

PIGGY-BACK EXPORTING, INTERMEDIATION, AND THE DISTRIBUTIONAL GAINS FROM TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS

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ABSTRACT. This paper investigates the distributional gains from changes in agricultural world prices in developing economies. Agricultural markets in developing countries are rarely perfectly competitive. The market structure is characterized by a large number of small farmers who typically sell their produce to one or few big companies with significant monopsony or oligopsony power. We provide a flexible theoretical framework that captures this market structure and allow us to investigate how international trade affects the incomes of small farmers, agribusiness and intermediaries in developing countries.

JEL Codes: F1, F6, Q1, O1.

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1. INTRODUCTION

A large theoretical and empirical literature has examined the gains from international trade to producers and consumers. This paper seeks to investigate the effect of openness to international trade in developing economies, where agricultural products are a main export. More specifically, the paper will study the gains from trade accruing to small farmers in a setting in which there are large agribusinesses and intermediaries with monopsony or oligopsony power. Much of the early theoretical literature assumes, for simplicity, that agricultural markets are perfectly competitive. While this might be a good approximation for the characterization of trade in international product markets, there are important departures from perfect competition that need to be taken into account in assessing the distributional gains from trade. In particular, four observations substantiate the need for a departure. First, several agricultural markets are characterized by the presence of a large number of small farmers together with few big agribusinesses with monopsony (or oligopsony) power in the domestic market. Second, small producers often engage in piggy-back exporting (or the sale of produce by small farmers to agribusinesses) or sell part of their produce through intermediaries. Third, small farmers have low bargaining power in their relationship with agribusiness firms. Fourth, only a small fraction of the change in a crop's international world price trickles down to small farmers growing that crop.¹ Our paper develops a flexible theoretical framework that captures this complex market structure and can be used to study the effects of globalization and changes in global commodity prices on farmers' incomes and welfare.

The modelling framework incorporates two key features. The first is the inability of small farmers to supply directly to the world market. The second feature is their reliance on either imperfectly competitive intermediaries or piggy-back exporting through agribusinesses in order to sell their produce to the world market. The inability of farmers to ship directly can be caused by a number of potential obstacles that increase the fixed cost of exporting, including, among others, lack of marketing knowledge, credit market imperfections and information barriers (Allen, 2014; Ashraf et al., 2009; Burke, 2014). The reliance on either intermediaries or

¹We document these regularities in the next section.

piggy-back exporting through big producers is a way of circumventing these high transaction costs of exporting. The lack of competition among intermediating exporters in developing economies is also well-documented and arises due to factors such as access to social networks and geographical remoteness, among others (Barrett and Mutambatsere, 2008; Bardhan, 1980). Finally, the presence of big farmers or agribusinesses producing and buying from small farmers for world export, though often glossed over in the literature, is a common feature in agricultural markets. In fact, policymakers in Africa are currently introducing new legislations for seeds, land, contract enforcement, and taxes to ease consolidation and operation of large commercial farms (Unctad, 2009; Provost et al., 2014; Provost and Kabendera, 2014; Carr, 2013).

In our model, farming requires land and capital inputs that are in limited supply, at least in the short run (e.g., packaging facilities, infrastructure). Intermediaries provide farmers with the capital inputs needed to ship the farmer's export crops to the world market. There is a finite number of monopsonistic agribusinesses that own big farms and also have the ability to ship the export crop to the world market. These agribusinesses have technical knowledge of farming, and when a farmer supplies her produce to an agribusiness, she earns a relationship-specific income. This captures the joint investment made to ensure quality standards to satisfy requirements in export markets. The agribusiness enjoys monopsony power in its relationship with the farmer. The farmer however has the ability to resort to intermediaries or to farm a non-tradable crop, and these factors determine the reservation prices of the farmer. The presence of agribusiness matters for the incomes of small farmers in two ways. First, agribusinesses can potentially raise the productivity of small farmers through knowledge and technical transfers. Second, agribusiness operations require capital for production and exports, resulting in a link between farmers, intermediaries and agribusiness through the capital market. Within this setting, we determine the gains from trade to farmers and examine how the presence of intermediaries and large agribusinesses affects the extent to which changes in world prices trickle down to small farmers.

We show that higher international prices for the export crop increase the gross revenue from exports but put pressure on the price of capital inputs as investments

into exporting rise. These two forces have competing effects on how much small farmers expect to share in the gains from higher international prices. If farmers can deflect some of their export crops to competing intermediaries, they get a part of the higher export revenue through competition among intermediaries. Farmers, however, suffer declining returns on their non-tradable production as prices of capital inputs rise from increased investment. This weakens the ability of farmers to negotiate a better price for their export crops from their agribusiness buyers. At one extreme, farmers receive the full benefit of higher world prices if they have access to intermediaries that compete with each other by making bids for the farmer's export crop. At the other extreme, farmers experience a decline in earnings, which happens when they are locked into binding relationships with their intermediaries (say, due to lack of timely access to other intermediaries or exclusive contract farming). In the absence of other avenues to sell their export crop, farmers receive lower prices from agribusinesses because the farmer's alternative cropping option in this case gives lower returns. Farmers suffer a fall in their bargaining power and receive lower earnings from their export crops despite a rise in export revenues for their intermediaries. We model these two competing forces flexibly, and discuss the economic channels underlying the resulting relationship between farmers' earnings from export crops, the prices of capital inputs, the value of non-tradable production, and the world prices for export crops.

The model underscores the important role played by the distribution of land ownership, the supply elasticity of capital inputs and the scale of agribusiness firms in determining the extent to which world price increases trickle down to the incomes of farmers. The trickle down effect rises with the farmers' ability to divert sales from agribusinesses to intermediaries outside the relationship. The share that farmers get from these intermediaries in turn rises with greater competition among intermediaries and with greater equality in land ownership. When farmers are more constrained in their ability to divert sales to intermediaries, they must rely on diverting the land to non-tradable crops and the trickle-down effect depends on alternative cropping options. The trickle-down effect falls with greater reliance on capital inputs for in production of the non-tradable crop. As the production and exports of agribusinesses expands, their capital investments rise. This raises the rental rate of capital

which makes farming of the non-tradable crop more costly and also makes entry of firms into intermediation more costly. Farmers lose out to agribusinesses due to this pressure on capital resources.

