

Ageing, Government Budgets, Retirement, and Growth*

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Abstract

We analyze the short and long run effects of demographic ageing—increased longevity and reduced fertility—on per-capita growth. The OLG model captures direct effects, working through adjustments in the savings rate, labor supply, and capital deepening, and indirect effects, working through changes of taxes, government spending components and the retirement age in politico-economic equilibrium. Growth is driven by capital accumulation and productivity increases fueled by public investment. The closed-form solutions of the model predict per-capita growth in OECD economies to accelerate in response to demographic ageing even though taxation and the retirement age increase. If only fiscal policy were endogenous but the retirement age were held constant, the growth rate would increase less strongly, due to a surge of social security transfers and crowding out of public investment.

1 Introduction

The prospect of “graying” populations in many developed economies raises concerns about the sustainability of economic growth. According to these concerns, rising old-age dependency ratios translate into growing tax burdens while generous pension and health care

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benefits crowd out public investment spending for infrastructure or education, with negative effects for capital accumulation and productivity growth. However, the demographic transition has been ongoing for a while—developed economies have experienced a marked decrease in fertility and increase in longevity for several decades—without producing clear evidence that this transition has caused a fall in per-capita growth. Rather to the opposite, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) find that both a decrease in the fertility rate and an increase in longevity are associated with higher growth rates.¹ The evidence is similarly mixed as far as the effect on public investment is concerned. While the observed increase of the GDP share of transfers to the elderly went hand in hand with a decline in the share for infrastructure investment, the share of education spending has actually grown.² Moreover, most developed countries have started to increase the retirement age or tighten the conditions for early retirement, reducing the pressure on social security taxes.

To interpret this data and gauge likely future developments, we develop a tractable model to analyze the effects of demographic ageing on per-capita growth. Building on a standard overlapping generations setup with private and public capital formation, our framework features two demographic driving forces—fertility and longevity—and endogenizes a number of economic and political choices. In their role as economic agents, households in the model take prices, taxes, public investment, the retirement age and retirement benefits as given when choosing consumption, savings, and labor supply. In their role as voters, households choose among office motivated parties that offer policy platforms comprising taxes, the expenditure shares for inter-generational transfers and public investment (reflecting spending components of central importance for developed economies), as well as the retirement age. The political process lacks commitment, and elections take place every period.

Policy choices in the model are of different concern to young and old voters: the exposure of households to labor income taxes changes over the life cycle; the old benefit from social security transfers to their group but are hurt by an increase in the retirement age; and only the young benefit from the returns to public investment. When evaluating the policy platforms on offer in the political arena, voters therefore disagree as to which platform should ideally be implemented. We model the resolution of the ensuing conflict under the assumption of probabilistic voting, reflecting a small degree of randomness in voters’ support for a party. In equilibrium, vote-seeking parties propose a policy platform maximizing average welfare of all voters, and changes in the economic or demographic environment give rise to a gradual adjustment of the policy instruments.

Policy choices do not only affect productivity, labor supply, capital accumulation, factor prices, and incomes. Absent commitment, they also affect, indirectly, future policy outcomes. In addition to the “economic” repercussions of their policy choices, voters therefore internalize the “political” repercussions, reflected in the equilibrium relation-

¹Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) estimate the effect of life expectancy on economic growth. They find no evidence of a positive effect.

²In the United States, government spending on the elderly grew much faster during the second half of the twentieth century than other components of government spending (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). In contrast with the time series evidence, the fraction of elderly residents in a district was negatively associated with education spending per child in the cross section (Poterba, 1997).

ship between future state variables and policy choices. We assume that only fundamental state variables enter this equilibrium relationship, excluding artificial state variables of the type sustaining trigger strategy equilibria. This restriction absolves us from having to make arbitrary assumptions about the strategies being played; it also reflects our assumption that political choices suffer from a lack of commitment, including commitment to particular enforcement strategies. While we agree that the existence of intergenerational transfers or public investment may also owe to reputational arrangements, we focus on the Markov perfect equilibrium in order to identify the fundamental and robust forces that shape the size of these programs, and therefore growth.³

Under standard functional form assumptions, we characterize the politico-economic equilibrium in closed form.⁴ Changes in the demographic structure affect the equilibrium allocation through several channels. First, increased longevity raises the incentive to save and work. Second, reduced fertility tends to increase the capital-labor ratio. Third, demographic ageing alters the number of voters who value transfers to the elderly relative to the number of those who value the future benefits of public investment, giving rise to a shift in the composition of government spending. Fourth, the induced change in old-age transfers affects the savings rate and labor supply. Finally, in spite of old households' disutility from working, ageing leads to an increase in the retirement age and aggregate labor supply, reducing the upward pressure on social security transfers. General equilibrium effects on wages and interest rates interact with these channels.

