countercyclical, and makes it to be a good hedge for the aggregate shock. This intuition is reflected in the third row of the right column, which shows that the prices of physical capital reduces much less than that of the intangible capital, since the latter does not provide benefit of relaxing the collateral constraint. Third, the realized return

of these two types of capital inherits their price dynamics, that is, the return on the intangible capital responds more negatively to the negative aggregate shock than that of the physical capital, and is more risky due to a higher covariance with the stochastic discount factor.

3.3 Testable Predictions of the Model

Our model suggests that firms with more non-collateralizable asset have lower debt capacity, and the collateralizable capital is more valuable in the bad times, hence it provides a counter cyclical value to the firm, firms with more collateralizable capital have lower returns. In the next few subsections, we show empirical evidence that firms with more non-collateralizable capital have higher stock returns, they have lower financial leverage due to lower debt capacity. More importantly, we test the key mechanism of our model, the price of collateralizable is less exposed to macroeconomic conditions than non-collateralizable capital, is true in the data.

3.3.1 Measuring Non-collateralizable Capital

Collateralizable asset of a firm may consist of different assets, such as real estate, machine, long lasting equipment, etc. There is no consensus in the literature on how to measure collateralizability of a firm precisely, we proxy non-collateralizable asset as intangible asset. Intangible capital can hardly be used as collateral, Falato et al. (2013) document that only 3% of total loan value is written on intangibles like patents or brands, they directly assume that intangible capital is non-collateralizable asset in their model. The intangible capital measure in this paper may not be the precise measure of the total value of non-collateralizable assets of a firm, since a certain fraction book assets of a firm is not collateralizable, but our measure can capture most of the non-collateralizable capital.

The measure of intangible capital is following Falato et al. (2013) and Peters and Taylor (2016). The total amount of intangible capital of a firm is consist of three parts, externally purchased intangible capital, internally generated R&D and organizational capital. We capitalize the past expenditures on R&D and SG&A to construct internally generated R&D and organizational capital respectively. Details can be found in the Appendix.

Firms balance sheet data is from CRSP/Compustat Merged Database Annual Industrial Files, monthly stock returns are from CRSP. Since 1975, FASB standardize the accounting rule of R&D expenditures, therefore the sample starts from 1975. We

exclude utility (SIC code between 4900 and 4999) and financial firms (SIC between 6000 and 6999). Additionally, we keep common stocks that are traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Firms with negative book value of assets, book equity or sales are excluded. Delisting bias is corrected following Shumway (1997).

In order to compare the composition of intangible capital among firms, we define intangible ratio as intangible capital over book value of total asset (COMPUSTAT item *AT*). It measures the share of non-collateralizable asset in a firm.

As our model predicts that firms with more non-collateralizable assets have higher returns, because non-collateralizable assets are more risky, especially in the economic down turns. Additionally less collateralizable assets will reduce firms ability of obtaining loans from creditors, therefore they will have lower financial leverage. In this section, we sort portfolios based on intangible to book asset ratio, a high-minus-low portfolio will yield 4.8% spread annually. We also show that firms with more non-collateralizable capital have lower financial leverage.

3.3.2 Firm Characteristics

The key assumption in our model is that intangible capital cannot be used as collateral, if a firm has relatively more non-collateralizable asset, the firm will have less asset to be pledged as collateral, therefore they have lower debt capacity, and their financial leverage should also be lower. Table 2 reports the firm characteristics across five quintiles of firms sorted on intangible ratio. It shows that financial leverage monotonically decreases as intangible ratio increases, the result is robust to different measures of financial leverage. The definitions of measures can be found in Table 2.

Firms in the fifth quintile have the lowest book to market ratio, but they have the highest returns as shown in Table 3. However, if we include intangible capital when calculating firms' book equity⁴, then the firms with higher intangible adjusted book to market ratio have higher returns. This implies, if we take into account intangible capital when measure book to market ratio, firms with more intangible capital will look like value firms. This can also be confirmed in the investment rates. According to neo-classical q theory, q can be approximated by investment rates, higher investment rates imply more investment opportunities. As we see the physical investment rate, it decrease across five quintiles, which means firms with most intangible capital invest least, it implies they are actually value firms with less investment opportunities. Intangible investment rates suggest the same intuition.

Additionally, indices of financial constraints are showing different interpretations.