The paper connects to a growing literature that has focused on the gains from trade in settings with imperfect competition. On the theoretical side, early work has examined how the Stolper Samuelson theorem is altered in the presence of a monopsony (Feenstra, 1980; Markusen and Robson, 1980; McCulloch and Yellen, 1980; Bhagwati et al., 1998). Recent contributions have focused on some of the microfoundations for market power. In particular, Antràs and Costinot (2011) and Chau et al. (2009) focus on search and matching frictions that confer market power to intermediaries, while Bardhan et al. (2013) stress reputational rents in the intermediation. A related theoretical literature has examined oligopsony power in intermediates and final goods markets (Devadoss and Song, 2006; Raff and Schmitt, 2005; Eckel, 2009; Bernard and Dhingra, 2015). Our main theoretical contribution is to embed key structural characteristics of smallholder farming. Rogers and Sexton (1994) explain that the structural characteristics of agricultural markets give rise to unique modeling issues relative to the analysis of seller market power in industry studies. On the empirical side, most of the extant work has focused on imperfections in the product markets and the gains from trade for consumers rather than producers (e.g., Atkin and Donaldson (2012)). In an informative study on producers, Balat et al. (2009) find that access to local markets makes it more likely for farmers to plant export crops and this helps in reducing poverty at the household level. Our paper seeks to systematically study how small producers of export crops might be affected by globalization and changes in world export prices, when they face monopsony power in the domestic market.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the motivating evidence and the related literature. Section III presents the model and discusses its implications. Section IV presents concluding remarks.

2. EMPIRICAL MOTIVATION

In this section, we discuss the main empirical observations motivating the model.

1. Several agricultural markets are characterized by the presence of a large number of small farmers together with few big agribusinesses with monopsony (or oligopsony) power in the domestic market.

The assumption of a large number of small farmers with no bargaining power and the presence of large agribusinesses and intermediaries with market power is consistent with the industrial organization of agriculture in developing countries. Lowder et al. (2014) demonstrate that out of a sample covering about 80 percent of the world's farms as well as about 80 percent of the world's population, 72 percent of the farms are smaller than one hectare in size; 12 percent are 1 to 2 hectares in size and 10 percent are between 2 and 5 hectares. Only 6 percent of the world's farms are larger than 5 hectares. Assuming this average is representative of the land distribution worldwide, they estimate that there are more than 410 million farms less than 1 hectare in size and more than 475 million small farms that are less than 2 hectares in size.

Specific case studies confirm these estimates. Whitfield (2012) documents that at its peak, the Ghanaian pineapple export industry consisted of 12 large farms (of 300-700 hectares), 40 medium farms (of 20-150 hectares) and 10,000 smallholders with acreage less than 10 hectares. Smallholders transacted with large agribusinesses with almost non-existent bargaining power (Fold and Gough, 2008). Based on interviews of the Kenyan horticulture producers, Jaffee and Masakure (2005) finds that smallholders accounted for 27 percent of fresh vegetable exports, medium and large-scale growers accounted for 29 percent, and farms leased or owned by export companies accounted for the remaining 44 percent of vegetable exports. The distribution of farm acreage and sales is characterized by the coexistence of a large number of small farmers together with a small number of large producers.

2. Small farmers often engage in piggy-back exporting or resort to intermediaries in order to export their produce

Small producers often carry out either piggy back exporting - sell their produce through large agribusinesses - or sell of part of their produce through intermediaries. Since market reforms in many developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, the rise of supermarket chains, agro-industrialization, and export oriented outgrower schemes,

there has been a substantial increase in production of export crops in developing countries (Barrett and Mutambatsere, 2008). This has increased contract farming and outgrower schemes between agro-industrial firms and farmers in developing countries.

Examples of these new relationships include small farmers that engage in contract farming of tea in Kenya, tobacco production for the British American Tobacco company (Minot, 2011), contract farming in Senegalese groundnut production (Warning and Key, 2002), vegetable farming for European supermarkets by farmers in Madagascar (Minten et al., 2009), production for supermarket supply chains in Latin America, Asia and Africa (Reardon and Timmer, 2007), commercial farming of export crops in Kenya and commercial farming of cash crops like sugar, cotton and tea in Europe and Central Asia (Robbins and Ferris, 2003). These studies show that agro-industrial firms and large commercial farms typically provide inputs to small farmers in the form of expertise, seeds, credit, etc. As they sell to export markets with higher quality standards, they also provide small farmers with technical assistance to meet these higher quality standards and to comply with sanitary requirements involved in export sales. Increased industrialization of agricultural markets has integrated markets which were fragmented, encouraged product diversification through differentiation, and provided opportunities for value addition and technology transfer (Barrett and Mutambatsere, 2008).

The rise of agribusiness is viewed as part of a broader trend towards globalization in agriculture (Simmons, 2002). Runsten (1994) documents that since 1989, there has been a range of contracts between Mexican farmers and agribusinesses for the production of high-value crops (such as strawberries, melons and frozen vegetables) that are exported to the United States. Goodman and Watts (1997) find a similar trend in contract farming and multinational agribusiness activity in pineapple and banana farming in Central America for exports to the United States and Europe.

3. Small farmers often have low bargaining power in their relationship with exporters.

One consequence of the skewed distribution of farm production and the complex arrangements with agribusinesses is that small farmers have low bargaining power

relative to their exporters. Barrett and Mutambatsere (2008) argue that while industrialization of agricultural markets provides small farmers with access to export markets and technical assistance, it reduces their bargaining power in negotiating contract conditions. There is growing concern that these developments might lead to a dual structure in farming with small farmers that have little market access and few large farmers and oligopsonistic multinationals that have the scale and capital to market their produce. Increasingly, contracts are being negotiated bilaterally between an individual farmer and an agribusiness firm, rather than through collective bargaining by farmer associations with government parastatals. Contract farming might also narrow markets outside the contract as farm resources are diverted towards contract production (Simmons, 2002). This would increase prices of local farm inputs and increase barriers to exit from contracts through higher costs of accessing outside markets, sunk relationship-specific investments and over-reliance on cash crops during food shortages (Key and Runsten, 1999).

Case studies provide evidence for some of these concerns. Warning and Key (2002) look at melon cultivation in Senegal. They document that small farmers had negotiated a fixed price for their produce. But when there was a glut in supply, the contracting firm did not return to purchase the melons and farmers lost out as spot market prices fell dramatically. Likulunga (2005) looks at cotton farming in Zambia where agribusiness firms paid farmers a lower price (in local currency) than that agreed at the time of making the contract as, in the firm's view, the price was tied to the dollar. The study argues that improving the flow of market information and market trends could improve the negotiating position of farmers. Mitra et al. (2013) conduct an experimental study of West Bengal potato farmers to study this phenomenon. Potato traders earn on average at least 50 to 60 per cent of the farm-gate price. When potato farmers in randomly selected villages were provided daily price information from neighboring wholesale markets, there was no significant average impact on these margins. In villages located in market areas with low wholesale prices in 2008, traded quantities as well as farm-gate prices fell significantly as a result of the information interventions. The opposite happened in villages with high wholesale prices. They take this as evidence of *ex post* bargaining in which the trader makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer to the farmer after observing the wholesale price, and

the farmer responds with a quantity that he wishes to sell. The only outside option farmers have is to thereafter take their produce to a local market and sell to a different trader who will also resell it in the wholesale market.

