

Equity Market Misvaluation, Financing, and Investment

MISSAKA WARUSAWITHARANA* and TONI M. WHITED†

First version, July 10, 2011

Revised, January 7, 2014

*Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 20th and C Streets, NW, Washington, DC 20551. Missaka.N.Warusawitharana@frb.gov. (202)452-3461.

†William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627. (585)275-3916. toni.whited@simon.rochester.edu.

We thank Yunjeon Kim for excellent research assistance. We have also received helpful comments and suggestions from Ron Kaniel, Jianjun Miao, Randall Morck, Gregor Matvos, Simon Gilchrist, and seminar participants at the SEC, the Federal Reserve Board, Georgetown, INSEAD, HEC-Paris, Colorado, Tulane, Toulouse, University of Bologna, UCSD, UT-Dallas, University of Georgia, Georgia State, Wharton, University of Wisconsin, the 2011 SITE conference, the European Winter Finance Summit, the AEA, the WFA, and the NBER. All of the analysis, views, and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Federal Reserve Board.

Equity Market Misvaluation, Financing, and Investment

Abstract

We quantify how much nonfundamental movements in stock prices affect firm decisions. We estimate a dynamic investment model in which firms can finance with equity, cash, or debt. Misvaluation affects equity values, and firms optimally issue and repurchase overvalued and undervalued shares. The funds flowing to and from these activities come from either investment, dividends, or net cash. The model fits a broad set of data moments in large heterogeneous samples and across industries. Our estimation results imply that firms respond to misvaluation by adjusting financing more than investment. Managers' rational responses to misvaluation increase shareholder value by up to 3%.

1 Introduction

We estimate the parameters of a dynamic model of investment and finance to understand and quantify the effects of equity mispricing on these policies. This inquiry is of interest in light of stock market volatility that often dwarfs the volatility of real activity (Shiller 1981). For example, the stock market crash of 2008 was followed by a complete rebound over the subsequent two years, and the technology boom in the late 1990s was followed by a marked reversal in the early 2000s. During these periods, although real activity moved in the same direction, the magnitudes were much smaller. The existence of such wide fluctuations in equity values relative to real activity raises the question of whether these swings reflect movements in intrinsic firm values, or even time-varying expected returns. If not, then it is natural to wonder whether such movements in equity values affect managerial decisions. Put simply, does market timing occur, and how large are its effects?

As surveyed in Baker and Wurgler (2012), many studies have tackled the question of the effects of equity misvaluation and investor sentiment. However, the literature lacks investigations of the quantitative importance of market timing, and measures of the sizes, costs, and benefits of managerial actions are by nature of interest to economists. We fill in this gap by using the estimates obtained from a dynamic model to quantify the effects of market timing on various firm policies. The short answer to our question is that misvaluation does affect firm behavior, but primarily financial decisions, as opposed to real decisions.

The intuition behind this result requires a description of our dynamic model, which captures decisions about a firm's dividends, investment, net cash (cash net of debt), equity issuances, and repurchases. Its backbone is a neoclassical model of physical and financial capital accumulation with profitability shocks, constant returns to scale, costs of adjusting the capital stock, and underwriting costs in the equity and debt markets. The model then incorporates a new feature that is motivated by the behavioral finance literature. Possibly persistent misvaluation shocks separate the market value of equity from its true value, and managers exploit this misvaluation to benefit a controlling block of shareholders at the expense of other shareholders who trade with the firm.

Misvaluation affects the firm because it attenuates the extent to which equity issuances and repurchases cause dilution and concentration of the controlling shareholders' stake. In response to misvaluation, firms predictably repurchase shares when equity is underpriced and issue shares

when equity is overpriced. Model parameters then dictate the size of these equity transactions, as well as the size of the misvaluation shocks themselves. They also dictate whether the funds required for repurchases or received from issuances flow out of or into capital expenditures or net cash balances. Quantifying the relative magnitudes of these different effects therefore requires estimating the model’s parameters. We use simulated method of moments (SMM), which minimizes model errors by matching model generated moments to real-data moments. We obtain estimates of parameters describing the firm’s technology, equity market frictions, and most importantly, the variance and persistence of misvaluation shocks.

This structural approach confers several benefits. First, we can test rigorously whether the model fits key features of the data. We find that our model does a remarkably good job fitting our data, given its simplicity. This good fit is evident not only in large heterogeneous samples of firms, but in homogeneous samples from different industries. In addition, we demonstrate the model’s external validity by showing that it can replicate features of the data not used in its estimation. In short, we find that the model credibly captures those features of the data we wish to understand and shows that misvaluation shocks are necessary for allowing the model to fit the data.

Second, we can directly estimate the variance of misvaluation shocks. In nearly all of our samples, we obtain significant estimates of this variance, which is larger in industries a priori more likely to be subject to equity misvaluation. This result constitutes a second test of external validity.

The third advantage of structural estimation is that we can conduct counterfactual exercises. To this end, we compute impulse response functions, which measure the reactions of firm policies to profit and misvaluation shocks. We find that equity repurchases and issuances respond more strongly to misvaluation shocks than to profit shocks, but that these reactions are short lived. In contrast, net cash balances respond strongly and persistently to the misvaluation shock. Finally, investment responds much more strongly to profit shocks than to misvaluation shocks.

Thus, our parameter estimates imply that although firms issue equity when it is overvalued, they only use a small fraction of the proceeds for capital investment. Instead, they tend to hoard the proceeds as cash or to pay down debt. This saving then gives the firm more flexibility to repurchase shares when equity is undervalued or to respond to profit shocks by investing in capital goods. We conclude that although equity misvaluation appears important for financial policies, its

impact on real policies is much smaller.

Our counterfactuals also examine hypothetical situations in which the magnitude of misvaluation shocks is different from that implied by our estimates. In particular, we compare a firm, as estimated, with a hypothetical firm that does not experience misvaluation shocks but that is otherwise identical. We find that average equity issuances and repurchases increase sharply with the variance of the misvaluation shocks. In addition, net cash balances also rise strongly. Interestingly, investment also rises with the variance of misvaluation shocks. With no misvaluation, investment is below the level predicted by a model with no financial constraints and then rises slightly above this level. In other words, misvaluation shocks help alleviate financial constraints. Finally, we find that equity market timing in our model increases equity value by up to 3%, relative to a model with no misvaluation shocks.

Our paper falls into several literatures. The first is the structural estimation of dynamic models in corporate finance, such as Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007), Taylor (2010), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011), and Matvos and Seru (2013). These papers examine such issues as capital structure, financial constraints, executive turnover, and resource allocation in conglomerates. Our paper is distinctive in that we ask whether behavioral factors affect firm decisions.

Our paper belongs in the large empirical behavioral literature on the effects of market misvaluation on firm policies. For example, Graham and Harvey (2001) find survey evidence that managers explicitly consider the possibility of equity overvaluation when deciding whether to issue shares. Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) and Baker and Wurgler (2012) provide excellent surveys of the empirical research that tests the more general proposition that market timing is important for many firm decisions. More recently, Jenter, Lewellen, and Warner (2011) find managerial timing ability by examining firms' sales of put options on their own stock, and Alti and Sulaeman (2011) find that high equity returns induce issuances only when there is institutional demand. Our results add to this research by providing the first quantitative evaluation of the effects of misvaluation.

The papers most closely related to ours are Eisfeldt and Muir (2012) and Alti and Tetlock (2013). Eisfeldt and Muir (2012) uses a model similar to ours, but without explicit misvaluation. Instead, the model contains stochastic issuance costs, and the goal of the study is to understand how these costs determine the correlation structure among aggregate firm policies, particularly

the high correlation between cash saving and external finance. Alti and Tetlock (2013) performs a structural estimation of a neoclassical investment model augmented to account for managerial behavioral biases. However, they focus on the asset pricing effects of these biases. Somewhat less closely related to our work are the theoretical models in Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2013) and Yang (2013). Bolton et al. (2013) considers the directional implications of exogenous stochastic issuance costs. Yang (2013) examines the theoretical effects on capital structure of mispricing that arises from differences in beliefs. Our goal, in contrast, is not to understand where mispricing comes from, but to quantify its effects empirically.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and presents descriptive evidence. Sections 3 and 4 present the model and discuss its optimal policies. Section 5 outlines the estimation and describes our identification strategy. Section 6 presents the estimation results. Section 7 presents our counterfactuals, and Section 8 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs.

2 Data and Summary Statistics

Our data are from the 2011 Compustat files. We remove all regulated utilities (SIC 4900-4999), financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), and quasi-governmental and non-profit firms (SIC 9000-9999). Observations with missing values for the SIC code, total assets, the gross capital stock, market value, or net cash are also excluded from the final sample. The final sample is an annual panel data set with 55,726 observations from 1987 to 2010. We use this specific time period for two reasons. First, prior to the early 1980s, firms rarely repurchased shares, so these data are unlikely to help us understand repurchases. Second, because our model contains a constant corporate tax rate, we need to examine time periods in which tax policy is stable. Therefore, we start the sample after the 1986 tax reforms, because during this period, there is only one major change in tax policy: the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. Therefore, for some of our estimations, we consider two sample periods, before and after this legislation.

We define our variables as follows. The most difficult is equity issuances because the Compustat variable SSTK contains a great deal of employee stock option exercises. McKeon (2013) shows that these passive issuances are large relative to SEOs and private placements. To isolate active equity issuance, we follow McKeon (2013) and classify management initiated issuances as the amount

of SSTK that exceeds 12% of market equity ($\text{PRCC_F} \times \text{CSHO}$). McKeon (2013) shows that this scheme is highly accurate. Measuring repurchases also requires the consideration of option exercise activity because, as summarized in Skinner (2008), firms usually repurchase shares in order to offset the dilution effects of option exercise. We therefore measure repurchases as PRSTK minus the amount of equity issuance classified as passive. The rest of the variable definitions are standard. Total assets is AT ; the capital stock is GPPE ; investment is capital expenditures (CAPX) minus sales of capital goods (SPPE); cash and equivalents are CHE ; operating income is OIBDP ; dividends are the sum of common and preferred dividends ($\text{DVC} + \text{DVP}$); debt is ($\text{DLTT} + \text{DLC}$); and Tobin's q is the ratio of $(\text{AT} + \text{PRCC_F} \times \text{CSHO} - \text{TXDB} - \text{CEQ})$ to $(\text{AT} - \text{CEQ})$. All other variables are also expressed as fractions of $(\text{AT} - \text{CEQ})$. We use this variable in the denominator of all of our ratios because it most closely measures the denominator of the ratios in our model.

We summarize these data in Figures 1 and 2, which plot several variables for small and large firms, respectively. We define a firm as large in a particular year if its assets exceed the median for the sample in that year. Otherwise, we define a firm as small. Panel A in Figures 1 and 2 plots equity issuance, equity repurchases, and dividends, each of which is scaled by total book assets. They also plot the average annual real ex-dividend return on equity. Panel B of each figure contains analogous plots for average debt issuance and saving, each of which is scaled by total assets, and the latter of which is defined as the change in (gross) cash balances. Panel C of each figure contains analogous plots for investment scaled by assets.

We find several patterns of interest. In Panel A of both Figures 1 and 2, we confirm the well-known stylized fact that equity returns and equity issuance track one another fairly closely, especially in the mid-1990s and the late 2000s. This pattern is much more pronounced for small firms than for large firms. We also see that repurchases appear to be slightly negatively correlated with returns. This pattern holds for both large and small firms. Finally, for both groups of firms, dividends are much smoother and decline over the sample period.

In Panel B of Figures 1 and 2, the most striking result is the strong positive comovement between saving and equity returns, especially for the small firms. Interestingly, we find almost no visible relationship between debt issuance and returns for the small firms, and perhaps a slightly negative relationship for the large firms. These results clearly indicate that any relationship between *net*

cash changes and returns comes from the cash side rather than from the debt side. Finally, Panel C of these two figures shows that investment in physical assets is much smoother than equity returns and is, if anything, slightly negatively correlated with returns.

We have not interpreted these results because correlations between equity returns and corporate policies might or might not indicate market timing. Market timing is important if equity values contain a component unrelated to fundamental firm value and if managers react to this misvaluation component. In this case, the high correlations between equity transactions and returns are clearly consistent with timing. Further, if timing is indeed occurring, then the high positive correlation between saving and returns suggests that the funds for equity transactions flow in and out of cash stocks. Of course, if equity is not misvalued or if managers do not pay any attention to misvaluation, these high correlations could also simply be a result of managers' attempts to fund profitable investment projects, which are naturally correlated with intrinsic firm value. To disentangle these competing explanations, we therefore estimate a dynamic model.

3 Model

As a basis for our estimation, we use a model that captures a firm's dividend, investment, cash (net of debt), and equity issuance/repurchase decisions. The backbone of this model is a dynamic investment model with financing frictions (e.g. Gomes 2001; Hennessy and Whited 2005). On top of this standard framework lies the key feature of our model: deviations of the value of equity from its fundamental value, which we subsequently refer to as misvaluation. These share price deviations naturally lead managers to time equity issuances and repurchases, with firms issuing equity when it is overvalued relative to fundamentals and repurchasing equity when it is undervalued.

Of course, this market timing activity by managers must benefit some shareholders at the expense of others. This heterogeneous effect on shareholders poses a considerable modeling challenge, as the standard framework of maximizing value for all shareholders typically used in dynamic investment models does not apply in a setting with heterogeneous shareholders. We address this challenge by using an agency framework where management works on behalf of a controlling block of shareholders and buys and sells shares with uninformed outsider shareholders, who, in a broad sense, function similar to noise traders as in Kyle (1985).

One striking feature of our model is that the framework we construct for firm optimization in a dynamic setting with misvaluation is independent of the various details pertaining to the cash flows of the firm. As such, it can be applied generally to study other potential questions of interest in a similar setting. Indeed, we view the development of a general framework for solving firm optimization decisions in the presence of misvaluation as one contribution of this study.