⁴Adjusted BE = AT + Intangible - LT

WW and SA indices show that tightness of financial constraint is increasing monotonically as intangible ratio increases. As pointed out by Hadlock and Pierce (2010), KZ index should be used with caution and it does not correlate strongly with WW or SA index. WW and SA indices have some degree of correlation, they are both indicating firms with more intangible capital are more financially constrained. This also provides evidence that more intangible capital increase the tightness of constraints, which is in line with our model prediction.

3.3.3 Portfolio Sorts

At the end of each June of year t (1975-2015), stocks are allocated into five quintiles based on intangible ratio (intangible to book asset ratio) in year $t - 1$ and portfolios are formed from July of year t to June of year $t + 1$. The portfolios are hold for one year and rebalanced at the end of each June. Therefore, portfolio 5 (1) contains firms with highest (lowest) intangible ratio. Table 3 shows the summary statistics of monthly stock returns of 5 quintiles portfolios. The 5-1 portfolio earns an annualized return of 4.8% for both value-weight and equal-weight returns.

As for robustness, Table 4 reports standard empirical asset pricing test using Carhart four factor model and Fama French five factor model. To take into account serial correlation, the t -statistics in parentheses are computed using Newey-West estimator allowing for three lags. As one can see that the anomaly can not be explained by these two models, because alphas are statistically significant. GRS tests reject that the alphas are jointly zero for both four factor model and five factor model, with p-values 0.001 and 0.003 respectively. Additionally, the alphas of fifth quintile portfolios are significantly larger than the alphas of the first quintile portfolios both of the models.

This section shows that firms with more non-collateralizable assets have higher expected returns, a long-short strategy can earn annualized return of 4.8%, the spread is also significant after risk adjustment, controlling for popular factor models. This verifies our theory that firms with more non-collateralizable capital have higher returns.

3.3.4 Predictability of Intangible Ratio

Portfolio sorts show us that on average, portfolios of firms with more non-collateralizable capital have higher expected returns, in order to test the predictability of intangible ratio at firm level, we perform Fama-Macbeth regressions in the following form with six lags to take into account autocorrelations, the specifications is following Li (2011).

$$R_{i,t+1} = \alpha^i + \beta_1 \log(ME_{it}) + \beta_2 \log(BM_{it}) + \beta_3 Mom_{it} + \beta_4 ROA_{it} + \beta_5 Intangible\ Ratio_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where $R_{i,t+1}$ is individual stocks' cumulative returns from July of year t to June of each year $t+1$, $\log(ME_{it})$ is the nature log of firms' market capitalization at the end of June of each year t , $\log(BM_{it})$ is the firms' book to market ratio at the end of June of each year t , Mom_{it} is the prior six month returns with a one-month gap between holding period and current month, ROA_{it} is income before extraordinary (IB) divide by total asset (AT) at June of year t , $Intangible\ Ratio_{it}$ is intangible capital divide by total asset at June of year t . Book leverage is financial debt (FD) divided by total asset. To avoid using future information, all the balance sheet variables measured at June of year t is using the value of fiscal year $t-1$, which is already known by investors.

Table 5 reports the results of Fama-Macbeth regression. The model indicates a significantly positive slope on intangible ratio. This slope is significant at 1% level, after controlling for size, book-to-market ratio, etc. It implies 1% increase in intangible ratio will predict 0.05% increase in return in the following year for an average firm, the magnitude is comparable to book-to-market ratio, which is considered to be one of the most prominent determinants of stock returns. This evidence supports our theory that if a firm has more non-collateralizable capital, it bears more risks, then it demands higher returns.

3.3.5 Capital Structure and Intangible Capital

Our model also has testable implications on financial leverage, since more non-collateralizable capital will shrink firms debt capacity, then the financial leverage will decrease. In order to study the effect of intangible capital on debt capacity of a firm as suggested by the model, we test whether more intangible capital is associated with lower financial leverage. Table 6 shows that 1% increase in intangible ratio will lead to $0.04 \sim 0.05\%$ increase in financial leverage. The result is statistically significant, standard errors are adjusted for clustering by firm and year, as suggested by Petersen (2009). The effect of intangible capital on financial leverage is comparable to size effect, robust to different financial leverage measures. Account payable denominated by total asset is included in the regression, because some short term debt is not included either in long-term debt or current debt (Welch (2011)), but are included in account payable. The results remain significant if we include other control variables. Detailed definitions of variables can be found in the comments of Table 6. The empirical findings on the negative correlation between intangible capital and financial leverage supports our theory that more non-collateralizable asset reduce the firms ability to acquire loans, therefore they have lower financial leverage.