To quantify the equilibrium implications of demographic ageing, we analyze calibrated versions of the model representing a rich OECD economy, a rich European OECD economy, the United States, and Japan. For each of the countries and country blocks, the model predicts that the forecasted changes in fertility and longevity give rise to a continued increase of the GDP share of social security transfers, a slightly higher GDP share of public investment, a strong increase of the retirement age, and a rise in per-capita growth. In the long run, per-capita growth is predicted to accelerate by 40 to 50 basis points on an annual basis.

Importantly, these findings hinge on the assumption that both fiscal policy and the retirement age are endogenous. With constant policy instruments, the growth rate (or, if the endogenous growth mechanism in the model is replaced by an exogenous growth specification, the level of per-capita output) would increase more strongly than in politico-economic equilibrium. With endogenous tax rates and budget shares but a fixed retirement age, the per-capita growth rate (or per-capita output level) would increase less strongly, due to a surge of social security transfers and crowding out of public investment.

While broadly consistent with the evidence, the model predictions contradict a common view among policy makers according to which the political process will implement measures to raise productivity in order to "outgrow" the burden imposed by demographic change.⁵ According to the model, demographic ageing indeed induces the political process to raise public investment in order to foster productivity growth. However, the main

³For a discussion of Markov perfect equilibrium see Krusell, Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997).

⁴Our functional form assumptions imply that the degree of strategic interaction between policy makers in different periods is minimal.

⁵See, for example, the discussions surrounding the European Union's "Lisbon Agenda."

positive growth effects arise directly, through capital deepening, a higher savings rate, and increased labor supply while the net effect of endogenous policy on growth is negative, due to higher social security transfers and an increasing retirement age.

Our work relates to the literature analyzing the effects of government policy on growth. Barro (1990) assumes that government spending is productive, entering directly in the final good production function. Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993) assume that government spending is a productive input in capital formation. Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) review the role of productive government spending in general equilibrium models of endogenous growth.⁶ Relative to this literature, our contribution lies in modeling the determinants of policy and linking fertility and longevity to growth.

Our work also relates to politico-economic models of redistribution and growth. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Krusell et al. (1997) argue that inequality depresses growth because anticipated redistributive taxation reduces the incentive to accumulate, or because higher inequality pushes the median voter's preferred level of public investment and taxes beyond the growth-maximizing level. Relative to these papers, we focus on inter- rather than intragenerational conflict, consider a larger set of policy instruments available to policy makers, and focus on the implications of fertility and longevity on growth. Our analysis therefore sheds light on the equilibrium size and composition of the government budget, and it emphasizes how demographic ageing as reflected in reduced fertility and increased longevity affects both this composition and growth.^{7 8}

Like Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (1999) and Rangel (2003), our paper endogenizes the choice of productive versus redistributive public spending in an overlapping-generations model. In these papers, voters support public investment even if they do not directly benefit from it because a trigger strategy links investment spending to the provision of public pensions in the future. Our model adopts a different perspective. Rather than emphasizing complementarities between investment spending and transfer payments, it focuses on the conflict over the size of these two spending components, and how the resolution of this conflict is shaped by fertility and longevity. The model also differs from these papers in that it features political and economic choices, embedded in the standard growth model. This allows us to model the macroeconomic consequences of population ageing in a relatively rich setting without having to sacrifice analytical tractability.⁹ Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004) argue that public investment might rise in response to increased longevity. Our model incorporates the mechanism underlying Gradstein and Kaganovich's (2004) argument. In addition, it features a role for fertility, the retirement age, a second government spending component that competes for funding, and—central

⁶Azzimonti, Sarte and Soares (2009) analyze capital formation by a benevolent government without commitment in a representative agent economy.

⁷Our work shares with Krusell et al. (1997) the restriction to Markov perfect equilibrium. Methodologically, it is related to Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008).

⁸Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Perotti (1993) analyze distributive conflict in models with human capital accumulation. They focus on the political choice of public versus private education and the effect of distortive redistribution in the presence of borrowing constraints, respectively.

⁹In Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (1999), population ageing triggers a decrease of both public investment and transfers.

to our analysis—growth effects of policy.

Galor and Weil (1999), Cervellati and Sunde (2005) and Soares (2005), among others, analyze the growth effects of demographic change due to its impact on private savings and education decisions. Hazan (2009) introduces private retirement decisions in a model of human capital accumulation. Our model complements these papers by introducing a role for public policy, modeling the determinants of policy in politico-economic equilibrium, and by focusing on the ongoing demographic transition in developed economies rather than historical developments.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model and characterizes the allocation conditional on policy. Section 3 solves for the politico-economic equilibrium and analyzes its properties. Section 4 contains the analysis of the short and long-run effects of demographic ageing on government budgets and macroeconomic outcomes, in particular the growth rate. Section 5 concludes.

