

Macroeconomic Effects of Bankruptcy & Foreclosure Policies*

Kurt Mitman[†]

University of Pennsylvania

First Draft: June 1, 2010

This Draft: February 14, 2012

Abstract

Bankruptcy laws govern consumer default on unsecured credit. Foreclosure laws regulate default on secured mortgage debt. In this paper I use a structural model to argue that bankruptcy and foreclosure are inter-related. This interaction is important for understanding the cross-state variation in bankruptcy rates and evaluating reforms to default policies. To study this interaction, I construct a general-equilibrium model where heterogeneous households have access to unsecured borrowing and can finance housing purchases with mortgages. Households can default separately on both types of debt. The calibrated model is quantitatively consistent with the observed cross-state correlation between policies and default rates. In particular, the model correctly predicts that bankruptcy rates are lower in states with more generous homestead exemptions (the amount of home equity that may be retained after filing for bankruptcy), despite the decreased penalty of declaring bankruptcy. In equilibrium, that lower penalty of going bankrupt in high exemption states raises the price of unsecured credit. Households respond to the higher price by taking on more highly leveraged mortgages and less unsecured credit. As a result, bankruptcy rates are lower in high exemption states than in low exemption states, but foreclosure rates are higher. I use the model to evaluate the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act which made it more difficult for high income households to declare bankruptcy. Despite being intended to reduce bankruptcy rates, I find that the reform substantially increases them. In addition, the reform has the unintended consequence of considerably increasing foreclosure rates. Nevertheless, the reform yields large welfare gains.

Keywords: Bankruptcy, Foreclosure, Housing, Default Risk, Household Debt

JEL codes: E21, G11, K35, R21

*I am indebted to my advisor, Dirk Krueger, for his advice and encouragement at each stage of this project. Comments from Greg Kaplan and Iourii Manovski have greatly improved the paper. I thank seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, NBER Summer Institute EFACR 2011, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, Congressional Budget Office, Midwest Macro 2011, EconCon 2011, and Penn Macro Club for their comments. I have also benefited from discussions with people at various institutions that are too numerous to mention.

[†]University of Pennsylvania, Department of Economics, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia PA, 19103.
Email: mitmanke@econ.upenn.edu

1 Introduction

In the United States, households hold two types of debt, secured and unsecured, and they hold large amounts of it, averaging more than 100% of disposable income. There are two channels for defaulting on this debt: bankruptcy for unsecured borrowing and foreclosure for secured mortgage borrowing. Households exercise these default options in large numbers - in 2004 more than 1.5 million households filed for bankruptcy and more than 275,000 homes were foreclosed. In this paper, I use a calibrated structural model to argue that the two channels for default - bankruptcy and foreclosure - are inter-related and that understanding the interaction between them has important positive and normative implications.

Despite being separate legal processes, bankruptcy and foreclosure are closely linked: bankruptcy may prevent foreclosure by discharging a household's unsecured debt, thereby freeing up income for making mortgage payments. On the other hand, foreclosure could lead to bankruptcy if banks can sue households who default on their mortgages (in addition to seizing their homes). Further, households take into account the different channels for default when choosing the optimal composition of secured and unsecured debt in their portfolios. Thus, a change to bankruptcy law, for example, may impact secured credit holdings and foreclosure rates if households respond by adjusting the portfolios of debt that they hold.

The fraction of households that choose to exercise the bankruptcy or foreclosure option varies greatly across U.S. states. In 2004, bankruptcy rates ranged from a low of 0.6 percent of households in Alaska to a high of 2.6 percent of households in Utah. Similarly, foreclosure rates ranged from 0.2 percent of mortgages in Hawaii to 1.3 percent of mortgages in Indiana. A natural candidate to explain the cross-state variation in default rates is variation in state bankruptcy and foreclosure law. Understanding the extent to which this policy variation matters is important for welfare and policy analysis.

States do vary significantly in two pertinent dimensions of default law: the homestead exemption and recourse. The homestead exemption specifies how much home equity the household can keep after the discharge of unsecured debt when a household files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In recourse states, after forfeiting their home, foreclosed households are still liable for the difference between the recovered value of the house and the face value of the mortgage, as opposed to no-recourse states where households can walk away with no additional liability. In Figures 1(a) and 1(b), I plot state bankruptcy and foreclosure rates as a function of homestead exemption. The figures illustrate the significant variation in default rates and laws across states. In addition, Figure 1(a) illustrates a *negative correlation* between the generosity of the bankruptcy law and the bankruptcy rate. This relationship is striking: one might expect more generous bankruptcy laws would make households

more likely to go bankrupt. However, that intuition relies on the implicit assumption that households' portfolios of debt are unaffected by the homestead exemption. If more generous bankruptcy policies result in higher prices of unsecured debt, they may lead to lower unsecured debt holdings and therefore lower bankruptcy rates. This observed relationship between bankruptcy and the homestead exemption suggests that accounting for general equilibrium effects of policies is important.

Motivated by these observations, I ask three questions in this paper: (1) What fraction of cross-state variation in default rates can be explained by differences in bankruptcy and foreclosure laws? (2) What are the effects of a major reform to bankruptcy, the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA)? and (3) If the government could standardize exemption and recourse policy across states, what policy should it adopt? The answer to the first question, consequential in its own right, is also important for addressing the second and third questions. A careful understanding of the effects of current policies is crucial to accurately evaluate the effects of a reform.

To address these questions, I analyze theoretically and quantitatively the effects of the homestead exemption and recourse on household portfolio and default choices, default rates and welfare. I construct a heterogeneous-agent general-equilibrium incomplete-markets model. The model has elements in common with the bankruptcy model of Chatterjee et al. (2007) and the foreclosure model of Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2011). Households can finance purchases of a housing good with mortgages, and can save in bonds or borrow in unsecured debt. Households face idiosyncratic income and housing risk and can default separately on their mortgages and unsecured credit. Households who default on mortgages forfeit their housing collateral. In addition, in recourse states, the difference between the face value of the mortgage and the collateral may be converted into unsecured credit. Households who file for bankruptcy have all unsecured debts discharged and can keep home equity up to the homestead exemption, but are then excluded from filing for bankruptcy for a period of time.

My main theoretical contribution is to characterize how the bankruptcy decision depends on the entire household portfolio. Unlike Chatterjee et al. (2007), I find that the net worth of a household is not sufficient for understanding a household's decision to go bankrupt. The bankruptcy decision depends jointly on the level of unsecured debt, home equity and non-exempt home equity. Given these three quantities, I prove that the set of income realizations that triggers bankruptcy is a closed interval. Further, I show that for a fixed level of net worth, a household with more home equity is more likely to declare bankruptcy since it stands to gain more from having its unsecured debt discharged. This result is consistent with the empirical findings of Fay, Hurst, and White (2002). In addition, I show that the probability of going bankrupt is decreasing in the amount of non-exempt home equity, as

the non-exempt portion is seized in bankruptcy.

Quantitatively, I find that the model can account for 20% of the overall variation in state bankruptcy rates, and for 80% of the variation that can be attributed to differences in laws. The model predicts, consistent with state level data, lower bankruptcy rates in states with higher homestead exemptions. More generous exemptions lessen the penalty from bankruptcy and therefore increase the probability of homeowners going bankrupt. This raises the equilibrium price of unsecured borrowing. This higher price, coupled with access to secured borrowing, causes households to substitute secured credit for unsecured by taking on more highly leveraged mortgages. Therefore, in states with higher exemptions, the household portfolio is more heavily weighted toward secured debt, resulting in lower bankruptcy rates, but higher foreclosure rates. Generating the negative correlation between bankruptcy rates and the homestead exemption depends crucially on the ability of households to endogenously substitute between the two types of credit. I show in counter-factual analysis, where secured borrowing and foreclosure are not allowed, that the model does not reproduce the observed negative relationship between bankruptcy rates and the homestead exemption. This highlights the importance of modeling secured and unsecured credit together.

I use the calibrated model to evaluate the effects of a recent major reform to bankruptcy law: the 2005 BAPCPA. The reform restricted households earning above median income in their state from filing for bankruptcy. Analyzing the transition induced by the reform, I find that bankruptcy rates initially drop, but then rise significantly for several years until converging to a rate roughly double the pre-reform level. The fraction of households with negative net worth and the total unsecured debt outstanding also increase significantly over the transition. Since income is highly persistent, households with above median income have a high probability of staying above median income (and being precluded from filing for bankruptcy) in the subsequent period, and thus their default risk is low. As a result, those households face much lower prices for unsecured debt, and optimally take on more of it than before the reform. If they remain above median income they repay or roll over the debt, but if they fall below they optimally choose to go bankrupt. This simultaneously generates increased indebtedness and higher bankruptcy rates.

Even though the BAPCPA reform only changed bankruptcy law, I find that it has significant effects on foreclosure rates. Along the transition foreclosure rates increase for several years and then converge to a level 0.6 percentage points higher. My findings provide support for the hypotheses of Morgan, Iverson, and Botsch (2009) and Li, White, and Zhu (2010) that BAPCPA contributed to the subsequent observed rise in foreclosure rates. As mentioned above, households become increasingly indebted causing a left-ward shift in the wealth distribution. Both before and after BAPCPA, households with low net worth take on

more highly leveraged mortgages than high net worth households because they have fewer resources to finance housing purchases. Thus, increasing the mass of low net worth households increases the foreclosure rate. In addition, households with non-exempt home equity take on less unsecured debt (since it provides less insurance against housing risk), resulting in portfolios more heavily weighted toward mortgage debt.

Despite the increase in default rates, the BAPCPA reform improves welfare - households are willing to pay more than 1.4% of annual consumption to implement the policy. The mechanism behind the welfare gain is the increased state-contingency of unsecured debt after BAPCPA. Restricting bankruptcy only to households who earn below median income moves the unsecured debt contract closer to an insurance contract against low income realizations. Households can take on unsecured debt and exempt home equity at lower prices than before the reform. In the event of a low income realization, households can declare bankruptcy and keep the home equity. Thus, using a combination of home equity and unsecured credit, households can insure themselves against low income realizations.

Finally, I address the question of what level of exemption and recourse policy the federal government should enact were it to standardize default policies across states. The U.S. Congress has attempted and failed to standardize exemption policy numerous times in the last 35 years amid intense debate over the optimal level of exemptions. To inform this policy debate, I use my calibrated model to quantitatively determine the optimal joint homestead exemption and recourse policy from a utilitarian welfare perspective. I take as my starting point the sixth year in the transition induced by the BAPCPA and solve for the transition to the new steady state. I find that the optimal joint policy is no-recourse foreclosure and a homestead exemption of roughly 25% of the state median income. The intuition for the result is as follows. Households in the economy face two types of risk: income and housing. By preventing recourse, secured debt can more effectively provide insurance against housing risk, since it does not expose households to the risk of also having to go bankrupt. The optimal size of the homestead exemption balances the insurance value of being able to keep home equity after bankruptcy with the increased cost of credit associated with the higher default risk. In the context of the income restrictions enacted in 2005, the negative price effects of higher homestead exemptions are mitigated for high income households, which drives part of the result. Households making less than median income, however, do not benefit as much from the restriction and thus prefer lower exemptions.

Connections to Existing Literature

This paper is related to multiple areas of the literature on incomplete markets and household default. Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) study economies with savings and competitively priced unsecured debt, with prices depending on loan size and household characteristics. In their models, they abstract from a household portfolio of exempt assets and liabilities and only consider the net household position. In my framework, I include an exempt housing asset and show that the net position is not sufficient to determine the default decision. Including assets and liabilities allows the model to be consistent with the large fraction of bankrupt households who have positive home equity, whereas in their models all bankrupt households have no assets. Further, the endogenous penalty of having non-exempt assets seized generates average credit spreads on unsecured credit that are consistent with what is observed in the data, which the existing literature has had trouble matching.¹ Hintermaier and Koeniger (2009) analyze optimal debt portfolios in a life-cycle model of durable and non-durable consumption, but without the possibility of mortgage default.

Four recent papers, Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2011), Corbae and Quintin (2011), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011) and Garriga and Schlagenhaut (2009) build equilibrium models of housing, endogenous leverage choice, and foreclosure. Those papers abstract from unsecured debt and bankruptcy, and are primarily focused on understanding the effects of government housing market policy or the 2007 housing bust². I see my paper as complementing those papers by providing insight on how BAPCPA may have contributed to the subsequent rise in foreclosures.

Another strand of the literature has separately investigated the effects of homestead exemptions and recourse. Gropp et al. (1997) find that in states with higher homestead exemptions households with lower wealth are more likely to be denied auto loans. Pavan (2008) shows that higher bankruptcy exemptions discourage the accumulation of durables, and Li and Sarte (2006) examine the general equilibrium effects of changes to homestead exemptions. Pence (2006) studies how state foreclosure laws affect the average size of mortgage loans and finds loans are smaller in more borrower friendly states. Complementing that work, Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) estimate that recourse laws significantly reduce the probability of foreclosure.

¹Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) do match average credit spreads on unsecured credit. However, in their model households are required to pay more than one years' earnings to the bank in the case of bankruptcy. No state in the US allows more than 25% of *earned but unpaid* wages to be taken in bankruptcy. Even for households paid at a monthly frequency, this implies that the most they would be required to contribute is $1/4 \times 1/12 = 1/36$ of annual earnings. Furthermore, in 95% of all bankruptcy cases no funds are returned to unsecured creditors (data from Department of Justice Report on Chapter 7 Bankruptcy).

²There is also an important, empirically focused literature that investigates the causes and consequences of the recent housing bust, see e.g. Foote et al. (2009) or Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2011).

This work also complements a growing empirical literature that focuses on the interaction between foreclosure and bankruptcy (e.g., Carroll and Li (2008), Li and White (2009)). To my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the effects of foreclosure and bankruptcy in a structural, dynamic, general equilibrium model.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe the model economy. In Section 3, I provide theoretical characterizations of household decisions and endogenous prices. The calibration procedure and the relevant data targets are presented in Section 4. The characteristics of the calibrated economy are discussed in Section 5. I discuss the results of policy experiments in Section 6. I conclude in Section 7.

2 Model

2.1 Economic Environment

I consider each state as an endowment economy, populated with a measure one continuum of households, a measure one continuum of banks and a measure one continuum of real estate construction companies. Time is modeled discretely and all agents are infinitely lived. Households face idiosyncratic endowment and housing depreciation shocks.

2.2 Households

Each period, households receive an idiosyncratic endowment of the consumption good y . The endowment is assumed to follow a stochastic process consisting of a persistent and a transitory component:

$$\log(y) = z + \varepsilon$$

where

$$z' = \rho z + \sqrt{(1 - \rho^2)}\eta$$

where ε and η are independent normally distributed random variables with variances σ_ε^2 and σ_η^2 .

Households derive period utility $U(c, s)$ from consumption and housing services s , which can be purchased at a price p_s relative to the consumption good. Households are expected utility maximizers and discount the future with parameter β .