3.3.6 Marginal Q

Our theory has the implication that collateralizable capital responds less to the negative aggregate shocks than does the non-collateralizable capital, due to its hedging effect from relaxing the collateral constraint. The model prediction is best summarized by the impulse response function in Figure 1 (third row, right column). In this subsection, we show the direct evidence that the price of non-collateralizable capital is more responsive to aggregate fluctuations. Since there is no good measure of (non)collateralizable capital, therefore we use the price of structural and intellectual capital as proxies for prices of collateralizable and non-collateralizable capital, respectively. Structure capital consists of buildings, power plants, heavy machines that firms need for production, and so on. Most items included in structures are highly collateralizable. Intellectual capital consists of software, R&D and entertainment products, which are hardly collateralizable. Therefore their price dynamics should be in line with the dynamics of collateralizable and non-collateralizable capitals.⁵ The prices of capital goods are from NIPA table 1.1.9 at quarterly frequency. We extract the cyclical component of the prices using HP filter and set standard penalty parameter at 1600 as suggested for the quarterly data.

We calculate the regression coefficients of the HP filtered cyclical component of prices of non-collateralizable and collateralizable capital on the cyclical component of aggregate GDP. These two regression coefficients are denoted as $\beta(q, y)$ and $\beta(p, y)$, respectively. The results in Table 7 confirm that price of non-collateralizable (intellectual) capital is more responsive to aggregate output than collateralizable (structure) capital. It implies when the economy is in economic down turn, the price of collateralizable capital decreases less. It is a direct evidence confirms the price dynamics of two types of assets, as predicted by our model. The results suggest that collateralizable capital is less risky than non-collateralizable capital, because its value is less exposed to aggregate economic conditions.

⁵Capital equipment is more complicated than structures and intellectuals. Part of equipment capital is short lasting equipments, software, part of it is long lasting transportation equipment like trucks, aircrafts. Therefore it is hard to classify equipment capital as collateralizable or not. Additionally, from the investment shocks literature, we know that price of equipment capital is counter cyclical. NIPA only offer deflators at structure, equipment and intellectual property level, we cannot get detailed price composition of equipment capital, and there is no guidance which kind of equipment capital can be used collateral, we cannot re-construct the price deflators of collateralizables and non-collateralizables of capital equipment.

3.3.7 Financial Constraints and the Return Spread

In this subsection, we test our model prediction that when the collateral constraint is more binding, the return spread between collateralizable versus non-collateralizable assets increase, summarized in Figure 1 (bottom row, right column). Following Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), we use TED spread as the proxy for funding liquidity measure, when TED spread is high, the funding liquidity constraint in the economy is increases. We obtain monthly TED spread data from S.t. Louis Fed. The sample starts from 1986 January.

Table 8 reports regression results of our tests. The first column regresses the high-minus-low portfolio (obtained by sorting on intangible to book asset ratio) on TED spread. It shows that TED spread has strong contemporaneous correlation with the return spread. More importantly, our model predicts that when collateral constraint is more binding, the return spread increases. The coefficient of TED spread in the first column is 0.55 and statistically significant, this confirms our model prediction. The magnitude is economically significant, one percent increase in TED spread in a month implies the monthly return spread to rise by 0.55 percent. The lagged TED spread also positively and significantly predicts return spread, as shown in the third column, with coefficient 0.64. We also control other factors including the market, value and size factors, the coefficient of TED spread remains positive and statistically significant.

The empirical tests in this subsection provide direct evidence that financial constraint is the key driver of the return spread between assets with different collateralizability.

3.4 Model Simulation and Quantitative Results

To understand the quantitative implications of the model, we simulate the model for long series of 3000 quarters and discard the first 400 quarters; we aggregate the quarterly quantities in the remaining part of the simulation into annual quantities; and we compute moments for annualized quantities. In order to highlight the important implications of the credit market frictions on asset prices, we simulate two specifications of the model. The first specification is the benchmark model, the calibration of which is described in Section 3.1. In the second specification, we shut down the collateral constraint and study a frictionless world by assuming the borrowing and lending between entrepreneurs and workers are frictionless and no requirement for collateral. For a fair comparison, we recalibrate the adjustment cost parameters for both types of capital to maintain the volatilities of investments to be of the comparable magnitudes, and focus

on the different implications on asset returns between these two specifications.