3.1 Cash Flows

We begin by laying out our assumptions about the firm's cash flows, as well as the financing frictions it faces. We consider an infinitely lived firm in discrete time. At each period, t , the firm's risk-neutral manager chooses how much to invest in capital goods and how to finance these purchases. The firm has a constant returns to scale production technology, $z_t K_t$, that uses only capital, K_t , and that is subject to a profitability shock, z_t . The shock follows an $AR(1)$ in logs:

$$\ln(z_{t+1}) = \mu + \rho_z \ln(z_t) + \varepsilon_{z\,t+1}, \quad (1)$$

in which μ is the drift of z_t , ρ_z the autocorrelation coefficient, and $\varepsilon_{z\,t+1}$ is an *i.i.d.*, random variable with a normal distribution. It has a mean of 0 and a variance of σ_z .

Firm investment in physical capital is defined as:

$$I_t = K_{t+1} - (1 - \delta) K_t, \quad (2)$$

in which δ is the depreciation rate of capital. When the firm invests, it incurs adjustment costs, which can be thought of as profits lost as a result of the process of investment. These adjustment costs are convex in the rate of investment, and are given by

$$A(I_t, K_t) \equiv \frac{\lambda I_t^2}{2K_t}. \quad (3)$$

The parameter λ determines the curvature of the adjustment cost function.

If the firm were to maximize its expected present value, given the model ingredients thus far, we would have a neoclassical q model of the sort in Hayashi (1982) or Abel and Eberly (1994). In this type of model, external financing is implicitly frictionless. Thus, we will refer to this benchmark case as the “frictionless” case.

The model we study expands upon this frictionless case in two dimensions. The first is financing. We assume that the firm finances its investment activities by retaining its earnings, issuing debt,

and issuing equity. When the firm retains earnings, it holds them as one-period bonds, C_t , that earn the risk-free rate, r . We allow C_t to take both positive and negative values, with the latter indicating that the firm has net debt on its balance sheet. In the model, debt is collateralized by the capital stock, so that the firm faces a constraint

$$-C_t \leq K_t. \quad (4)$$

Thus, debt is risk-free and the interest rate on debt is r . Because we allow $C_t < 0$, we refer to C_t as net cash. Although debt is risk-free, it incurs proportional issuance costs of the form

$$\Phi(C_{t+1}, C_t) \equiv \phi \text{abs}(\max(C_{t+1} - C_t, C_{t+1}))\mathcal{I}(C_{t+1} < 0, C_{t+1} < C_t),$$

where $\mathcal{I}$ is an indicator function. This formulation captures debt flotation costs by making debt increases costly, but leaving debt reductions and all changes in cash costless.

We denote equity issuances by E_t , with a negative number indicating repurchases. When the firm issues equity, it pays a fixed cost, $a_0 K_t$, which is independent of the size of the issuance, and which can be thought of as an intermediation cost for a seasoned offering. Note that the cost is proportional to the capital stock, which preserves homotheticity in the model.

The firm's profits are taxed at a rate τ_c , with the tax bill, T_t , given by

$$T_t = (z_t K_t - \delta K_t + C_t r) \tau_c. \quad (5)$$

Note that the tax schedule is linear, so that the tax bill can be negative. This simplifying feature captures tax carryforwards and carrybacks. The final financing option available to the firm is adjustment of its dividends, D_t , which are given by a standard sources and uses of funds identity:

$$D_t = z_t K_t - I_t - \frac{\lambda I_t^2}{2K_t} + C_t(1+r) - C_{t+1} - T_t + E_t - a_0 K_t \mathcal{I}(E_t > 0) - \Phi(C_{t+1}, C_t), \quad (6)$$

in which cash flow net of taxes and equity issuance or repurchases equals the total dividend payout. Finally, we assume that dividends are taxed at a rate τ_d . This assumption implies that in the model as specified thus far, the firm strictly prefers repurchasing shares to paying dividends.

3.2 Agency Problem

As this point the model is a standard neoclassical model of investment with exogenous financing frictions. Although our ultimate goal is to study equity misvaluation and market timing, we first

need to consider the inherent agency problem associated with market timing. For a manager to take advantage of misvalued equity, he needs to issue shares when equity is overvalued and repurchase shares when it is undervalued. These transactions transfer wealth from the shareholders who trade with the firm to those who do not. As such, market timing by managers implies that managers do not maximize the value for all shareholders at all times.

We need to formalize this agency problem in a tractable way that lets us retain the rich specification of financing and investment, which is necessary for success in confronting the model with data. To this end, we assume that managers maximize the value for a block of shares that constitute a controlling position of the firm. We require that this controlling block not engage in any equity transactions directly with the firm. This restriction is natural for a firm that issues and repurchases shares to time the market because it would be disadvantageous for controlling block shareholders to engage in any such share transactions with the firm. Although we assume the block contains a fixed number of shares, we do not need to specify the exact size of this block, nor do we impose the restriction that the size of the block remain the same across firms. In addition, we do not need to make any assumptions about the identity of the shareholders in the controlling block; they can sell the shares to new shareholders, who then take over the controlling stake. We do require that the block not constitute all shareholders, and we thus assume that cumulated equity transactions never cause the number of non-controlling shares to go to zero. Thus, there are always shareholders available to take the opposite side of the equity transactions that benefit the shareholders in the controlling block. The block must also be large enough to control the firm. Because the size of a controlling block can be much smaller than 50% (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer 1999), we do not need to assume a strict lower bound on the block size.

These assumptions on the size of the controlling block can effectively be viewed as implicit restrictions on the model parameters that govern the size of equity transactions, with parameter values that encourage net equity issuance shrinking the fractional size of the block, and vice versa. To maintain tractability, we do not explicitly impose any such restrictions, but we later we examine how well these assumptions hold at the estimated parameter values. Similarly, although controlling shareholders clearly care about retaining control, for tractability, we do not allow the manager to optimize over the size of the controlling stake. Again, we check the conditions under which control

might plausibly be lost, given our estimated parameter values.

We now show how these assumptions affect the managers' maximization problem: first, in the case of no misvaluation, and, second, in the case of misvaluation. In both cases, the fraction of total shares outstanding owned by the controlling shareholders varies over time as the firm issues and repurchases shares. We denote this fraction by f_t . In the case of no misvaluation, the value of the controlling block of shares can be written as follows:

$$V^c(f_0, K_0, C_0, z_0) = \max_{\{K_t, C_t, E_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t f_t (1 - \tau_d) D_t \right). \quad (7)$$

The operator $\mathbb{E}_t$ is the expectation operator with respect to the distribution of z_t , conditional on the information at time 0. As we assume that the controlling block does not engage in equity transactions with the firm, its value does not incorporate payouts from repurchases.

We assume that the initial fraction held by the controlling block, f_0 , is such that the block always maintains control of the firm. This assumption implies that f_0 functions as a scaling parameter that influences only the fraction of total dividends accruing to the controlling block. As such, we can pull out f_0 from the above infinite sum to obtain the following:

$$V^c(f_0, K_0, C_0, z_0) = f_0 \max_{\{K_t, C_t, E_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{f_t}{f_0} (1 - \tau_d) D_t \right). \quad (8)$$

Define the value of the controlling block scaled by its fractional holding as:

$$V(K_0, C_0, z_0, f_0) \equiv \frac{V^c(f_0, K_0, C_0, z_0)}{f_0}. \quad (9)$$

We next show that $V(K_0, C_0, z_0, f_0)$ can be expressed using a recursive formulation. Combining together equations (8) and (9), we obtain:

$$V(K_0, C_0, z_0, f_0) = \max_{\{K_t, C_t, E_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}} \left\{ (1 - \tau_d) D_0 + \mathbb{E}_0 \left(\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{f_t}{f_0} (1 - \tau_d) D_t \right) \right\}, \quad (10)$$

where the initial dividend payment has been pulled out of the summation. The infinite sum (10) can be expressed in recursive form as the Bellman equation:

$$V(K, C, z, f) = \max_{K', C', E} \left\{ (1 - \tau_d) D + \beta \mathbb{E} \left(\frac{f'}{f} V(K', C', z', f') \right) \right\}, \quad (11)$$

where a prime indicates a variable tomorrow and no prime indicates a variable today. Thus, we have translated the problem of maximizing the value of the block shareholders into a recursive specification that takes into account the evolution of the fraction of shares owned by the block.

The next proposition shows that it is possible to express f'/f solely in terms of the current state variables, (K, C, z) .

Proposition 1 *The fractional ownership of the controlling block evolves according to:*

$$\frac{f'}{f} = \frac{V(K, C, z, f) - D(1 - \tau_d)}{V(K, C, z, f) - D(1 - \tau_d) + E}. \quad (12)$$

The above expression has a very intuitive explanation. An equity issuance ($E > 0$) dilutes the holdings of the controlling block and reduces its fractional ownership by a ratio determined by the ex-dividend value of the firm. An equity repurchase ($E < 0$) has the opposing effect of concentrating the fractional ownership of the controlling block.

Substituting (12) into (11) reveals that neither f nor f' has any impact on the firm's optimal policies. Thus, we can drop f from the expression for $V(K, C, z, f)$ to obtain

$$V(K, C, z) = V(K, C, z, f). \quad (13)$$

This simplification implies that the optimal policies of the firm and the value of the controlling block scaled by its fractional holding are independent of the fractional holding itself. As such, our model solution allows for variation in this controlling fraction across firms and over time.

3.3 Misvaluation

The next model ingredient is a misvaluation shock, ψ , that determines the ex-dividend equity value, V^* , at which equity transactions occur. In particular, V^* is a stochastic multiple of the ex-dividend target equity value that the managers maximize for the controlling block defined in the previous section. As these misvaluation shocks also affect the firm's optimal policies, we now define this target value as $V(K, C, \psi, z)$. Note that $V(K, C, \psi, z)$ differs from the fundamental value of the firm that would be obtained in the absence of misvaluation. This difference arises because managers actively optimize the value of the controlling block in response to misvaluation shocks. Thus, we call $V(K, C, \psi, z)$ “target value” because it is a function of the misvaluation term, ψ .

We write the value at which equity transactions occur, V^* , as:

$$V^* = (V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d)) \psi. \quad (14)$$

When $\psi = 1$, the firm is valued correctly; when $\psi < 1$, the firm is undervalued; and when $\psi > 1$, the firm is overvalued. This specification implies that misvaluation affects the price at which firms

transact equities. The misvaluation shock, ψ , follows the first-order autoregressive process:

$$\ln \psi' = \mu_\psi + \rho_{z\psi} \ln z + \rho_\psi \ln \psi + \varepsilon'_\psi, \quad (15)$$

where, ρ_ψ is the serial correlation of the shock, and ε_ψ is a normally distributed *i.i.d.* shock with mean zero and variance σ_ψ . It is uncorrelated with the shock to the profitability process, ε_z . Nonetheless, the form of (15) allows for correlation between the misvaluation and profitability processes. This correlation occurs through $\rho_{z\psi}$, which implies that the current profitability level affects the conditional expectation of the future misvaluation level. This model feature is motivated by the notion that investors over-extrapolate, so overvaluation is more likely to occur during good times, while undervaluation is more likely to occur during bad times. As detailed in the Appendix, the μ_ψ term is set so that the unconditional expectation of the misvaluation term equals 1.

Several different models can rationalize the presence of market mispricing. The first is simple asymmetric information, where the manager can observe the shock; that is, he knows the target value of the firm and can therefore observe deviations of target from market values. However, market participants cannot observe target value. If misvaluation stems solely from asymmetric information between the manager and outsiders, then for it to be persistent, there must exist frictions that prevent market participants from eventually inferring target firm value. An example of such a friction might be exogenous incomplete markets, as in Eisfeldt (2004), or a continuous inflow of private information. Another plausible theory of misvaluation is Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), which does not rely on asymmetric information. Instead, market participants disagree about target value, and short-sale constraints imply that optimal trading strategies result in mispricing. Another plausible theory is in Hellwig, Albagli, and Tsyvinski (2009), where traders receive heterogeneous signals about firm value, and the market price imperfectly aggregates these signals.

Although motivated by these various theories, our shock is exogenous to the firm's decisions, which implies that managers do not manipulate market expectations about firm value. Nonetheless, our specification of an exogenous shock allows us to model investment and a rich set of financing options in a dynamic setting. These features of our model are essential for quantifying the effects of mispricing on the firm.

In our model, misvaluation affects the price at which the firm either issues or repurchases shares. As such, it impacts the evolution of the fraction of shares owned by the controlling block, f . The

next proposition formally derives the evolution of this ratio in the presence of misvaluation.

Proposition 2 *In the presence of misvaluation, the fractional holding of the controlling block evolves according to the following:*

$$\frac{f'}{f} = \frac{V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau)}{V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau) + \frac{E}{\psi}}. \quad (16)$$

The above expression captures the effect of misvaluation on the evolution of the fractional holding of the control block. When firms are overvalued, i.e., $\psi > 1$, they are able to obtain a given amount of financing, E , by issuing a smaller number of shares, thus lessening the dilution of the controlling block's holding. On the other hand, when firms are undervalued, they are able to repurchase a greater quantity of shares for a given amount of expenditures, $E < 0$, enabling the controlling block to further concentrate its holdings.

Proposition 2 shows that under the assumption that the manager optimizes the value of a controlling block of shareholders, the manager's problem in the presence of misvaluation diverges from the optimization problem previously detailed only in rate at which the fraction of shares held by the controlling block evolves over time. As such, despite the nonstandard specification of the Bellman equation, (11), our model framework is fully time consistent.