Households can save or borrow by purchasing one-period bonds with face value b' , with negative values interpreted as unsecured loans. The “price” of a bond with face value b' can be a function of all observable household characteristics as well as asset choices and is

denoted $q_b(\cdot)$. The timing convention implies that for savings the household pays $b' \times q_b(b', \cdot)$ in the current period to receive b' in the subsequent period. For unsecured borrowing, the household receives $-b' \times q_b(b', \cdot)$ in the current period and has to repay $-b'$ in the subsequent period or go bankrupt.

Households can purchase perfectly divisible houses h' at a price p_h per unit of housing. Each unit of the housing good generates a unit flow of housing services, which can be rented out in the same period of purchase. Following Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2011), I assume houses are subject to *idiosyncratic* depreciation shocks, δ' . The shocks are distributed according to CDF $F(\delta')$, with negative values of δ' corresponding to house appreciation. The realizations of δ' are assumed to be independent across time and households. A large of large numbers is assumed to hold such that $F(\cdot)$ represents the cross-sectional distribution of depreciation shocks.

Households can finance housing purchases with mortgages with face value denoted by m' . The mortgage is secured by the housing good owned by the household, and the price can be a function of all observable household characteristics as well as goods and asset choices and is denoted $q_m(\cdot)$. I assume that neither households nor financial intermediaries can commit to long term mortgage contracts³. A mortgage therefore is a contract to receive $m' \times q_m(m', \cdot)$ units of the consumption good in the current period and to repay m' in the subsequent period or go into foreclosure. Households are restricted from engaging in lending contracts amongst themselves: only financial intermediaries are allowed to issue lending contracts⁴.

2.3 Legal Environment

2.3.1 Foreclosure

Households have the option to default on mortgages after the realization of the housing depreciation and income shocks. When a household defaults, the depreciated housing collateral is seized via a foreclosure technology. If the depreciated housing collateral exceeds the face value of the mortgage, the excess is returned to the household,⁵ i.e. the household

³On the household side, the assumption is innocuous given access to low cost mortgage refinance and home-equity lines of credit. On the bank side, long term contracts provide households insurance against inflation risk, real-interest rate risk and income risk. Since I am focused on steady-state equilibria, there is no aggregate inflation or interest rate risk that households need to insure against. In Section 3, I show that in no-recourse states households are also insured against income risk. Thus, the assumption of short term contracts seems reasonable in my setting.

⁴This assumption is motivated by un-modeled information and enforcement frictions and is standard in the incomplete markets literature.

⁵This is consistent with foreclosure law. If the value of the collateral exceeds the outstanding debt, the bank must return the excess after liquidating the collateral and covering any associated costs related to the foreclosure.

receives $\max\{\gamma(1 - \delta')p_h h' - m', 0\}$, where m', h' are the mortgage and house size before the default decision respectively, δ' is the realized depreciation shock, and $\gamma \leq 1$ represents the foreclosure technology. There is also a deficiency judgment technology, $\mathcal{J} \in \{0, 1\}$. If the housing collateral (after depreciation and foreclosure) is less than the face value of the mortgage, the difference is converted into unsecured debt (or receives a deficiency judgment, $\mathcal{J} = 1$) with probability ψ . Otherwise, the household does not face any additional penalty. The unsecured position of the households after foreclosure can be represented as:

$$b_F = b' + \mathcal{J}(\gamma(1 - \delta')p_h h' - m')$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{J}] = \psi$$

with $\psi \in [0, 1]$. A no-recourse state is a state where $\psi = 0$. The assumption of stochastic deficiency judgments is an abstraction to capture the decision of the bank to sue a household motivated by the fact that banks do not pursue deficiency judgments for all households who go into foreclosure even if it is legally allowed.

2.3.2 Bankruptcy

Bankruptcy is modeled after U.S. Chapter 7 bankruptcy law. Chapter 7 is by far the most commonly exercised bankruptcy option, accounting for more than 70% of all bankruptcies⁶. The level of the state homestead exemption is denoted by χ . The bankruptcy decision is made after the foreclosure decision and the realization of any deficiency judgment. The timing convention is chosen to preclude the possibility of the household having an empty budget set after both default decisions. If a household declares bankruptcy, in the current period the following happens:

1. Households can keep home equity up to the exemption
2. Any non-exempt home equity is applied to unsecured debt
3. Unsecured debt is set to 0 and households cannot accumulate bonds
4. Households cannot change their home equity balance
5. Households credit history state changes to bad

⁶The other option to households is Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Chapter 13 involves a repayment of debts over a 3-5 year period. Close to 50% of households who enter into Chapter 13 do not successfully complete the repayment plan, and a significant fraction end up converting to Chapter 7. It is important to note that the homestead exemption is still relevant for Chapter 13. Creditors must receive at least as much repayment as they would under the discharge of debt in Chapter 7.

The restrictions on savings and home equity come from the process of liquidation and exemptions. Households can sell their homes in bankruptcy and keep the exempt equity only if they use or intend to use that equity to purchase another home. In some states, e.g. Florida and Texas, exempt equity proceeds from the sale of a home must be placed into a homestead account until the new homestead is purchased.

Households with bad credit histories are excluded from unsecured borrowing and cannot declare bankruptcy, but they are not excluded from the mortgage market. Further, households with bad credit histories face a proportional consumption penalty λ to represent the increased difficulty of getting a cell phone or a lease, for households with a bankruptcy on a credit record. A household's credit history changes to a good history with probability α and remains bad with probability $1 - \alpha$.

2.4 Household Decision Problem

Households can be in one of two credit history states, $\mathcal{H} = \{G, BC\}$, G represents a good credit history and BC represents having a bad credit history. The relevant state variables at the beginning of the period are the household portfolio, b, h, m , credit history, $\mathcal{H}$ and shocks δ, y, z . Let $X = (b, h, m, \delta, y, z)$, which summarizes the household state. Denote by a the cash-at-hand, or net resource household of a household after the foreclosure and bankruptcy decisions, and $\eta = \max\{p_h h(1 - \delta) - m, 0\}$ the non-negative home equity of a household after the default decisions. The dynamic programming problem of the household can be written as follows:

An agent who begins the period with a good credit history, has lifetime utility given by:

$$V^G(b, h, m, \delta, y, z) = \max_{\mathcal{F} \in \{0,1\}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{J}} \max \{W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta_{\mathcal{F}}, y, z), W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z)\} \quad (1)$$

where $\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{J}}$ is the expectation over a deficiency judgment if the household goes in to foreclosure, and $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}$ and $W_{\mathcal{F}}^B$ are the value of not going bankrupt and going bankrupt, respectively, conditional on the foreclosure choice. Conditional on choosing not to go bankrupt ($W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}$), the households solves:

$$\begin{aligned} W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z) &= \max_{c, s, m', h' \geq 0, b'} \left\{ U(c, s) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{(\delta', y', z')|z} V^G(b', h', m', \delta', y', z') \right\} \\ \text{subj. to} \quad &c + p_s s + [p_h - p_s] h' - m' q_m(b', h', m', z, G) + b' q_b(b', h', m', z) \leq a_{\mathcal{F}} \\ \text{where:} \quad &\underbrace{a_{\mathcal{F}=0} = (1 - \delta) p_h h - m + b + y}_{\text{No Foreclosure}} \quad \underbrace{a_{\mathcal{F}=1} = b_F + y}_{\text{Foreclosure}} \end{aligned}$$

The household consolidates its asset position and then chooses contemporaneous consump-

tion and new bond, housing and mortgage positions. A household who went bankrupt ($W_{\mathcal{F}}^B$) conditional on the foreclosure choice solves:

$$\begin{aligned}
W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta_{\mathcal{F}}, y, z) &= \max_{c, h, m', h' \geq 0} \left\{ U(c, s) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{(\delta', y', z')|z} V^{BC}(b', h', m', \delta', y', z') \right\} \\
\text{subj. to } & c + p_s s = y \quad b' = 0 \\
& [p_h - p_s]h' - m' q_m(b', h', m', z, BC) = \eta_{\mathcal{F}} \\
\text{where: } & \eta_{\mathcal{F}=0} = \underbrace{\min\{(1 - \delta)p_h h - m, \chi\}}_{\text{Exempt home equity}} \quad \eta_{\mathcal{F}=1} = 0
\end{aligned}$$

where now the household consumes only out of the period's endowment, can't save or borrow in bonds and keeps the same amount of exempt home equity. V^{BC} is the value function of a household that starts the period with a bad credit history and is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}
V^{BC}(b, h, m, \delta, y, z) &= \max_{\mathcal{F} \in \{0, 1\}} \mathbb{E}_{\psi} \left\{ \max_{c, s, h', m', b' \geq 0} U(c, s) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{(\delta', y', z')|z} \left[\begin{array}{c} \alpha V^G(X') + \\ (1 - \alpha) V^{BC}(X') \end{array} \right] \right\} \\
\text{subj. to } & \lambda(c + p_s s) + [p_h - p_s]h' - q_m m' + q_b b' \leq a_{\mathcal{F}} \\
\text{where: } & a_{\mathcal{F}=0} = (1 - \delta)p_h h - m + b + y \quad a_{\mathcal{F}=1} = b_F + y
\end{aligned}$$

Notice that the timing is such that the housing services generated by the house h' can be traded in the same period as purchase, which is why the effective per unit price is $p_h - p_s$. If households are indifferent between either going bankrupt or not, it is assumed they do not go bankrupt. If households are indifferent between foreclosing or not foreclosing it is assumed they foreclose if they have negative equity and do not foreclose if they have positive equity. The value functions for households with bad credit histories V^{BC} or that chose not to go bankrupt V^{NB} , may not be well defined as written. Since cash at hand can be negative, it is possible that there are no feasible choices (b', h', m') that result in non-negative consumption (c, s) . In that case, households declare bankruptcy and receive no consumption for the period.

The solutions to these four coupled Bellman equations imply binary decision rules for foreclosure and bankruptcy, $f^*(X', \mathcal{H})$ and $B_{\mathcal{J}}^*(X')$, respectively, (where a value of 1 implies default) where recall $\mathcal{J}$ is an indicator representing where the household received a deficiency judgment. In addition, the solutions also imply policy rules for housing, mortgage and bond choice.

2.5 Real Estate Construction Sector

The real estate sector is populated by a continuum of competitive firms who possess a linear, reversible technology to produce houses:

$$H = C_h$$

where H is output of houses and C_h is the input of consumption good. The representative firm solves the following maximization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{H, C_h} \quad & p_h H - C_h \\ \text{subj. to} \quad & H = C_h \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the equilibrium house price is given by $p_h = 1$. In effect, the model has an exogenous house price, but an endogenous rental price p_s (which clears the market for housing services) and thus endogenous house-price to rent ratios.

2.6 Financial Intermediaries

Banks can borrow at the risk-free interest rate, denoted r_b , which they take as given. Issuing debt, both secured and unsecured, is costly because of administrative and screening costs. To capture these costs, I impose a proportional real resource cost r_a for issuing each unit of a mortgage or negative face value bond. Thus, the effective cost of financing one unit of debt is $r_b + r_a$. It is assumed that agents simultaneously apply for mortgages and unsecured loans and that banks can observe the portfolio choices b', h', m' , persistent state z and the credit history. The banking sector is competitive, and banks are assumed to make zero expected profit loan-by-loan (as in Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Jeske, Krueger & Mitman (2011)). Specifically, cross-subsidization is not allowed across agents nor across loan types. Restricting the contract space to exclude subsidization across loan types is motivated by the legal difficulties in designing and enforcing a joint unsecured-secured debt contract. The zero-profit assumption allows me to analyze the mortgage and bond problems separately.

2.6.1 Mortgage Problem

The price for a mortgage depends on the foreclosure and bankruptcy decision rules of the household. Banks have access to foreclosure and deficiency judgment technologies as described in Section 2.3.1. The price of a mortgage of size m' to purchase a house of size h' will reflect all of the expected possible outcomes. If the household forecloses on a mortgage

with face value m' used to purchase a house of size h' , the bank recovers the depreciated value of the house processed through the foreclosure technology⁷, $\gamma h'(1 - \delta')$. In addition, with probability ψ the bank wins a deficiency judgment, $m' - \gamma h'$, but only recovers that value if the household does not file for bankruptcy. If a household goes bankrupt, the bank can recover any bonds held by the household⁸. Therefore, in general, the price of a mortgage will depend on all the observable characteristics of the household and the bond position b' in addition to m' and h' . The typical bank will only issue mortgage contracts with a return greater than or equal to the cost of funds:

$$q_m(b', h', m', z, G)m' \leq \frac{1}{1 + r_b + r_a} \times \mathbb{E}_{y', \delta', z'|z} \left\{ (1 - f^*(X'))m' + f^*(X') \left[\psi((1 - B_1^*(X'))m' + B_1^*(X')(\gamma(1 - \delta')h') + \max\{b', 0\}) + (1 - \psi)(\gamma(1 - \delta')h') \right] \right\} \quad (2)$$

A household with a bad credit history cannot declare bankruptcy, and thus the mortgage price is characterized as above, but with $B^*(\cdot) = 0$. For a household with a bad credit history, the price also takes into account that the foreclosure decision is made after the realization of whether the household will enter the subsequent period with a good credit history, so there is an additional expectation. The conditions for the typical bank to issue a mortgage for those two cases can be found in the Appendix.

2.6.2 Unsecured Credit Problem

When households are saving in bonds, $b' \geq 0$, q_b represents the price of buying a bond that pays b' units of consumption good tomorrow. There is no default risk on savings, so the bank will sell bonds as long as the discounted face value is less than the funds received today:

$$q_b(b', g', m', z) \geq \frac{1}{1 + r_b} \quad (3)$$

which from the zero profit condition immediately implies that the price only depends on the risk-free rate, $q_b = \frac{1}{1 + r_b}$ when $b' \geq 0$.

The price of a bond with negative face value b' depends on the household's default probability and its non-exempt assets. If a household declares bankruptcy and has home equity in excess of the homestead exemption χ the bank can recover a fraction of it. Let ξ' denote the non-exempt portion of a household's home equity, namely $\xi' = \max\{h'(1 -$

⁷Since $p_h = 1$, I drop it from the remainder of the analysis.

⁸The seizure of bonds is assumed to be efficient to represent the fact that secured debt is treated as senior debt in bankruptcy, and thus is paid before fees and administrative costs.