We report the moments of macroeconomic quantities (top panel) and those of asset returns (bottom panel) of two model specifications, namely “Benchmark” and “Frictionless” respectively in Table 9. Both specifications of the model are consistent with the basic features of the aggregate economy in terms of volatilities of consumption, physical and intangible investments, and the relative magnitude of two types of capital. It is noteworthy that we calibrate the adjustment cost parameters to be asymmetric between two capitals, with higher adjustment cost elasticity parameter for intangible capital, in order to respect the empirical fact that intangible investment is less volatile than its counterpart. The model generated volatility of physical investment is still a bit on the lower side; this reflect the typical tension in the production-based asset pricing model with adjustment cost: higher adjustment cost required by delivering volatile asset prices tend to make the investment to be smoother than that in the data.

Focusing on the asset pricing moments of the benchmark specification, our model is reasonably successful in generating asset pricing moments both at the aggregate level and more importantly in the cross-section. Our model replicates a low and smooth risk free rate, with mean 0.8% and volatility 0.8%. This is consistent with long run risks literature with a recursive preference of high intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). The equity premium in this economy is 3.5%, comparable to 5.7% in the data when take into account of standard errors. The return on entrepreneurs equity is a levered position between risky assets and a risk free asset as discussed in section 2.5, therefore the risky asset returns we reported here are levered returns. Our calibration targets a leverage ratio of 2.3, in line with the non-financial corporate sector’s leverage ratio in the data. The spread between intangible and physical capital return is 5.1%, quantitatively close to its data counterpart of 4.8%.

In order to highlight the intuition on the key model ingredient that delivers the quantitative success on asset prices, we compare the moments with the frictionless model specification. In the frictionless model without collateral constraint, only unlevered returns are simulated. For a fair comparison, we multiply the return spreads by a factor of 2.3, the targeted corporate leverage ratio. We make several observations in the comparison. First, the aggregate equity market premium in the frictionless model only accounts roughly one-half of that in our benchmark model. This is due to lack of the amplification prorogation mechanism of the financial frictions. As emphasized in Li (2016), this mechanism will increase the effective risk aversion of the entrepreneurs through the augmented component in the stochastic discount factor, and make it much more volatile. Second, the frictionless specification delivers a return spread between

intangible and tangible assets of 1.65%, only about one-third of the magnitude of our benchmark model. This mild amount of return spread is generated by the asymmetric adjustment costs. Recall that we calibrate a lower elasticity parameter in the adjustment cost function for intangible capital, this makes the price of intangible capital to be more volatile than that of the physical capital. However, as we show in the comparison, asymmetric capital adjustment costs alone cannot quantitatively generate enough return spread. More importantly, we need the countercyclical tightness of the collateral constraint to provide the physical capital a strong hedging role in relaxing the constraint, where physical capital provides additional counter cyclical value of relaxing the constraint, and this channel is the main contributor of the cross-sectional stock return spread.

4 Conclusion

In this study, we present a general equilibrium asset pricing model with collateral constraint and two types of assets which differ in their collateralizability. Our model predicts that the collateralizable asset provides an insurance against aggregate shocks and therefore is expected to earn lower expected return, because it relaxes the countercyclical collateral constraint in bad times. We measure non-collateralizable capital based on intangible capital, and document the empirical evidence which is consistent with the predictions of our model. In particular, we find in the data that stock of firms with a larger share of non-collateralizable capital earn on average 4.8% higher return annually than those of firms with a lower share. When calibrate our model to standard statistics of the dynamics of macroeconomic quantities, we show that the credit market friction channel is quantitatively important at determining the cross-section of asset returns. Our model is able to reproduce the key features of asset return data, including an annualized 5.1% return spread between assets with different collateralizability and high equity premium, while maintaining the success of matching the moments of aggregate quantities as compared to standard real business cycle models.

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
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Figures

Figure 1: Impulse Responses to TFP shock

This figure shows the log-deviations from the steady state with respect to a one-standard deviation negative shock to aggregate productivity. The frequency is at quarterly. All parameters are calibrated as in Table 1.



Tables

Table 1: Calibration

We calibrate the model at quarterly frequency. This table reports the moments we used to calibrate the parameters of the model, or the corresponding literature. Note that ζ , λ , ϕ and χ are jointly determined by matching the moments, details can be found in section 3.1.