4. Only a small fraction of the change in a crop's international world price trickles down to small farmers growing that crop.

It is well-known that export price increases have very low trickle down effects on the prices that farmers receive for their produce. For instance, McMillan et al. (2003) claim that no more than 40 to 50 percent of the increase in cashew export prices in the 1990s went to farmers in Mozambique. Fafchamps and Hill (2008) examine the transmission of international coffee prices to Ugandan Robusta growers. They find that when the export price of Ugandan coffee increased in 2002-03, wholesale prices rose, but the gap between wholesale and farm-gate prices widened. Looking at local maize markets in Ghana, Badiane and Shively (1998) find that the degree of pass-through of price changes in the central market (caused by production changes resulting from policy reforms) to local market prices is as low as 0.27 and 0.54 for Bolgatanga and Makola. Bolgatanga is further away from the central market and has a lower quality of infrastructure, compared to Makola.

To add to this evidence, we also investigated the extent of pass-through in Uganda, using farmer-level panel data from the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) surveys over three annual spells (2009, 2010, and 2011). The results are summarized in Table 1, which shows the results from regressions of (log) farmer income on (log) world prices for four crops, beans, maize, banana, and coffee.² Doubling of world prices leads to an average increase in farmers' income ranging from 16 to 88 percent, depending on the crop.

The model we present next will be consistent with these facts, and will attempt to shed light on the causes for the differences and relatively small trickle-down effects.

²Both farmers' income and world prices are measured in U.S. dollars. The choice of country and crop was dictated by the availability of data. (For these crops we observe more than 100 farmers over time.) LSMS cover other countries and crops but only in Uganda were we able to identify a critical number of farmers-crops observations in repeated spells.

TABLE 1. Response of Farmer's Income to World Prices in Uganda, by crop

	Beans	Maize	Banana	Coffee
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Log of World Price	0.165** (0.0820)	0.356** (0.1380)	0.419*** (0.0929)	0.881*** (0.2430)
Household FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
	1,367	1,489	1,274	1,054
R^2	0.009	0.013	0.035	0.029
Number of Household FE	916	984	707	614

Notes: The table reports results from regressions of total household income from each crop on the world price of the crop, using farm-level data from four crops in Uganda. ** 5%, *** 1% levels of significance.

3. A MODEL OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND TRADE

In this section, we develop a model to capture what appear to be recurrent features of agriculture in less developed countries. The first feature is the inability of small farmers to supply directly to the world market. The second feature is their reliance on either imperfectly competitive intermediaries or piggy-back exporting through agribusinesses in order to sell their produce to the world market. In an open economy setting, the model will seek to understand how changes in global demand affect the income received by small and large scale farmers, as well as intermediaries.

We consider a small open economy that takes world prices for its exports as given. The model economy consists of Farmers who are unable to export directly, Agribusinesses, which farm and have access to export markets, and Intermediaries, who do not farm but have access to the world market for the export crop. The environment is characterized as follows. There is a continuum of farmers, each endowed with a unit of land on which they can grow the export crop. Farmers can ship this crop through intermediaries or through agribusinesses to the world market. There is a finite number of intermediaries, who have the capital inputs needed to ship the export crop to the world market. Intermediaries are oligopsonistic in their purchases from farmers, but take world prices p_w (net of export costs) as given. There is a finite number of agribusinesses that own big farms and also have the ability to ship the

export crop to the world market. We will first describe the operation of farmers, then intermediaries, and finally, agribusinesses. Next, we will determine the equilibrium prices and earnings.

3.1. Farmers. There is a continuum of farmers who can produce a units of the export crop, where a is drawn from a productivity distribution $G(a)$. Each farmer has linear utility for a numeraire good and therefore maximizes farm earnings. Farmers cannot sell directly to world markets, and can export either through agribusinesses or through intermediaries. This assumption is motivated by the vast literature in agricultural economics, surveyed in Barrett (2008), which finds that smallholders face high transaction costs in selling their crops to export markets. They lack the productive assets, access to technologies, and infrastructure needed to produce a marketable surplus, and must rely on intermediaries or agribusinesses to access markets. For instance, Fafchamps and Hill (2008) find that only 15 per cent of Ugandan coffee growers travel to nearby markets to sell their produce and the others sell through traders due to high costs of transportation.

We consider two categories of farmers to highlight the role of agribusinesses and intermediaries. A fraction $1 - \eta$ of the farmers have the ability to sell a units of their export crop through intermediaries but do not have access to an agribusiness. Farmers receive price p for their export crop from the intermediaries. They can alternatively produce s units of a non-tradable crop on their land. Let p_h denote the given price of the non-tradable crop and α denote its unit capital requirement. Then farmers with $a \geq s_a \equiv (p_h - \alpha r) s / p$ grow the export crop, and farmers with export crop productivity $a < s_a$ choose to produce the non-tradable crop. The ability to produce an alternative non-tradable crop induces an upward-sloping supply curve for the export crop from farmers, resulting in market power among intermediaries. The remaining fraction η of the farmers have access to agribusinesses. Farmers that sell through agribusinesses engage in relationship-specific investments, and their earnings will depend on the options available outside the relationship. Our focus is on understanding the role of agribusinesses in trickle down of world prices to small farmers, so we will assume that the option of selling to agribusinesses is viable for small farmers.

3.2. Intermediaries. There is a finite number N of identical intermediaries who do not farm and compete for the produce of small farmers in Cournot oligopsonistic fashion. Each of them has an intermediation productivity of $m \in (0, 1)$ and pays an entry cost of f units of capital to become an exporter. Intermediary i 's profit from exporting x_i units of the export crop is $\pi_i = (p_w m - p)x_i$. The inverse of the intermediation productivity $1/m$ acts like an iceberg trade cost for the exporter to ship to the world market. The total supply of the export crop from $1 - \eta$ farmers to exporters is

$$X_I = (1 - \eta) \int_{s_a}^{\infty} a dG(a).$$

The formula already embeds the equilibrium result that, when given the option, the remaining η farmers always weakly prefer to sell to the agribusinesses rather than the intermediaries. For simplicity, we assume a Pareto productivity distribution, $G(a) = 1 - (a_{\min}/a)^k$ with $a \geq a_{\min} > 0$ and $k \geq 1$. A fall in the Pareto shape parameter k captures an increase in inequality (as measured by the Gini index for land productivity). Using the Pareto distribution, the supply of the export crop is:

$$X_I = \frac{(1 - \eta) k}{k - 1} \frac{a_{\min}^k}{(p_h - \alpha r)^{k-1}} \left(\frac{p}{s}\right)^{k-1}$$