$\delta') - m' - \chi, 0\}$. Through the bankruptcy technology, the bank can recover $\max\{-b', \zeta\xi'\}$ from a household that declares bankruptcy, where $\zeta \leq 1$ represents the bankruptcy recovery technology. The bank will only issue unsecured debt if the expected return is greater than the cost of funds:

$$-b'q_b(b', h', m', z) \leq \frac{1}{1 + r_b + r_a} \times \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{J}, y', \delta', z' | z} [-b'(1 - B_{\mathcal{J}}^*(X')) + B_{\mathcal{J}}^*(X')\zeta\xi'] \right\} \quad (4)$$

2.7 Equilibrium Definition

The pair (ψ, χ) summarizes the legal environment for the state. Each state is treated as a small open economy for the purpose of the bond and mortgage market, therefore the risk-free rate is given and the bond and mortgage markets need not clear. The housing market is closed, reflecting the fact that housing services must be consumed in the same geographic location as the housing good. Let μ denote the cross sectional distribution of households over the credit history, cash at hand, income and home equity. I focus on a stationary recursive equilibrium.

Definition Given ψ, χ, r_b , a Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium comprises:

- Value functions for the households,
 $\{V : \mathcal{H} \times \mathbb{R}^3 \times [\underline{\delta}, 1] \times Y \times Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\}, \{W : \{B, NB, BC\} \times \{0, 1\} \times \mathbb{R} \times Y \times Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\}$
- Default decision rules and policy functions for the households:
 $\{f^* : \mathcal{H} \times \mathbb{R}^3 \times [\underline{\delta}, 1] \times Y \times Z \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\}, \{B^* : \mathbb{R}^3 \times [\underline{\delta}, 1] \times Y \times Z \times \{0, 1\} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\}$
and $\{c, s, b', m', h' : \{B, NB, BC\} \times \mathbb{R} \times Y \times Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\}$
- Price p_s , pricing functions $\{q_m : \mathcal{H} \times \mathbb{R}^3 \times Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+\}$ and $\{q_b : \mathbb{R}^3 \times Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+\}$
- An invariant distribution: $\{\mu^* : \{B, NB, BC\} \times \mathbb{R} \times Y \times Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+\}$

such that:

1. **Households Maximize:** Given prices and the pricing functions, the value functions solve (1), and c, s, b', m', h' are the associated policy functions, and B^*, f^* are the associated default rules.
2. **Zero Profit Mortgages:** Given f^*, B^*, q_m makes (2) hold with equality
3. **Zero Profit Unsecured Debt:** Given B^*, q_b makes (4) hold with equality
4. **Zero Profit Bonds:** $q_b = \frac{1}{1+r_b}$ when $b' \geq 0$.

5. **Rental Market Clearing:** $\sum_{\mathcal{I} \in \{B, NB, BC\}} \int h'_{\mathcal{I}}(a, y, z) d\mu = \sum_{\mathcal{I} \in \{B, NB, BC\}} \int s_{\mathcal{I}}(a, y, z) d\mu$
6. **Invariant Distribution:** The distribution μ^* is invariant with respect to the Markov process induced by the exogenous Markov process z and the policy functions m', h', b', B^*, f^*

3 Theoretical Results

3.1 Household Problem

I can simplify the household problem because of the static intra-temporal substitution between consumption and housing services. Thus, in the household problem define:

$$\begin{aligned} u(c; p_s) &= \max_{\tilde{c}, s \geq 0} U(\tilde{c}, s) \\ &\quad s.t. \\ \tilde{c} + p_s s &= c \end{aligned}$$

3.1.1 Existence of a Solution

In order to prove the existence of a solution to the household problem, I need to make an assumption on preferences and on the assets traded. I assume that utility is bounded above and that the utility of consuming zero is small enough that a household will always prefer to go bankrupt to having zero consumption in a given period⁹. Second, in order to rule out Ponzi schemes, I assume maximum levels of borrowing for unsecured debt and mortgages. Under these assumptions, which are formalized in the appendix, a solution to the household problem exists. Further, consistent with the penalties associated with bankruptcy, a household with a bad credit history *ceterus paribus* has lower lifetime utility than one with a good credit history.

Proposition 1 Existence of a Solution to the Household Problem

(1) The household value functions $V^{\mathcal{H}}$ exist and are unique; (2) The value functions are bounded, and increasing in a ; (3) A bad credit score reduces utility, i.e. $V^G \geq V^{BC}$

The proof of the existence of a solution to the household problem follows from standard contraction mapping arguments. The details of all proofs can be found in the Appendix.

⁹In my quantitative analysis I will assume a constant relative risk aversion utility function with CRRA parameter greater than 1 which satisfies this condition.

3.1.2 The Bankruptcy Decision

As one of the novel features of this paper is including the possibly non-exempt housing asset and mortgage default, one of the contributions of the paper is characterizing how housing, foreclosure, and the homestead exemption affect the household bankruptcy decision. Since the bankruptcy decision is made after the foreclosure decision and realization of deficiency judgments I can characterize the bankruptcy decision in terms of a *bankruptcy set* $\bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$, where b_F is unsecured credit after deficiency judgments, η is home equity, and ξ is non-exempt home equity. The bankruptcy set is the set of realizations of the endowment y for which the household finds it optimal to declare bankruptcy as opposed to repaying b_F . The bankruptcy set depends on those four variables alone because they capture the benefits of bankruptcy (the discharge of unsecured debt b_F and preservation of exempt equity $\eta - \xi$) as well as the costs (the loss of non-exempt equity ξ).

Proposition 2 Bankruptcy Characterization

Conditional on the foreclosure choice f^ :*

- (a) *For any values of unsecured debt b_F , home equity η , and non-exempt home equity ξ , if the bankruptcy set is non-empty it is a closed interval, i.e. $\bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z) = [\underline{y}^B, \bar{y}^B]$, or $\bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z) = \emptyset$.*
- (b) *The bankruptcy set expands with indebtedness b_F , i.e. $\bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(\hat{b}_F, \eta, \xi, z) \subseteq \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$ for $b_F < \hat{b}_F$.*

The proposition is illustrated graphically in Figure 2. The utility of going bankrupt and not going bankrupt are plotted as a function of endowment. The strict concavity of the utility function guarantees that if the curves intersect, their intersection will form a closed set. The intuition for this result is that households with very low endowment realization prefer to take on more debt and consume more in the current period than they would if they declared bankruptcy. Households with high endowments prefer to maintain access to credit, and thus pay off the debt but may consume less than if they had declared bankruptcy. Unlike Chatterjee et al (2007), the default decision does not depend solely on the net asset position of the household: home equity and exemptions affect the bankruptcy decision.

Proposition 3 Home Equity, Exemptions and Bankruptcy

- (a) *The bankruptcy set contracts in non-exempt home equity ξ , i.e. $\bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi_1, z) \subseteq \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi_2, z)$, for $\xi_2 < \xi_1$.*

- (b) Holding net assets constant (i.e. fixing $\eta + b_F$) the bankruptcy set is expanding in home equity, i.e. $\bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z) \subseteq \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F - x, \eta + x, \xi, z)$ for $x > 0$. Or equivalently, the bankruptcy set is increasing in the difference of home equity and debt $\eta - b_F$.
- (c) When home equity exceeds the homestead exemption, the bankruptcy set is decreasing in home equity, i.e. $\bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta + x, \xi + x, z) \subseteq \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$ for $x > 0$.
- (d) When there is no homestead exemption, i.e. $\chi = 0$, the bankruptcy set only depends on the net asset position $\eta + b_F$ and the persistent income state z .
- (e) The bankruptcy set is empty if net assets exceed the homestead exemption, i.e. if $\eta + b_F > \chi$, then $\bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z) = \emptyset$.

Non-exempt home equity decreases the probability of bankruptcy. Intuitively, as the household holds more non-exempt home equity the cost of going bankrupt in terms of lost housing wealth is increasing, but the benefit of going bankruptcy is constant. Thus, the set of endowment realizations for which the household goes bankrupt contracts. Having a substantial amount of non-exempt home equity effectively increases the punishment of going bankrupt. This will be an important mechanism for understanding the general equilibrium price effects generated in the quantitative analysis.

The household portfolio composition is also important for understanding the bankruptcy decision. For a given net asset position having more home equity increases the chance of bankruptcy. This result is illustrated graphically in Figure 3. The value of repaying is the same under both scenarios. Keeping the net asset position fixed but changing its composition does not affect the value of repaying, since after repayment the relevant state variable for the household is the consolidated asset position. The two values of going bankrupt represent the same net position, but the higher line is a household with more home equity and more unsecured debt. Since the household now has more home equity which can be preserved in bankruptcy, the lifetime utility of going bankrupt increases and therefore the set of endowment values for which the household goes bankrupt expands.

3.1.3 The Foreclosure Decision

Modeling secured and unsecured debt together is one of the key innovations of this paper, so it will be useful to establish how the household will decide whether to foreclose and how that relates to the subsequent bankruptcy decision. The decision to foreclose and how it is related to bankruptcy will depend crucially on the probability of a deficiency judgment, ψ . In order to understand how ψ controls the complementarity between foreclosure and

bankruptcy, I first characterize when households repay their mortgages for sure. Since the housing market is frictionless, if the foreclosure technology is inefficient ($\gamma < 1$), households will always repay their mortgages if the depreciated value of the house is greater than the face value of the mortgage. This is formalized in Lemma 1.

Lemma 1 *If the foreclosure technology is inefficient, $\gamma < 1$, $f^*(X, \mathcal{H}) = 0$ for all b, z , and y when $h(1 - \delta) \geq m$.*

For two special cases the foreclosure decision follows a cutoff rule in the depreciation shock δ' . If banks cannot obtain deficiency judgments (i.e., no-recourse, $\psi = 0$), households will choose to foreclose on their mortgages whenever they have negative equity. Since households face no additional cost of foreclosure, it is always optimal to “walk away.” Thus, similar to Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2011), under no-recourse Lemma 1 becomes an if-and-only-if statement - households only repay their mortgage when the value of the house exceeds the value of the mortgage (formalized in Lemma 2). In no-recourse states, therefore, the foreclosure decision is independent of bond position or income of the household. Foreclosure and bankruptcy are then essentially independent decisions.

Lemma 2 *If there is no recourse, $\psi = 0$, the foreclosure decision follows a cutoff rule in δ , i.e. there exists $\delta^*(h, m)$ such that $f^*(X, \mathcal{H}) = 1$ for all $\delta \geq \delta^*(h, m)$ and 0 otherwise for all b, y, z . Further, the cutoff depends only on the leverage $\kappa = \frac{m}{h}$, and $\delta^*(\kappa) = 1 - \kappa$.*

Consider now the other extreme, one where deficiency judgments always occur, $\psi = 1$. If the foreclosure technology is inefficient, a household will either repay, or foreclose and go bankrupt:

Lemma 3 *If deficiency judgments always occur, $\psi = 1$, the foreclosure decision follows a cutoff rule in δ , which in general will depend on b, h, m, y, z . Further, any household with a good credit history that chooses foreclosure will subsequently go bankrupt. Households in the bankruptcy or bad credit will optimally choose b', h', m' such that foreclosure is never optimal.*

If foreclosure is inefficient, the household can repay by paying $m - (1 - \delta)h$ or choose foreclosure and have additional unsecured debt $m - \gamma(1 - \delta)h$. If the household does not subsequently go bankrupt, it will always prefer to repay, since it yields a higher net asset position. Therefore, whenever the household forecloses it will subsequently go bankrupt to erase the deficiency.

Lemmas 2 & 3 show that in the limiting cases of ψ the foreclosure decision follows a cutoff rule. In addition, ψ partially controls the complementarity between foreclosure

and bankruptcy: when $\psi = 0$ the foreclosure decision is independent of the subsequent bankruptcy decision, but when $\psi = 1$ foreclosure always results in bankruptcy.

3.2 Financial Intermediaries

Characterizing the intermediary pricing of mortgages and unsecured credit is limited by my ability to characterize the household foreclosure decision. However, the characterization of the foreclosure decision when there is no recourse ($\psi = 0$) admits useful characterizations of the mortgage and unsecured debt prices.

3.2.1 Unsecured Debt Prices

When there is no recourse, the foreclosure decision is independent of the level of unsecured debt and the bankruptcy decision. From Proposition 2, since the bankruptcy set is expanding in indebtedness, the price of unsecured debt will be decreasing in indebtedness. Further, from Proposition 3, if there is no homestead exemption, the bankruptcy set depends only on the net asset position. Since the net asset position is increasing in the size of the house and decreasing in the size of the mortgage, unsecured debt prices will increase in house size and decrease in mortgage size. Recall that because of the timing convention, decreasing prices q_b are equivalent to increasing implied interest rates. Formally:

Lemma 4 *If there is no recourse ($\psi = 0$):*

1. $b' \leq \hat{b}'$ implies $q_b(b', h', m', z) \leq q_b(\hat{b}', h', m', z)$.
2. *If in addition the homestead exemption is zero, $\chi = 0$:*
 - (a) $h' \leq \hat{h}'$ implies $q_b(b', h, m', z) \leq q_b(b', \hat{h}', m', z)$
 - (b) $m' \geq \hat{m}'$ implies $q_b(b', h', m, z) \leq q_b(b', h', \hat{m}', z)$

3.2.2 Mortgage Prices

Using Lemma 2, if there is no recourse, mortgage prices have a closed form solution. Using the zero-profit condition for competitive banks and equation (2), I conclude mortgages are priced exclusively based on leverage κ' :

$$\begin{aligned} q_m(h', m', b', z, \mathcal{H}; \psi = 0) &= \frac{1}{1 + r_b + r_a} \left\{ F(\delta^*(\kappa')) + \frac{\gamma}{\kappa'} \int_{\delta^*(\kappa')}^1 (1 - \delta') dF(\delta') \right\} \\ &= q_m(\kappa'; \psi = 0) \end{aligned}$$

where κ' and $\delta'^*(\kappa')$ are defined as in Lemma 2. Note that $q_m(\kappa')$ is strictly decreasing in κ' , thus mortgage interest rates are increasing in leverage κ' . The interest rates are increasing to reflect the increasing risk of foreclosure. In no-recourse states the mortgage interest rates are independent of the credit history of households, since the bankruptcy decision has no effect on the ability of the bank to recover the housing collateral in the case of foreclosure.

The mortgage price function and Lemma 4 imply that when there is no recourse and no homestead exemption ($\psi = 0$ and $\chi = 0$) there is an endogenous maximum leverage.

Lemma 5 *If $\psi = 0$, $\chi = 0$ and $F(\delta)$ is $\mathcal{C}^2$ and log-concave, there exists an endogenous maximum leverage κ^* . That is, it is optimal for a household to choose leverage $\kappa \leq \kappa^*$.*

The intuition is that for a fixed choice h , by increasing the household's leverage the household can increase receipts today up to a maximal point. And since increasing leverage weakly decreases assets in all states tomorrow, it is never optimal to choose a higher leverage than the point that maximizes receipts today.

4 Calibration

The goal of the calibration is to validate that the model can account for aggregate facts related to both secured and unsecured borrowing, foreclosure, and bankruptcy. In order to capture the heterogeneity in state law but still match national level data I treat each state as a small open economy and aggregate state-level moments. I allow states to vary only in the homestead exemption χ , whether there is recourse ($\psi > 0$), and the level of median income, keeping technology and preference parameters constant across states. For each trial of technology and preference parameters, the model needs to be solved for every combination of homestead exemption and recourse, χ and ψ .