Parameter	Symbol	Value	Target/Source	Moments (Annual)
Relative risk aversion	γ	10	Bansal and Yaron (2004)	-
IES	ψ	1.5	Bansal and Yaron (2004)	-
Mean productivity growth rate	$E(\tilde{A})$	0.005	Mean GDP growth rate	2%
Capital share	α	0.33	Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)	-
Depreciation rate of collateralizable	δ_K	0.025	Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)	10%
Depreciation rate of non-collateralizable	δ_H	0.0375	Li and Hall (2016)	15%
Time discount rate	β	0.997	Risk-free rate	1%
Liquidation value of collateral	ζ	0.844	Corporate leverage	2.3
Survival rate of entrepreneurs	λ	0.986	TED spread	0.8%
Share of collateralizable	ϕ	0.58	E(J/I)	0.7
Transfer to entering entrepreneurs	χ	0.385	E(C/I)	5
Persistence of TFP shock	ρ^A	0.989	Autocorrelation of GDP growth	0.49
Standard deviation of TFP shock	σ^A	0.015	Volatility of GDP growth	3.30
Invest. adj. cost of collateralizable	ξ^K	9	$\sigma(\Delta i)$	10.30
Invest. adj. cost of non-collateralizable	ξ^H	2	$\sigma(\Delta j)$	3.88

Table 2: **Firm Characteristics**

This table shows the firm characteristics of the five portfolios sorted on intangible to total asset. Intangible ratio is measured by intangible to total asset (AT), financial debt (FD) is defined as long-term debt (DLTT), plus debt in current liability (DLC). Book equity (BE) is stockholder's book equity (SEQ), plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (TXDITC) if available, minus the book value of preferred stock (PSTK/PSTKRV/PSTKL depends on availability). Market equity (ME) is defined as the price of stock times share outstanding (SHROUT). Intangible investment is the combination of R&D expenditure, plus 30% of SGA.

Book leverage denominated by book asset is defined as FD/AT , book leverage denominated by book equity is defined as $FD/(BE+FD)$, market leverage is $FD/(FD+ME)$, book to market ratio (BM) is BE/ME . Asset turnover is defined as sales (SALES) to book assets (AT), return on assets is net income (NI) to total asset (AT). Tangible investment rate is defined as physical investment (CAPX) denominated by total asset (AT), intangible investment rate is intangible investment to intangible capital. Firm age is the years since a firm has record in COMPUSTAT. KZ, WW and SA indices are financial constraint measures, they are from Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Whited and Wu (2006) and Hadlock and Pierce (2010), respectively. The firms are more financially constrained when the KZ, WW and SA index are assigned with higher values.

	1	2	3	4	5
Intangible Ratio	0.099	0.344	0.570	0.827	1.416
FD/AT	0.267	0.213	0.198	0.162	0.058
FD/(BE+FD)	0.347	0.290	0.269	0.219	0.083
FD/(FD+ME)	0.281	0.209	0.174	0.127	0.032
BM	0.752	0.665	0.612	0.543	0.437
BM(account for intangible)	0.863	1.140	1.288	1.372	1.674
Physical investment rate (%)	8.121	5.034	3.990	3.593	3.196
Intangible investment rate (%)	18.232	18.128	18.010	17.573	16.937
log(ME)	5.672	5.302	5.384	5.135	4.023
Firm age	9.000	9.000	9.000	8.000	6.000
KZ	0.493	-0.531	-1.461	-1.936	-2.142
WW	6.656	3.809	4.229	5.982	10.262
SA	-3.226	-3.105	-3.097	-2.942	-2.389

Table 3: **Portfolios Sorted on Intangible to Book Asset Ratio**

This table reports the monthly excess stock returns and their statistics. At the end of June each year t , we sort all the firms into five quintiles based on intangible ratio, where intangible ratio is measured as intangible over total asset at the end of year $t - 1$. The portfolios are reformed every June. This table reports monthly average excess returns R^e , standard errors σ , t -statistics (t), and Sharpe ratios SR across portfolios.