2 Economic Environment

We consider an economy inhabited by two overlapping generations: young households and old households. Young households in period t supply labor, pay taxes, consume and save for retirement. With probability $p_{t+1} \in (0, 1]$, they survive to become old households in period $t + 1$. Old households in turn consume the return on their savings, old-age benefits and the proceeds of their labor income in old age. The size of this labor income depends on the retirement age, ϱ_t , and the labor productivity of old relative to young workers, $\chi \geq 0$. If $\varrho_t = 0$ or $\chi = 0$, the effective per-capita labor supply of old households equals zero. Old households die at the end of the period.

Each cohort consists of a continuum of homogeneous agents. The ratio of young to old households in period t equals ν_t/p_t reflecting fertility ν_t ($\nu_t > 0$) and longevity p_t . Both these demographic parameters follow deterministic processes. On a balanced growth path, the survival probability is constant at value p and the gross population growth rate is given by ν . Savings of young households who die before reaching old age are distributed among their surviving peers reflecting a perfect annuities market.

2.1 Technology

A continuum of competitive firms transforms capital and labor into output by means of a Cobb-Douglas technology. Output per young household in period t is given by

$$B_0 k_t^\alpha [H_t \psi_t(\varrho_t)(1 - x_t)]^{1-\alpha},$$

where $B_0 > 0$ and the capital share $\alpha \in (0, 1)$. Capital depreciates after one period. The capital stock per young household, k_t , therefore corresponds to the per-capita savings of young households in the previous period, s_{t-1} , corrected for the population growth rate of young workers, ν_t . We normalize the period time-endowment to unity and denote leisure consumption and labor productivity of the young by x_t and H_t , respectively. Labor supply by an old worker in period t equals $\varrho_t(1 - x_t)$ reflecting the assumption that young

and non-retired old households work the same number of hours. Labor supply per young household in period t is given by $\psi_t(\varrho_t)(1 - x_t)$ with $\psi_t(\varrho_t) \equiv 1 + \varrho_t \chi p_t / \nu_t$.

Production factors are paid their marginal products, due to perfect competition. The wage per unit of time, w_t , and the gross return on physical capital, R_t , therefore satisfy

$$\begin{aligned} w_t &= (1 - \alpha) B_0 H_t^{1-\alpha} k_t^\alpha [\psi_t(\varrho_t)(1 - x_t)]^{-\alpha}, \\ R_t &= \alpha B_0 H_t^{1-\alpha} k_t^{\alpha-1} [\psi_t(\varrho_t)(1 - x_t)]^{1-\alpha} = w_t \frac{\psi_t(\varrho_t)(1 - x_t)}{k_t} \alpha', \end{aligned}$$

with $\alpha' \equiv \alpha / (1 - \alpha)$. As a consequence of annuitization, the gross return on savings of a young household that survives to old age equals $\hat{R}_t \equiv R_t / p_t$.

Labor productivity H_t reflects productive public investment (into education, health, infrastructure etc.) during previous periods.¹⁰ More specifically, productivity growth is a function of public investment per worker,

$$H_{t+1} = B_1 H_t^{1-\delta} I_t^\delta,$$

with $B_1 > 0$, $\delta \in (0, 1)$ and I_t denoting investment spending per worker. A specification of this type is standard in the literature.¹¹ (We discuss the role of the endogenous growth assumption for the model predictions as we go along. The central model predictions are robust to replacing the assumption of endogenous growth by one of exogenous growth.)

2.2 Government

The government taxes the labor income of young households in period t at rate $\tau_t + \sigma_t$.¹² Revenues fund transfers to old households—the component corresponding to τ_t —as well as public investment—the component corresponding to σ_t . Denoting the transfer to old households (per old household) by b_t , we have

$$\begin{aligned} b_t &= w_t(1 - x_t)\tau_t\nu_t/p_t, \\ I_t &= w_t(1 - x_t)\sigma_t. \end{aligned}$$

Public investment I_t , the transfer payment b_t and the retirement age must be non-negative (we exclude lump-sum taxes). The policy instruments therefore have to satisfy¹³

$$\tau_t, \sigma_t, \varrho_t \geq 0 \quad \text{for all } t. \tag{1}$$

We denote a combination of the policy instruments in period t by κ_t , $\kappa_t \equiv (\tau_t, \sigma_t, \varrho_t)$.

¹⁰Due to the Cobb-Douglas specification of the production function in the final good sector, H_t can equivalently be interpreted as total factor productivity. Since our objective is to analyze the link between changes in the size and composition of the population on the one hand and productivity growth on the other, we do not allow for scale effects as they are sometimes considered in endogenous growth models.

¹¹For example, Boldrin and Montes (2005) use the above specification, with H_t interpreted as human capital and I_t interpreted as public education.

¹²Labor income of old households is not taxed as these receive old-age benefits.

¹³We suppress the upper bound of unity on the retirement age since it will not be binding.