To balance richness in variation with computational feasibility, I restrict the current calibration to consider seven configurations of the homestead exemption and recourse law. I allocate each state in the US to one of the seven bins according to its homestead exemption and recourse policy. For each bin I calculate the average homestead exemption and median income, weighting by state populations. The relative weight of the seven economies in calculating aggregate statistics is determined by the relative proportion of households from those states. I refer to the seven state economies as Washington, California, Minnesota, Maryland, Michigan, Massachusetts and Florida. The state policy parameters are summarized in Table 1.

The values for the homestead exemption χ are constructed from state laws and state-level median household income estimates from the Current Population Survey published by the

U.S. Census Bureau. The values used for the homestead exemption and income are taken from the year 2000 (see Appendix C for details). For each state, median income is normalized to 1, so χ is in units of state median income. For example, median household income in Pennsylvania was \$40,106, with an exemption of \$30,000 for couples, yielding a $\chi^{PA} = 0.75$.

Good data on deficiency judgments do not exist, so I take the value of ψ as a parameter to calibrate. Li and White (2009) analyze a sample of prime and sub-prime mortgages and find that roughly 18% of prime and 72% of sub-prime mortgages that are foreclosed eventually end up in bankruptcy. In 2004, sub-prime mortgages accounted for roughly 18% of the number of mortgages outstanding, thus roughly 28% of households who have foreclosure proceedings initiated against them also file for bankruptcy. I take this value as my target for calibrating ψ .¹⁰

In addition to state-specific laws regarding bankruptcy, the legal environment is described by α and λ , the parameters governing how long a household has a bad credit record and the consumption penalty, respectively. By law, households cannot file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy twice in any six year period. The Fair Credit Reporting Act stipulates that bankruptcy filings cannot remain on a household's record for more than 10 years. Since the model period is one year, the logical bounds for α are between $[1/10, 1/6]$. I set $\alpha = 1/6$ to match the legal exclusion from being able to declare bankruptcy since there is evidence households regain access to credit while the bankruptcy notation still appears on their credit report. The parameter λ is then determined jointly to match the unsecured share of household debt. Data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the U.S. published by the Federal Reserve (Table Z.1 D.3) indicate that consumer credit accounted for roughly 24% of household debt outstanding from 1983 to 2004. Over that same period, approximately 37% of consumer credit consisted of revolving credit, which is the closest analogue to unsecured debt in the model (non-revolving credit includes secured auto loans, student loans, etc). I target an aggregate share of unsecured credit of $0.24 \times 0.37 = 0.089$ ¹¹. I aggregate unsecured debt and total debt across the seven economies (weighted by households and income) and compute the unsecured share.

4.1 Technology

Endowment Process: Following Storesletten et al. (2004), I set persistence of the shock z , $\rho = 0.98$ and the variance to the innovations to $\sigma_\eta^2 = 0.09$. Estimates for the variance of

¹⁰Strictly speaking, the discussion relating parameters to data targets is heuristic in the sense that all parameters determine all endogenous variables jointly. I associate parameters with the moments on which they have the greatest affect, quantitatively, in the model.

¹¹This number is nearly identical to the ratio of unsecured credit to unsecured credit plus mortgage debt measured in the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances for prime age households.

log annual income range from 0.04 to 0.16 . I thus set $\sigma_\varepsilon^2 = 0.06$, generating a variance of log annual income of 0.15. Using the method of Tauchen and Hussey (1991), I approximate the persistent component with a two state Markov chain.

Foreclosure Technology: The foreclosure loss parameter, γ , is set to match the additional depreciation incurred in a foreclosure (e.g., it captures effects such as decreased maintenance by the occupants). The average loss was estimated by Pennington-Cross (2006) to be 22%. He estimates the loss by comparing revenue from foreclosed home sales to a market price constructed via the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) repeat sales index. I therefore set $\gamma = 0.78$ for all states in the model.

Bankruptcy Technology: In order to map the bankruptcy recovery rate from the U.S. to the model, I must determine if 1) there is any loss in the forced sale of the home in bankruptcy; and 2) what fraction of assets recovered are actually distributed to creditors. First, note that if the house has been foreclosed the secured creditors seize it and there is nothing for unsecured creditors to collect (see Lemma 1). Campbell et al. (2011) estimate the discount due to bankruptcy in Massachusetts, and find it to be less than 5%. Thus, if a homeowner has positive equity in the home and declares bankruptcy, I assume that there is no loss in the sale of the house. The proceeds of the sale are first used to repay secured creditors. Next, the costs of administering the bankruptcy (including court costs, fees and administrative expenses) are paid. Finally, unsecured creditors are repaid from anything that remains. According to the “Preliminary Report on Chapter 7 Asset Cases 1994 to 2000” prepared by the U.S. Department of Justice, roughly \$10.5 billion was collected in asset cases over that seven year period. Only 52.3% was dispersed to secured and unsecured creditors. Thus, I set the recovery parameter $\zeta = 0.52$.

The Depreciation Process: As in Jeske, Krueger & Mitman (2011), I calibrate the depreciation process to simultaneously match foreclosure rates and house depreciation moments from the data. Consistent with data from the Mortgage Banker’s Association on foreclosure rates from 1990-2003, I target an aggregate foreclosure rate of 0.55 percent. I also target the mean house depreciation, calculated at 1.48% annually, based on mean depreciation of residential housing reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Using data on repeat home sales, the OFHEO estimates both aggregate and purely idiosyncratic components of house price risk¹². Since there is only idiosyncratic risk in the model, I target the annual idiosyncratic house price volatility reported by the OFHEO of 10%.

¹²It models log house prices as a diffusion process consisting of a market price index and a house specific random walk. The technical details can be found in Calhoun (1996).

I find that I need a fat tailed distribution to simultaneously match the price volatility and foreclosure rates. I assume that the depreciation shock follows a generalized Pareto distribution. The generalized Pareto distribution has three parameters, a shape parameter, k , a scale parameter, σ_δ , and a cutoff parameter $\underline{\delta}$. The upper bound for the support is set to 1. The cumulative distribution function is :

$$F(\delta) = 1 - \left(1 + \frac{k(\delta - \underline{\delta})}{\sigma_\delta}\right)^{\left(-\frac{1}{k}-1\right)}$$

4.2 Preferences

For the utility function I choose Cobb-Douglas preferences over consumption and housing services nested in a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) function:

$$U(c, h) = \frac{(c^\theta h^{1-\theta})^{(1-\sigma)} - 1}{1 - \sigma}$$

Notice that this implies the solution to the intra-temporal consumption optimization problem is:

$$p_s h = \frac{1 - \theta}{\theta} c$$

which allows me to independently calibrate θ to match the share of housing in total consumption. According to NIPA data, the housing share of total consumption has been relatively stable at 14.1% over the last forty years, thus I set $\theta = 0.8590$.

The CRRA parameter σ is calibrated jointly to match median net worth observed in the data. I use the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances to compute the median net-worth of prime age households (head age ≤ 50). Median net-worth divided by median income is found to be 1.19. I restrict the analysis to households under age 50 because of strong life-cycle effects in housing and mortgage choice. Households in an infinite horizon model more closely correspond to prime age households in the data.

I calibrate the time discount factor β to match the aggregate bankruptcy rate. I construct bankruptcy rates from state bankruptcy filings and the number of households per state. I use annual non-business bankruptcy filings by state from 1995-2004 published by the American Bankruptcy Institute and obtain data on the number of households by state from the Census. Recent research (e.g., Chakravarty and Rhee (1999) and Himmelstein et al. (2009)) suggests that medical expenditures account for a significant fraction of household bankruptcies in the United States. Chakravarty and Rhee (1999) report that 16.4% of respondents in the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics who filed for bankruptcy listed excessive health-care bills as the cause. Himmelstein et al. (2009) attribute a much higher fraction of bankruptcies to health

shocks because they include health related job loss and income changes. Since those shocks are captured in the calibration of the income process but expenditures related to health care are not (and are abstracted from in the model), I target $100\% - 16.4\% = 83.6\%$ of the observed bankruptcy rate in the data.

The full list of externally calibrated parameters are listed in Table 2. The internally calibrated parameters and relevant model moments are listed in Table 3.

4.3 Model Fit

Aggregated statistics across the seven computed economies are listed in Table 4. The model performs well accounting for non-targeted moments in the data. The model slightly over-predicts average holdings of housing. This result is not surprising since median net worth is targeted in the calibration, but housing and bonds are the only assets that households can hold. In the context of the model, housing is a proxy for all risky assets. In the data, however, households hold risky equity in addition to housing, which could account for the over-prediction. The model does successfully account for the fact that prime age households primarily allocate their wealth in risky assets, as indicated by the low levels of bond holdings. The high level of housing leads to an over-prediction of mortgage holdings and of unsecured debt holding (by construction since the ratio is targeted). The model does well in matching the fraction of households with zero or negative net-worth and the fraction of households who have unsecured debt.

Past models of household bankruptcy have had difficulties in simultaneously matching bankruptcy rates, unsecured debt outstanding and mean interest rate paid on unsecured debt. The presence of the housing asset allows the model to generate realistic interest rates. The mean interest rate paid on unsecured debt in the model is 11.2%, very close to the 12.3% reported in the SCF. The model is also able to successfully replicate the default premium on mortgages. The mean mortgage interest rate in the model is 1.24%, corresponding to a default premium of 24%. By comparison, the implied default premium for a 1-year-adjustable rate mortgage (MORTGAGE1US from St. Louis FRED) over the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate (GS1) during the inter-recession period March 1991-2001 was 22%.

5 Results

5.1 Accounting for State Differences in Bankruptcy Rates

By calibrating the model to aggregate bankruptcy and foreclosure rates, I do not directly target the effects that the homestead exemption and recourse have on default rates. Thus, I can evaluate to what extent the cross-state variation in bankruptcy rates in the data is predicted by the model. Further, the exercise provides a source of model validation before proceeding to the policy analysis.

States vary in demographic and legal characteristics that are abstracted from in the model, but which may be relevant to default. In order to partially control for that additional variation, in Figure 4, I plot mean model and data bankruptcy rates for states binned by exemption level and recourse policy. The model is able to capture the negative relationship between homestead exemption and bankruptcy and the positive relationship between recourse and bankruptcy. Figure 4 only presents conditional means, therefore, for a more careful accounting I control for additional observables and compute what fraction of the residual variation the model explains. First, I regress the state level bankruptcy rate on log median household income, the average household size, a dummy indicating lenient garnishment law, a dummy for judicial foreclose, a dummy for recourse, the homestead exemption, the homestead exemption squared, a dummy for unlimited exemption, and a constant. The four variables related to recourse and the homestead exemption I denote $x_{L,i}$ to represent the legal differences that are varied in the model, and the remainder of the regressors I label $x_{D,i}$. The coefficients on the legal variables are significant and indicate that recourse increases bankruptcy rates and that more generous homestead exemptions lower bankruptcy rates. The full coefficients are in Table 5. To compare my model to the predictions from the regression, I compute the R^2 between the fitted bankruptcy rate using only the legal variables $x_{L,i}\hat{\beta}_L$ and the model predictions m_i . I find that the $R^2 = 0.82$, indicating that the model can explain more than 80% of the variation attributable to variations in homestead exemptions and recourse law. The predicted bankruptcy rates from the regression and from the model are plotted in Figure 5. The model quantitatively matches the cross-state correlation between policies and default rates. In terms of the overall variation in default rates, I find that the model can explain roughly 20% (computed by taking the R^2 between the model and data).

5.2 The Household Default Decision

In order to understand how default policies lead to differences in default rates it is important to understand when households choose to default. In Figure 7 I consider a household in the Virginia economy, who had purchased a \$200,000 house, had an 80% leverage mortgage and took on \$12,500 of unsecured debt. Virginia is a recourse state with a \$10,000 homestead exemption. I plot the bankruptcy and foreclosure decisions as a function of the realized home equity (after the price shock) and income realization. First consider the foreclosure decision. Consistent with the theoretical results, if the household has positive home equity it always repays its mortgage. If the household has negative home equity and low income it defaults on its mortgage, but if it has high income it is willing to repay its under water mortgage - if it is not in too extreme of a negative equity position - to avoid a possible deficiency judgment. Turning to the bankruptcy decision, first note that if the household receives a deficiency judgment it declares bankruptcy¹³. However, if the household goes into foreclosure and has low income it goes bankrupt regardless of whether there is a deficiency judgment. If the household has positive home equity and high income it does not file for bankruptcy. However, if it has low income file, it files for bankruptcy with high probability when all of its home equity is exempt, however as home equity exceeds the exemption the set of incomes realizations for which the household goes bankrupt contracts.

Examining the household default problem alone cannot explain why bankruptcy rates are lower when homestead exemptions are higher, since from the household perspective more generous exemptions should lead to larger sets of income realizations for which the household will go bankrupt. Therefore the key mechanism must be coming through a price effect, which causes households to select into different debt portfolios across the different states.

5.3 Effects of the Homestead Exemption

In this section I explore the general-equilibrium price effects that arise from different homestead exemptions. In the theoretical results, I proved that households with less non-exempt home equity are more likely to go bankrupt. Since the prices of unsecured credit reflect the implied default probabilities, a household with less non-exempt home equity should face a higher cost of borrowing in unsecured credit than one with more non-exempt home equity.

To illustrate this effect, I choose two households, one in Virginia and one in Michigan that have roughly median net worth and high persistent income. Both are recourse states but have

¹³In general this is true for households that have unsecured debt. However, households with large savings in bonds in general prefer to repay the deficiency judgment.

different homestead exemptions: Virginia has a \$10K exemption as compared to Michigan's \$30K. The household in Virginia optimally chooses a portfolio consisting of a \$265K house, a \$180K mortgage and \$36K in unsecured credit. In Figure 8(a), I plot the unsecured interest rate for hypothetical other amounts of unsecured borrowing for the Virginia household. In addition, I plot the unsecured interest rate as a function of unsecured debt for the household in Michigan, assuming the same choice of housing and mortgage. Notice that the interest rate in Michigan is significantly higher at the Virginia optimal choice of \$36K. This is due to the fact that in Michigan the household has more exempt home equity and less non-exempt home equity. Both households would have \$85K in home equity. However, in Michigan \$30K of that equity is exempt as compared to \$10K in Virginia. Imagine that the value of the home fell by 15%. Both households would be left with slightly more than \$45K in equity. If the household in Virginia went bankrupt, it would have \$36K in unsecured debt discharged, but would lose \$35 in non-exempt equity - for a financial benefit of \$1K. The Michigan household, however, would get the same discharge, but only forfeit \$15K, meaning a financial benefit of bankruptcy of \$21K. Thus, because of the difference in exemptions, the Michigan household is more likely to go bankrupt and would have to pay a higher price on unsecured debt.