Panel A: Value-weighted Portfolios						
	1	2	3	4	5	5-1
$R^e(\%)$	0.51	0.65	0.71	0.66	0.91	0.40
(t)	2.39	2.68	3.25	3.17	3.95	2.32
$\sigma(\%)$	4.64	5.30	4.77	4.54	5.00	3.72
SR	0.11	0.12	0.15	0.15	0.18	0.11
Panel B: Equal-weighted Portfolios						
	1	2	3	4	5	5-1
$R^e(\%)$	0.56	0.76	0.90	0.95	0.97	0.40
(t)	2.15	2.90	3.44	3.37	2.84	2.03
$\sigma(\%)$	5.71	5.74	5.71	6.11	7.41	4.34
SR	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.15	0.13	0.09

Table 4: **Asset Pricing Tests**

This table shows asset pricing test for five value weighted portfolios sorted on intangible ratio. In Panel A, I regress the five quintile portfolios on Fama French three factor model, in Panel B I regress five portfolios on Carhart four factor model. To take in to account serial correlation, the t -statistics in parentheses are computed via Newey-West estimator allowing for three lags. All values reported here are in monthly frequency..

Panel A: Carhart Four Factor Model

	1	2	3	4	5	5-1
α	-0.12	0.11	0.17	0.14	0.33	0.45
(t)	-1.34	1.45	2.81	1.66	2.74	2.61
β_{MKT}	1.00	1.07	0.99	0.92	0.92	-0.08
(t)	41.67	42.00	69.05	35.22	29.95	-1.61
β_{HML}	0.15	-0.22	-0.15	-0.15	-0.17	-0.32
(t)	3.18	-4.64	-5.29	-2.88	-2.64	-3.57
β_{SMB}	-0.14	0.08	0.04	-0.05	0.16	0.31
(t)	-2.65	1.78	1.49	-1.73	3.28	3.60
β_{MOM}	0.02	-0.08	-0.03	0.03	0.05	0.03
(t)	0.67	-2.17	-1.64	1.01	0.88	0.37
R^2	0.84	0.91	0.92	0.84	0.78	0.15

Panel B: Fama-French Five-Factor Model

	1	2	3	4	5	5-1
α	-0.19	0.13	0.16	0.03	0.42	0.61
(t)	-2.04	1.59	2.09	0.36	3.70	3.51
β_{MKT}	1.02	1.05	1.02	0.96	0.94	-0.08
(t)	40.97	42.99	65.49	38.24	29.70	-1.69
β_{SMB}	-0.09	0.05	0.02	-0.03	0.34	0.43
(t)	-2.22	1.40	0.47	-0.90	7.81	6.59
β_{HML}	0.10	-0.05	-0.25	-0.29	-0.42	-0.52
(t)	1.58	-0.89	-6.36	-4.53	-6.97	-4.89
β_{RMW}	0.18	-0.06	-0.01	0.19	-0.42	-0.60
(t)	3.06	-1.07	-0.35	3.75	-7.18	-5.73
β_{CMA}	0.11	-0.27	0.10	0.29	0.25	0.14
(t)	1.40	-2.49	1.43	3.19	2.44	0.85
R^2	0.85	0.91	0.92	0.84	0.86	0.42

Table 5: **Return Spread: Multivariate Regression Analysis**

$R_{i,t}$ is individual stocks' cumulative return from July of year t to June of year $t + 1$, $\log(ME)$ is the nature log of firms' market capitalization at the end of June of year t , $\log(BM)$ is the firms' book to market ratio at the end of June of year t , Mom is the prior six month returns with a one-month gap between holding period and current month, ROA is income before extraordinary (IB) divide by total asset (AT) at June of year t , *Intangible Ratio* is intangible capital divide by total asset at June of year t . Book leverage is financial debt (FD) divided by total asset. All the balance sheet variables measured at June of year t is using the value of fiscal year $t - 1$. Values in parenthesis are t -statistics estimated by Newey-West estimator allowing for 6 lags.

$$R_{i,t+1} = \alpha^i + \beta_1 \log(ME_{it}) + \beta_2 \log(BM_{it}) + \beta_3 Mom_{it} + \beta_4 ROA_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Intangible Ratio}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
log(ME)	-0.0114 (-1.80)	-0.00649 (-0.95)	-0.0117 (-1.83)	-0.00831 (-1.23)
log(BM)	0.0440*** (5.20)	0.0533*** (5.89)	0.0436*** (5.61)	0.0513*** (5.93)
Mom	0.0646** (2.82)	0.0617** (2.88)	0.0632** (2.78)	0.0593** (2.87)
Leverage	-0.0250 (-0.56)	0.00242 (0.06)	-0.0171 (-0.38)	0.0177 (0.47)
Intangible Ratio		0.0456*** (3.25)		0.0545*** (3.67)
ROA			0.0524 (1.40)	0.113*** (3.38)
Observations	109520	109520	109502	109502
R^2	0.0384	0.0438	0.0430	0.0484