3.4 Price Impact

The model presented above entails uninformed investors transacting with the firm based on V^* , which incorporates an exogenous misvaluation shock. The model thus rests on the implicit assumption that the firm manager knows more about the true value of the firm relative to these uninformed investors. In this case, market participants are likely to infer from the firm's equity repurchase and issuance decisions that the share price may be overvalued or undervalued and then bid the price down or up. See, for example, the evidence in Brockman and Chung (2001). More generally, a large literature documents that firms can issue (repurchase) shares only at a discount (premium) to the current price. For instance, Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Corwin (2003) find that SEOs occur at discounts to market prices and that the discount increases with the size of the equity offering. Similarly, a large literature following Vermaelen (1981) documents that firms announce repurchases at a premium to the current share price. These findings imply that firms cannot transact at the

market price in the model, V^* , but instead must transact at a price that takes into account the potential price impact of their announced equity transaction. In terms of our model, price impact therefore can therefore be viewed as a form of partial learning by these uninformed investors.

We model this price impact of equity transactions in a reduced-form manner by assuming that firms transact as if the market value of the firm is given by $V^*/(1 + \nu(E, K))$, where:

$$\nu(E, K) \equiv \frac{E}{2K} (\nu_i \mathcal{I}(E > 0) + \nu_r \mathcal{I}(E \leq 0)), \quad \nu_i, \nu_r \geq 0. \quad (17)$$

This piecewise linear specification of the price impact term $\nu(E, K)$ implies that the firm faces a discount from its market value when issuing shares ($E > 0$) and pays a premium when repurchasing shares, consistent with the evidence noted above. Note that $\nu(E, K)$ is a function of the fraction E/K . This assumption maintains homotheticity in the model and embodies the notion that the price impact of an equity transaction depends on the size of transaction relative to firm size.¹

This price impact affects the quantity of shares transacted by the firm, and thus the evolution of the fractional holding of the controlling block, as follows:

Proposition 3 *In the presence of misvaluation and price impact, the fractional holding of the controlling block evolves according to the following:*

$$\frac{f'}{f} = \frac{V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau)}{V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau) + \frac{E}{\psi}(1 + \nu(E, K))}. \quad (18)$$

The price impact implies that for a given equity issuance, $E > 0$, the firm must issue more shares to offset the price impact as $\nu(E, K) > 0$, leading to a larger reduction in the fractional holding of the controlling block shareholders. Conversely, a firm can repurchase less shares for a given amount $E < 0$, implying a smaller increase in the fractional holding of the controlling block. The reduced-form specification of (17) assumes that if asymmetric information is the force behind the price reaction, informational frictions prevent traders from completely inferring the firm manager's target valuation, $V(K, C, z, \psi)$.

We can substitute the evolution of the fractional holding of the controlling block shown in Equation (18) into Equation (11) to derive the following Bellman equation for the value of the

¹For tractability, we also assume that the price impact does not affect the process for ψ in (15). Price impact in our model can therefore be thought of as the cash equivalent of the discount or premium the firm experiences in its equity transactions. Because our estimates of price impact do not imply a large effect on the dilution or concentration of blockholder value, this assumption likely has little impact on our results.

controlling block in the presence of misvaluation and price impact:

$$V(K, C, \psi, z) = \max_{K', C', E} \left\{ (1 - \tau_d)D + \beta \frac{(V - D(1 - \tau_d))\psi}{(V - D(1 - \tau_d))\psi + E(1 + \nu(E, K))} \mathbb{E} (V(K', C', \psi', z')) \right\}. \quad (19)$$

The above expectation is taken over the joint distribution of (ψ', z') , conditional on (ψ, z) . One important implication of our motivation for the price impact term is the form the model takes in the absence of misvaluation. As emphasized in Hennessy and Whited (2007), lemons' premia and other forms of price impact can occur in the absence of misvaluation. In this case, by setting $\psi = 1$ in (19), we obtain a standard neoclassical model with financing frictions.

It is not obvious that a solution to (19) exists, inasmuch as the discount factor need not always be less than one. However, as in Bazdresch (2013), the following proposition allows the Bellman equation (19) to be written with a constant discount factor.

Proposition 4 *The solution to (19) is identical to the solution of*

$$V(K, C, \psi, z) = \max_{K', C', E} \left\{ (1 - \tau_d)D - \frac{E(1 + \nu(E, K))}{\psi} + \beta \mathbb{E} (V(K', C', \psi', z')) \right\}. \quad (20)$$

It is straightforward to show that (20) satisfies the conditions in Stokey and Lucas (1989) that are necessary for the existence and uniqueness of a solution.

The above specification also highlights a helpful technical role that price impact plays in the model. In the absence of price impact, the relative price of equity and dividends would be a linear function of misvaluation, ψ . In addition, conditional on an equity transaction, equity transactions and dividends offset each other one-for-one in the budget constraint, as shown in Equation (6). This linearity implies that there would be no interior solution for optimal equity issuances and repurchases in the presence of misvaluation. The price impact term allows for an interior solution for equity transactions because the marginal benefit of equity transactions declines with their size.

It is important to note that the Bellman equation (20) does not imply that the model contains stochastic issuance costs, as in Eisfeldt and Muir (2012) or Bolton et al. (2013). This distinction is important for three reasons. First, the misvaluation shock directly affects the price of equity capital and thus affects *both* repurchases and issuances, instead of just issuance. Second, as we show below, our model has the potential to generate realistic covariances between equity returns and firm policies, whereas models with stochastic issuance costs cannot because they do not generate

sufficient equity variability. Finally, the misvaluation shock has no direct impact on the budget constraint (6) that defines dividends, whereas stochastic issuance costs would.

Our model is, nonetheless, closely related to those in Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005) or Eisfeldt and Muir (2012). Gilchrist et al. (2005) examine equity issuance and investment in a model with reduced-form bubbles in the price of equity. In contrast to their model, we allow for equity to be both over- and under-priced relative to fundamentals, and we also allow for firms to adjust on the savings margin, in addition to the investment margin. Eisfeldt and Muir (2012) examine firm's investment and saving decisions in the presence of stochastic issuance costs and an aggregate productivity shock. However, they do not incorporate any deviations in the price of equity from its fundamental value. Our model is also unique with respect to both of these models in the distinction between dividends and repurchases.

3.5 Constant Returns to Scale Specification

Our model can be further simplified by taking advantage of its constant returns to scale nature, and redefining all of the quantities in the model as a fraction of the capital stock, K . Define the following scaled variables:

$$c \equiv \frac{C}{K}, d \equiv \frac{D}{K}, e \equiv \frac{E}{K}, i \equiv \frac{I}{K}, v(c, \psi, z) \equiv \frac{V(K, C, \psi, z)}{K}.$$

Then, by dividing all of the variables in (20) by K , we obtain the following Bellman equation:

$$v(c, \psi, z) = \max_{c', e, i} \left\{ (1 - \tau_d)d - \frac{e(1 + \nu(e, 1))}{\psi} + \beta \mathbb{E} (v(c', \psi', z') (1 - \delta + i)) \right\}, \quad (21)$$

and the constraints become:

$$d - e + \mathcal{I}(e > 0)a_0 = z(1 - \tau_c) - i - \frac{\lambda i^2}{2} + c(1 + r - r\tau_c) - c'(1 - \delta + i) + \delta\tau_c - \Phi(c, c'), \quad (22)$$

$$d \geq 0 \quad (23)$$

$$-c \leq 1.$$

4 Optimal Policies

In this section, we analyze the first-order conditions for optimal financial and investment policies.

Equity and Dividends

We start with equity and dividend policy, holding optimal investment and net cash policy fixed. The right-hand side of (22) is then also fixed. Let e^* be the unconstrained best equity policy, which is the optimal policy absent the constraint (23). We solve for e^* by substituting (22) into (21), differentiating with respect to e , and setting the result equal to zero. We also must ensure that e^* is large enough to warrant paying the fixed cost; that is, the payoff to equity holders if the firm issues equity must exceed the payoff when it does not. Unconstrained optimal equity policy is given by:

$$e^* = \begin{cases} (\psi(1 - \tau_d) - 1)/\nu_i > 0 & \text{for } \psi > 1/(1 - \tau_d) \text{ and } (e^* - a_0)(1 - \tau_d) - e^*(1 + \nu_i e^*/2)/\psi < 0 \\ (\psi(1 - \tau_d) - 1)/\nu_r < 0 & \text{for } \psi < 1/(1 - \tau_d) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (24)$$

where the last expression on the first line of (24) is the extra optimality constraint that arises from the fixed cost. This constraint implies an inaction region in which the firm neither issues nor repurchases shares. Outside this region, for ψ sufficiently large, the firm wishes to issue equity, and for ψ sufficiently small, the firm wishes to repurchase shares. The higher the parameters ν_i and ν_r , the smaller the desired issuance and repurchasing activity. The dividend tax implies that when $\psi = 1$, the optimal policy in the absence of the constraint (22) is to repurchase shares. If equity policy is given by (24), desired dividends then are given by (22).

Of course, these first-order conditions ignore the constraint (23), which provides an important link between the real and financial sides of the firm. If the first-order conditions in (24) produce optimal dividends that are positive, then (24) holds exactly. However, if (24) implies that optimal dividends are negative, the constraint binds, so that they are zero. Optimal equity issuance is then given not by (24) but by the budget constraint (22). The policy implied by the budget constraint always trumps the policy implied by the first-order condition when the two policies differ. Thus, mispricing is not the sole determinant of equity policy: funding needs matter as well.

Table 1 contains a schematic that categorizes the possible combinations of optimal equity and dividend policies. For brevity, we denote the right-hand side of the budget constraint (22) as b . Then we have $d - e + \mathcal{I}(e > 0)a_0 = b$. The second column of Table 1 describes the equity policy given by (24) alone, that is, e^* . The third column lists various possibilities for the value of the budget constraint, b , relative to 0 and to e^* . The fourth and fifth columns list the optimal equity

and dividend policies, respectively.

Table 1: Optimal Equity and Dividend Policies

case	first-order condition	budget constraint	equity policy	dividend policy
(1)	$e^* < 0$	$b > -e^*$	$e = e^*$	$d = b + e > 0$
(2)	$e^* < 0$	$0 < b < -e^*$	$e = -b$	$d = 0$
(3)	$e^* < 0$	$b < 0$	$e = -b + a_0 > 0$	$d = 0$
(4)	$e^* > 0$	$b > 0$	$e = e^*$	$d = b + e - a_0 > 0$
(5)	$e^* > 0$	$-e^* - a_0 < b < 0$	$e = e^*$	$d = b + e - a_0 > 0$
(6)	$e^* > 0$	$b < -e^* - a_0$	$e = -b + a_0 > 0$	$d = 0$
(7)	$e^* = 0$	$b > 0$	$e = e^* = 0$	$d = b > 0$
(8)	$e^* = 0$	$b < 0$	$e = -b + a_0 > 0$	$d = 0$
(9)	$e^* \leq 0$	$b = 0$	$e = 0$	$d = 0$

Cases (1)–(3) are those in which the firm would repurchase shares if it had no budget constraint. Each case corresponds to a different situation vis-à-vis the budget constraint. In Case (1), the firm has ample resources after implementing its optimal investment and cash policies, so it simultaneously pays dividends and repurchases shares. This situation can occur because the tax disadvantage of cash implies that the firm will not optimally want to retain all of its earnings after it exhausts profitable investment projects. Case (1) is also interesting because it shows that the model can allow for simultaneous dividends and repurchases. To the extent that price impact can occur even in the absence of misvaluation, this case demonstrates that misvaluation is not required for simultaneous dividends and repurchases. Second, in Case (2), the firm has enough resources to repurchase shares, but not enough to attain the level given by e^* . Dividends are thus zero. Third, if the firm requires external equity funding ($b < 0$), as in Case (3), then it issues equity, even though equity is undervalued. Misvaluation in this case makes equity issuance extremely costly. Not only does the firm have to pay the issuance cost, a_0 , but it is forced by the budget constraint to float shares in a state of the world in which it would be optimal to repurchase shares.

The next three cases describe overvaluation. In Case (4), the right-hand side of (22) is positive, so the firm issues equity, and then uses b and the proceeds to pay dividends. If, as in Case (5), $b < 0$ but this deficit is more than filled by the level of equity issuance given by e^* , then once again, the firm both issues equity and pays dividends. If the firm is both overvalued and requires a great deal of external equity finance, as in Case (6), then the firm issues equity but pays no dividends.

Cases (7) and (8) concern the inaction region in which $e^* = 0$. In this region, the firm never repurchases shares. If $b > 0$, then the firm pays dividends and engages in no equity transactions. On the other hand, if $b < 0$, the firm issues equity to fill the funding gap and then pays zero dividends. Case (9) reflects an inaction region that arises when the budget constraint is such that the firm would wish to issue equity and invest, but refrains from doing so due to the fixed cost of equity issuance. Instead, the firm issues no equity, finances investment with available funds and pays zero dividends.

Investment

We now turn to the first-order condition for optimal investment, which we obtain by differentiating (21) with respect to i :

$$(1 - \tau_d + \gamma)(1 + \lambda i) = \beta \mathbb{E} (v(c', \psi', z') - (1 - \tau_d + \gamma)c'). \quad (25)$$

Here, γ is the Lagrange multiplier on the dividend nonnegativity constraint (23). Naturally, this first-order condition appears similar to that from a neoclassical q model. If the dividend nonnegativity constraint does not bind, then the marginal cost of investment is $(1 + \lambda i)(1 - \tau_d)$. At an optimum, cash and investment are chosen so that this marginal cost equals the discounted expected value of $v(c', \psi', z')$ less after-tax future net cash. Financing frictions add an additional component to the marginal cost of investment, which is the Lagrange multiplier term γ . This term implies that investment is more costly to the firm in those states of the world in which more investment would force the dividend nonnegativity constraint to bind. Conversely, if overvaluation induces a large equity issuance, then the dividend nonnegativity constraint is less likely to bind, and the firm will likely invest more. This latter effect confirms the common intuition that overvaluation relaxes financial constraints by making equity financing cheap. Examining the marginal benefit of investment, given by the right-hand side of (25), also reveals useful intuition. If there is no misvaluation ($\psi = 1$), then the right-hand side of (25) shows that misvaluation has no *direct* effect on the marginal benefit of investment, but it does have an *indirect* effect because it affects the target value that managers maximize for the controlling block.