At that price, however, the Michigan household does not find it optimal to take on \$36K in debt. Since unsecured credit is more expensive, the overall cost of borrowing is higher for the Michigan household. As a result, it optimally takes on a lower level of debt. Since the household is borrowing less, it also optimally chooses a smaller sized house and mortgage. The Michigan household chooses a \$210K house and \$155K mortgage. In Figure 8(b), I plot the unsecured interest rates facing the Michigan household under the optimal housing and mortgage choice¹⁴. Since the household has only \$25K of non-exempt home equity, the interest rate rises rapidly as unsecured debt approaches that level. The household optimally chooses a much lower level of unsecured debt, about \$6K, but at a comparable interest rate to the Virginia household. Notice that in addition to the Michigan household taking on less overall debt (\$161K vs \$180K) the composition of the debt is also different. The Michigan household borrows almost exclusively in mortgage debt by taking on a more highly leveraged mortgage (74% vs 68%). By buying a smaller house, the Michigan household has less home equity, which further compounds the price effect of the higher homestead exemption. Thus, the household finds it optimal to increase its leverage, since that only results in a small increase in the interest rate paid on the mortgage.¹⁵

¹⁴It should be understood that the household is making its choice of housing, mortgage and unsecured credit simultaneously. The discussion of the choices as separate or sequential is merely to help illustrate the intuition for the mechanism at hand.

¹⁵see Figure 9 for the mortgage interest rate schedule faced by the Michigan household conditional on its

The above discussion sheds light on why household portfolios are different across states with different homestead exemptions, but does not directly answer why these differences lead to different default rates. In all states, there are very low net worth households that only borrow in unsecured credit, and have no housing or mortgage debt. The debt portfolios and default rates of these households are, to first order, unaffected by the exemption, since they hold no housing. The equilibrium price effects of the homestead exemption do, however, affect the fraction of households with housing that choose to take on unsecured debt. Households with non-exempt home equity are the ones that take advantage of cheap unsecured borrowing. As the homestead exemption rises, the fraction of households that have non-exempt home equity falls. As a result, some households stop borrowing unsecured and only take on mortgage debt. Thus, the fraction of households who borrow unsecured, and therefore *are at risk of going bankrupt* is smaller in high exemption states, which leads to lower bankruptcy rates¹⁶. Foreclosure rates are higher in high exemption states because mortgage leverage is higher and the probability of foreclosure is increasing with leverage. These effects can be seen in the state level aggregates in Table 8.

5.3.1 Unsecured Interest Rates Across States

In the model, households in low exemption states pay on average lower interest rates on unsecured debt than households in high exemption states. To compare the prediction of the model to the data, I construct a measure of interest rate paid using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) from 1994-2003. For households that reported having unsecured debt, I compute the effective interest rate by dividing the expenditure on interest and finance charges by the amount of unsecured debt. While a crude measure, the CEX is the only public data source to my knowledge that provides information on unsecured debt, interest and state of residence. There are a total of 10,760 observations in my sample, so I simulate 100 samples of the same size from the model. I report the means and standard errors across the simulations from the model generated data. Because the CEX is not designed to be representative at the state level, I divide states into high and low exemption states and then compare the mean interest rates in Table 6. The interest rates are significantly higher in the CEX (and are high relative to the 12.3% average interest rate reported in the SCF), most likely due to simplified measure being used. However, the direction and magnitude of the difference in interest rates in the model is consistent with the data, providing additional evidence for the mechanism.

housing and unsecured debt choice

¹⁶In recourse states even households that hold no unsecured debt but hold mortgages are at risk of bankruptcy because of deficiency judgments in foreclosure. However, quantitatively, these households account for less than 1% of bankrupt households.

5.3.2 Mortgage Leverage Across States

As examined in the previous section, homestead exemptions change the price of unsecured debt. As a result households take on different portfolios of debt. The model predicts that households in high exemption states take on more highly leveraged mortgages than in low exemption states. To compare this prediction to the data, I construct household mortgage leverage from the 2000 Residential Finance Survey (RFS). I compute the leverage by summing across the balance on all mortgages outstanding and dividing by the current value of the home for all prime-aged households. Since the RFS only includes state identifying information for twelve states (note that those twelve states include 65% of all households in the US¹⁷) again I partition the states between high and low exemption states. The mean leverage of households with a mortgage and standard errors are reported in Table 7. I simulate households from the model of the same sample size ($N = 4,315$) and same states as the RFS 100 times and report the mean leverage and standard deviation across simulated means also in Table 7. The model does remarkably well in matching the level of leverage and difference across high and low exemption states.

5.4 Effects of Recourse

Recourse has surprisingly little effect on foreclosure and mortgage interest rates. Comparing the foreclosure rates in Tables 8 and 9, recourse and no recourse states with the same homestead exemption have nearly identical foreclosure rates. This is because recourse only has significant effects on two groups of mortgage holders. The first are on those with mortgages with very high leverage ($>90\%$). Those households have a large probability of being slightly underwater in the next period, and households are more likely to repay slightly underwater mortgages in recourse states (as shown in Figure 7). However, very few households take on mortgages with leverage over 90% (median leverage in the data and model are both less than 70%), so in the aggregate the effect is marginal.

The other group of households affected by recourse are those with substantial savings in bonds. Those households are less likely to foreclose because they have the resources to repay an underwater mortgage and want to avoid a deficiency judgment¹⁸. However, households that have substantial savings in bonds take on mortgages with very low leverages and thus have low probabilities of going into foreclosure. Further, only a small fraction of households hold significant amounts of savings in bonds. Thus, the marginal change in their interest

¹⁷The twelve states are: California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, Washington.

¹⁸This is consistent with the interpretation of the effects of recourse found in Ghent and Kudlyak (2011).

rate and foreclosure probability is negligible when aggregated at the state level.

To give an example of how mortgage interest rates vary only for high leverage mortgages, I plot the mortgage interest schedule for the Michigan household considered in the previous section (a recourse state) and a no-recourse state in Figure 9. The Michigan household has a \$210K house and \$6K in unsecured debt. The optimal leverage choice of the household is 73.8%. The no-recourse interest rate schedule is independent of income or bond holdings and only depends on the leverage of the household (see Lemma 2). At the optimal choice of leverage for the Michigan household the interest rate is nearly identical to the one the household would receive if recourse were prohibited. Furthermore, the interest rate charged is nearly identical for all leverage ratios less than 0.9, indicating the large down payments significantly mitigate foreclosure risk.

In addition, the model predicts that recourse states will have higher bankruptcy rates than no-recourse states. The result is intuitive, since in recourse states foreclosing households face additional liability, which may trigger bankruptcy following foreclosure. Comparing the fraction of households that file for bankruptcy following foreclosure (Joint in Tables 8 and 9), in recourse states 10-20% more households go bankrupt conditional on foreclosure in recourse states compared to no-recourse states. That number directly reflects the effect of the parameter ψ which reflects the probability of a deficiency judgment. These results are consistent with recent research (Table 5 in Li and White (2009)) that suggests that households are more likely to file for bankruptcy after foreclosure in recourse states than no-recourse states.

6 Policy Experiments

I use the calibrated model to conduct two policy experiments. In the first policy experiment, I consider the effects of the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA). The reform made it more difficult for households earning more than the median income in their state from filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In the second experiment I quantitatively determine the optimal joint homestead exemption and recourse policy.

6.1 BAPCPA

To simulate the effects of BAPCPA, in the model households above median income cannot file for bankruptcy, unless as a result they have non-positive consumption. I compute the transition from the original steady state to the new steady state equilibrium. I find that it takes several years for default, housing and debt to reach the new steady state levels. Taking

into account the costs of transition will therefore be important for understanding the welfare implications of the policy.

6.1.1 Effects on Allocations

The aggregate implications of the reform are substantial in terms of default rates and total borrowing in the economy, as shown in Table 10. Unsecured debt increases 30% over several years, shown in Figure 10(a). The increase in unsecured debt is small, however, relative to the increased indebtedness of households. After reform, as more households take on unsecured debt, the fraction of households with non-positive net worth almost triples to more than 15%, as shown in Figure 10(b). The percentage of households that file for bankruptcy initially drops, and then rises rapidly and converges to a rate of 2.45%, as shown in Figure 10(c). Qualitatively, the initial drop and subsequent rise are consistent with bankruptcy rates post-BAPCPA, however the model predicts a much faster increase in bankruptcy rates than observed. Foreclosure also more than doubles going from 0.55% to 1.15% of mortgages per year. How can a policy that is intended to make it more difficult for households to go bankrupt result in *higher* bankruptcy rates?

The reform significantly reduces the cost of unsecured borrowing. In Figure 11(a), I plot the unsecured interest rates for the same household in Michigan as in the previous section, one with roughly median net worth and high persistent income. The household optimally chooses a portfolio consisting of \$210K house, a \$155K mortgage and \$6K of unsecured credit. Also in the figure, I plot the unsecured interest rates that household would face if it chose the same size house and mortgage after the BAPCPA reform. The interest rate schedule shifts significantly to the right, meaning that the household faces lower interest rates. In addition, the interest rate schedule remains low, even when the total amount of debt borrowed exceeds non-exempt home equity (the point at which the ex-ante financial gain from going bankrupt is positive). This is as a result of the fact that if the household earns above median income in the subsequent period it cannot go bankrupt even though there is a financial gain from doing so. Households are also less likely to go bankrupt in order to maintaining access to credit. Since interest rates are lower, access to credit is more valuable post-reform, implying a greater direct financial benefit is required for a household to choose to go bankrupt.

Facing the lower cost of borrowing, the household in Michigan no longer finds it optimal to take on \$6K of unsecured credit. After the reform, the household takes on a bigger house and mortgage, \$280K and \$190K respectively. Based on those choices, the unsecured interest rates that the household faces are plotted in Figure 11(b). With the increased amount of home equity and the BAPCPA restrictions, the household faces significantly lower borrowing

costs and optimally chooses \$41K of unsecured credit. This type of change in behavior can explain the large increases in unsecured debt taken on by households after the reform.

Increases in debt and lower interest rates alone do not fully account for the increase in bankruptcies. The composition of who is taking on unsecured debt changes. Before the reform, there were primarily two groups of households that took on unsecured debt: those with very low net worth and those with substantial non-exempt home equity. Households with only exempt home equity took on only small amounts unsecured debt or none at all. After the reform that distribution changes. The low net worth households continue to borrow only in unsecured debt. However, households with high income and only exempt home equity take on more unsecured credit than before the reform. The persistence of income makes interest rates on unsecured debt low, even though the financial benefit of going bankrupt is high. If the household stays above median income, it simply repays or rolls over the debt. However, if the household falls below median income, it files for bankruptcy because the financial gain from doing so is large (since it keeps all of its home equity and discharges substantial unsecured debt). Unsecured borrowing coupled with exempt home equity essentially serves as insurance against below-median income realizations in the subsequent period. These results contrast those of Chatterjee et al (2007) who find a slight decline in the bankruptcy rate after imposing the income restriction for filing. The difference highlights the importance of considering exempt assets as well as liabilities in any analysis of the effects of bankruptcy policy.

6.1.2 Effect of Homestead Exemption under BAPCPA

Before the reform, higher homestead exemptions lead to lower bankruptcy rates. After BAPCPA, the relationship is reversed - higher levels of the homestead exemption lead to higher levels of bankruptcy. The state by state default rates are displayed in Table 11.

The income restriction imposed under BAPCPA significantly mitigates the price effect of higher exemptions because high income households are prevented from going bankrupt even when there is a financial benefit of doing so. As described in the previous section, unsecured credit and exempt home equity can mimic an insurance contract against low income realizations. The level of insurance provided is limited by the level of the exemption (the maximum amount households can keep after bankruptcy). Therefore, households in high exemption states take on unsecured debt and increase home equity, leading to increased bankruptcy rates.

6.1.3 Welfare Consequences of the Reform

Despite higher levels of bankruptcy and foreclosure, households on average are made strictly better off from the reform. Taking into account transitional dynamics, households would be willing to pay on average 1.4% of lifetime consumption to adopt the policy. The reason why households are being made better off is that they are excluded from going bankrupt in states of the world where the gain is relatively small, but allowed to go bankrupt when the gain is large. Furthermore, with the exempt asset they are able to do better than just not having to repay the debt - they can also essentially transfer resources to the bankruptcy state through exempt housing. Since income is persistent, the cost of this “insurance” is fairly low for households above median income, so more households use it and end up going bankrupt more often, but are better off by doing so.

6.2 Optimal Homestead Exemption and Recourse Policy

In my second policy experiment, I ask how the government should optimally set the homestead exemption and recourse policy to maximize utilitarian welfare. The federal government has the power to adopt uniform bankruptcy law, but in the past has allowed states to opt-out of the federally mandated exemptions.

In order to solve for the optimal policy, I take as my initial condition the economy along the transition path induced by the passage of BAPCPA. I solve for the policy that maximizes current welfare taking into account the new transition path induced by the change in exemption and recourse law. I find that the optimal joint policy prescribes no recourse and a homestead exemption of roughly one quarter of median state income.

Eliminating recourse may at first seem counterintuitive, since in problems providing insurance the strongest punishments typically yield the best outcomes. However, households in this economy face two types of uncorrelated risk: house price risk and income risk. Having no recourse mortgages allows the two debt instruments to more effectively span the space of possible shocks. When there is recourse, housing risk could result in bankruptcy which reduces the ability of the household to use savings or unsecured debt to insure against income risk. A no-recourse mortgage policy is in some sense regressive, however, as the households that benefit the most are high income and high net worth households that have large homes and large mortgages. Lower net worth households get less insurance, but face the higher borrowing cost.

The intuition for why a positive homestead exemption is optimal relates to the discussion in the previous section on how unsecured debt can provide insurance against a drop in income. The trade-off between price and insurance is lower after BAPCPA, however, since default

is costly, it is optimal to keep the exemption relatively low, yielding lower bankruptcy and foreclosure rates. In addition, the lower exemption disproportionately benefits households with low wealth, since their assets are mostly exempt. Since I have adopted a utilitarian welfare function, setting the exemption to benefit mostly low net worth households may represent a trade-off with no-recourse mortgages, which disproportionately benefit high net worth households.

The welfare gains from adopting the optimal exemption and recourse policy are non-negligible - on average households gain 0.4% of average lifetime consumption by the switching to the optimal policy. The gains are not uniform across states, as the states with recourse and high exemptions see the largest welfare gains.