Table 6: **Capital Structure Regressions - Fixed Effects**

This table shows capital structure panel regression with firm fixed effects. I use intangible ratio instead of tangibility in standard literature. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering by firm and year, as suggested by Petersen (2009). BM is book to market ratio, profitability is operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) divide by total asset (AT), cash ratio is cash and short-term investments (CHE) divide by total asset. AP/AT is account payable (AP) denominated by total asset. Numbers reported in parenthesis are t -statistic, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.

	FD/AT	FD/(FD+ME)	FD/(BE+FD)
BM	-0.00369** (-2.29)	0.0103** (2.44)	-0.00671** (-2.48)
CF	-0.0874*** (-19.18)	-0.0987*** (-15.91)	-0.112*** (-18.01)
Intangible Ratio	-0.0228*** (-11.48)	-0.0476*** (-11.65)	-0.0282*** (-11.39)
log(ME)	-0.0227*** (-24.24)	-0.0757*** (-36.48)	-0.0351*** (-24.06)
AP/AT	-0.264*** (-26.52)	-0.234*** (-15.62)	0.0328** (2.18)
Cash ratio	-0.290*** (-77.74)	-0.286*** (-69.14)	-0.362*** (-74.75)
R^2	0.136	0.317	0.145

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: **Capital Prices and Aggregate Output**

$\beta(q, y)$ and $\beta(p, y)$ denote the regression coefficients of regressing the cyclical component of marginal price of collateralizable and non-collateralizable capital on cyclical component of aggregate GDP, respectively.

Variable	Data	Model
$\beta(q, y)$	0.26 (0.07)	0.11
$\beta(p, y)$	0.68 (0.12)	0.49

Table 8: **Financial Constraints and the Return Spread**

In this table, we regress the high minus low portfolio on TED spread, with market, book-to-market and size factor as controls.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
TED	0.555** (2.07)	0.637** (2.50)		
TED(t-1)			0.582** (2.18)	0.584** (2.25)
MKT		-0.0190 (-0.46)		
BM		-0.426*** (-4.85)		
SMB		0.329*** (3.73)		
MKT(t-1)				-0.00876 (-0.19)
BM(t-1)				-0.194*** (-2.86)
SMB(t-1)				-0.0922 (-1.08)
Observations	360	360	359	359
R^2	0.01	0.22	0.01	0.04

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: **Model Simulations and Quantitative Results**

This table presents the moments from the simulated economy. All returns are levered except for risk free rate. $R^{L,K}$, $R^{L,H}$ denotes the levered returns. The leverage is 2.3 as determined in the economy. We simulate the economy at quarterly frequency, then calculate the moments on the annualized quantities and prices. Number in parenthesis are standard errors of the calculated moments. Benchmark: $\xi^K = 9$, $\xi^H = 2$; Case 1: $\xi^K = \xi^H = 4$; Frictionless: No collateral constraint

Moments	Data	Benchmark	Frictionless
$\sigma(\Delta y)$	3.30 (0.60)	3.29	3.38
$\sigma(\Delta c)$	2.53 (0.56)	2.98	3.04
$\sigma(\Delta i)$	10.30 (2.36)	4.72	4.96
$\sigma(\Delta j)$	3.88 (1.45)	3.40	3.06
$AC_1(\Delta c)$	0.49 (0.15)	0.25	0.26
$E(H/K)$	0.40 (0.09)	0.42	0.44
$\sigma(\tilde{M})$		104.59	94.31
$E[R^f]$	1.20 (0.16)	0.83	1.14
$\sigma(R^f)$	0.97 (0.31)	0.81	0.84
$E[R^{L,K} - R^f]$		1.58	1.26
$\sigma(R^{L,K})$		2.34	1.65
$E[R^{L,H} - R^f]$		6.73	2.91
$\sigma(R^{L,H})$		4.66	2.61
$E[R^{L,H} - R^{L,K}]$	4.80 (2.04)	5.15	1.65
$E[R^M - R^f]$	5.71 (2.25)	3.50	1.79