Net Cash

Let $\mathcal{I}_c$ be an indicator function that is one when the firm is issuing debt. We obtain the first-order condition for net cash by differentiating (21) with respect to c' :

$$(1 - \delta + i - \phi \mathcal{I}_c) = \beta \mathbb{E} (v_c(c', \psi', z')(1 - \delta + i)). \quad (26)$$

Next we use the envelope condition to eliminate $v_c(c', \psi', z')$ from the problem. Let ξ be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the collateral constraint (4). Substituting in the envelope condition, $v_c(c, \psi, z) = (1 + r(1 - \tau_c) + \phi \mathcal{I}_c)(1 + \gamma + \xi)$, and rearranging gives:

$$(1 - \delta + i - \phi \mathcal{I}_c) = \beta \mathbb{E} ((1 + r(1 - \tau_c) + \phi \mathcal{I}_c')(1 + \gamma' + \xi')(1 - \delta + i)). \quad (27)$$

To interpret (27), we first set $\phi = 0$, so that the $(1 - \delta + i)$ terms cancel. The right-hand side of (27) is the expected discounted value of cash, which equals the after tax principal and interest on net cash balances. The Lagrange multipliers γ' and ξ' then show that net cash is more valuable when the dividend constraint or the collateral constraint is expected to bind. In particular, the presence of ξ' means that the firm adjusts net cash to avoid bumping up against the collateral constraint. As is standard in dynamic investment models (e.g. Gamba and Triantis 2008), net cash (equivalently, debt capacity) thus has value because it confers financial flexibility. If $\phi \neq 0$, then (27) shows that there is an inaction region for debt issuance. Because misvaluation is persistent, it affects the constraints associated with dividends and net cash, and thus the Lagrange multipliers γ' and ξ' , which in turn affect the optimal cash holdings this period.

Numerical Policy Functions

In Figure 3, we plot the policy functions for investment, net cash, issuances/repurchases, and dividends, which we denote as $\{c', i, e, d\} = h(c, \psi, z)$. We parameterize the model using the estimates from the late/large sample reported subsequently in Table 2.²

Panel A of Figure 3 depicts the optimal choices of net cash, investment, equity issuances/repurchases, and dividends as a function of the misvaluation shock. The x-axis contains possible values of the shock. It has a log scale because the shock is approximately lognormally distributed. A value

²Policy functions calculated with parameters from our other estimations are qualitatively similar.

of 1 indicates no misvaluation. To construct this panel, we have fixed the profit shock and the current-period level of net cash at their respective sample means from a model simulation.

As expected, given the first-order conditions in (24), Panel A shows that the equity policy function slopes upward, with an inaction region in the center that stems from the fixed issuance cost. Outside of this inaction region, undervaluation results in repurchases, and overvaluation results in issuance. More interesting is the contrast between the policy functions for investment and net cash. The former is largely flat, except for a slight upward slope when the firm is issuing equity. In contrast, the policy function for net cash largely tracks the policy function for equity issuance. This contrast occurs because our parameter estimates indicate that investment is more costly to adjust than net cash. Thus, the firm uses debt financing or dissaving for repurchases and either hoards the proceeds from issuances as cash or uses the proceeds to pay down debt. Finally, the policy function for dividends is also flat, except for a slight uptick for extreme overvaluation. This pattern can also be understood in terms of Cases (4) and (5) in Table 1, in which desired equity issuance is so high that there are proceeds left over to distribute to shareholders after all other optimal policies have been funded.

Panel B Figure 3 depicts the response of investment, net cash, issuances/repurchases, and dividends to the profitability shock, z . For this panel, we fix the level of ψ at $1/(1 - \tau_d)$ and the current-period level of net cash at the sample mean from a model simulation. In contrast to the result in the Panel A, investment responds strongly and positively to the profitability shock because the profitability shock is the one-period marginal product of capital. The response of optimal net cash to the profitability shock is nonmonotonic. For most of the range of z , net cash increases slightly. When z rises, the increase in the marginal product of capital implies that the firm substitutes physical assets for financial assets. However, there is also a positive income effect on net cash from a higher z , because costly external finance confers a flexibility benefit on net cash. The income effect dominates for most of the range of z . For extremely high levels of z , the flexibility benefit of higher net cash is negligible because the firm is flush with resources. Thus, the firm increases net debt (decreases net cash) to finance capital accumulation.

Equity transactions do not vary with the profitability shock, remaining at 0 over the entire range of z . When $\psi = 1 < 1/(1 - \tau_d)$, (24) shows that zero equity transactions are optimal unless

the firm's optimal cash and investment policies, together with the budget constraint (22), indicate that the firm needs external equity financing. However, for the level of current cash underlying Figure 3, the firm never optimally needs to fund investment with equity issuance. In contrast, dividends do respond to the profitability shock, but only when it is high. In these states of the world, the firm has more than enough internal funds to finance its optimal investment program, so it pays the residual out to shareholders.

The main conclusions to be drawn from Figure 3 are as follows. First, investment is mostly affected by shocks to profitability and not by equity market misvaluation. Second, net cash policy is affected by both profitability and misvaluation shocks. Finally, equity issuance policy is affected far more by misvaluation shocks than by profitability shocks. It is worth noting that these patterns are in no way hardwired into the model because different arbitrary parameters can yield policy functions with different shapes. For this reason, we analyze the model only for the parameter values that we *estimate*, so that the results are empirically relevant.

5 Estimation and Identification

In this section, we first explain how we estimate the parameters of the model detailed in Section 3. We then discuss our identification strategy.

5.1 Estimation

We estimate most of the structural parameters of the model using simulated method of moments (SMM). However, we specify some model parameters separately. For example, we estimate the risk-free interest rate, r , as the average real 3-month Treasury bill rate over the sample period of interest. We set the corporate tax rate equal to 20%. This level is lower than the statutory rate because we omit personal taxes on interest from the model. Finally, we set the tax rate on dividends, τ_d equal to the difference between the statutory rates on dividends and capital gains.

We then estimate the following 12 parameters using SMM: the fixed equity issuance cost, a_0 ; the linear debt issuance cost, ϕ ; the drift, standard deviation, and autocorrelation of the profitability process, μ , σ_z and ρ_z ; the quadratic adjustment cost parameter, λ ; the standard deviation and autocorrelation of the misvaluation process, σ_ψ and ρ_ψ ; the market-timing penalties, ν_i and ν_r , the

correlation between the misvaluation and profitability shocks, $\rho_{z\psi}$, and the depreciation rate, δ .

The SMM estimation proceeds as follows. First, we generate simulated data using the numerical solution to the model. Specifically, we take a random draw from the distribution of $(\varepsilon'_z, \varepsilon'_\psi)$, conditional on $(\varepsilon_z, \varepsilon_\psi)$, and then compute $v(c, \psi, z)$, $(c', e, i) = h(c, \psi, z)$, and various functions of $v(c, \psi, z)$, c' , e , and i , such as Tobin's q . We continue drawing values of $(\varepsilon'_z, \varepsilon'_\psi)$ and using these computations to generate an artificial panel of firms. Next, we calculate interesting moments using both these simulated data and actual data. SMM then picks the model parameters that make the actual and simulated moments as close as possible. The Appendix provides details.

One important issue for estimation is unobserved heterogeneity in our data from Compustat. These firms differ along a variety of dimensions, such as technology and access to external finance. In contrast, the only source of heterogeneity in our model is the individual draws of $(\varepsilon_z, \varepsilon_\psi)$. Therefore, we remove the heterogeneity from the actual data, using fixed firm effects in the estimation of variances and covariances. We calculate autocorrelation coefficients using the method in Han and Phillips (2010), which controls for heterogeneity at the firm level.

This issue of heterogeneity implies that SMM estimates the parameters of an average firm, not the average of the parameters across firms. These two quantities are not the same because the model is nonlinear. Because it is often difficult to conceptualize an average firm in a large population of firms over a long time span, we first examine subsamples of firms that are homogeneous along the time and size dimensions, as in Figures 1 and 2. We examine separately the time periods before and after the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. Within these two time periods, we analyze small and large firms, so that we end up with four groups of firms.

5.2 Identification

The success of this procedure relies on model identification, which requires that we choose moments that vary when the structural parameters vary. In making these choices, we do not want to “cherry-pick” moments because we want to understand what features of the data our model can and cannot reconcile. Therefore, we examine all of the standard deviations, as well as most of the means and serial correlations, of all of the variables we can compute from our model: investment, profits, equity issuances, equity repurchases, net cash, equity returns, and Tobin's q . We construct our simulated variables as follows. Net cash is c , investment is i , net saving is $c'(1 - \delta + i) - c$, equity

issuance is $\max(e, 0)$, repurchases are $\min(-e, 0)$, and returns are $(\psi'v')/(\psi v) - 1$.

We now describe and rationalize the 19 moments that we match. Of particular interest is finding moments that can be used to identify the standard deviation and serial correlation of the misvaluation shock, ρ_ψ and σ_ψ , as well as the correlation between the two shocks, $\rho_{z\psi}$. Because both the misvaluation shocks and profitability shocks affect firm policies, this task is difficult.

Of great help in this endeavor are the mean, standard deviation, and serial correlation of operating profits, which are defined in the model as z . The only model parameters that induce any variation in these three moments are the drift, residual standard deviation, and serial correlation of the profitability shock, μ , σ_z , and ρ_z . Therefore, these three parameters can be pinned down using only these three moments. Roughly speaking, with these three parameters pinned down, moments related to the market value of the firm can be used to pin down ρ_ψ , σ_ψ , and $\rho_{z\psi}$.

We use five moments related to market values. The first four are the standard deviation and serial correlation of Tobin's q and equity returns.³ All four moments are useful for identifying the standard deviation and the serial correlation of the misvaluation process, σ_ψ and ρ_ψ . Intuitively, the standard deviations of returns and Tobin's q are strongly increasing in σ_ψ . The serial correlation of Tobin's q increases with ρ_ψ , while the serial correlation of returns decreases with ρ_ψ because returns are roughly the first difference of Tobin's q , which is stationary in the model. The fifth moment we use to identify misvaluation shocks is the slope coefficient from regressing equity issuance on returns, which is generally increasing in $\rho_{z\psi}$. Issuance is determined by both ψ and z , as is firm value, so the higher the correlation between ψ and z , the more issuance covaries with returns.

Our next moments are the mean, serial correlation, and standard deviation of the rate of investment, i . The standard deviation is useful for identifying the adjustment cost parameter, λ , because higher λ produces less volatile investment. The serial correlation is primarily affected by the smooth adjustment cost parameter, as well by the serial correlation of the profitability process, ρ_z . The mean of investment is particularly useful for identifying the depreciation rate of capital, as average investment is strongly increasing in this parameter.

The rest of the moments pertain to the firm's financing decisions. We include the mean, serial correlation, and standard deviation of the ratio of net cash to assets. The standard deviation of net

³We omit the means of Tobin's q and equity returns because our model cannot capture rents to capital or the equity premium, which largely determine the means of these two variables, respectively.

cash decreases sharply with ϕ and is thus useful for its identification. We also include the mean and standard deviation of the ratio of equity issuance to capital, the incidence of equity issuance, and the mean and standard deviation of the ratio of repurchases to capital. These moments are useful for identifying the equity issuance cost parameter, a_0 , the parameters penalizing equity transactions, ν_i and ν_r . The incidence of issuance is particularly useful for identifying the standard deviation of the misvaluation shock. Absent the misvaluation shock, the model can produce lumpy, infrequent issuance that is used to fund investment. However, the frequency is much smaller than what is in the data. The presence of the misvaluation shock helps bridge this gap.⁴

6 Results

This section presents estimates of the model from Section 3, as well as from an augmented model that contains time-varying expected returns. For these first two estimations, we stratify the sample by time period and firm size. We also report estimations from different industries.

6.1 Baseline Estimation

Panel A of Table 2 shows that the model fits the data surprisingly well. Across the four estimations, only one third of the simulated moments are statistically significantly different from their data counterparts, and only a handful are *economically* different. In addition, although we reject the joint null that all of the model errors equal zero for the early samples and for the small firms in the late sample, we cannot reject this null for the large firms in the late sample. This good fit is remarkable, given that we have used many more moments than parameters in the estimation. The model does an especially good job of matching all of the mean moments. In particular, the model comes close to matching the high net cash of the small firms in the latter part of the sample. The model also reconciles the standard deviations of most of the variables. Here, the ability of the model to match the standard deviation of profits is important. Otherwise, if the model could not generate sufficient variability in profits, this shortcoming would put substantial weight on misvaluation to generate sufficient variability in firm policies. The model struggles with only a few features of

⁴We omit moments related to dividends. As with all investment-based models of financing (e.g. Hennessy and Whited 2005, 2007), the model-implied variance of dividends far exceeds the smoothness observed in the data. If we use dividend moments in the estimation, this model failure causes many moments to be poorly matched. Therefore, any counterfactuals constructed using the poorly fitting simulated moments produce inaccurate inferences.

the data. The serial correlations of net cash and returns are too high, and the serial correlation of Tobin's q is too low. Also, the means of repurchases in the late period are too low, and the standard deviation of investment in three of the four samples is too low.