7 Conclusions

The option to default provides an important channel for insurance for households in an incomplete markets world. In the wake of the 2005 reform and the financial crisis of 2008 there has been fierce debate over how the government should regulate consumer credit markets. In this paper, I have shown that household behavior fundamentally links secured and unsecured credit, and foreclosure and bankruptcy. Researchers and policy makers, therefore, need to take into account both channels of default when analyzing consumer credit, otherwise they are likely to misstate the overall effect on household behavior and welfare. I illustrated this in the evaluation of the 2005 BAPCPA reform, which had the unintended consequence of raising both bankruptcy and foreclosure rates. This paper presents a novel framework that can be used in future analysis of credit markets and household default.


References

- CALHOUN, C. A. (1996): "OFHEO House Price Indexes: HPI Technical Description," Ofheo paper.
- CAMPBELL, J. Y., S. GIGLIO, AND P. PATHAK (2011): "Forced Sales and House Prices," *American Economic Review*, 101(5), 2108–31.
- CARROLL, S., AND W. LI (2008): "The Homeownership Experience of Households in Bankruptcy," *American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings*, (45).
- CHAKRAVARTY, S., AND E.-Y. RHEE (1999): "Factors Affecting an Individual's Bankruptcy Filing Decision," *SSRN eLibrary*.
- CHATTERJEE, S., D. CORBAE, M. NAKAJIMA, AND J.-V. RÍOS-RULL (2007): "A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default," *Econometrica*, 75(6), 1525–1589.
- CHATTERJEE, S., AND B. EYIGUNGOR (2011): "A Quantitative Analysis of the US Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Foreclosure Crisis," *SSRN eLibrary*.
- CORBAE, D., AND E. QUINTIN (2011): "Mortgage Innovation and the Foreclosure Boom," *Working Paper, University of Wisconsin*.
- FAY, S., E. HURST, AND M. J. WHITE (2002): "The Household Bankruptcy Decision," *The American Economic Review*, 92(3), pp. 706–718.
- FOOTE, C., K. GERARDI, L. GOETTE, AND P. WILLEN (2009): "Reducing Foreclosures: No Easy Answers," Working Paper 15063, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- GARRIGA, C., AND D. SCHLAGENHAUF (2009): "Home Equity, Foreclosures, and Bailouts," *Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis*.
- GHENT, A. C., AND M. KUDLYAK (2011): "Recourse and Residential Mortgage Default: Evidence from US States," *Review of Financial Studies*.
- GROPP, R., J. K. SCHOLZ, AND M. J. WHITE (1997): "Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(1), 217–251.
- HIMMELSTEIN, D. U., D. THORNE, E. WARREN, AND S. WOOLHANDLER (2009): "Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study," *The American Journal of Medicine*, 122(8), 741 – 746.
- HINTERMAIER, T., AND W. KOENIGER (2009): "Debt Portfolios," Working Papers 646, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- JESKE, K., D. KRUEGER, AND K. MITMAN (2011): "Housing and the Macroeconomy: The Role of Bailout Guarantees for Government Sponsored Enterprises," Working Paper 17537, National Bureau of Economic Research.

- LI, W., AND P.-D. SARTE (2006): “U.S. consumer bankruptcy choice: The importance of general equilibrium effects,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 53(3), 613 – 631.
- LI, W., AND M. J. WHITE (2009): “Mortgage Default, Foreclosure, and Bankruptcy,” Working Paper 15472, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- LI, W., M. J. WHITE, AND N. ZHU (2010): “Did Bankruptcy Reform Cause Mortgage Default to Rise?,” Working Paper 15968, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- LIVSHITS, I., J. MACGEE, AND M. TERTILT (2007): “Consumer Bankruptcy: A Fresh Start,” *American Economic Review*, 97(1), 402–418.
- MIAN, A., A. SUFI, AND F. TREBBI (2011): “Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy,” Working Paper 16685, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- MORGAN, D. P., B. C. IVERSON, AND M. BOTSCH (2009): “Seismic Effects of the Bankruptcy Reform,” *SSRN eLibrary*.
- PAVAN, M. (2008): “Consumer durables and risky borrowing: The effects of bankruptcy protection,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 55(8), 1441 – 1456.
- PENCE, K. M. (2006): “Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit,” *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 88(1), 177–182.
- PENNINGTON-CROSS, A. (2006): “The Value of Foreclosed Property,” *Journal of Real Estate Research*, 28(2).
- STOKEY, N. L., R. E. LUCAS, AND E. C. PRESCOTT (1989): *Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics*. Harvard University Press.
- STORESLETTEN, K., C. I. TELMER, AND A. YARON (2004): “Consumption and risk sharing over the life cycle,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 51(3), 609 – 633.



(a) Bankruptcy rates as a function of homestead exemption.



(b) Foreclosure rates as a function of homestead exemption.

Figure 1: The homestead exemptions in terms of median income is calculated by state law for the homestead exemption in the year 2000 and median household income from the Census in 2000. Average state bankruptcy rates 1995-2004 are computed using bankruptcy filings from the American Bankruptcy Institute and the number of households in each state from the Census. Average state foreclosure rates 1994-1999 are computed from the Mortgage Banker Association's quarterly National Delinquency Survey from 1994-1999. The dashed lines are smoothed versions of the data.




Figure 2: The bankruptcy set is a closed interval in income y .




Figure 3: Holding the net asset position $\eta + b$ constant, the bankruptcy set is increasing in home equity η .




Figure 4: Bankruptcy rates in the data and model. States are binned according to exemption level and recourse policy.




Figure 5: Fitted data after controlling for additional demographic features versus model generated data. Each point represents a different state.




Figure 6: Data vs recalibrated model without mortgages and foreclosure.






Figure 7: Household discrete choices with a house size equal to five times the median income and an 80% leveraged mortgage.



(a) The household in Virginia optimally chooses a \$265K house, \$180K mortgage and \$36K of unsecured debt. The Michigan line represents the price schedule that the household would face if it chose the same size house and mortgage as the Virginia household.



(b) The household in Virginia optimally chooses a \$265K house, \$180K mortgage and \$36K of unsecured debt. The Michigan line represents the price schedule given its optimal choice of housing and mortgage: \$210K house, \$155K mortgage and \$6K of unsecured debt.

Figure 8: Interest rates on unsecured debt as a function of debt for households of identical net worth in Virginia and Michigan. The dots in both figures represent the optimal policy choices.







Figure 9: Mortgage interest rates as a function of leverage, $\kappa = \frac{m}{h}$, for a household in Michigan, a recourse state, and in all no recourse states. The Michigan line represents the price schedule given its optimal choice of housing and unsecured debt: \$210K house and \$6K of unsecured debt. The No-Recourse line is independent of house size and unsecured debt position.



(a) Total unsecured debt along the transition path.




(b) Fraction of households that have non-positive net-work along the transition path.




(c) Bankruptcy rate along the transition path.

Figure 10: Transitional dynamics after the implementation of BAPCPA at time 0.



(a) Before the reform, the household optimally chooses a \$210K house, \$155K mortgage and \$6K of unsecured debt. The BAPCPA line represents the price schedule that the household would face if it chose the same size house and mortgage as before the reform.



(b) Before the reform, the household optimally chooses a \$210K house, \$155K mortgage and \$6K of unsecured debt. The BAPCPA line represents the price schedule given the household's optimal choice of housing and mortgage after the reform: \$280K house, \$190K mortgage and \$41K of unsecured debt.

Figure 11: Interest rates on unsecured debt as a function of debt for a household in Michigan before and after the BAPCPA reform. The dots represent the optimal policy choices of the household.

Table 1: Legal Environments Considered

States	Homestead Exemption	Recourse	Median HH Income	Weight
Washington , N. Carolina	0.64	No	42334	0.053
California , Alaska, N. Dakota	1.58	No	47211	0.112
Minnesota , Arizona, Montana	3.33	No	42154	0.050
Maryland , Ohio, Georgia, Illinois, Tennessee, Indiana, Virginia Kentucky, S. Carolina, Alabama	0.23	Yes	42146	0.248
Michigan , Missouri, Louisiana, New York, Wyoming, New Jersey, Nebraska, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Hawaii, Oregon, West Virginia, Utah, Wisconsin, Arkansas, Delaware, Colorado, Idaho	0.677	Yes	42650	0.305
Massachusetts , New Mexico, Maine, New Hampshire, Mississippi, Nevada, Connecticut, Vermont, Rhode Island	3.65	Yes	44872	0.075
Florida , Texas, Kansas Oklahoma, S. Dakota, D.C.	∞	Yes	38944	0.158

Table 2: Externally Calibrated Parameters

Parameter	Value	Target
<i>Income Process</i>		
Persistence, ρ	0.98	
Std. of persistent shocks, σ_ν	0.3	Income process (Storesletten et al, 2004)
Std. of transitory shocks σ_ε	0.245	
<i>Legal Technology</i>		
Foreclosure technology, γ	0.78	Foreclosure Sale Loss
Bankruptcy technology, ζ	0.52	Distributions to Creditors
Clean credit history, α	0.167	File for Chapter 7 every 6 years
<i>Interest Rates</i>		
Risk-free rate, r_b	0.01	Risk-free rate
Cost of issuing debt, r_a	11 BP	Bank administration cost
<i>Preferences</i>		
Cobb-Douglas parameter, θ	0.8590	Housing share of consumption 14.1%

Table 3: Internally Calibrated Parameters

Parameter	Value	Target	Data	Model
<i>Preferences</i>				
Risk aversion, σ	2.751	Bankruptcy rate	1.06%	1.06%
Discount factor, β	0.943	Median net worth/income:	1.19	1.19
<i>Depreciation Process</i>				
Shape parameter, k	0.688	Foreclosure rate	0.55%	0.55%
Scale parameter, σ_δ	6.77×10^{-3}	Average depreciation	1.48%	1.48%
Cutoff parameter, $\underline{\delta}$	1.49×10^{-3}	House price variance	0.01	0.01
<i>Legal Technology</i>				
Probability of deficiency judgment, ψ	0.184	Probability of bankruptcy conditional on foreclosure	0.28	0.28
Consumption penalty, λ	5.68×10^{-3}	Revolving share of debt	8.9%	8.9%

Table 4: Aggregate Results

	Model	Data	Source
Housing, H	5.25	4.10	Residential Property, SCF 2004
Debt	-3.88	-2.36	SCF 2004
Bonds, B_+	0.16	0.18	Savings/Bonds, SCF 2004
Unsecured debt, B_-	-0.34	-0.21	Unsecured Debt, SCF 2004
Mortgages M	3.54	1.93	Residential Mortgage Debt, SCF 2004
Fraction of households with net worth ≤ 0	5.3%	6.7%	Unsecured Debt, SCF 2004
Fraction of households with Unsecured Debt	38.3%	32.5%	SCF 2004
Mean Interest Rate	11.2%	12.3%	SCF 2004
Paid on Unsecured Debt			
Mortgage Default Premium	24%	22%	MORTGAGE1US, GS1 from FRED

Table 5: Decomposing Bankruptcy Rates

$$bankrate_i = \beta_0 + \beta_L x_{L,i} + \beta_D x_{D,i} + \epsilon_i$$

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
<i>Demographic</i>		
log(Median household income)	-0.0047	(0.0027)
Average household size	0.0099*	(0.0028)
Weak garnishment law	-0.0033*	(0.0008)
Judicial Foreclosure	-0.0018*	(0.0008)
<i>Bankruptcy & Foreclosure Law</i>		
Recourse	0.0029*	(0.0010)
Homestead Exemption	-0.0019*	(0.0009)
Square of Homestead Exemption	0.0002	(0.0002)
Unlimited Exemption	-0.0028*	(0.0014)
Constant	0.0316	(0.0271)
R ²	0.58	
* indicates significance at 5% level		

Table 6: Unsecured Interest Rates

	Data (CEX)	Model
Low Exemption	23.49% (1.13%)	7.93% (0.56%)
High Exemption	27.64% (3.49%)	13.07% (2.50%)

Data constructed by dividing interest and finance charges by total debt and computing the mean across households. The model means are the averages of 100 simulations of a sample of size $N = 10,760$. Standard errors are reported across simulations

Table 7: Mortgage Leverage

	Data (RFS)	Model
Low Exemption	67.03% (0.82%)	68.27% (0.66%)
High Exemption	74.50% (5.23%)	74.10% (0.52%)

Data constructed by dividing mortgage balances by current house value and computing the mean across households. The model means are the averages of 100 simulations of a sample of size $N = 4,315$. Standard errors are reported across simulations

Table 8: State Results - Recourse

	Maryland $\chi^s = 0.23$	Michigan $\chi^s = 0.68$	Massachusetts $\chi^s = 3.7$	Florida $\chi^s = \infty$
Unsecured debt, B_-	-0.59	-0.48	-0.04	-0.01
Mortgages M	3.34	3.39	3.81	3.83
Bankruptcy rate	1.24%	1.22%	0.91%	0.88%
Foreclosure rate	0.49%	0.54%	0.61%	0.62%
Joint	42%	36%	21%	21%
In debt	5.5%	5.4%	4.9%	4.9%

Table 9: State Results - No Recourse

	Washington $\chi^s = 0.64$	California $\chi^s = 1.57$	Minnesota $\chi^s = 3.32$
Unsecured debt, B_-	-0.38	-0.20	-0.04
Mortgages M	3.54	3.64	3.78
Bankruptcy rate	1.15%	1.00%	0.62%
Foreclosure rate	0.53%	0.58%	0.63%
Joint	23%	10%	2%
In debt	5.3%	5.2%	5.0%

Table 10: Aggregate Effects of BAPCPA

	Baseline	BAPCPA
Housing, H	5.25	5.21
Unsecured debt, B_-	-0.34	-0.46
Mortgages M	3.54	3.64
Fraction with net worth ≤ 0	5.3%	15.1%
Bankruptcy Rate	1.06%	2.45%
Foreclosure Rate	0.55%	1.16%

Table 11: State Level Implications of BAPCPA

State	Foreclosure Rates		Bankruptcy Rates	
	Baseline	BAPCPA	Baseline	BAPCPA
Maryland	0.49%	1.28%	1.24%	2.27%
Michigan	0.54%	1.29%	1.22%	2.32%
Massachusetts	0.61%	1.30%	0.91%	2.57%
Florida	0.62%	1.31%	0.88%	2.58%
Washington	0.53%	0.61%	1.14%	2.44%
California	0.58%	0.69%	1.00%	2.77%
Minnesota	0.63%	0.71%	0.62%	2.86%

APPENDIX

A Proofs Related to the Household Problem

Assumption 1 $U(c, s) : \mathbb{R}_+^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is strictly increasing, concave and differentiable. Further, it is bounded above by $\bar{U}$, and given $p_s > 0$,

$$u(\underline{y}^i/\lambda; p_s) - u(0; p_s) > \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}(\bar{U} - u(\underline{y}^i/\lambda; p_s)) \quad \forall i$$

In addition, to rule out Ponzi schemes, I assume that there exist maximum levels of borrowing, both secured and unsecured:

Assumption 2 There exists a maximum level of unsecured borrowing, $b_{\min}$, and a maximum mortgage size, $m_{\max}$.