From land market clearing for the $1 - \eta$ farmers, the total purchases of all intermediaries must equal the total supply ($\sum_{i=1}^N x_i = X_I$). For Cournot oligopsonists, the own price impact of purchases by an intermediary is $dp/dx_i = p/X_I(k - 1)$, holding fixed the purchases of other intermediaries, x_{-i} . The optimal sales of an intermediary is $x_i = (p_w m - p)(k - 1)X_I/p$. In a symmetric equilibrium, intermediaries have identical sales, with $x_i = X_I/N$ and the optimal price paid by the intermediary is

$$p = \frac{N(k - 1)}{N(k - 1) + 1} p_w m.$$

Under perfect competition prices equal costs, $p = p_w m$, and the full world price (net of trade costs) is transmitted to the farmers. When intermediaries are oligopsonistic (i.e. N and k are finite), farmers receive a smaller share of the world price:

$$\text{Farmer Share} \equiv \frac{p}{p_w m} = \frac{N(k - 1)}{N(k - 1) + 1} < 1$$

In the extreme cases of infinite entry ($N \rightarrow \infty$) or a perfectly equal land distribution ($k \rightarrow \infty$), prices do not change the extent to which farmers alter their supply to intermediaries, so the full world price is transmitted to farmers.

Ignoring the integer constraint, free entry of intermediaries ensures profits are driven down to the entry cost. Let r denote the rental rate of the fixed stock of capital $\bar{K}$ in the economy. The free entry condition determines the equilibrium number of intermediaries as:

$$(3.1) \quad \pi_i = \frac{(1 - \eta)k}{k - 1} \frac{a_{\min}^k}{(p_h - \alpha r)^{k-1} s^{k-1}} \frac{1}{N} \left(\frac{N(k-1)p_w m}{N(k-1) + 1} \right)^k = rf.$$

The number of intermediaries rises with export receipts $p_w m$ and falls with alternative cropping receipts and entry costs. We summarize these observations for farm incomes in Proposition 1 below.

Proposition 1. (1) *Intermediaries behave oligopsonistically when there are few intermediaries and an unequal land distribution (N and k are finite).*

(2) *The share of the export price transmitted by intermediaries to farmers rises with more intermediaries and greater land equality (Farmer Share rises with N and k).*

(3) *The elasticity of the farmer share with respect to world prices is proportional to the elasticity of the number of intermediaries:*

$$d \ln \text{Farmer Share} / d \ln p_w = (d \ln N / d \ln p_w) / (N(k-1) + 1).$$

Suppose there are no agribusinesses and all farmers must sell abroad only through intermediaries ($\eta = 0$). Then the number of intermediaries is determined by the free entry condition and the rental rate is determined by capital market clearing, $Nf + \alpha sG(s_a) = \bar{K}$. An increase in the entry costs f lowers entry and increases rents. The share of farmers in export earnings falls and the earnings from subsistence crops rises, inducing more farmers to abandon export crop farming. We summarize these observations for farm incomes in Proposition 2 below.

Proposition 2. *Earnings of small farmers fall with a rise in entry costs f .*

3.3. Agribusinesses. There is a fixed number M of identical agribusiness firms who produce b units of the export crop and have the ability to access world markets.

Each agribusiness has an intermediation productivity m_b with $1 > m_b \geq m > 0$. An agribusiness invests in its relationship with farmers and shares technical knowledge of farming with them. This increases the productivity of farmer a to $aq^\beta > a$ for $\beta \in (0, 1)$. Increasing productivity entails investments in quality which cost q units of capital. By investing q units of capital, the agribusiness earns $p_w m_b b q^\beta$ from own exports of b units and $p_w m_b a q^\beta$ from exports of farmer a 's export crop. Denoting the payment made to a by b by $T(a, b)$, the agribusiness earns a profit of :

$$\pi_b = p_w m_b b q^\beta + \int 1_{a \text{ meets } b} (p_w m_b a q^\beta - T(a, b)) dG(a) - r q.$$

On the farmer's side, increasing quality requires putting in effort into farming. If the farmer puts in effort, then the quality is realized. If not, the farmer puts in no effort and diverts the investment made by the agribusiness towards sales to intermediaries or towards own consumption. For flexibility, we model the farmer's no-effort option as giving her $\theta \delta_e p a + (1 - \theta) (p_h - \alpha r) \delta_h s$. The parameter θ is the share of the investment specific to the export crop (e.g. high-yielding seeds) and $1 - \theta$ is the share that can be diverted towards alternative uses such as immediate consumption (e.g. through a credit collateral). The parameters $\delta_e, \delta_h > 1$ represent the quality spillover from the agribusiness investment, while $\delta_e, \delta_h < 1$ represent delayed sales to other parties after disagreement with the agribusiness. The agribusiness pays each farmer her reservation value to ensure they put in effort to realize quality. The farmer receives

$$T(a, b) = \theta \delta_e p a + (1 - \theta) (p_h - \alpha r) \delta_h s.$$

We focus on the case where $T(a, b)$ is at least as good as selling through intermediaries or growing the subsistence crop.

Assuming each farmer matches with different agribusinesses with equal probability, the total purchases of agribusiness b from small farmers is

$$x_b \equiv \int 1_{a \text{ meets } b} a dG(a) = X_B / M$$

where X_B is the total supply of export crops in the matching market. The matching assumption captures the observation that small farmers typically have access to monopsonistic buyers due to government policies such as monopsony licenses, zoning

regulations and minimum distance rules. Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015) explain the rationale for these policies by showing that competition among coffee mills in Rwanda undermined relational contracts between mills and farmers, leading to lower farmer welfare and reduced quality of the delivered produce.

Substituting for the payment to farmers, the optimal capital investment of the agribusiness is $q = [\beta p_w m_b (b + x_b) / r]^{1/(1-\beta)}$, which increases with the size of the agribusiness. In summary, own farming of agribusinesses directly increases the income of a farmer through productivity transfers ($\delta_e a > a$ and $\delta_h s > s$) and indirectly lowers the farmer's income through greater capital investments which drive up the cost of farming the non-tradable crop (through higher r from higher q).

3.4. Market Equilibrium. Having explained the agents in the economy, we determine the number of intermediaries and the rental rate in the economy. The number of intermediaries N is determined by the free-entry condition. Capital market clearing implies $Mq + Nf + (1 - \eta)\alpha s G(s_a) = \bar{K}$. Substituting for the optimal quality investment, the rental rate is determined by:

$$M [\beta p_w m_b (b + a_b) / r]^{1/(1-\beta)} + Nf + (1 - \eta)\alpha s G(s_a) = \bar{K}.$$

Given N , entry costs rf increase with the number of agribusinesses M and their sales $(b + x_b)$. The entry decision of intermediaries and the investment decision of agribusinesses are interrelated through the capital market, and this is reflected in the reservation income of small farmers.