Panel B of Table 2 presents the parameter estimates we obtain from each of our four samples. Most of the parameters are statistically significant. Two exceptions are the estimates of the equity issuance cost parameter (a_0) from the late period. This result is not surprising, given the rise of the practice of shelf registration of equity offerings (Gao and Ritter 2011). The other exceptions are three of the estimates of the shock correlation parameter, $\rho_{z\psi}$, and all of the estimates of the debt issuance cost parameter, ϕ . Although we cannot estimate ϕ precisely, the cost of debt issuance does play a helpful role in constraining the volatility of net cash holdings.

More importantly, for all four samples, the standard deviations of the misvaluation shocks are highly statistically significant, ranging from 0.21 to 0.29. To interpret these magnitudes, it is important to remember that these figures are for $\ln(\psi)$, not for the level of ψ . Thus, the standard deviation estimates are of the same order of magnitude as return standard deviations, which in our four samples run from 42% to 55%. We conclude that a great deal, but by no means all of the variability in market values fails to reflect the manager's view of fundamentals. Finally, note that the estimates of the serial correlation of the process for $\ln(\psi)$ are all low and insignificantly different from zero. This result implies that the standard deviation of the innovation to the process for $\ln(\psi)$ roughly equals the standard deviation of $\ln(\psi)$ itself.

The economic magnitudes of many of the other parameters are plausible. The estimates of the adjustment cost parameters correspond to the range of estimates of the coefficient on Tobin's q reported in, for example, Erickson and Whited (2012). Two parameters that are difficult to interpret are ν_i and ν_r , so we gauge their economic magnitudes by setting them to zero, calculating the dilution or concentration of the value of the controlling block that occurs, and then comparing these figures to the dilution or concentration that occurs, given the estimated values of ν_i and ν_r . These figures are reasonable. For example, according to the late-large estimation, an equity issuance of 1% of firm value has a dilution effect for controlling shareholders equal to an issuance of 1.09% of firm value in a frictionless setting with no ν_i term. These dilution effects range from 1.02% to 1.05% for the other three samples. The figures for repurchases imply that the concentration of

the holdings of controlling shareholders ranges from 0.78% to 0.97% for a 1% equity repurchase. In sum, although we find a sizable amount of perceived misvaluation, these parameter estimates indicate that potential adverse market responses limit managers' ability to take advantage of it.

Recall that we have not restricted the parameter values to ensure that the size of the controlling block does not become either too small or so large that it encompasses all shareholders. To address these possibilities, we calculate how many years it would take for either of these two scenarios to occur, given our estimated parameter values. For the early/small sample, average issuance exceeds average repurchases, so the concern is that the controlling stake will be diluted. We use model simulations to calculate that it would take over 100 years for a 50% ownership stake to be diluted in half. For the other three samples, because average repurchases exceed issuance, the concern is that the controlling stake would grow to comprise the entire firm. We calculate that for an initial controlling stake of 50%, it would take between 40 and 100 years for this scenario to occur, depending on the sample. These time spans are sufficiently long to support our assumptions about the fixed size of the controlling block.

6.2 Pricing Kernel

We now ask whether our estimates of the variance of the misvaluation shock are simply picking up movements in rational expected returns. To this end, we add an aggregate productivity term to our model that is calibrated to match the duration and severity of expansions and recessions in the United States and an associated pricing kernel. See the Appendix for details. Table 3 presents our estimates of this augmented model. The augmented model fits most of the moments better, which is not surprising, given that the augmented model contains an extra shock. Interestingly, the estimates for the standard deviation of the misvaluation shock are still significantly different from zero. Compared to the estimates in Table 2, they are nearly the same for the early period and slightly higher for the late period, compared to baseline model. Thus, time-varying expected returns cannot account for the levels of the misvaluation shock standard deviation.

6.3 Industry Estimation

The parameter estimates we obtain are for an average firm, not an average parameter across firms. Therefore, we now estimate the model using data from homogeneous groups of firms that are

stratified by two-digit SIC industry. This exercise provides a stricter test of the model’s ability to rationalize the data from very different types of firms.

Because our highly nonlinear estimations require a great deal of data for identification, we choose the eight two-digit SIC codes with the most data points. SIC13 is oil and gas extraction; SIC20 is food products; SIC28 is chemicals and allied products; SIC35 is machinery and computer equipment; SIC36 is electronic and electrical equipment; SIC38 is measuring instruments; SIC50 is wholesale trade; and SIC73 is business services.

We first present the moment estimates. For brevity, Figure 4 displays our results from matching an important subset of moments: the means of the four policy variables in our model, which are investment, net cash, equity issuances, and repurchases. Each panel in Figure 4 corresponds to a different moment, with the x-axes containing the simulated moments and the y-axes containing the data moments. Each pair of data moment and corresponding simulated moment is then labeled by the relevant industry SIC code.

Panels A and B show that the model does an excellent job of matching average net cash and investment. These moment pairs line up nicely along their respective 45° lines, and none of these pairs represent a significant model error. This result is particularly strong, given the large differences in the moments across industries. For example, oil and gas extraction has high net debt of approximately 25% of assets, while business services has high net cash of approximately 3% of assets. As seen in Panel C, the model does not do as good a job of matching average equity issuance. Although the model can capture the wide difference between the low equity issuance in food and the very high equity issuance in oil and gas, three of eight pairs of moments are statistically significantly different from each other. Panel D shows that the model does a somewhat worse job with average repurchases. Only two of these moment pairs are insignificantly different from each other. Nonetheless, the model does capture the “spread” observed in the repurchase moment conditions across industries.

Table 4 contains the parameter estimates. We concentrate on the estimates of the standard deviation σ of the misvaluation shock. The industries with the lowest variance shocks are SIC20 (food products), SIC50 (wholesale trade), and SIC 38 (measuring instruments). The industries with the highest variance shocks are SIC13 (oil and gas extraction), SIC35 (machinery and computer

equipment), SIC 36 (electronic equipment), and SIC73 (business services). It is useful to compare these estimates with other measures of misvaluation. Unfortunately, the misvaluation of an entire group of firms is hard to gauge. Nonetheless, we find it plausible that firms in high R&D industries are more opaque, and thus more likely to suffer from misvaluation. The bottom row of Table 4 contains average R&D for the firms in each industry. Interestingly, the lowest R&D industries (food and wholesale) have the lowest variance misvaluation shocks, which are also statistically insignificant. Except for oil and gas extraction, which does negligible R&D, the highest R&D industries also have the highest variance misvaluation shocks. One obvious explanation for the oil and gas industry is that the exploration business is extremely risky and the oil reserves of these companies are hard to value. These results thus constitute a useful external model validation exercise that lends credibility to the interpretation of ψ as a misvaluation shock, as opposed to some other source of variability.

7 Counterfactuals

We now quantify the effects of misvaluation via counterfactual exercises. First, in Figure 5 we measure the change in firm policies when we alter the standard deviation of the misvaluation shock process. To construct this figure, we parameterize the model with the late-large estimates in Table 2 because this is the sample on which the model fits best, so our counterfactuals will be most empirically relevant.⁵ We then solve the model 20 times, each time corresponding to a different value of σ_ψ , with the rest of the parameters held at their estimated values. For each model solution, we simulate 150,000 firm-year observations, and then compute the averages of five variables.

Panel A of Figure 5 plots repurchases and equity issuance as a function of the standard deviation of the misvaluation shock, σ_ψ . In both cases, we average in observations with zero activity. Not surprisingly, average equity issuances and repurchases increase with the misvaluation shock standard deviation. To understand whether the increase in issuance is due to size or frequency, we also plot the incidence of equity issuance. Interestingly, average incidence rises almost parallel with average issuance, which means that the average size of an issuance remains roughly constant. Only the frequency increases with misvaluation shock standard deviation.

⁵ The results using the other model parameterizations are qualitatively similar.

In Panel B of Figure 5, we plot average net cash and average investment as a function of σ_ψ . Net cash is much higher for firms that face higher standard deviation misvaluation shocks. Although average investment is also higher, this effect is much more modest. For reference, we also plot the level of investment that would result from a frictionless neoclassical investment model with the same profitability shock process, depreciation rate, and investment adjustment costs. Interestingly, we find that firms overinvest relative to this level, except at the lowest misvaluation shock volatility. This result is interesting because it shows that in the model misvaluation shocks allow firms to issue equity when the existence of equity issuance costs would make this source of financing prohibitively expensive, that is, misvaluation alleviates financial constraints. We find that this effect does not result in the same level of investment that would occur in a frictionless environment. Instead, the resulting level of investment is somewhat higher.

Panel C of Figure 5 plots average firm fundamental value, v as a function of σ_ψ , where we have normalized the value with no misvaluation to be one so that the plot isolates the value of timing. The effect of σ_ψ is modest, especially for low shock standard deviations. One question we can answer from this plot is how much controlling shareholders' value would be lost if the shock standard deviation were zero instead of its estimated value of 0.29. Equivalently, how much value would be lost if the manager followed the optimal policies of a firm that experienced less (or no) misvaluation, but worked in a firm subject to misvaluation. We find that the controlling shareholders would lose 3% of their equity value.⁶ This figure is likely an upper bound for the actual amount of lost value. When we change the misvaluation shock standard deviation, we do so holding all other parameters constant. However, it is unlikely that the market response to equity issuance and repurchases (as captured by the parameters ν_i and ν_r) would remain the same in a low misvaluation environment. Indeed, these parameters would likely be somewhat smaller and equity transactions would be less constrained. More liberal equity policies would then attenuate the drop in the value of controlling shareholders' equity.

To understand the economic mechanisms behind this result, we examine the immediate impact of misvaluation shocks by calculating impulse response functions. Once again, we parameterize the model using the estimates from the large firms in the late period. This exercise differs from our

⁶The corresponding figures for our other three samples are between 2.1% and 3%.

comparative statics exercises in which we change a model *parameter* and then examine its impact on average firm policies. Instead, we are looking at the immediate response of a single variable to an actual realization of a shock. Calculating an impulse response function with real data requires estimating, inverting, and orthogonalizing a vector autoregression because the shocks that drive the variables of interest are unobservable. However, in our simulated data we *do* observe our shocks, so to calculate our impulse response functions, we simply regress our variables of interest on each of our two shocks, which we standardize and orthogonalize using a Cholesky decomposition.

The results are in Figure 6. The y-axis in each panel contains the *change* in the variable of interest in response to a one standard deviation shock. The x-axis is time since the shock realization. The most striking result is in Panel A, which depicts net cash balances. A one standard deviation misvaluation shock raises net cash balances by about 2% of assets. This substantial effect dies out only by half after five years. As shown in Panels B–D, a one standard deviation misvaluation shock also has important effects on issuances and repurchases, but not on investment.

The effects of the profit shock are noticeably different in magnitude. First, a one standard deviation profit shock has a large negative effect on average net cash balances, as firms substitute out of financial capital and into physical capital when the latter becomes more productive. For firms with positive net debt, this response simply represents the use of debt finance to fund investment. Interestingly, this effect dies out rapidly. Next, we find that issuance and repurchases respond only weakly to the profit shocks. In the case of issuance, a one standard deviation shock does not induce such a large investment that the firm wishes to pay the fixed issuance cost to finance the investment with equity. In contrast, profit shocks have a much stronger effect on investment than do misvaluation shocks.

External validity

Finally, we conduct an informal “out-of-sample” test of the validity of our model, in the sense that we want to ascertain whether it can reconcile patterns in the data that were not used to estimate it. In particular, given our interest in market timing, we want to ascertain whether our model can replicate the correlations between equity returns and a variety of different variables. Table 5 contains the results from this comparison. We do separate calculations for the four samples from Table 2: early/small, early/large, late/small, and late/large, with Panel A containing results from

a model with the estimated variances of the misvaluation shocks and with Panel B containing the results for no misvaluation. The actual data correlations are correlations between the aggregate variables depicted in Figures 1 and 2. The simulated correlations are from data simulated from the model, given the four different parameterizations.

Panel A shows that for all four samples, we match the signs of the correlations between returns and investment, net saving, equity issuance, and repurchases. We also match many of the actual magnitudes of the correlations, although our model captures only about half of the extremely high correlation between net saving and returns for the small firms in the late sample. However, this large correlation is primarily driven by the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Our model does not do as good a job at matching the signs of the correlations between returns and dividends, which is not surprising because we have no moments related to dividends in our estimation. Nonetheless, given that we only use a moment related to one out of these five correlations (returns versus issuance) in our estimation, our ability to replicate other correlations bolsters confidence in the model.

Panel B examines the role of misvaluation in generating these correlations. For this panel, we set the variance of the misvaluation shocks to near zero. We find that even without misvaluation, the model can generate substantial correlations between returns and investment or returns and saving, especially in the early sample. What the model without misvaluation cannot do is generate sizable correlations between returns and equity transactions, except for repurchases in the early/large sample. In the late sample, the model without misvaluation also cannot generate even moderate correlations between returns and savings. We conclude that the misvaluation shocks are essential for making sense of the correlations between returns, issuances, and repurchases in Figures 1 and 2. Misvaluation shocks are also helpful in reconciling about half of the high correlation between saving and returns observed in the late part of the sample.

8 Conclusion

In this paper, we quantify the extent to which nonfundamental movements in the price of a firm’s stock affect its various policies. Although this topic has been addressed by a large number of studies, we approach the problem in a new way—structural estimation—with the intent of adding quantitative results to this body of literature. We develop a framework for firm optimization

decision in the presence of misvaluation. Building on this framework, we estimate a version of a constant returns neoclassical investment model in which equity financing is costly, the firm can accumulate cash and issue debt, and, most importantly, equity values can be subject to misvaluation shocks. In the model, firms naturally issue equity when it is overvalued and repurchase equity when it is undervalued. Depending on the model parameters, the funds flowing to and from these activities can come from either changes in (net) cash balances or changes in investment, or both.