5 Appendix

5.1 Details on Constructing Intangible Capital

The total amount of intangible capital of a firm is defined as

$$\text{Intangible capital} = \text{INTAN} + \text{R\&D capital} + \text{Organizational capital}$$

5.1.1 Externally Acquired Intangible Capital

The externally acquired capital is defined as item *INTAN* in COMPUSTAT. It reflects the amount of intangible capital a firm purchases in a given fiscal year. Firms typically capitalize this type of asset on the balance sheet as part of intangible assets. For an average firm, *INTAN* is only 19% of total intangible capital, meanwhile the median value is just 3%, consistent with Peters and Taylor (2016). I set *INTAN* to zero when missing.

Internally created intangible capital has two components, R&D and organizational capital, we discuss the methods to recover them from firms' balance sheets in the following sections.

5.1.2 R&D capital

Internally created R&D capital does not appear on firm's balance sheet, one can estimate it by accumulating past expenditures. R&D expenditure is from COMPUSTAT item *XRD*, "Research and Development Expense", it represents the amount of expenditures on research and development of a firm in a given fiscal year. Following Falato et al. (2013) and Peters and Taylor (2016), we recover R&D capital using perpetual inventory method⁶:

$$RD_{t+1} = (1 - \delta_{RD})RD_t + XRD_t$$

where δ_{RD} is the depreciation rate of R&D capital, consistent with Peters and Taylor (2016), the depreciation rates are following Li and Hall (2016), which is also published on BEA R&D satellite account. For unclassified industries, the depreciation rates are set to 15%. Our results are not sensitive to the choice depreciation rates.

However, this is not enough to identify the stock of capital, the initial value for R&D capital is still undefined. We use the first non-missing R&D expenditure, *XRD*,

⁶It is also used by BEA R&D satellite account

as the first R&D investment, then the initial stock of R&D capital is specified as,

$$RD_0 = \frac{XRD_1}{g_{RD} + \delta_{RD}} \quad (22)$$

where g_{RD} is the average annual growth rate of firm level R&D expenditure, which is 29.1% in my sample. The sample starts from 1975, since the accounting treatment of R&D expense reporting was standardized in 1975, the amount of XRD reported by firms may not be comparable to each other before this standard is adopted, therefore previous R&D expenditures are not taken into account.

5.1.3 Organizational Capital

Another internally created component is organizational capital, it is constructed by accumulating a fraction of past SGA expense, COMPUSTAT item $XSGA$, "Selling, General and Administrative Expense". It includes lots of items, e.g. marketing expense, employee benefit, etc. It indirectly reflects reputation or human capital of a firm. Additionally it includes R&D expenses unless it's included in cost of goods sold by the company, therefore we need to exclude the R&D part from $XSGA$.

Peters and Taylor (2016) document that $XSGA$ (Selling, General and Administrative Expense) includes R&D expense unless the company record R&D expense as cost of goods sold (Compustat item $COGS$), and Compustat adds R&D to $XSGA$ in 90 out of 100 cases. Additionally $XSGA$ do not incorporate the in process R&D expense (Compustat item $RDIP$), $RDIP$ is coded as negative numbers. To exclude R&D capital from organizational capital, following Peters and Taylor (2016), I define $SGA \equiv XSGA - XRD - RDIP$, where the absolute value of $RDIP$ is basically added to SGA. Additionally, following Peters and Taylor (2016), we add a filter: when XRD exceeds XSGA but is less than COGS, or when XSGA is missing, we keep XSGA with no further adjustment. we replace missing XSGA with zero. Following Hulten (2008), Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2014) and Peters and Taylor (2016), we count only 30% of SGA expense as investment in organizational capital, the rest 70% is treated as operating costs.

Using the same procedure, the organizational capital is constructed as,

$$\begin{aligned} SGA_t &= 0.3(XSGA_t - XRD_t - RDIP_t) \\ OG_{t+1} &= (1 - \delta_{OG})OG_t + SGA_t \end{aligned}$$

where δ_{SGA} is set at 20%, consistent with Falato, Kadyrzhanova, Sim, Falato, and

Sim (2013) and Peters and Taylor (2016), g_{RD} is the average annual growth rate of firm level XSGA. I set initial level of organizational capital as

$$OG_0 = \frac{SGA_1}{g_{OG} + \delta_{OG}}$$

where $g_{OG} = 18.9\%$ in the sample.