2.3 Preferences

Young households value consumption during young age, c_1 , and in old age, c_2 , as well as leisure. Agents discount the future at factor $\beta \in (0, 1)$. Due to the risk of death, the effective discount factor of young households equals βp_{t+1} . For analytical tractability, we assume that the period utility function of consumption is logarithmic. Maximizing expected utility, a worker in period t solves the following problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{s_t, x_t} \quad & \ln(c_{1,t}) + v(x_t) + \beta p_{t+1} [\ln(c_{2,t+1}) + v(1 - \varrho_{t+1}a)] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & c_{1,t} = w_t(1 - x_t)(1 - \tau_t - \sigma_t) - s_t, \\ & c_{2,t+1} = s_t \hat{R}_{t+1} + w_{t+1}(1 - x_{t+1})\chi \varrho_{t+1} + b_{t+1}. \end{aligned}$$

The felicity function of leisure, $v(\cdot)$, is increasing and concave. The parameter a measures the extent to which changes in the retirement age affect leisure consumption of old households. In the simulations, we set this value equal to the steady state labor supply of young households, $1 - x$.¹⁴

2.4 Economic Equilibrium

The first-order conditions characterizing the households' savings and labor-supply decisions, respectively, are standard:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{c_{1,t}} &= \beta p_{t+1} \hat{R}_{t+1} \frac{1}{c_{2,t+1}}, \\ v'(x_t) &= w_t(1 - \tau_t - \sigma_t) \frac{1}{c_{1,t}}. \end{aligned}$$

Substituting, the Euler equation characterizing the optimal savings choice of an *individual* household yields a closed-form solution for the *aggregate* savings function,¹⁵

$$s_t = z_{t+1}(\tau_{t+1}, \varrho_{t+1}) w_t(1 - x_t)(1 - \tau_t - \sigma_t),$$

where $z_{t+1}(\tau_{t+1}, \varrho_{t+1})$ denotes the savings rate of young households,

$$z_{t+1}(\tau_{t+1}, \varrho_{t+1}) \equiv \frac{\alpha \beta}{\alpha(1 + \beta p_{t+1})/p_{t+1} + \frac{1-\alpha}{\psi_{t+1}(\varrho_{t+1})} \left(\frac{\tau_{t+1}}{p_{t+1}} + \frac{\chi \varrho_{t+1}}{\nu_{t+1}} \right)} \geq 0.$$

¹⁴We do not set a equal to $1 - x_{t+1}$ since this would make it impossible to characterize the equilibrium in closed form. In the simulations, labor supply turns out to be very inelastic. This suggests that setting $a = 1 - x_{t+1}$ rather than $1 - x$ should have only very minor effects on the equilibrium allocation.

¹⁵Using $s_{t-1} R_t / \nu_t = w_t \psi_t(\varrho_t)(1 - x_t) \alpha'$, the optimal savings choice of a young household is characterized by the condition

$$\frac{s_t \hat{R}_{t+1} + w_{t+1}(1 - x_{t+1})\chi \varrho_{t+1} + b_{t+1}}{\beta p_{t+1} \hat{R}_{t+1}} = w_t(1 - x_t)(1 - \tau_t - \sigma_t) - s_t.$$

Simplifying the left-hand side of this equation and setting individual and average savings equal to each other, we arrive at the specified expression.

Note that the savings rate in period t depends on policy choices in period $t+1$. (If $\tau_{t+1} > 0$ or $\chi\varrho_{t+1} > 0$, old households receive retirement benefits or labor income in addition to the return on their savings. This renders the savings rate endogenous to policy, even with logarithmic preferences.) If these policy instruments themselves depend on aggregate savings, then the above relation characterizes savings only implicitly. We return to this point when discussing the objective function maximized in the political process.

Combining the first-order condition for leisure with the conditions defining $c_{1,t}$ and z_{t+1} , the equation

$$v'(x_t)(1 - x_t)(1 - z_{t+1}(\tau_{t+1}, \varrho_{t+1})) = 1 \quad (2)$$

implicitly defines the labor supply of young households. Note that this labor supply is independent of contemporaneous taxes as income and substitution effects cancel.

The endogenous state variables at time t are H_t and k_t . To simplify notation, we work with the state variables H_t and $q_t \equiv H_t^{1-\alpha} k_t^\alpha$ instead. Let $\mathcal{L}_t \equiv B_0(1 - \alpha)q_t(1 - x_t)^{1-\alpha}\psi_t(\varrho_t)^{-\alpha} = w_t(1 - x_t)$ denote labor income of a young household. Combining $k_t = s_{t-1}/\nu_t$ and the aggregate savings function with the dynamic budget constraint and the expressions for factor prices, the equilibrium allocation can recursively be expressed in terms of the following functions of policy instruments:

$$\left. \begin{aligned} k_{t+1} &= \mathcal{L}_t (1 - \tau_t - \sigma_t) z_{t+1}(\tau_{t+1}, \varrho_{t+1})/\nu_{t+1} = s_t/\nu_{t+1}, \\ c_{1,t} &= \mathcal{L}_t (1 - \tau_t - \sigma_t) (1 - z_{t+1}(\tau_{t+1}, \varrho_{t+1})), \\ c_{2,t} &= \mathcal{L}_t \nu_t \left(\alpha' \psi_t(\varrho_t)/p_t + \frac{\tau_t}{p_t} + \frac{\chi\varrho_t}{\nu_t} \right), \\ x_t &= x_t(\tau_{t+1}, \varrho_{t+1}), \\ H_{t+1} &= B_1 H_t^{1-\delta} (\mathcal{L}_t \sigma_t)^\delta, \\ q_{t+1} &= \left(B_1 H_t^{1-\delta} (\mathcal{L}_t \sigma_t)^\delta \right)^{1-\alpha} (\mathcal{L}_t (1 - \tau_t - \sigma_t) z_{t+1}(\tau_{t+1}, \varrho_{t+1})/\nu_{t+1})^\alpha, \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (3)$$

where the function $x_t(\cdot)$ is defined by (2).

Conditional on initial values for the two endogenous state variables, (H_0, q_0) , as well as a sequence of policy instruments, $\{\kappa_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$, conditions (2) and (3) fully characterize the equilibrium allocation. Taking logarithms, we can express the laws of motion of the two state variables as

$$\begin{bmatrix} \ln(H_{t+1}) \\ \ln(q_{t+1}) \end{bmatrix} = \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1 - \delta & \delta \\ (1 - \alpha)(1 - \delta) & \alpha + \delta(1 - \alpha) \end{bmatrix}}_{\equiv M} \begin{bmatrix} \ln(H_t) \\ \ln(q_t) \end{bmatrix} + \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} m_t^H(\cdot) \\ m_t^q(\cdot) \end{bmatrix}}_{\equiv m_t} \quad (4)$$

where the definitions of $m_t^H(x_t(\cdot), \sigma_t, \varrho_t)$ and $m_t^q(x_t(\cdot), \tau_t, \sigma_t, \varrho_t, \tau_{t+1}, \varrho_{t+1})$ follow from the laws of motion in (3).

In the special case of inelastic labor supply, $v'(x) = 0$, $x_t = 0$, and the equilibrium conditions (3) maintain their validity while equation (2) becomes irrelevant.

2.5 Balanced Growth Path

Along a balanced growth path, all tax rates and demographic variables are constant, implying that per-capita labor supply is time-invariant as well. From (3), the growth

rates of $k_t, s_t, c_{1,t}$, and $c_{2,t}$ then are equal to the growth rate of q_t . The laws of motion for the two state variables in (3) imply that, along the balanced growth path, the gross growth rate of H_t , γ_H , equals the gross growth rate of q_t . For any time-invariant choice of tax rates, the last two equations in (3) therefore pin down the ratio H_t/q_t on the corresponding balanced growth path. Given this ratio, the same two conditions pin down γ_H and thus, the balanced growth rates of $q_t, k_t, s_t, c_{1,t}$, and $c_{2,t}$. Following this logic, we find

$$\gamma_H = \left((B_0 \psi(\varrho)^{-\alpha} (1-\alpha)(1-x)^{1-\alpha})^\delta B_1^{1-\alpha} \left((1-\tau-\sigma) \frac{z(\tau, \varrho)}{\nu} \right)^{\alpha\delta} \sigma^{\delta(1-\alpha)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha(1-\delta)}} \quad \text{s.t. (2).} \quad (5)$$

Income taxes and leisure consumption depress growth because they lower disposable income of young households (the effects captured by the terms $1-\tau-\sigma$ and $1-x$), as do retirement benefits because they lower the savings rate ($z(\cdot)$ is decreasing in τ). At the same time, public investment fosters productivity growth (the effect captured by σ in the last term), in line with the empirical evidence (e.g., Blankenau, Simpson and Tomljanovich, 2007). Later retirement has a negative effect on growth. It lowers the wages of workers (the effect captured by $\psi(\varrho)^{-\alpha}$) and also decreases the savings rate. Population growth ν has a direct negative effect on per-capita growth because it reduces the growth rate of capital per young household for a given savings rate (the effect captured by ν in the denominator), and a positive effect because it increases wages given the stock of capital per young household (the effect captured by the term $\psi(\varrho)^{-\alpha}$). Longevity has a direct negative effect on growth by reducing wages given the stock of capital per young household. In addition, demographic change affects the savings rate and thus, x .