We find that non-fundamental movements in equity prices (misvaluation) are sizable. Our counterfactual exercises show misvaluation shocks directly induce firms to issue and repurchase equity, but the proceeds from these issuances and the funds from these repurchases flow into and out of net cash balances. The immediate impact on real investment expenditures is small. This result echoes the descriptive findings in McLean (2011) that firms tend to hoard the proceeds from equity issuances. These higher net cash balances provide firms with more financial flexibility, which in turn adds to the equity value of controlling shareholders. In short, misvaluation has large effects on financial policies, especially equity transactions, much smaller effects on real investment policies, and modest valuation effects.

One admitted drawback of our approach is our modeling of misvaluation shocks as exogenous. This modeling choice is necessary for tractability, which allows us to examine the interesting question of market timing quantitatively. However, this choice makes it difficult to answer questions related to managers' manipulation of share prices. If managers do attempt to misguide shareholders, then their reactions to mispricing might differ from those produced by our model. Examining this type of framework is an interesting avenue for future research.

References

- Abel, A. B., and J. C. Eberly. 1994. A Unified Model of Investment Under Uncertainty. *American Economic Review* 84:1369–1384.
- Alti, A., and J. Sulaeman. 2011. When do High Stock Returns Trigger Equity Issues? *Journal of Financial Economics* 103:61–87.
- Alti, A., and P. Tetlock. 2013. How Important Is Mispricing? *Journal of Finance*, forthcoming.
- Asquith, P., and D. W. Mullins, Jr. 1986. Equity issues and offering dilution. *Journal of Financial Economics* 15:61–89.
- Baker, M., and J. Wurgler. 2012. Behavioral Corporate Finance: An Updated Survey. In G. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. Stulz (eds.), *Handbook of the Economics of Finance*, vol. 2. North-Holland: Elsevier.
- Bazdresch, S. 2013. Financial lumpiness and investment. *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*.
- Bolton, P., H. Chen, and N. Wang. 2013. Market timing, investment, and risk management. *Journal of Financial Economics* 109:40–62.
- Brockman, P., and D. Y. Chung. 2001. Managerial timing and corporate liquidity: evidence from actual share repurchases. *Journal of Financial Economics* 61:417–448.
- Corwin, S. A. 2003. The determinants of underpricing of seasoned equity offers. *Journal of Finance* 58:2249–2279.
- DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and T. M. Whited. 2011. Capital structure dynamics and transitory debt. *Journal of Financial Economics* 99:235–261.
- Duffie, D., and K. J. Singleton. 1993. Simulated Moments Estimation of Markov Models of Asset Prices. *Econometrica* 61:929–52.
- Eckbo, B. E., R. W. Masulis, and Oyvind. Norli. 2007. Security Offerings, Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, E. Eckbo. In B. E. Eckbo (ed.), *Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance*. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Eisfeldt, A., and T. Muir. 2012. Aggregate Issuance and Savings Waves. Manuscript, UCLA.
- Eisfeldt, A. L. 2004. Endogenous Liquidity in Asset Markets. *Journal of Finance* 59:1–30.
- Erickson, T., and T. M. Whited. 2002. Two-step GMM estimation of the errors-in-variables model using high-order moments. *Econometric Theory* 18:776–799.
- Erickson, T., and T. M. Whited. 2012. Treating measurement error in Tobin’s q . *Review of Financial Studies* 25:1286–1329.
- Gamba, A., and A. Triantis. 2008. The value of financial flexibility. *Journal of Finance* 63:2263–2296.
- Gao, X., and J. Ritter. 2011. The Marketing of Seasoned Equity Offerings. *Journal of Financial Economics* 97:33–52.
- Gilchrist, S., C. P. Himmelberg, and G. Huberman. 2005. Do stock price bubbles influence corporate investment? *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52:805 – 827.
- Gomes, J. F. 2001. Financing Investment. *American Economic Review* 91:1263–1285.

- Graham, J. R., and C. R. Harvey. 2001. The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence from the field. *Journal of Financial Economics* 60:187–243.
- Han, C., and P. C. B. Phillips. 2010. GMM Estimation for Dynamic Panels with Fixed Effects and Strong Instruments at Unity. *Econometric Theory* 26:119–151.
- Hayashi, F. 1982. Tobin’s marginal q and average q: A neoclassical interpretation. *Econometrica* 50:213–224.
- Hellwig, C., E. Albagli, and A. Tsyvinski. 2009. Information Aggregation and Investment Decisions. Manuscript, Harvard University.
- Hennessy, C. A., and T. M. Whited. 2005. Debt dynamics. *Journal of Finance* 60:1129–1165.
- Hennessy, C. A., and T. M. Whited. 2007. How costly is external financing? Evidence from a structural estimation. *Journal of Finance* 62:1705–1745.
- Ingram, B. F., and B.-S. Lee. 1991. Simulation and Estimation of Time Series Models. *Journal of Econometrics* 47:197–205.
- Jenter, D., K. Lewellen, and J. B. Warner. 2011. Security Issue Timing: What Do Managers Know, and When Do They Know It? *Journal of Finance* 66:413–443.
- Kyle, A. S. 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. *Econometrica* 53:1315–1335.
- La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 1999. Corporate Ownership around the World. *Journal of Finance* 54:471–517.
- Matvos, G., and A. Seru. 2013. Resource Allocation within Firms and Financial Market Dislocation: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates. *Review of Financial Studies* Forthcoming.
- McKeon, S. 2013. Firm-Initiated versus Investor-Initiated Equity Issues. Manuscript, University of Oregon.
- McLean, R. D. 2011. Share issuance and cash savings. *Journal of Financial Economics* 99:693 – 715.
- Scheinkman, J. A., and W. Xiong. 2003. Overconfidence and speculative bubbles. *Journal of Political Economy* 111:1183–1220.
- Shiller, R. J. 1981. Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends? *The American Economic Review* 71:421–436.
- Skinner, D. J. 2008. The evolving relation between earnings, dividends, and stock repurchases. *Journal of Financial Economics* 87:582–609.
- Stokey, N. L., and R. E. Lucas. 1989. *Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Taylor, L. A. 2010. Why are CEOs rarely fired? Evidence from structural estimation. *Journal of Finance* 65:2051–2087.
- Vermaelen, T. 1981. Common stock repurchases and market signalling. *Journal of Financial Economics* 9:139–183.
- Yang, B. 2013. Capital Structure with Heterogeneous Beliefs and Market Timing. *Journal of Corporate Finance* 22:254–277.

Appendix

This Appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 1–4, the derivation of μ_ψ , the model that contains time-varying expected returns, and an outline of the estimation procedure.

Proof of Proposition 1

Let Q denote the number of shares outstanding for the firm, and let F denote the number of shares in the controlling block. As noted above, F is a constant. The fraction of shares in the controlling block is then given by $f = \frac{F}{Q}$. The ex-dividend price per share of the firm equals $\frac{V(K, C, z) - D(1 - \tau_d)}{Q}$. Consider an equity issuance of E . Such an issuance will involve an increase in the quantity of shares outstanding of $N = \frac{QE}{V(K, C, z) - D(1 - \tau_d)}$, which follows from dividing the value of the issuance by the share price. Thus, the quantity of shares outstanding evolves according to the following equation:

$$Q' = Q + \frac{QE}{V(K, C, z) - D(1 - \tau_d)}. \quad (\text{A.1})$$

Some algebra reveals:

$$\frac{Q'}{Q} = \frac{V(K, C, z) - D(1 - \tau_d) + E}{V(K, C, z) - D(1 - \tau_d)}. \quad (\text{A.2})$$

Following the definition of the fraction of shares in the controlling block,

$$\frac{f'}{f} = \frac{Q}{Q'}. \quad (\text{A.3})$$

This expression reflects the fact that an increase in the quantity of shares outstanding will reduce the fractional ownership of the controlling block. Substituting (A.3) into (A.2) and taking the inverse, one obtains:

$$\frac{f'}{f} = \frac{V(K, C, z) - D(1 - \tau_d)}{V(K, C, z) - D(1 - \tau_d) + E}. \quad (\text{A.4})$$

Thus, the evolution of the fraction of shares held by the controlling block can be written solely in terms of firm value, dividends and equity issuance.

Proof of Proposition 2

Misvaluation affects the price at which firms transact shares, which is now a function of V^* . We start with the number of shares in an equity transaction, which is:

$$N = \frac{QE}{V^*} = \frac{QE}{\psi(V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d))}. \quad (\text{A.5})$$

We now obtain the following expressions for the evolution of the fraction of shares held by the controlling block.

$$\begin{aligned}
Q' &= Q + \frac{QE}{\psi(V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d))}, \\
\frac{Q'}{Q} &= \frac{\psi(V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d)) + E}{\psi(V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d))}, \\
\frac{f'}{f} &= \frac{\psi(V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d))}{\psi(V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d)) + E}, \\
\frac{f'}{f} &= \frac{V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d)}{V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d) + \frac{E}{\psi}}.
\end{aligned} \tag{A.6}$$

Proof of Proposition 3

The price impact term changes the price at which firms can transact shares as a function of the size of the transaction. As above we need to express the number of shares in a given equity transaction:

$$N = \frac{QE(1 + \nu(E, K))}{V^*(K, C, \psi, z)} \tag{A.7}$$

We can now use equation (A.7) and proceed as above to derive the evolution of the fraction of shares held by the controlling block.

$$\begin{aligned}
Q' &= Q + \frac{E(1 + \nu(E, K))Q}{\psi(V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d))}, \\
\frac{Q'}{Q} &= \frac{\psi(V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d)) + E(1 + \nu(E, K))}{\psi(V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d))}, \\
\frac{f'}{f} &= \frac{\psi(V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d))}{\psi(V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d)) + E(1 + \nu(E, K))}, \\
\frac{f'}{f} &= \frac{V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d)}{V(K, C, \psi, z) - D(1 - \tau_d) + \frac{E}{\psi}(1 + \nu(E, K))}.
\end{aligned}$$

Proof of Proposition 4

Let $\tilde{V}$ be a solution to equation (19), with corresponding policy functions $\tilde{D}$ and $\tilde{E}$. Then one obtains from (19):

$$\tilde{V}(K, C, \psi, z) = \tilde{D}(1 - \tau_d) + \beta \frac{\psi(V - \tilde{D}(1 - \tau_d))}{\psi(V - \tilde{D}(1 - \tau_d)) + \tilde{E} + \nu(\tilde{E}, K)} \int V(K', C', \psi', z') dg(\varepsilon'_\psi, \varepsilon'_z | \varepsilon_\psi, \varepsilon_z).$$

Rearranging the dividend term and dividing the numerator and denominator of the left hand side by ψ gives

$$\tilde{V}(K, C, \psi, z) - \tilde{D}(1 - \tau_d) = \beta \frac{(V - \tilde{D}(1 - \tau_d))}{(V - \tilde{D}(1 - \tau_d)) + \frac{\tilde{E}}{\psi} + \frac{\nu(\tilde{E}, K)}{\psi}} \int V(K', C', \psi', z') dg(\varepsilon'_\psi, \varepsilon'_z, \mid \varepsilon_\psi, \varepsilon_z). \quad (\text{A.8})$$

Next, divide (A.8) throughout by $\tilde{V}(K, C, \psi, z) - \tilde{D}(1 - \tau_d)$ and multiply by $\tilde{V}(K, C, \psi, z) - \tilde{D}(1 - \tau_d) + \tilde{E}/\psi + \nu(\tilde{E}, K)/\psi$ to obtain

$$\tilde{V}(K, C, \psi, z) - \tilde{D}(1 - \tau_d) + \frac{\tilde{E}}{\psi} + \frac{\nu(\tilde{E}, K)}{\psi} = \beta \int V(K', C', \psi', z') dg(\varepsilon'_\psi, \varepsilon'_z, \mid \varepsilon_\psi, \varepsilon_z),$$

Thus $\tilde{V}$, $\tilde{D}$, and $\tilde{E}$ also solve equation (20).

Conversely, let $\hat{V}$ be a solution to equation (20), with corresponding policy functions $\hat{D}$ and $\hat{E}$.

One can use a similar approach to the above to show that $\hat{V}$, $\hat{D}$, and $\hat{E}$ also solve (19).