The number of intermediaries and the rental rate of capital are determined together through the free-entry condition (Equation 3.1) and capital-market clearing:

$$(3.2) \quad M [\beta p_w m_b (B + X_B) / Mr]^{1/(1-\beta)} + Nf + (1 - \eta)\alpha s G(s_a) = \bar{K}.$$

The size of the agribusiness has detrimental effects on the earnings of small farmers. An increase in the agribusiness' own farm lowers entry of intermediaries and increases the rental rate, leading to a fall in the earnings of all small farmers. We summarize these observations for farm incomes in Proposition 3 below.

Proposition 3. *Earnings of small farmers fall with a rise in the size of agribusinesses b .*

3.5. The Impact of World Price Changes. Having determined the market equilibrium, we examine how changes in the world price of the export crop affects earnings of small farmers. We start with a discussion of changes in entry and rents, and then discuss the impact on earnings of each type of farmers.

From the free-entry condition,

$$(3.3) \quad \frac{d \ln N}{d \ln p_w} = \frac{N(k-1)+1}{(N-1)(k-1)} \left(k - \frac{p_h - k\alpha r}{p_h - \alpha r} \frac{d \ln r}{d \ln p_w} \right).$$

The direct effect of a rise in p_w is to increase entry through higher export earnings. The indirect effect is to decrease entry through a rise in the entry cost rf (for $p_h \geq \alpha r$ which is ensured in equilibrium as shown in the Appendix). Substituting for Equation 3.3 and differentiating the capital market clearing implies $d \ln N / d \ln p_w \geq 0$ (Appendix). More intermediaries enter when world prices are higher, because they expect to earn higher profits. This increases competition for scarce capital, and rental rates increase with world prices $d \ln r / d \ln p_w \geq 0$. The rise in the rental rate lowers the earnings of subsistence farmers because $d \ln(p_h - \alpha r) / d \ln p_w = -(\alpha r / (p_h - \alpha r)) d \ln r / d \ln p_w < 0$.

The rise in the rental rate reduces the trickle down of world price increases to farmer incomes due to lower entry of intermediaries. The net effect of higher world prices is to increase the number of intermediaries. As a result, farmers selling to intermediaries experience a rise in the share of the export incomes they receive from intermediaries. The elasticity of the share of the export price transmitted by intermediaries to farmers is

$$\frac{d \ln p / p_w m}{d \ln p_w} = \frac{1}{N(k-1)+1} \left(\frac{d \ln N}{d \ln p_w} \right) \geq 0$$

We summarize this in Proposition 4 below.

Proposition 4. *A rise in the world price of the export crop increases competition for capital ($d \ln r / d \ln p_w > 0$). This lowers the earnings of subsistence farmers and dampens entry of intermediaries. But the net effect is a rise in the number of intermediaries rises ($d \ln N / d \ln p_w > 0$), which increases the share of the export price transmitted by the intermediaries to farmers ($d \ln \text{Farmer Share} / d \ln p_w > 0$).*

Having determined the income effects of world price changes on subsistence farmers and farmers selling through intermediaries, we determine the impact on incomes of farmers with access to an agribusiness. A farmer transacting with an agribusiness earns her reservation income of

$$T(a, b) = \theta \delta_e \frac{N(k-1)}{N(k-1)+1} p_w m a + (1 - \theta) \delta_h (p_h - \alpha r) s.$$

Differentiating $T(a, b)$ with respect to world prices, the trickle-down effect of world price changes into farmer incomes is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d \ln T(a, b)}{d \ln p_w} = & \underbrace{\frac{\theta \delta_e \frac{N(k-1)}{N(k-1)+1} p_w m a}{T(a, b)}}_{\text{Direct Effect on Intermediary Prices}} \left[1 + \underbrace{\frac{1}{N(k-1)+1} \frac{d \ln N}{d \ln p_w}}_{\text{Indirect Effect on \#Intermediaries}} \right] \\ & - \underbrace{\frac{(1 - \theta) \delta_h \alpha r s}{T(a, b)} \frac{d \ln r}{d \ln p_w}}_{\text{Indirect Effect on Non-Export Profits from Capital Market}}. \end{aligned}$$

The world price directly affects how much intermediaries receive from sales of the export crop, which in turn is reflected in the price that is paid to farmers. This is the first term in the expression above. The second and third terms are the indirect effects of world price changes. An increase in the world price alters the profitability of intermediation and this is captured in the second term which contains the elasticity of the number of intermediaries with respect to world price. The third term reflects the competition for limited capital resources. An increase in the world price alters the number of intermediaries and the investments of agribusinesses, which change the rental rate of capital. We summarize these channels in Proposition 5 below.

Proposition 5. *When a farmer sells through an agribusiness, the elasticity of the farmer's income wrt world prices consists of: (1) a positive direct effect of a change in world price of the export crop on the export revenue earned by intermediaries, (2) a positive indirect effect on the number of intermediaries, and (3) a negative indirect effect on the cost of farming the non-tradable crop.*

To understand the underlying economic channels determining the extent of trickle-down, we discuss the earnings under different parameter values. When subsistence farming does not require any capital inputs $\alpha = 0$, world prices have no impact on the earnings of subsistence farmers. Earnings of farmers selling through agribusinesses is affected by rental rates only through the number of intermediaries and not through the outside option of subsistence farming (see Appendix for details). For $\alpha = 0$, the entry response of intermediaries is decreasing in Nf because:

$$\frac{(N-1)(k-1)}{N(k-1)+1} \frac{1}{k} \frac{d \ln N}{d \ln p_w} = \frac{k-1}{k} \frac{1}{1 + \frac{(1-\beta)Nf}{K-Nf} \frac{N(k-1)+1}{(N-1)(k-1)}}.$$

The returns to quality decline as agribusinesses invest more and more capital. So more intermediaries can enter when the share of capital use by agribusinesses is high relative to the capital use by intermediaries. This occurs when entry cost f is relatively low and the size of agribusinesses b is relatively high which ensure Nf is low. The pass-through of world prices into prices received by farmers who sell through intermediaries ranges from 1 to $N/(N-1)$, i.e. $d \ln p/d \ln p_w \in (1, N/(N-1))$. This is the effect from oligopsonistic intermediaries which shows that the change in the share of export earnings passed through to consumers is $d \ln \text{Farmer Share}/d \ln p_w \in (0, 1/(N-1))$. Building in relationship transacting with agribusinesses, we find that the trickle down of export prices to farm incomes is

$$d \ln T/d \ln p_w \in (1, N/(N-1)) \theta \delta_a p a/T(a, b).$$

Farmers transacting with agribusinesses experience lower trickle down, although they have higher levels of earnings through productivity spillovers.