Physical capital along its long-run growth path satisfies $k_{t+1} = \mathcal{L}_t(1-\tau-\sigma) z(\tau, \varrho)/\nu$. Since k_t grows at the gross rate γ_H , it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\frac{H_t}{k_t} \right)^{1-\alpha} &= \frac{\gamma_H \nu}{B_0 \psi(\varrho)^{-\alpha} (1-\alpha)(1-x)^{1-\alpha} (1-\tau-\sigma) z(\tau, \varrho)} \quad \text{s.t. (2),} \\ R &= \frac{\alpha \psi(\varrho) \gamma_H \nu}{(1-\alpha)(1-\tau-\sigma) z(\tau, \varrho)} \quad \text{s.t. (2).} \end{aligned}$$

The growth effects of changes in labor supply, the savings rate, population growth and the policy instruments translate into parallel level effects in an otherwise identical model with exogenous growth. To see this, consider a modified specification of productivity growth,

$$H_{t+1} = B_1 H_t^{\varepsilon(1-\delta)} I_t^\delta,$$

where $0 < \varepsilon < 1$. (The model analyzed in the paper corresponds to the case $\varepsilon = 1$.) For $\varepsilon < 1$, the model does not display endogenous growth and the equations in (3) determine steady-state levels q and H that depend positively on z , $(1-\tau-\sigma)$, σ and $(1-x)^{1-\alpha} \psi(\varrho)^{-\alpha}$ and negatively on ν .

3 Politico-Economic Equilibrium

We assume that young and old households vote on candidates whose electoral platforms specify values for the policy instruments, κ_t . Voters do not only support a candidate for her policy platform, but also for other characteristics (“ideology”) that are orthogonal to the fundamental policy dimensions of interest. These characteristics are permanent and cannot be credibly altered in the course of electoral competition. Moreover, their valuation differs across voters (even if voters agree about the preferred policy platform) and is subject to random aggregate shocks, realized after candidates have chosen their platforms. This “probabilistic-voting” setup renders the probability of winning a voter’s support a continuous function of the competing policy platforms, implying that equilibrium policy platforms smoothly respond to changes in the demographic structure. This stands in sharp contrast to the “median-voter” setup where, in a model with only a few generations, an infinitesimal change in the demographic structure has implausibly large effects on policy outcomes if it alters the cohort the median voter is associated with.

In the Nash equilibrium of the game with two candidates choosing platforms to maximize their expected vote shares, both candidates propose the same policy platform.¹⁶ This platform maximizes a convex combination of the objective functions of all groups of voters, where the weights reflect the groups’ size and sensitivity of voting behavior to policy changes. Those groups that care the most about policy platforms rather than other candidate characteristics are the most likely to shift their support from one candidate to the other in response to small changes in the proposed platforms. In equilibrium, such groups of “swing voters” thus gain in political influence and tilt policy in their own favor. If all voters are equally responsive to changes in the policy platforms, electoral competition implements the utilitarian optimum with respect to voters.

Owing to political competition at the beginning of each period, policy makers cannot commit to future policy platforms. Voters therefore have to form expectations about the effect of current policy choices on future policy outcomes. Under the Markov assumption, future leisure and policy choices are functions of the fundamental state variables only, $x_{t+1} = \tilde{x}_{t+1}(H_{t+1}, q_{t+1})$ and $\kappa_{t+1} = \tilde{\kappa}_{t+1}(H_{t+1}, q_{t+1})$. (The state variables include demographic variables, thus the time indices of the policy functions.) If the policy functions are independent of (H, q) , $\kappa_{t+1} = \tilde{\kappa}_{t+1}$, then (2) implies that the leisure function is independent of (H, q) as well, $x_{t+1} = \tilde{x}_{t+1}$, and both the aggregate savings function and the economic equilibrium conditions (3) apply (recall the discussion of the aggregate savings function in subsection 2.4). In the following, we conjecture that the policy functions indeed are independent of (H, q) . We derive the equilibrium choice of policy instruments under this conjecture and show that this choice does not depend on (H, q) , thereby verifying the conjecture.

Letting ω denote the per-capita political influence of old relative to young households, the program characterizing equilibrium policy choices in period t is given by

$$\max_{\kappa_t} W_t(H_t, q_t, \kappa_t; \tilde{\kappa}_{t+1}, \tilde{x}_{t+1}) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad (1).$$

¹⁶See Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for discussions of the probabilistic voting setup.

The political objective function $W_t(\cdot)$ depends on the endogenous state variables (as well as the exogenous ones, thus the time index), the contemporaneous policy instruments, and the anticipated values of policy instruments and leisure in the following period. In particular,

$$\begin{aligned} W_t(H_t, q_t, \kappa_t; \tilde{\kappa}_{t+1}, \tilde{x}_{t+1}) &\equiv \omega p_t \{ \ln(c_{2,t}) + v(1 - \varrho_t a) \} \\ &\quad + \nu_t \{ \ln(c_{1,t}) + v(x_t) + \beta p_{t+1} [\ln(c_{2,t+1}) + v(1 - \varrho_{t+1} a)] \} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad &(2), (3); H_t, q_t \text{ given}; \kappa_{t+1} = \tilde{\kappa}_{t+1}, x_{t+1} = \tilde{x}_{t+1}. \end{aligned}$$

Political equilibrium requires that for any combination of state variables (H_t, q_t) , the κ_t solving this program is given by $\tilde{\kappa}_t$.