Derivation of μ_ψ

Define the following matrices:

$$Y = \begin{bmatrix} \ln z \\ \ln \psi \end{bmatrix}, C = \begin{bmatrix} \mu_z \\ \mu_\psi \end{bmatrix}, R = \begin{bmatrix} \rho_z & 0 \\ \rho_{z\psi} & \rho_\psi \end{bmatrix}, \epsilon = \begin{bmatrix} \epsilon_z \\ \epsilon_\psi \end{bmatrix}, \Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_z^2 & 0 \\ 0 & \sigma_\psi^2 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Then, the joint transition equation can be written as the following VAR(1):

$$Y_{t+1} = C + RY_t + \epsilon, \quad \epsilon \sim N(0, \Sigma).$$

The unconditional mean of Y is given by the following expression:

$$E[Y] = (I_2 - R)^{-1}C,$$

where I_n denotes a identity matrix of order n . The unconditional variance of Y is given by:

$$\text{Vec}(\text{Var}(Y)) = [(I_4 - (R \otimes R))]^{-1} \text{Vec}(\Sigma),$$

where Vec denotes the vectorization operator and $\otimes$ denotes the Kronecker product. For notational convenience, let $M = [(I_4 - (R \otimes R))]^{-1}$. One can then derive the unconditional mean and variance

of $Y(2) = \ln \psi$ as:

$$\begin{aligned} E[\ln \psi] &= \frac{1}{(1 - \rho_z)(1 - \rho_\psi)} (\rho_{z\psi}\mu_z + (1 - \rho_z)\mu_\psi), \\ \text{Var}(\ln \psi) &= M(4, 1)\sigma_z^2 + \frac{\sigma_\psi^2}{(1 - \rho_\psi^2)}, \end{aligned}$$

where $M(4, 1)$ denotes the $(4, 1)^{\text{th}}$ element of the matrix M . The restriction that the unconditional expectation of the misvaluation term equals one implies that

$$\ln E[\psi] = 0, \quad \Rightarrow \quad E[\ln \psi] + 0.5\text{Var}(\ln \psi) = 0.$$

Some algebra then reveals that

$$\mu_\psi = - \left[\frac{1}{2}(1 - \rho_\psi)M(4, 1)\sigma_z^2 + \frac{\sigma_\psi^2}{2(1 + \rho_\psi)} + \frac{\rho_{z\psi}\mu_z}{1 - \rho_z} \right].$$

Time-Varying Expected Returns

Let x_t be an aggregate productivity variable that takes one of two values, x_l, x_h . Let x_l denote a recessionary state and x_h an expansionary state ($x_h > x_l$). The probability of remaining in a recessionary state is given by p_l , and the probability of remaining in an expansionary state is given by p_h . This implies expected durations of recessions and expansions of $1/(1 - p_l)$ and $1/(1 - p_h)$, respectively. In addition, we impose the restriction that the unconditional expectation of the aggregate productivity shocks equals 1 so that average profits remains unchanged from the previous model.⁷

The expected return varies with aggregate productivity x_t . Denote the conditional expected return as

$$\beta m(x, x').$$

Following the production-based asset pricing literature, the time-varying expected return can be parameterized as a function of current and future aggregate productivity. Thus,

$$\ln m(x, x') = m_0 + m_1(x' - x).$$

⁷Formally, this imposes the restriction that $x_h \frac{1-p_l}{2-p_h-p_l} + x_l \frac{1-p_h}{2-p_h-p_l} = 1$.

Economic reasoning suggests that investors place a higher valuation on assets that payoff in bad states of the world. This imposes the requirement that $m_1 < 0$. In order to ensure that average discount rates remain unchanged from the model without aggregate shocks, we require that $E[m(x, x')] = 1$.⁸

Given these assumptions, the expanded model can be written as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} v(c, \psi, z, x) &= \max_{c', e, i} \left\{ d(1 - \tau_d) - \frac{e(1 + \nu(e, 1))}{\psi} + \beta \mathbb{E} \left(m(x, x') v(c', \psi', z', x') (1 - \delta + i) \right) \right\} \\ d - e + \mathcal{I}(e > 0) a_0 &= zx(1 - \tau_c) - i - \frac{\lambda_i^2}{2} + c(1 + r - r\tau_c) - c'(1 - \delta + i) + \delta \tau_c \Phi(c, c'), \\ -c' &\leq \phi, \quad d \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

The solution to the expanded problem takes into account that the static allocation decisions now depend on the aggregate productivity state. It also takes into account the impact of the pricing kernel $m(x, x')$ and the transition matrix for x on the expected future value of the firm.

We calibrate p_l and p_h to match average durations of recessions and expansions of 16 and 42 months, respectively.⁹ We calibrate x_l and x_h to generate an average decline in output from its trend growth path of 4%, similar to the output declines observed in U.S. post-war recessions. Combined with the restriction that $E[x] = 1$, one obtains $x_h = 1.011$ and $x_l = 0.971$. This calibration leads to a spread between expected returns in the high and low states of 1.54%.

Estimation

We now give a brief outline of the estimation procedure, which draws from Ingram and Lee (1991) Duffie and Singleton (1993), but which is adapted to our panel setting. Suppose we have J variables contained in the data vector x_{it} , $i = 1, \dots, n$; $t = 1, \dots, T$. We assume that the $J \times T$ matrix x_i is *i.i.d.*, but we allow for possible dependence among the elements of x_i . Let $y_{itk}(b)$ be a data vector from simulation k , $i = 1, \dots, n$, $t = 1, \dots, T$, and $k = 1, \dots, K$. Here, K is the number of times the model is simulated. (In practice, K is the simulated sample size, 150,000, divided by the actual

⁸This yields the following equation:

$$\exp(m_0) \left[\frac{1 - p_h}{2 - p_h - p_l} (p_l + (1 - p_l) \exp(m_1(x_h - x_l))) + \frac{1 - p_l}{2 - p_h - p_l} (p_h + (1 - p_h) \exp(m_1(x_l - x_h))) \right] = 1.$$

⁹See <http://www.nber.org/cycles.html> for information on the duration of recessions.

sample size).

The simulated data, $y_{itk}(b)$, depend on a vector of structural parameters, b . In our application $b \equiv (\alpha_1, \lambda, \delta, \rho_\psi, \sigma_\psi, \mu, \rho_z, \sigma_z, \nu_i, \nu_r, \rho_{z\psi})$. The goal is to estimate b by matching a set of simulated moments, denoted as $h(y_{itk}(b))$, with the corresponding set of actual data moments, denoted as $h(x_{it})$. Our moments are listed in the text, and we denote the number of moments as H . Define the sample moment vector:

$$g(x_{it}, b) = (nT)^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{t=1}^T \left[h(x_{it}) - K^{-1} \sum_{k=1}^K h(y_{itk}(b)) \right].$$

The simulated moments estimator of b is then defined as the solution to the minimization of

$$\hat{b} = \arg \min_b g(x, b)' \hat{W} g(x, b),$$

in which $\hat{W}$ is a positive definite matrix that converges in probability to a deterministic positive definite matrix W .

Our weight matrix, $\hat{W}$, differs from that given in Ingram and Lee (1991). First, we calculate it using the influence function approach in Erickson and Whited (2002). Second, it is not the optimal weight matrix, and we justify this choice as follows. First, because our model is of an individual firm, we want the influence functions to reflect within-firm variation. Because our data contain a great deal of heterogeneity, we therefore demean each of our variables at the firm level and then calculate the influence functions for each moment using the demeaned data. We then covary the influence functions (summing over both i and t) to obtain an estimate of the covariance matrix of the moments. The estimated weight matrix, $\hat{W}$, is the inverse of this covariance matrix. Note that the weight matrix does not depend on the parameter vector, b .

Two details regarding this issue are important. First, neither the influence functions for the autocorrelation coefficients nor the coefficients themselves are calculated using demeaned data because we obtain them using the double-differencing estimator in Han and Phillips (2010). Thus, we remove heterogeneity by differencing rather than by demeaning. Second, although we cannot use firm-demeaned data to calculate the means in the moment vector, we do use demeaned data to calculate the influence functions for these moments. Otherwise, the influence functions for the means would reflect primarily cross sectional variation, whereas the influence functions for the rest

of the moments would reflect within-firm variation. In this case, the estimation would put the least weight on the mean moments, which does not appear to be a sensible economic objective.

The above described weight matrix does achieve our goal of reflecting within-firm variation. However, it does not account for any temporal dependence in the data. We therefore calculate our standard errors using the optimal weight matrix, which is the inverse of a clustered moment covariance matrix. We calculate the estimate of this covariance matrix, denoted $\hat{\Omega}$, as follows. Let ϕ_{it} be the influence function of the moment vector $g(x_{it}, b)$ for firm i at time t . ϕ_{it} then has dimension H . Note that this influence function is of the actual moment vector $g(x_{it}, b)$, which implies that we do not use demeaned data to calculate the influence functions for the means or autocorrelation coefficients, but that we do use demeaned data to calculate the rest of the moments. The estimate of Ω is

$$\frac{1}{nT} \sum_{i=1}^n \left(\sum_{t=1}^T \phi_{it} \right) \left(\sum_{t=1}^T \phi_{it} \right)'$$

Note that this estimate does not depend on b . Note also that if we were to use demeaned data, the elements corresponding to the mean moments would be zero.

The standard errors are then given by the usual GMM formula, adjusted for simulation error. Letting $G \equiv \partial g(x_{it}, b) / \partial b$, the asymptotic distribution of b is

$$\text{avar}(\hat{b}) \equiv \left(1 + \frac{1}{K} \right) [GWG']^{-1} [GW\Omega WG'] [GWG']^{-1}.$$

Table 2: SIMULATED MOMENTS ESTIMATION

Calculations are based on a sample of nonfinancial firms from the annual 2011 COMPUSTAT industrial files. The sample period is from 1987 to 2010. The sample is split into four groups: large and small firms in the first part of the sample (through 2003), and large and small firms in the second part of the sample. The estimation is done with SMM, which determines structural model parameters by matching the moments from a simulated panel of firms to the corresponding moments from the data. Panel A reports the simulated and actual moments and the clustered t -statistics for the differences between the corresponding moments. Panel B reports the estimated structural parameters, with clustered standard errors in parentheses. λ is the cost of adjusting the capital stock, and δ is the rate of capital depreciation. μ is the drift of the profitability process, ρ_z is its serial correlation, and σ_z is the standard deviation of the innovation to this process. ρ_ψ and σ_ψ are the serial correlation of the misvaluation process and the standard deviation of its innovation. $\rho_{z\psi}$ governs the serial correlation of the two processes. ν_i and ν_r are penalties on equity issuance and repurchases. a_1 is the fixed equity issuance cost, and ϕ is the proportional debt issuance cost.

A. Moments

	Early/Small			Early/Large			Late/Small			Late/Large		
	Actual	Model	t -stat	Actual	Model	t -stat	Actual	Model	t -stat	Actual	Model	t -stat
Average net cash	-0.137	-0.178	2.268	-0.238	-0.234	-0.158	-0.035	-0.061	1.847	-0.193	-0.194	0.038
Std. dev. of net cash	0.150	0.170	-4.165	0.136	0.126	1.761	0.144	0.148	-0.990	0.131	0.105	3.886
Serial correlation net cash	0.532	0.949	-3.407	0.413	0.947	-4.258	0.636	0.957	-2.731	0.468	0.844	-3.225
Average investment	0.091	0.079	1.356	0.088	0.080	0.880	0.070	0.065	0.986	0.066	0.067	-0.621
Std. dev. of investment	0.055	0.015	4.552	0.045	0.012	3.341	0.043	0.024	2.710	0.034	0.027	1.241
Serial correlation investment	0.611	0.574	1.029	0.706	0.507	1.747	0.663	0.660	0.023	0.619	0.635	-0.110
Average profits	0.165	0.156	0.702	0.191	0.181	1.316	0.142	0.132	1.418	0.180	0.174	0.815
Std. dev. of profits	0.089	0.090	-0.233	0.074	0.063	1.210	0.085	0.083	0.431	0.065	0.071	-1.707
Serial correlation profits	0.763	0.543	1.389	0.807	0.428	2.028	0.883	0.604	1.253	0.766	0.640	0.797
Std. dev. of Tobin's q	0.529	0.577	-1.693	0.526	0.541	-0.381	0.538	0.590	-1.804	0.434	0.473	-1.126
Serial correlation Tobin's q	0.669	0.093	6.938	0.738	0.185	4.571	0.642	0.391	2.774	0.745	0.614	1.005
Return std. dev.	0.507	0.385	2.550	0.417	0.299	6.421	0.547	0.492	1.922	0.440	0.382	1.128
Return serial correlation	-0.055	-0.415	2.241	-0.069	-0.382	8.401	-0.043	-0.315	6.653	-0.103	-0.174	1.055
Average equity issuance	0.009	0.009	-0.096	0.007	0.006	1.923	0.010	0.009	0.599	0.005	0.003	1.656
Std. dev. of issuance	0.033	0.035	-1.180	0.027	0.026	1.303	0.033	0.034	-0.582	0.023	0.020	1.866
Average repurchases	0.006	0.004	0.908	0.012	0.011	0.759	0.006	0.021	-12.537	0.021	0.032	-3.123
Std. dev. of repurchases	0.030	0.004	3.868	0.034	0.012	3.492	0.037	0.025	3.504	0.040	0.037	1.490
Issuance-return sensitivity	0.011	0.000	3.451	0.009	0.001	1.319	0.011	0.003	1.601	0.009	0.004	0.959
Issuance Incidence	0.062	0.074	-1.119	0.055	0.050	1.255	0.066	0.069	-0.223	0.040	0.032	1.672

B. Parameter estimates

	λ	δ	ρ_ψ	σ_ψ	μ	ρ_z	σ_z	ν_i	ν_r	$\rho_{z\psi}$	a_0	ϕ
Early Small	15.358 (8.110)	0.046 (0.001)	0.013 (0.430)	0.247 (0.071)	-1.064 (0.047)	0.469 (0.025)	0.473 (0.022)	3.792 (1.519)	29.430 (39.924)	0.079 (0.570)	0.014 (0.006)	0.028 (0.030)
Early Large	19.151 (2.960)	0.050 (0.002)	0.114 (0.463)	0.209 (0.075)	-1.004 (0.043)	0.433 (0.016)	0.306 (0.045)	4.015 (1.700)	9.224 (8.585)	0.146 (0.748)	0.015 (0.002)	0.028 (0.033)
Late Small	6.304 (2.555)	0.085 (0.018)	0.004 (0.170)	0.291 (0.033)	-0.798 (0.166)	0.635 (0.061)	0.441 (0.063)	6.598 (1.438)	6.496 (2.004)	0.372 (0.173)	0.018 (0.057)	0.029 (0.029)
Late Large	3.838 (0.820)	0.132 (0.010)	0.355 (0.761)	0.297 (0.156)	-0.637 (0.071)	0.650 (0.029)	0.295 (0.032)	11.280 (3.522)	4.927 (0.961)	0.499 (0.797)	0.014 (0.008)	0.000 (0.002)

Table 3: SIMULATED MOMENTS ESTIMATION: PRICING KERNEL MODEL

Calculations are based on a sample of nonfinancial firms from the annual 2011 COMPUSTAT industrial files. The sample period is from 1987 to 2010. The sample is split into four groups: large and small firms in the first part of the sample (through 2003), and large and small firms in the second part of the sample. The estimation is done with SMM, which determines structural model parameters by matching the moments from a simulated panel of firms to the corresponding moments from the data. Panel A reports the simulated and actual moments and the clustered t -statistics for the differences between the corresponding moments. Panel B reports the estimated structural parameters, with clustered standard errors in parentheses. λ is the cost of adjusting the capital stock, and δ is the rate of capital depreciation. μ is the drift of the profitability process, ρ_z is its serial correlation, and σ_z is the standard deviation of the innovation to this process. ρ_ψ and σ_ψ are the serial correlation of the misvaluation process and the standard deviation of its innovation. $\rho_{z\psi}$ governs the serial correlation of the two processes. ν_i and ν_r are penalties on equity issuance and repurchases. a_1 is the fixed equity issuance cost, and ϕ is the proportional debt issuance cost.