Once we build in the interconnections through competition for scarce capital, the trickle down effects for farmers selling through agribusinesses depend crucially on the share of income θ derived from re-selling to intermediaries. The economic channels for trickle down can be easily understood by considering an intermediate step where subsistence farmers do not need capital in production, but farmers selling through agribusinesses need capital to re-sell their produce in the event of a disagreement. This can be interpreted as the farmer having missed the bus operated by the intermediary to go to the port, so that she must hire her own local transport to reach the port. Or, it can be interpreted as the farmer needing her own

line of credit to switch to subsistence crops in the event of a disagreement with the agribusiness. Then the trickle down effect for farmers selling through agribusinesses is $d \ln T / d \ln p_w = \frac{\theta \delta_a p a}{T(a, b)} \left(1 + \frac{1}{N(k-1)+1} \frac{d \ln N}{d \ln p_w} \right) - \frac{\alpha_a r}{T(a, b)} \frac{d \ln r}{d \ln p_w}$ where α_a is the total capital requirement of the farmer in the event of a disagreement. The rest of the analysis is similar to the above case for $\alpha = 0$. Substituting for the entry and rental rate responses under $\alpha = 0$, the range of the trickle down effect is

$$d \ln T / d \ln p_w \in \left(1 - \frac{k \alpha_a r}{\theta \delta_a p a}, \frac{N}{N-1} - \frac{\alpha_a r}{\theta \delta_a p a} \right) \theta \delta_a p a / T(a, b).$$

The trickle down effect would be negative for high levels of capital requirement α_a and greater than one for low levels of α_a .³

More generally, the number of intermediaries and the rental rates rise with world prices. For $\theta = 1$, the farmer can divert all her export crop to intermediaries and the trickle-down effect rises with an increase in world prices, $d \ln T(a, b) / d \ln p_w = 1 + (d \ln N / d \ln p_w) / (N(k-1) + 1) \geq 1$. The agribusiness competes with intermediaries to secure the produce of the farmer, and greater competition among intermediaries translates into higher trickle down for farmers.

For $\theta = 0$, the farmer is unable to recover the export crop in the event of a disagreement with the agribusiness. She must divert her land towards producing and selling the non-export crop. A rise in the world price disproportionately increases the rental rate of capital inputs, and this implies that essential inputs required for production and sales of the non-export crop become more scarce. Farmers lose from a rise in the world price as their ability to earn profits from the non-export crop declines. Trickle-down is negative ($d \ln T(a, b) / d \ln p_w = -\alpha r / (p_h - \alpha r)$) and the agribusiness gains at the expense of the small farmers. Brambilla and Porto (2011) find that failure of outgrower schemes between Zambian cotton farmers and monopsonistic agribusinesses caused farmers to move back to subsistence farming, and led to reductions in cotton yields of over 40%. The negative trickle down shows that losses to farmers rise with the size of the agribusiness. This is because a bigger agribusiness makes larger capital investments which intensifies competition for scarce

³We would need that the spillover to subsistence farming δ_h is high enough to ensure that selling to agribusinesses is still viable for farmers.

capital. Higher entry costs also increase competition for capital and the losses are bigger. We summarize this result in Remark 6

Remark 6. The trickle-down effect of world price changes to incomes of farmers selling through agribusinesses rises with the farmer's ability θ to divert the export crop to intermediaries in the event of a disagreement with the agribusiness. For $\theta = 1$, the elasticity of farmer incomes to world prices ranges from 1 to $N/(N - 1)$. For $\theta = 0$, the non-export crop is the farmer's only outside option, so increases in world prices have a negative trickle down effect. The losses rise with the size of agribusiness and with the entry costs of capital.

4. CONCLUSION

Agricultural markets are rarely competitive in developing economies, and they typically consist of a large number of small farmers who sell their produce through intermediaries and big agribusinesses with market power. We provide a flexible approach to embed the complexity of the industrial organization of agricultural markets.

Incorporating a richer market structure shows that a small farmer receives a greater share of the world price when there is more competition among intermediaries and greater equality in land ownership. Own farming by agribusinesses increases the trickle down of world prices to farm incomes through productivity transfers. But agribusinesses also increase competition for scarce capital which is necessary for marketing farm produce. These conflicting forces imply that the trickle down effect of increases in world commodity prices ranges from negative to greater than one, depending on the degree to which small farmers are locked into their relationship with big agribusinesses. Future work can quantify this degree of lock-in to determine the extent to which farmers gain from trade.

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
APPENDIX A. RESULTS

A.1. Equilibrium Existence. We focus on the case where $p_h \geq k\alpha r$ and this Section sketches the conditions needed to ensure the existence of an equilibrium.

Assumptions. To ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium for $p_h - k\alpha r > 0$, we assume the following parameter conditions on B and f :

- (1) $\left[M \left(\beta p_w m_b \left(B + \eta \frac{k a_{\min}}{k-1} \right) / Mr \right)^{1/(1-\beta)} / \left(\bar{K} - (1-\eta)\alpha s \right) \right]^{1-\beta} < p_h / k\alpha$,
- (2) $\hat{N}^{k-1} \left(\hat{N}(k-1) + 1 \right)^{-k} < f / (1-\eta)\alpha s k \left(\frac{p_w m}{p_h} \frac{k}{k-1} \frac{a_{\min}}{s} \right)^k < k^{-k}$ where $\hat{N} \equiv \left(\bar{K} - (1-\eta)\alpha s \right) \left[1 - M \left(\beta p_w m_b \left(B + \eta \frac{k a_{\min}}{k-1} \right) / Mr \right)^{1/(1-\beta)} k\alpha / p_h \left(\bar{K} - (1-\eta)\alpha s \right) \right]$.

The market equilibrium can be summarized by the following two equations - free entry and capital market clearing. The equilibrium values for the number of intermediaries N and the rental rate r are determined by the free entry condition and



the capital-market clearing condition as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{(1-\eta)k}{k-1} \frac{a_{\min}^k}{(p_h - \alpha r)^{k-1} s^{k-1}} \frac{1}{N} \left(\frac{N(k-1)p_w m}{N(k-1)+1} \right)^k - r f &= 0 \quad \text{FE} \\ M \left(\frac{\beta p_w m_b}{Mr} \left(B + \eta \frac{k a_{\min}}{k-1} \right) \right)^{1/(1-\beta)} + N f \left[1 - \frac{(k-1)\alpha r}{k(p_h - \alpha r)} \right] &= \bar{K} - (1-\eta)\alpha s \quad \text{K Mkt} \end{aligned}$$

The equilibrium existence conditions are explained through Figure A.1. The equilibrium values of N and r are given by the intersection of the FE and K Mkt curves. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the two curves will intersect at well-defined values. The FE curve is downward-sloping in (N, r) space. Higher entry lowers profits of intermediaries through greater competition, so rental rates must fall to maintain profits net of entry costs. Under $p_h \geq k\alpha r$, FE implies $d \ln r / d \ln N = -\frac{p_h - \alpha r}{p_h - k\alpha r} \frac{N(k-1)+1}{(N-1)(k-1)} < 0$ and FE asymptotes as r and N get close to zero. The K Mkt curve is upward-sloping because higher entry drives up capital market competition and increases rental rates, $d \ln r / d \ln N = N f \left[1 - \frac{k-1}{k} \frac{\alpha r}{p_h - \alpha r} \right] / \left[\frac{Mq}{1-\beta} + N f \frac{k-1}{k} \frac{\alpha r p_h}{(p_h - \alpha r)^2} \right] > 0$.