Using the equilibrium expressions for consumption from (3), the objective function can be expressed as

$$\begin{aligned} W_t(\cdot) &= \omega p_t \left\{ \ln \left[\psi_t(\varrho_t)^{-\alpha} \left(\alpha' \psi_t(\varrho_t)/p_t + \frac{\tau_t}{p_t} + \frac{\chi \varrho_t}{\nu_t} \right) \right] + v(1 - \varrho_t a) \right\} \\ &\quad + \nu_t \left\{ \ln[\psi_t(\varrho_t)^{-\alpha} (1 - \tau_t - \sigma_t)] \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \beta p_{t+1} \ln \left[(\psi_t(\varrho_t)^{-\alpha})^{\delta(1-\alpha)+\alpha} (1 - \tau_t - \sigma_t)^\alpha \sigma_t^{\delta(1-\alpha)} \right] \right\} \\ &\quad + \text{t.i.p.} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad (2), \end{aligned}$$

where t.i.p. denotes terms that are unaffected by contemporaneous policy choices (under the conjecture). Notice that the contemporaneous policy instruments do not interact with the state variables H_t or q_t , due to the logarithmic preference assumption. This confirms the conjecture that the equilibrium policy functions are independent of these state variables.¹⁷

Letting $\Delta_{t+1} \equiv 1 + \beta p_{t+1}(\alpha + \delta(1 - \alpha))$ denote the semi-elasticity of young households' utility with respect to labor income, the first-order conditions with respect to τ_t , σ_t and ϱ_t , respectively, read

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} \frac{\frac{1}{p_t}}{\alpha' \psi_t(\varrho_t)/p_t + \frac{\tau_t}{p_t} + \frac{\chi \varrho_t}{\nu_t}} + \lambda^\tau &= \frac{1 + \alpha \beta p_{t+1}}{1 - \tau_t - \sigma_t}, \\ \frac{\delta(1 - \alpha) \beta p_{t+1}}{\sigma_t} + \lambda^\sigma &= \frac{1 + \alpha \beta p_{t+1}}{1 - \tau_t - \sigma_t}, \\ \frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} \left(\frac{\alpha' \psi'_t(\varrho_t)/p_t + \chi/\nu_t}{\alpha' \psi_t(\varrho_t)/p_t + \frac{\tau_t}{p_t} + \frac{\chi \varrho_t}{\nu_t}} - v'(1 - \varrho_t a) \right) + \lambda^\varrho &= \frac{\alpha \psi'_t(\varrho_t)}{\psi_t(\varrho_t)} \left(\frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} + \Delta_{t+1} \right), \end{aligned}$$

where the λ s denote the multipliers associated with the non-negativity constraints on the policy instruments.

¹⁷In related work, we analyze the sensitivity of a parallel result to changes in functional form assumptions (Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2005). We find that, in the case of generalized CRRA preferences, state variables and policy instruments do interact. However, the quantitative implications for equilibrium policies are negligible.

If the tax rates τ_t and σ_t are interior (as is the case in the simulations we conduct later and in the data) then we can solve the former two first-order conditions for

$$\begin{aligned}\tau_t(\varrho_t) &= \frac{\frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} - \Delta_{t+1} ((1 + \alpha')\psi_t(\varrho_t) - 1)}{\frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} + \Delta_{t+1}}, \\ \sigma_t(\varrho_t) &= \beta \delta p_{t+1} \frac{\psi_t(\varrho_t)}{\frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} + \Delta_{t+1}}.\end{aligned}$$

Assuming $v(\cdot) \equiv m \ln(\cdot)$ and solving the three first-order conditions simultaneously yields the closed-form solutions

$$\begin{aligned}\tau_t &= \frac{(1 - \alpha) \left(\frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} + \Delta_{t+1} \right) + \frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} m - \Delta_{t+1} \left(1 + \frac{\chi p_t}{\nu_t a} \right)}{(1 - \alpha) \left(\frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} + \Delta_{t+1} \right) + \frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} m}, \\ \sigma_t &= \beta \delta p_{t+1} \frac{(1 - \alpha) \left(1 + \frac{\chi p_t}{\nu_t a} \right)}{(1 - \alpha) \left(\frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} + \Delta_{t+1} \right) + \frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} m}, \\ \varrho_t &= \frac{(1 - \alpha) \left(\frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} + \Delta_{t+1} \right) / a - \frac{\omega}{\chi} m}{(1 - \alpha) \left(\frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} + \Delta_{t+1} \right) + \frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} m}.\end{aligned}$$

If the above expression for ϱ_t is negative, then the equilibrium values of the policy instruments are given by $\kappa_t = (\tau_t(0), \sigma_t(0), 0)$, otherwise by the above expressions for τ_t , σ_t and ϱ_t .