Proof of Lemma 15 Immediate from the definition of the foreclosure value functions and b_F . ■

Lemma 6 $u(c; p_s)$ is continuous, strictly concave, strictly increasing.

Proof Take $c_1, c_2 > 0$ and $c_\theta = \theta c_1 + (1 - \theta)c_2$ for $\theta \in (0, 1)$. $u(c_i; p_s) \equiv U(\tilde{c}_i, s_i)$ where $\tilde{c}_i$ and s_i are from the maximizers. From the strict concavity of U , we know that

$$\begin{aligned} \theta U(\tilde{c}_1, s_1) + (1 - \theta)U(\tilde{c}_2, s_2) &< U(\theta\tilde{c}_1 + (1 - \theta)\tilde{c}_2, \theta s_1 + (1 - \theta)s_2) \\ &\leq U(\tilde{c}_\theta, s_\theta) \end{aligned}$$

where the first inequality comes from the strict concavity of U and the second from the fact that $\theta\tilde{c}_1 + (1 - \theta)\tilde{c}_2 + p_s(\theta s_1 + (1 - \theta)s_2) = \theta c_1 + (1 - \theta)c_2 = c_\theta$, thus it is a feasible choice for the maximization for $u(c_\theta; p_s)$, and by definition of a max. Continuity and strict monotonicity follow from the properties of U . ■

Let $M \subset \mathbb{R}_+$ be the mortgage choice set, $B \subset \mathbb{R}$ be the bond/unsecured choice set, $H \subset \mathbb{R}_+$ be the housing choice set, $C \subset \mathbb{R}_+$ be the consumption expenditure choice set. The continuous state variable, cash-at-hand, $a \in A \subset \mathbb{R}_+$. Let Z and Y be the set of possible realizations for the persistent shock and income. The possible credit histories are $\mathcal{H} = \{G, B, BC\}$. For the household problem, I take the pricing functions $q_b : B \times H \times M \times Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ and $q_m : B \times H \times M \times I \times \mathcal{H} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ as given. To economize on notation, I will typically not make explicit the dependence of the prices on the choice parameters.

I define the budget correspondence for households with a good credit history and foreclosure choice $\mathcal{F}$ who didn't go bankrupt, $\Gamma_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB} : A \times Z \rightarrow C \times B \times H \times M$ as:

$$\Gamma_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z) = \{(c, b, h, m) \in C \times B \times H \times M : c + bq_b + h[1 - p_s] - mq_m \leq a_{\mathcal{F}}\} \quad (5)$$

and households who did go bankrupt, I define the budget correspondence $\Gamma^B : A \times Z \rightarrow \times H \times M$ as:

$$\Gamma_{\mathcal{F}}^B(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z) = \{(h, m) \in G \times M : h[1 - p_s] - mq_m \leq a_{\mathcal{F}}\} \quad (6)$$

Households with bad credit histories face the budget correspondence $\Gamma_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC} : A \times Z \rightarrow C \times B \times H \times M$ as:

$$\Gamma_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC}(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z) = \{(c, b, h, m) \in C \times B \times H \times M : \lambda c + bq_b + h[1 - p_s] - mq_m \leq a_{\mathcal{F}}, b \geq 0\} \quad (7)$$

Now, I can define the value functions of households that begin the period with good and bad credit histories:

$$\begin{aligned} V^G(b, g, m, \delta, y, z) &= \max_{\mathcal{F} \in \{0,1\}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{J}} \max \{W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta_{\mathcal{F}}, y, z), W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z)\} \\ \eta_{\mathcal{F}} &= (1 - \mathcal{F})[(1 - \delta)h - m] \\ a_{\mathcal{F}} &= y + (1 - \mathcal{F})[(1 - \delta)h - m + b] + \mathcal{F}b_F \\ V^{BC}(b, g, m, \delta, y, z) &= \max_{\mathcal{F} \in \{0,1\}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{J}} \{W_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC}(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z)\} \\ a_{\mathcal{F}} &= y + (1 - \mathcal{F})[(1 - \delta)h - m + b] + \mathcal{F}b_F \end{aligned}$$

where

$$W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z) = \max_{x \in \Gamma_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z)} \left\{ u(c; p_s) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{(\delta', y', z')|z} V^G(b', h', m', \delta', y', z') \right\} \quad (8)$$

$$W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta_{\mathcal{F}}, y, z) = u(y; p_s) + \max_{x \in \Gamma_{\mathcal{F}}^B} \left\{ \beta \mathbb{E}_{(\delta', y', z')|z} V^{BC}(b', h', m', \delta', y', z') \right\} \quad (9)$$

$$W_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC}(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z) = \max_{x \in \Gamma_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC}(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z)} \left\{ u(c; p_s) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{(\delta', y', z')|z} \left[\frac{\alpha V^G(X') + (1 - \alpha) V^{BC}(X')}{1} \right] \right\} \quad (10)$$

Denote the cardinality of the number of credit states by $N_{\mathcal{H}}$. Let $\mathcal{V}$ be the set of all continuous (in b, h, m, δ, y, z), vector-valued functions $V : B \times H \times M \times \Delta \times Y \times Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{N_{\mathcal{H}}}$ that are increasing in b, h, y and decreasing in m, δ that satisfy the following:

$$V^H(b, h, m, \delta, y, z) \in \left[\frac{u(0; p_s)}{1 - \beta}, \frac{\bar{u}}{1 - \beta} \right] \quad (11)$$

$$V^G(b, h, m, \delta, y, z) \geq V^{BC}(b, h, m, \delta, y, z) \quad (12)$$

Lemma 7 $\mathcal{V}$ is nonempty. With $\|V\| = \max_H \{\sup |V^H|\}$ as the norm, $(\mathcal{V}, \|\cdot\|)$ is a complete metric space.

Proof Any constant vector-valued function that satisfies (11) is clearly continuous and satisfies the monotonicity requirements. The set of all continuous vector-valued functions coupled with the same norm $(\mathcal{C}, \|\cdot\|)$ is a complete metric space, thus to prove that $(\mathcal{V}, \|\cdot\|)$ is a complete metric space I need to show that $\mathcal{V} \subset \mathcal{C}$ is closed under the defined norm. Take an arbitrary sequence of functions from $\mathcal{V}$, $\{V_n\}$ that is converging to a function V^* . If V^*

violates any of the conditions (11)-(12) or the monotonicity properties, then there must exist some N , such that V_N also violates those conditions or properties, but that contradicts the assertion that $V_n \in \mathcal{V} \forall n$. Therefore, V^* must satisfy conditions (11)-(12) and the monotonicity properties. To prove the continuity of V^* , one can apply Theorem 3.1 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989), adapted to a vector-valued function. ■

Lemma 8 $\Gamma_{\mathcal{F}}^B$ is nonempty, monotone, compact-valued and continuous.

Lemma 9 Given $V \in \mathcal{V}$, $W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta_{\mathcal{F}}, y, z; V)$ defined by (9) exists, is continuous in $a_{\mathcal{F}}$ and y , increasing in $a_{\mathcal{F}}$ and strictly increasing in y .

Proof The existence and continuity of $W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta_{\mathcal{F}}, y, z; V)$ are a direct consequence of the Theorem of the Maximum, since V is continuous and $\Gamma_{\mathcal{F}}^B$ is compact valued and continuous. The strict monotonicity in y comes from the strict monotonicity of $u(\cdot; p_s)$. The monotonicity in $\eta_{\mathcal{F}}$ comes from the fact that $\Gamma_{\mathcal{F}}^B$ is monotone in $\eta_{\mathcal{F}}$ and the monotonicity of V . ■

In order to show the existence of $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z)$ and $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC}(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z)$ I first need to extend their definitions, because for some values of a the budget correspondence may be empty. First, I will denote by $c_H(a, z, x')$ the consumption of a household with a, z, H who makes the portfolio choice x' . Thus, $c_G(a, z, x') \equiv a - b'q_b - h'[1 - p_s] + m'q_m$ and $c_B(a, z, x') \equiv (a - b'q_b - h'[1 - P_s] + m'q_m) / \lambda$. Note that these consumptions can be negative. Using this notation, I can define lifetime utility from choosing portfolio x' as follows:

$$\omega_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC}(a, z, x'; W) \equiv u(\max\{c_{BC}(a, z, x'), 0\}) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{(\delta', y', z')|z} \left[\frac{\alpha V^G(X') + (1 - \alpha)V^{BC}(X')}{\alpha V^G(X') + (1 - \alpha)V^{BC}(X')} \right] \quad (13)$$

$$\omega_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(a, z, x'; V) \equiv u(\max\{c_G(a, z, x'), 0\}) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{(\delta', y', z')|z} V^G(x', \delta', y', z') \quad (14)$$

where $X' = (x', \delta', y', z')$

Lemma 10 $\omega_{\mathcal{F}}^H(a, z, x'; V)$ is continuous in a and x' . Further, for any i, x' , ω^s is increasing in a , and strictly increasing if $c_H(a, z, x') > 0$.

Proof Note that $c_s(a, z, x')$ are continuous functions of a and x' and $u(\cdot; p_s)$ is continuous in its first argument. Further, since $V \in \mathcal{V}$ it is continuous in x' and integration preserves continuity. The monotonicity comes because of the strict monotonicity in $u(\cdot; p_s)$ and the fact that $c_H(a, z, x')$ is increasing in a and strictly increasing in a when $c_H(a, z, x') > 0$ ■

Thus, I redefine the extended value functions as:

$$W_{\mathcal{F}}^H(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z; V) = \max_{x' \in \bar{X}_s(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z)} \omega_{\mathcal{F}}^H(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z, x'; V) \quad (15)$$

where $\bar{X}_{\mathcal{F}}^H(a_{\mathcal{F}}, i) = \{(b, g, m) \in B \times H \times M : bq_b + h[1 - p_s] - mq_m \leq a\} \cup \mathbf{0}$ is taken to be the budget correspondence (without c).

Lemma 11 $W_{\mathcal{F}}^H(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z; V)$ exists, is continuous in its first argument and is increasing in its first argument.

Proof Immediate from the Theorem of the Maximum and the monotonicity of $\omega_{\mathcal{F}}^H$. $\blacksquare$

Lemma 12 *A bad credit history lowers lifetime utility $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC} \leq W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}$*

Proof Since $V \in \mathcal{V}$, $\alpha V^{BC} + (1 - \alpha)V^G \leq V^G$. From the definition of $c_H(a, z, x')$, $\max\{c_B(a, z, x'), 0\} \leq \max\{c_G(a, z, x'), 0\}$. Thus, from the strict monotonicity of $u(\cdot; p_s)$, $\omega_{\mathcal{F}}^B(a, z, x'; V) \leq \omega_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC}(a, z, x'; V)$. Hence, since $\bar{X}_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC} \subset \bar{X}_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}$, $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC} \leq W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}$. $\blacksquare$

I define the operator vector valued operator $TV(b, h, m, y, \delta) = \{TV^H(b, h, m, \delta, y, z) : H \in \mathcal{H}\}$ by:

$$\begin{aligned} TV^G(b, h, m, \delta, y, z) &= \max_{\mathcal{F} \in \{0,1\}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{J}} \max \{W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta_{\mathcal{F}}, y, z; V), W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z; V)\} \\ \eta_{\mathcal{F}} &= (1 - \mathcal{F})[(1 - \delta)h - m] \\ a_{\mathcal{F}} &= y + (1 - \mathcal{F})[(1 - \delta)h - m + b] + \mathcal{F}b_F \\ TV^{BC}(b, h, m, \delta, y, z) &= \max_{\mathcal{F} \in \{0,1\}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{J}} \{W_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC}(a_{\mathcal{F}}, z; V)\} \\ a_{\mathcal{F}} &= y + (1 - \mathcal{F})[(1 - \delta)h - m + b] + \mathcal{F}b_F \end{aligned}$$

Lemma 13 *T is a contraction mapping with modulus β .*

Proof In order to prove that T is a contract mapping I appeal to Blackwell's sufficient conditions:

1. Self-map: $TV \subset \mathcal{V}$. In order to show this first note that $W_{\mathcal{F}}^H$ are all continuous in their first argument, the convex combination of two continuous functions is continuous and the maximum of two continuous functions is continuous. The boundedness property (11) is satisfied by the boundedness of $W_{\mathcal{F}}^H$. That TV is increasing in b' , h' and y' comes from the fact that all the $W_{\mathcal{F}}^H$ are increasing in their first argument and that $W_{\mathcal{F}}^B$ is strictly increasing in y . By the same argument, TV is decreasing in both δ' and m' . The monotonicity property (12) is satisfied by virtue of $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB} \geq W_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC}$ since the payoff in V^B can always be achieved in V^G .
2. Monotonicity: $\hat{V} \geq V \rightarrow T\hat{V} \geq TV$. For each $H \in \mathcal{H}$, $W_{\mathcal{F}}^H(\cdot; V)$ is increasing in V . Therefore, because the convex combination of two increasing functions is increasing and the maximum of two increasing functions is increasing $T\hat{V} \geq TV$.
3. Discounting: $T(V + k) = TV + \beta k$. Notice that for each $H \in \mathcal{H}$ $W_{\mathcal{F}}^H(\cdot; V)$, $W_{\mathcal{F}}^H(\cdot; V + k) = W_{\mathcal{F}}^H(\cdot; V) + \beta k$, thus for each $H \in \mathcal{H}$, $T(V^H + k) = TV^H + \beta k$. $\blacksquare$

Since I have extended the domain of $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC}$ and $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}$, I must now verify that an agent will never make a choice such that he will have no feasible choices (i.e. for $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}$ he would choose to go bankrupt rather than repay, and for $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC}$ that he would never pick a portfolio choice that could result in a negative asset position at the beginning of the next period). First I prove that an agent will choose to go bankrupt rather than not go bankrupt and have zero consumption.

Lemma 14 *Under Assumption 1, an agent with a good credit history will always choose to go bankrupt rather than not go bankrupt and have zero consumption. Furthermore, an agent that chooses not to go bankrupt always consumes a strictly positive amount.*

Proof The utility from choosing not to go bankrupt when the budget set is empty is bounded by $u(0; p_s) + \beta \bar{u}/(1 - \beta)$. By choosing bankruptcy the agent can guarantee lifetime utility of at least $u(y_{\min}/\lambda)/(1 - \beta)$, which by Assumption 1 is strictly greater. To ensure that conditional on not going bankrupt agents consume a strictly positive amount, note that from the continuity of $u(\cdot; p_s)$, there exists some $\tilde{c} > 0$ such that $u(\tilde{c}; p_s) + \beta \bar{u}/(1 - \beta) < u(y_{\min}/\lambda)/(1 - \beta)$, which implies that conditional on not going bankrupt an agent will consume at least $\tilde{c}$. ■

When an agent is in the bankruptcy or bad credit state, he does not have the option to declare bankruptcy, only foreclosure. Therefore, I must show that an agent will never make a portfolio or foreclosure choice that would result in zero consumption in the subsequent period.