For N close to zero, K Mkt gives $r = M^{1-\beta} \left(\frac{\beta p_w m_b}{M} \left(B + \eta \frac{k a_{\min}}{k-1} \right) \right) / (\bar{K} - (1-\eta)\alpha s)^{1-\beta}$ and Assumption 1 ensures that the K Mkt curve does not start in the $r > p_h/k\alpha$ region. We also need to ensure that there is in fact an intersection, which will be guaranteed as long as FE implies a higher N than that implied by K Mkt at the maximum rental rate. At $r = p_h/k\alpha$, FE implies the number of intermediaries is

given by

$$(A.1) \quad N^{k-1} (N(k-1) + 1)^{-k} = f/(1-\eta)\alpha s k \left(\frac{p_w m}{p_h} \frac{k}{k-1} \frac{a_{\min}}{s} \right)^k.$$

The LHS of the equation A.1 is decreasing in N . We want to show that the N implied by K Mkt, referred to as $\hat{N}$, is greater than the above N which is derived from FE. The first inequality in Assumption 2 ensures the LHS of equation A.1 at $\hat{N}$ is lower than the RHS of equation A.1. Finally, we want to focus on oligopsonistic behavior, so that $N > 1$ in equilibrium. The second inequality in Assumption 2 ensures the LHS of equation A.1 at $N = 1$ is greater than the RHS of equation A.1.

A.2. Impact of World Price Changes. From free entry of intermediaries, $d \ln r / d \ln p_w = \frac{p_h - \alpha r}{p_h - k \alpha r} \left[k - \frac{(N-1)(k-1)}{N(k-1)+1} d \ln N / d \ln p_w \right]$. From optimal quality choice, $d \ln q / d \ln p_w = [1 - d \ln r / d \ln p_w] / (1-\beta)$. The capital used by subsistence farmers is $K_s \equiv \alpha s G(s_a) = \alpha s \left[1 - \left(\frac{a_{\min}}{s} \frac{p_w m}{p_h - \alpha r} \frac{N(k-1)}{N(k-1)+1} \right)^k \right]$, so $-\frac{1/k}{\alpha s - K_s} K_s d \ln K_s / d \ln p_w = 1 + \frac{\alpha r}{p_h - \alpha r} d \ln r / d \ln p_w + \frac{1}{N(k-1)+1} d \ln N / d \ln p_w$. From capital market clearing, the change in entry from $M q d \ln q / d \ln p_w + N f d \ln N / d \ln p_w + (1-\eta) K_s d \ln K_s / d \ln p_w = 0$. Substituting for the changes in capital by subsistence farmers and the change in quality investments of agribusinesses,

$$\begin{aligned} & \left[- (1-\eta)(\alpha s - K_s) k \left(1 - \frac{\alpha r}{p_h - k \alpha r} (N-1)(k-1) \right) \frac{1}{N(k-1)+1} \right] \frac{d \ln N}{d \ln p_w} \\ & = \left[\begin{aligned} & \frac{M q}{1-\beta} \frac{p_h}{p_h - k \alpha r} (k-1) + 0 \\ & + (1-\eta)(\alpha s - K_s) k \frac{p_h}{p_h - k \alpha r} \end{aligned} \right] \end{aligned}$$

The RHS is positive and we will show that the square bracket term on the LHS is also positive, so that entry rises with world prices. From free entry and the definition

of K_s ,

$$\begin{aligned}
 & Nf - (1 - \eta)(\alpha s - K_s)k \frac{1 - \frac{\alpha r}{p_h - k\alpha r}(N - 1)(k - 1)}{N(k - 1) + 1} \\
 &= (1 - \eta)(\alpha s - K_s) \frac{k(p_h - \alpha r)}{(k - 1)\alpha r} \left[1 - \underbrace{\frac{(k - 1)\alpha r}{(N(k - 1) + 1)(p_h - \alpha r)}}_{\leq 1} \underbrace{\left(1 - \frac{\alpha r(N - 1)(k - 1)}{p_h - k\alpha r}\right)}_{\leq 1} \right].
 \end{aligned}$$

The term in square brackets on the RHS is positive implying $d \ln N / d \ln p_w > 0$.

Having solved for the change in entry, we determine the change in rental rate, $d \ln r / d \ln p_w = \frac{p_h - \alpha r}{p_h - k\alpha r} k \left[1 - \frac{1}{k} \frac{(N - 1)(k - 1)}{N(k - 1) + 1} d \ln N / d \ln p_w \right]$. We will show that the direct effect of change in world price dominates the indirect the change in entry because for $Z \equiv \left\{ \frac{N(k - 1) + 1}{(N - 1)(k - 1)} \frac{k}{k - 1} \frac{p_h - \alpha r}{\alpha r} - \frac{k}{(N - 1)(k - 1)} + \frac{k\alpha r}{p_h - k\alpha r} \right\}$,

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \left[\frac{Mq}{1 - \beta} \frac{p_h - \alpha r}{p_h - k\alpha r} k + (1 - \eta)(\alpha s - K_s)kZ \right] \frac{1}{k} \frac{(N - 1)(k - 1)}{N(k - 1) + 1} \frac{d \ln N}{d \ln p_w} \\
 &= \left[\frac{Mq}{1 - \beta} \frac{p_h}{p_h - k\alpha r} (k - 1) + (1 - \eta)(\alpha s - K_s)k \frac{p_h}{p_h - k\alpha r} \right]
 \end{aligned}$$

The first term on the LHS is larger than the first term on the RHS because $(p_h - \alpha r)k \geq (k - 1)p_h$ for $p_h \geq k\alpha r$. Next, we will show that the second term on the LHS is greater than the second term on the RHS so that the direct effect dominates in the rental rate change. This is because $Z \geq p_h / (p_h - k\alpha r)$ which follows from $\frac{N(k - 1) + 1}{(N - 1)(k - 1)} \frac{k}{k - 1} \frac{p_h - \alpha r}{\alpha r} \geq 1 + \frac{k}{(N - 1)(k - 1)}$. The LHS of this inequality is decreasing in αr . At the maximum value of $\alpha r = p_h / k$, the inequality is true because $\frac{N(k - 1) + 1}{N - 1} \frac{k}{k - 1} \geq 1 + \frac{k}{(N - 1)(k - 1)}$. We conclude that $\frac{1}{k} \frac{(N - 1)(k - 1)}{N(k - 1) + 1} \frac{d \ln N}{d \ln p_w} \leq 1$ so that $d \ln r / d \ln p_w > 0$.