A. Moments

	Early/Small			Early/Large			Late/Small			Late/Large		
	Actual	Model	t -stat	Actual	Model	t -stat	Actual	Model	t -stat	Actual	Model	t -stat
Average net cash	-0.137	-0.144	0.170	-0.238	-0.236	-0.133	-0.035	-0.034	-0.095	-0.193	-0.194	0.084
Std. dev. of net cash	0.150	0.153	-0.228	0.136	0.130	1.467	0.144	0.146	-0.328	0.131	0.135	-0.515
Serial correlation net cash	0.532	0.936	-3.285	0.413	0.924	-4.117	0.636	0.947	-2.500	0.468	0.835	-3.252
Average investment	0.091	0.088	0.340	0.088	0.083	0.681	0.070	0.073	-0.710	0.066	0.066	0.139
Std. dev. of investment	0.055	0.022	4.017	0.045	0.013	3.270	0.043	0.021	3.693	0.034	0.017	2.973
Serial correlation investment	0.611	0.535	0.647	0.706	0.299	5.259	0.663	0.598	0.716	0.619	0.631	-0.085
Average profits	0.165	0.155	0.579	0.191	0.187	0.284	0.142	0.136	0.517	0.180	0.179	0.387
Std. dev. of profits	0.089	0.092	-0.297	0.074	0.059	1.796	0.085	0.077	1.343	0.065	0.066	-0.226
Serial correlation profits	0.763	0.404	2.658	0.807	0.428	2.099	0.883	0.648	1.685	0.766	0.722	0.284
Std. dev. of Tobin's q	0.529	0.502	0.399	0.526	0.493	0.942	0.538	0.524	0.908	0.434	0.414	0.959
Serial correlation Tobin's q	0.669	0.411	1.578	0.738	0.440	2.319	0.642	0.492	1.531	0.745	0.639	1.309
Return std. dev.	0.507	0.503	0.117	0.417	0.403	1.237	0.547	0.536	1.906	0.440	0.440	0.007
Return serial correlation	-0.055	-0.248	2.223	-0.069	-0.344	3.926	-0.043	-0.333	5.084	-0.103	-0.253	2.375
Average equity issuance	0.009	0.006	1.158	0.007	0.006	0.417	0.010	0.006	1.828	0.005	0.006	-1.151
Std. dev. of issuance	0.033	0.028	1.036	0.027	0.026	0.530	0.033	0.026	2.777	0.023	0.025	-1.570
Average repurchases	0.006	0.004	0.538	0.012	0.012	0.030	0.006	0.012	-2.991	0.021	0.028	-1.896
Std. dev. of repurchases	0.030	0.006	3.796	0.034	0.032	0.655	0.037	0.037	-0.198	0.040	0.033	1.085
Issuance-return sensitivity	0.011	0.003	1.254	0.009	0.001	1.130	0.011	0.001	2.678	0.009	0.003	1.076
Issuance Incidence	0.062	0.050	0.769	0.055	0.055	-0.071	0.066	0.055	0.947	0.040	0.053	-1.081

-0.13594531 0.00000000 -0.00991879 -0.12486226 2.96005669 0.00000000 2.26352211 -0.00379203 0.00024355 0.22005898 -0.77294241 0.76563236

B. Parameter estimates

	λ	δ	ρ_ψ	σ_ψ	μ	ρ_z	σ_z	ν_i	ν_r	$\rho_{z\psi}$	a_0	ϕ
Early Small	10.027 (1.359)	0.056 (0.009)	0.433 (0.124)	0.366 (0.029)	-1.137 (0.096)	0.436 (0.035)	0.491 (0.037)	12.801 (4.355)	29.533 (2.200)	0.003 (0.154)	0.029 (0.003)	0.040 (0.061)
Early Large	19.440 (0.600)	0.050 (0.006)	0.216 (0.167)	0.285 (0.036)	-0.969 (0.162)	0.438 (0.091)	0.278 (0.048)	15.056 (3.938)	0.643 (1.120)	0.147 (0.223)	0.030 (0.004)	0.006 (0.609)
Late Small	12.746 (2.076)	0.065 (0.012)	0.211 (0.126)	0.360 (0.018)	-0.686 (0.080)	0.678 (0.027)	0.388 (0.036)	20.310 (3.314)	1.176 (2.011)	0.015 (0.057)	0.030 (0.008)	0.025 (0.362)
Late Large	11.158 (2.403)	0.098 (0.005)	0.324 (0.192)	0.332 (0.026)	-0.471 (0.089)	0.736 (0.046)	0.244 (0.032)	9.227 (1.406)	5.281 (1.147)	0.300 (0.255)	0.019 (0.206)	0.007 (0.016)

Table 4: PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR INDUSTRY ESTIMATIONS

Calculations are based on a sample of nonfinancial firms from the annual 2011 COMPUSTAT industrial files. The sample period is from 1987 to 2010. The sample is split into eight industry groups. SIC13 is oil and gas extraction; SIC20 is food products; SIC28 is chemicals and allied products; SIC35 is machinery and computer equipment; SIC26 is electronic and electrical equipment; SIC38 is measuring instruments; SIC50 is wholesale trade; and SIC73 is business services. The estimation is done with SMM, which determines structural model parameters by matching the moments from a simulated panel of firms to the corresponding moments from the data. The estimation is done for each industry separately. This table reports the estimated structural parameters, with clustered standard errors in parentheses. λ is the cost of adjusting the capital stock, and δ is the rate of capital depreciation. μ is the drift of the profitability process, ρ_z is its serial correlation, and σ_z is the standard deviation of the innovation to this process. ρ_ψ and σ_ψ are the serial correlation of the misvaluation process and the standard deviation of its innovation. $\rho_{z\psi}$ governs the serial correlation of the two processes. ν_i and ν_r are penalties on equity issuance and repurchases. a_1 is the fixed equity issuance cost, and ϕ is the proportional debt issuance cost. The bottom row of the table presents average R&D for each industry.


	SIC13	SIC 20	SIC 28	SIC 35	SIC 36	SIC 38	SIC 50	SIC 73
λ	2.267 (0.713)	18.634 (15.310)	2.072 (2.144)	10.435 (8.748)	3.708 (1.975)	19.947 (9.515)	8.350 (17.169)	11.757 (6.447)
δ	0.168 (0.004)	0.057 (0.017)	0.146 (0.052)	0.062 (0.013)	0.073 (0.017)	0.045 (0.011)	0.051 (0.046)	0.076 (0.024)
ρ_ψ	0.291 (1.025)	0.000 (0.432)	0.854 (0.110)	0.172 (0.806)	0.152 (0.767)	0.006 (1.245)	0.012 (0.724)	0.199 (0.801)
σ_ψ	0.345 (0.114)	0.113 (0.114)	0.431 (0.111)	0.323 (0.192)	0.313 (0.135)	0.130 (0.158)	0.132 (0.179)	0.330 (0.107)
μ	-0.724 (0.042)	-0.704 (0.212)	-1.193 (0.552)	-0.808 (0.191)	-1.126 (0.215)	-1.329 (0.288)	-0.889 (0.316)	-0.716 (0.201)
ρ_z	0.506 (0.032)	0.612 (0.105)	0.381 (0.231)	0.632 (0.059)	0.485 (0.112)	0.336 (0.151)	0.630 (0.126)	0.632 (0.110)
σ_z	0.384 (0.064)	0.294 (0.138)	0.493 (0.168)	0.500 (0.174)	0.500 (0.126)	0.449 (0.107)	0.430 (0.166)	0.456 (0.081)
ν_i	4.127 (3.260)	4.215 (3.228)	20.962 (8.946)	6.666 (4.070)	20.216 (33.227)	6.905 (5.818)	6.160 (7.072)	6.937 (2.054)
ν_r	39.055 (58.041)	3.506 (7.478)	30.982 (22.729)	5.754 (4.283)	1.569 (0.882)	0.723 (2.556)	5.642 (8.110)	4.454 (1.501)
$\rho_{z\psi}$	0.086 (1.591)	0.493 (0.517)	0.490 (0.201)	0.238 (0.666)	0.169 (0.699)	0.414 (1.071)	0.496 (0.531)	0.316 (0.721)
a_0	0.012 (0.031)	0.014 (0.154)	0.024 (0.224)	0.024 (0.011)	0.024 (0.033)	0.025 (0.020)	0.015 (0.012)	0.024 (0.006)
ϕ	0.029 (0.453)	0.012 (0.068)	0.029 (0.035)	0.034 (0.123)	0.034 (0.084)	0.023 (0.083)	0.021 (0.441)	0.034 (0.195)
Average R&D	0.001	0.003	0.064	0.060	0.071	0.027	0.001	0.062

Table 5: ACTUAL VERSUS MODEL IMPLIED TIME-SERIES CORRELATIONS

The figures presented are the simple correlations between annual real ex-dividend equity returns and the indicated variables. Data calculations are based on a sample of nonfinancial firms from the annual 2011 COMPUSTAT industrial files. The sample period is from 1987 to 2010. Net Saving, investment, dividends, equity Issuance, and repurchases are all scaled by total book assets less cash. Each variable is aggregated by taking the average across all firms in the sample in each year. The indicated correlations are then time-series correlations of these aggregated variables. Simulated calculations are based on data simulated from the model. The model parameterizations are from the estimates in Table 2.


	Early/Small		Early/Large		Late/Small		Late/Large	
	Actual	Simulated	Actual	Simulated	Actual	Simulated	Actual	Simulated
A. Misvaluation								
Investment	-0.291	-0.141	-0.128	-0.151	-0.584	-0.200	-0.601	-0.193
Net Saving	0.514	0.361	0.100	0.346	0.905	0.474	0.659	0.132
Equity Issuance	0.400	0.417	0.030	0.161	0.091	0.312	0.118	0.186
Repurchases	-0.597	-0.516	-0.114	-0.531	-0.678	-0.496	-0.422	-0.427
Dividends	-0.260	0.067	-0.042	0.129	-0.169	0.209	0.516	0.271
B. No Misvaluation								
Investment	-0.291	-0.243	-0.128	-0.227	-0.584	-0.456	-0.601	-0.476
Net Saving	0.514	0.599	0.100	0.452	0.905	0.193	0.659	0.002
Equity Issuance	0.400	-0.057	0.030	0.001	0.091	0.002	0.118	0.000
Repurchases	-0.597	0.039	-0.114	-0.122	-0.678	-0.052	-0.422	0.124
Dividends	-0.260	0.385	-0.042	0.369	-0.169	0.409	0.516	0.363

Figure 1: Time Series Patterns: Small Firms



Calculations are based on a sample of nonfinancial firms from the annual 2011 COMPUSTAT industrial files. The sample period is from 1987 to 2010. Each series is the year-by-year asset-weighted average of a particular variable. Small firms are those whose assets are below the median for a particular year in the sample. Investment, dividends, equity Issuance, saving, debt Issuance, and repurchases are all scaled by total book assets. Saving is the change in the stock of cash. Return is the real annual ex-dividend equity return.


Figure 2: Time Series Patterns: Large Firms




Calculations are based on a sample of nonfinancial firms from the annual 2011 COMPUSTAT industrial files. The sample period is from 1987 to 2010. Each series is the year-by-year asset-weighted average of a particular variable. Large firms are those whose assets are above the median for a particular year in the sample. Investment, dividends, equity Issuance, saving, debt Issuance, and repurchases are all scaled by total book assets. Saving is the change in the stock of cash. Return is the real annual ex-dividend equity return.

Figure 3: Policy Functions

A.




B.



This figure depicts the optimal levels of investment, equity transactions, cash, and dividends as a function of the misvaluation shock, ψ in Panel A, and to the productivity shock, z , in Panel B. Both horizontal axes are log scale. Positive equity transactions are issuances, and negative equity transactions are repurchases. All variables are scaled by the capital stock, K .


Figure 4: Matching Moments by Industry




Calculations are based on a sample of nonfinancial firms from the annual 2011 COMPUSTAT industrial files. The sample period is from 1987 to 2010. The sample is split into eight industry groups. SIC13 is oil and gas extraction; SIC20 is food products; SIC28 is chemicals and allied products; SIC35 is machinery and computer equipment; SIC26 is electronic and electrical equipment; SIC38 is measuring instruments; SIC50 is wholesale trade; and SIC73 is business services. The estimation is done with SMM, which determines structural model parameters by matching the moments from a simulated panel of firms to the corresponding moments from the data. This figure plots data moments versus simulated moments for four of the “mean” moments.

Figure 5: Counterfactuals


A.



B.




C.




This figure is constructed as follows. We pick a grid for σ_ψ , the standard deviation of the innovation to the misvaluation shock. We then solve the model for each of the different parameter values, and then plot net cash, investment, equity issuance, equity repurchases, market value, and intrinsic value σ_ψ . Frictionless Investment is the average rate of investment from a frictionless neoclassical q model that is technologically identical to our model.

Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions


A.




B.



C.



D.



This figure depicts the responses of various variables to a one standard deviation innovation to each of the misvaluation and profit shock processes.