First consider the case where there is no recourse after foreclosure, i.e. $\psi = 0$. From Lemma 2, when $\psi = 0$ an agent will choose foreclosure whenever $(1 - \delta')h' < m'$. Hence, an agent will always begin the subsequent period with a positive a since $y_{\min}$ is bounded away from zero.

When there is a positive probability of recourse, i.e. $\psi > 0$, even if an agent chooses foreclosure, he may still be responsible for the entire balance of the mortgage. Further, since the support of $F(\delta')$ includes 1, there is a positive probability that the depreciated value of the house $(1 - \delta')h'$ is arbitrarily close to zero. Thus, I need to rule out any *portfolio choices* (b', h', m') , that could result in cash-at-hand positions for which the budget set is empty in the subsequent period. However, since my choice of $u(0; p_s)$ is unrestricted, I can set it arbitrarily low, such that a household would always find it optimal to never choose a portfolio that resulted in 0 consumption with positive probability.

Proof of Proposition 1 The existence and uniqueness of the value functions is an immediate consequence of Lemma 13 and the Contraction Mapping Theorem. The monotonicity properties of the value functions and the effect of a bad credit score follow immediately from Lemmas 11 & 12. ■

Lemma 15 *Conditional on the foreclosure choice and deficiency judgment realization, the bankruptcy decision B^* depends only on unsecured debt b_F , positive home equity η , non-exempt equity ξ , endowment y , and persistent state z .*

The proof of Proposition 2 is an extension of Chatterjee et al. (2007). I first prove two lemmas.

Lemma 16 *Let $\hat{y} \in Y \setminus \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$, $y > \hat{y}$. If $y \in \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$, then the optimal consumption with $\hat{y}$, $c^*(\eta + b_F + \hat{y}) > \hat{y}$.*

Proof Since $\hat{y} \in Y \setminus \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$, the agent strictly prefers not declaring bankruptcy, i.e.:

$$u(c^*(\eta + b_F + \hat{y}); p_s) + \beta \mathbb{E}V^G(X'^*) > u(\hat{y}; p_s) + \beta \mathbb{E}V^{BC}(X') \quad (16)$$

Let $\epsilon = y - \hat{y}$. The choices: $\check{c} = c^*(\eta + b_F + \hat{y}) + \epsilon$, $\check{b}' = b'^*$, $\check{h}' = h'^*$, $\check{m}' = m'^*$ were feasible choices with resources $y + \eta + b_F$, but were not chosen since $y \in \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$ (where the starred variables are the optimal choices under endowment $\hat{y}$), therefore:

$$u(\check{c}; p_s) + \beta \mathbb{E}V^G(X'^*) \leq u(y; p_s) + \beta \mathbb{E}V^{BC}(X') \quad (17)$$

Subtracting equations (16) and (17) I obtain:

$$u(\hat{y} + \epsilon; p_s) - u(\hat{y}; p_s) > u(c^*(\eta + b_F + \hat{y}) + \epsilon; p_s) - u(c^*(\eta + b_F + \hat{y}); p_s) \quad (18)$$

which from the strict concavity of $u(\cdot; p_s)$ implies that $c^*(\eta + b_F + \hat{y}) > \hat{y}$. The portfolio choice is unchanged for the household conditional on bankruptcy, thus X' is the same across (17) and (18). ■

Lemma 17 *Let $\hat{y} \in Y \setminus \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$, $y < \hat{y}$. If $y \in \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$, then the optimal consumption with $\hat{y}$, $c^*(\eta + b_F + \hat{y}) < \hat{y}$.*

Proof Omitted. The proof is essentially identical to the previous. ■

Proof of Proposition 2

- (a) If $\bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$ is non-empty let $\underline{y}^B = \inf \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$ and $\bar{y}^B = \sup \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$. These both exist from the Completeness Property of $\mathbb{R}$ since $\bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z) \subseteq Y \subset \mathbb{R}$. If they're equal, I'm done, therefore suppose $\underline{y}^B < \bar{y}^B$. Take $\hat{y} \in (\underline{y}^B, \bar{y}^B)$. Suppose by way of contradiction that $\hat{y} \notin \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$. Now, there exists a $y \in \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$ such that $y > \hat{y}$ (if not $\bar{y}^B = \hat{y}$, contradicting that $\hat{y} \in (\underline{y}^B, \bar{y}^B)$). Thus, from Lemma 1, $c^*(\eta + b_F + \hat{y}) > \hat{y}$. By the same argument there exists a $y \in \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$ such that $y < \hat{y}$, but from Lemma 2 this implies $c^*(\eta + b_F + \hat{y}) < \hat{y}$, a contradiction. The closedness comes from the continuity of $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}$ and $u(\cdot; p_s)$. ■
- (b) Suppose $y \in \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(\hat{b}_F, \eta, \xi, z)$. Take $b_F < \hat{b}_F$. Since $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}$ is increasing in the first argument, $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(b_F + \eta + y, z) \leq W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(\hat{b}_F + \eta + y, z)$. However, since $y \in \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(\hat{b}_F, \eta, \xi, z)$ this implies that $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(\hat{b}_F + \eta + y, z) \leq W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta - \xi, y, z) \Rightarrow W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(b_F + \eta + y, z) \leq W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta - \xi, y, z) \Rightarrow y \in \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$, which implies $\bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(\hat{b}_F, \eta, \xi, z) \subseteq \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$. ■

Proof of Proposition 3

- (a) Suppose $y \in \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi_1, z)$. Take $\xi_2 < \xi_1$. Since $W_{\mathcal{F}}^B$ is increasing in the first argument $W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta - \xi_1, y, z) \leq W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta - \xi_2, y, z)$. However, since $y \in \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi_1, z)$ this implies that $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(b_F + \eta + y, z) \leq W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta - \xi_1, y, z)$, which implies that $y \in \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi_2, z)$. ■
- (b) Suppose $y \in \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$. Take $x > 0$. Since $W_{\mathcal{F}}^B$ is increasing in its first argument, $W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta + x - \xi, y, z) \geq W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta - \xi, y, z)$. However, since $y \in \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$ this implies that $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(\eta + y + b_F, z) \leq W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta - \xi, y, z)$, and $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(\eta + y + b_F, z) = W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}((\eta + x) + y + (b_F - x), z)$, therefore $y \in \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F - x, \eta + x, \xi, z)$. ■

- (c) Suppose $y \notin \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$, where $\xi > 0$. Take $x > 0$. Since $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}$ is increasing in the first argument, $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(b_F + \eta + x + y, z) \geq W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(b_F + \eta + y, z)$. Note that since $\xi > 0$, the additional home equity is forefeited in bankruptcy, $W_{\mathcal{F}}^B((\eta + x) - (\xi + x), y, z) = W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta - \xi, y, z)$. Thus, since $y \notin \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$ this implies that $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(b_F + \eta + x + y, z) \geq W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(b_F + \eta + y, z) \geq W_{\mathcal{F}}^B(\eta - \xi_1', y, z)$, which implies that $y \notin \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta + x, \xi + x, z)$. ■
- (d) When there is no homestead exemption the value of defaulting only depends on the endowment y and state z . Today's budget set only depends on the net asset position, therefore the bankruptcy set only depends on $\eta + b_F$ and z . ■
- (e) This comes directly from Proposition 1 and that $W_{\mathcal{F}}^{NB}(a, i) \geq W_{\mathcal{F}}^{BC}(a, i)$. Let $\varepsilon = b_F + \eta - \chi^s > 0$. Suppose not, i.e. $\exists y \in \bar{\mathcal{B}}^*(b_F, \eta, \xi, z)$. This implies that $u(y; p_s) + \beta \mathbb{E}V^{BC} \geq u(c^*(\eta + b_F + y); p_s) + \beta \mathbb{E}V^G$. However, consuming $y + \varepsilon$ and saving χ was a feasible choice, which implies that: $u(c^*(\eta + b_F + y); p_s) + \beta \mathbb{E}V^G \geq u(y + \varepsilon; p_s) + \beta \mathbb{E}V^{BC} > u(y; p_s) + \beta \mathbb{E}V^{BC}$ from the strict monotonicity of u , which arrives at the desired contraction. ■

Proof of Lemma 1 When $\gamma < 1$ and $h(1 - \delta) > m$ implies $h(1 - \delta) - m > \gamma h(1 - \delta) - m$ (the deficiency judgment value) and $h(1 - \delta) - m > \max\{\gamma h(1 - \delta) - m, 0\}$ (the no deficiency judgment value). Thus, the household can guarantee itself strictly more resources tomorrow if it does not declare bankruptcy (if it has a good credit history), then from since the value functions are increasing in their first argument, we are done. In case of bankruptcy and $\chi > 0$ the same argument holds. If $\chi = 0$ the assumption that when a household has positive home equity and is indifferent between foreclosing and not it chooses to repay completes the proof. ■

Proof of Lemma 2 The proof is immediate from Lemma 1 and the definition of foreclosure when $\psi = 0$. When $\delta \geq 1 - \kappa \Rightarrow h(1 - \delta) \leq m$, thus the household will always have more resources if it chooses foreclosure. ■

B Proofs Related to the Intermediaries Problem

Proof of Lemma 4 The proof is a direct consequence of Propositions 2-3 and Lemma 2. ■

Proof of Lemma 5 This is essentially the same as Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2011) Proposition 7. The result for q_m carries through. To complete the proof note that when $\chi = 0$ the price of unsecured credit is decreasing in m' . Thus, for a fixed h', b' , picking an m' such that $m'/h' > \kappa^*$ reduces mortgage and unsecured receipts. ■

C Computational Details

In order to calibrate the model I employ a nested fixed point algorithm to match relevant moments from the model with the data. I discretize the state space and the choice parameters.

The outline of the algorithm is as follows:

1. **Loop 1** - Guess a vector of the structural parameters Θ^0
 - (a) **Loop 2** - Make an initial guess for the price of housing services p_s^0
 - i. **Loop 3** - Make an initial guess for the price schedules q_b^0 and q_m^0
 - ii. Compute the policy choice $(\check{b}', \check{h}', \check{m}')$ that yields the maximal resources in the current period, and denote it by $\check{a}$.
 - A. **Loop 4** - Make an initial guess for W^0 on the domain $[\check{a} - \underline{c}, \check{a}]$, and define v^0 for $a < \check{a} - \underline{c}$ as $u(\underline{c}) + \beta \bar{u} / (1 - \beta)$, where $\underline{c}$ is a minimal consumption level.
 - B. Compute $\mathbb{E}_{\delta', y', z'} V^H(b', h', m', y', \delta', z')$ for each choice of b', h', m' , and the implied default decisions B^* and f^* .
 - C. Compute the new value functions, W^1 , by maximization given $\mathbb{E}_{\delta', y', z'} V(b', h', m', y', \delta', y')$
 - D. Compute the foreclosure, bankruptcy and portfolio policy functions
 - E. If $\|W^1 - W^0\| < \epsilon_W$ end **Loop 4**, otherwise set $W^0 = W^1$ and go to B.
 - iii. Given the default decisions $B^*(b', h', m', y', \delta', z')$ and $f^*(b', h', m', y', \delta', z')$, use Equations 4 & 2 to compute the new implied price schedules q_b^0 and q_m^0 .
 - iv. If $\|q^1 - q^0\| < \epsilon_q$ end **Loop 3**, otherwise set $q^0 = \nu q^0 + (1 - \nu)q^1$ and go to (ii).
 - (b) Compute the invariant distribution μ over $A \times Z \times Y\mathcal{S}$.
 - (c) Compute the housing services supplied S^S and demanded S^D from the policy functions and invariant distribution.
 - (d) If $\|S^D - S^S\| < \epsilon_S$ end **Loop 2**.
 - (e) If $S^D < S^S$, pick $p_s^1 < p_s^0$ and repeat **Loop 3**
 - (f) Repeat until $S^D > S^S$, then use a bisection until $\|S^D - S^S\| < \epsilon_S$ end **Loop 2**.
2. Compute model moments $\mathcal{M}^{\text{MODEL}}$.
3. If $\sum w_i (\mathcal{M}_i^{\text{MODEL}} - \mathcal{M}_i^{\text{DATA}})^2 < \epsilon_{\mathcal{M}}$ end **Loop 1**. Otherwise, return to 1.

D Foreclosure and Bankruptcy Information by State

Table 12: Foreclosure Deficiency and Homestead
Bankruptcy Exemption by State

State	Foreclosure Deficiency	Max Homestead Exemption	Federal Allowed
Alabama	Yes	5,000*	No
Alaska	No	54,000	No
Arizona	No	150,000	No
Arkansas	Yes	17,425*	Yes
California	No	50,000 [†]	No
Colorado	Yes	45,000	No
Connecticut	Yes	75,000	Yes
Delaware	Yes	50,000	No
D.C.	Yes	17,425*	Yes
Florida	Yes	∞	No
Georgia	Yes	10,000*	No
Hawaii	Yes	17,425*	Yes
Idaho	Yes	104,471	No
Illinois	Yes	7,500*	No
Indiana	Yes	7,500	No
Iowa	No	∞	No
Kansas	Yes	∞	No
Kentucky	Yes	5,000	No
Louisiana	Yes	25,000	No
Maine	Yes	35,000	No
Maryland	Yes	0	No
Massachusetts	Yes	100,000	Yes
Michigan	Yes	17,425*	Yes
Minnesota	No	200,000	Yes
Mississippi	Yes	75,000	No
Missouri	Yes	15,000	No
Montana	No	100,000	No
Nebraska	Yes	12,500	No
Nevada	Yes	550,000	No
New Hampshire	Yes	100,000	No
New Jersey	Yes	17,425*	Yes
New Mexico	Yes	30,000*	Yes
New York	Yes	50,000	No
North Carolina	No	18,500	No
North Dakota	No	80,000	No
Ohio	Yes	5,000	No

Continued on Next Page...

Table 12 – Continued

State	Foreclosure Deficiency	Max Homestead Exemption	Federal Allowed
Oklahoma	Yes	∞	No
Oregon	Yes	25,000 [‡]	No
Pennsylvania	Yes	17,425*	Yes
Rhode Island	Yes	200,000	Yes
South Carolina	Yes	17,425*	Yes
South Dakota	Yes	30,000	No
Tennessee	Yes	5,000 [†]	No
Texas	Yes	∞	Yes
Utah	Yes	20,000*	No
Vermont	Yes	75,000	Yes
Virginia	Yes	5,000*	No
Washington	No	40,000	Yes
West Virginia	Yes	25,000	No
Wisconsin	Yes	40,000*	Yes
Wyoming	Yes	10,000*	No

*Can be doubled for couples

[†]Can be multiplied by 1.5 for couples

[‡]33,000 for couples