A.3. No Capital in Subsistence. For $\alpha = 0$, $d \ln r / d \ln p_w = k - \frac{(N - 1)(k - 1)}{N(k - 1) + 1} d \ln N / d \ln p_w$, $d \ln q / d \ln p_w = [1 - d \ln r / d \ln p_w] / (1 - \beta) = -\frac{k - 1}{1 - \beta} \left[1 - \frac{N - 1}{N(k - 1) + 1} d \ln N / d \ln p_w \right]$ and $K_s = 0$. From capital market clearing,

$$\left[\frac{Mq}{1 - \beta} k + Nf \frac{k(N(k - 1) + 1)}{(N - 1)(k - 1)} \right] \frac{(N - 1)(k - 1)}{N(k - 1) + 1} \frac{1}{k} \frac{d \ln N}{d \ln p_w} = \frac{Mq}{1 - \beta} (k - 1)$$

so that the change in entry is

$$\frac{(N-1)(k-1)}{N(k-1)+1} \frac{1}{k} \frac{d \ln N}{d \ln p_w} = \frac{k-1}{k} \frac{1}{1 + \frac{(1-\beta)Nf}{\bar{K}-Nf} \frac{N(k-1)+1}{(N-1)(k-1)}}$$

The second term on the RHS is decreasing in Nf . Lower values of Nf imply higher entry response, which means the trickle down effect is larger when f is relatively low and b is relatively high. For $Nf \rightarrow 0$, the second term on the RHS is 1 and for $Nf \rightarrow \bar{K}$, it is 0 implying

$$\frac{(N-1)(k-1)}{N(k-1)+1} \frac{1}{k} \frac{d \ln N}{d \ln p_w} \in \left(0, \frac{k-1}{k}\right)$$

Therefore, $d \ln r / d \ln p_w = (1, k)$, $d \ln p / d \ln p_w = (1, \frac{N}{N-1})$ and $d \ln \text{Farmer Share} / d \ln p_w = \frac{1}{N(k-1)+1} d \ln N / d \ln p_w = (0, 1/(N-1))$. The trickle down to earnings of farmers selling through agribusinesses is $d \ln T / d \ln p_w \in \frac{\theta \delta_a p a}{\theta \delta_a p a + (1-\theta) \delta_h p_h s} \cdot (1, \frac{N}{N-1})$.

A.4. Entry Costs and Size of Agribusiness. We look at the comparative statics of farmer incomes with respect to entry costs f and the size of agribusiness b in turn. Proceeding as above, $d \ln r / d \ln f = -\frac{p_h - \alpha r}{p_h - k \alpha r} \left[1 + \frac{(N-1)(k-1)}{N(k-1)+1} d \ln N / d \ln f\right]$, $d \ln q / d \ln f = -(1/(1-\beta)) d \ln r / d \ln f$ and $-\frac{1/k}{\alpha s - K_s} K_s d \ln K_s / d \ln f = -\frac{\alpha r}{p_h - k \alpha r} + \left[1 - \frac{\alpha r}{p_h - k \alpha r} (N-1)(k-1)\right] \frac{1}{N(k-1)+1} d \ln N / d \ln f$. Substituting for the changes,

$$\left[(\bar{K} - K_s) - (\alpha s - K_s) k \frac{1 - \frac{\alpha r (N-1)(k-1)}{p_h - k \alpha r}}{N(k-1)+1} \right] \frac{d \ln N}{d \ln f} = -(\bar{K} - K_s) - (\alpha s - K_s) \frac{k \alpha r}{p_h - k \alpha r}$$

For $p_h - k \alpha r > 0$, we also have $p_h - \frac{2k-1}{k} \alpha r > 0$. As $\bar{K} \geq \alpha s$, $d \ln N / d \ln f < 0$ because:

$$[(\bar{K} - \alpha s) + (\alpha s - K_s) Z] \frac{d \ln N}{d \ln f} = -(\bar{K} - K_s) - (\alpha s - K_s) \frac{k \alpha r}{p_h - k \alpha r}$$

for $Z \equiv 1 - \underbrace{\left(1 - \frac{\alpha r}{p_h - k\alpha r}(N-1)(k-1)\right)}_{\leq 1} \frac{k}{N(k-1)+1} \geq 0$. Further, $|d \ln N / d \ln f| < 1$ so that $d \ln r / d \ln f > 0$ because

$$\begin{aligned} & \left[(\bar{K} - K_s) + (\alpha s - K_s) \frac{k\alpha r}{p_h - k\alpha r} + \frac{k(\bar{K} - \alpha s)}{(N-1)(k-1)} \right] \frac{(N-1)(k-1)}{N(k-1)+1} \frac{d \ln N}{d \ln f} \\ & = - \left[(\bar{K} - K_s) + (\alpha s - K_s) \frac{k\alpha r}{p_h - k\alpha r} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, $d \ln r / d \ln b = -\frac{p_h - \alpha r}{p_h - k\alpha r} \frac{(N-1)(k-1)}{N(k-1)+1} d \ln N / d \ln b$, $(1-\beta)d \ln q / d \ln b = b/(\eta A/M + b) - d \ln r / d \ln b$ and $-\frac{1/k}{\alpha s - K_s} K_s d \ln K_s / d \ln b = \frac{\alpha r}{p_h - \alpha r} d \ln r / d \ln b + \frac{1}{N(k-1)+1} d \ln N / d \ln b$. Substituting for these changes in the capital market,

$$\left[\frac{Mq}{1-\beta} \frac{p_h - \alpha r}{p_h - k\alpha r} \frac{(N-1)(k-1)}{N(k-1)+1} + Nf - \frac{(1-\eta)(\alpha s - K_s)k}{N(k-1)+1} \left(1 - \frac{\alpha r}{p_h - k\alpha r}(N-1)(k-1)\right) \right] \frac{d \ln N}{d \ln b} = -\frac{Mq}{1-\beta} \frac{b}{\eta A/M + b}$$

We will show that the LHS square bracket term is positive so that $d \ln N / d \ln b < 0$. This follows from $Z \equiv Nf - \frac{(\alpha s - K_s)k}{N(k-1)+1} \left(1 - \frac{\alpha r}{p_h - k\alpha r}(N-1)(k-1)\right) \geq 0$ because $Z = (1-\eta)(\alpha s - K_s)k \left[\frac{1}{k-1} \frac{p_h - \alpha r}{\alpha r} - \frac{k}{N(k-1)+1} \left(1 - \frac{\alpha r(N-1)(k-1)}{p_h - k\alpha r}\right) \right]$ and the term in square brackets is positive as $\frac{1}{k-1} \frac{p_h - \alpha r}{\alpha r} - \frac{k}{N(k-1)+1} \geq 0$ at its minimum value which is attained at $\alpha r = p_h/k$.