Demographic change affects the policy instruments through three channels. (Unless otherwise noted, the comparative statics results hold for τ_t and σ_t even if ϱ_t is in a corner or otherwise fixed.) First, by altering the relative political power of the old, $\frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t}$. An increase in this ratio as induced by lower fertility or higher longevity raises τ_t and lowers σ_t and ϱ_t (we interpret the ratio ω/χ as $\frac{\omega p_t}{\nu_t} / \frac{\chi p_t}{\nu_t}$). Second, by altering the effect of later retirement on aggregate labor supply, $\frac{\chi p_t}{\nu_t}$. An increase in this ratio—also induced by lower fertility or higher longevity—reduces τ_t , and increases σ_t and ϱ_t . The combined effect of these first two channels is to raise τ_t and ϱ_t and lower σ_t in response to increases in p_t/ν_t . Thus, even though the old dislike working and their relative political power increases, the retirement age rises. Third, demographic change affects the policy instruments by altering future longevity p_{t+1} and thus, the weight the political process attaches to the future (see also Gradstein and Kaganovich, 2004). An increase in this parameter reduces τ_t but increases σ_t and ϱ_t .

The comparative statics results working through the first channel correspond with conventional wisdom. Often overlooked are the consequences of the second channel and the third, as well as the fact that the interaction between the three channels generates non-monotone dynamics. For example, a permanent shock to longevity gives rise to a fall in the tax rate τ in the period preceding the shock followed by a recovery thereafter (the net effect in the long run is ambiguous unless ϱ_t is fixed in which case τ_t unambiguously rises). In response to the same shock, the tax rate σ displays the opposite dynamics and the retirement age rises both in the short and the long run. Data about the evolution

of government budget shares might therefore be misleading as to the direction of the long-run changes in these shares.

An increase in m or a raises the marginal cost of working for the old. This induces the political process to reduce the retirement age and shift government spending from investment to social security benefits. If the retirement age is fixed, changes in m or a do not affect the two tax rates. An increase in the elasticity of productivity growth to public investment, δ , leads to a reduction of τ_t and an increase in σ_t and ϱ_t .

The equilibrium policy functions κ_t are unique in the limit of the finite horizon economy. To see this, consider the final period T and note that labor supply is inelastic in this final period (from (2)). The political objective function in period T therefore depends on the consumption of young and old households,

$$c_{1,T} = \mathcal{L}_T(1 - \tau_T) \quad \text{and} \quad c_{2,T} = \mathcal{L}_T \nu_T \left(\frac{(\alpha' + 1)\psi_T(\varrho_T) + \tau_T - 1}{p_T} \right),$$

respectively. Note that $\sigma_T = 0$ since there is no benefit of public investment in the final period. Differentiating the political objective function in period T with respect to τ_T and ϱ_T yields two equations in the policy instruments that are independent of (H_T, q_T) . This implies that κ_T is not a function of (H_T, q_T) . Moving to period $T-1$, the forgoing analysis shows that the policy functions κ_{T-1} are independent of (H_{T-1}, q_{T-1}) as well, and given by the equilibrium expressions reported earlier. The result then follows by induction.

In Appendix A, we derive as a criterion for *production efficiency* along a balanced growth path the requirement that

$$1 \geq \alpha' \frac{I}{s} > \delta.$$

If either of the two inequalities is violated then a reallocation of investment spending between I and s may weakly increase output in all future periods, and strictly in some (see Cass, 1972). In particular, if the left inequality is violated, the economy accumulates too much H and if the right inequality is violated, the economy accumulates too much k . As shown in Appendix A, the economy necessarily over accumulates k relative to H in politico-economic equilibrium. As a consequence, the allocation in politico-economic equilibrium necessarily differs from the allocation supported by any Ramsey policy.¹⁸

4 Quantitative Implications of Demographic Ageing

Based on the analytical results derived earlier, we compute quantitative predictions for a synthetic “rich OECD economy,” representing the population weighted average of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States; a synthetic “rich European OECD economy,”

¹⁸With exogenous growth ($\varepsilon < 1$), the production inefficiency result remains valid, see Appendix A. The political process does not internalize the dynamic externality from current to future H , in contrast to a Ramsey planner. As a consequence, the strength of this dynamic externality is irrelevant for the equilibrium κ_t .

representing the population weighted average of the European countries in the above list; the United States; and Japan. We take one period in the model to correspond to 30 years in the data but compute the model predictions for the years 1970, 1980, $\dots$, 2080. This allows us to construct three sequences of model predictions, each with a period length of 30 years. The first such sequence begins in the year 1970, the second one in the year 1980, and the third one in the year 1990. When reporting time series predictions, we merge these three sequences.

We use the 30-year population growth rate as a measure of ν_t , the number of young households in period t relative to the number in the preceding period. For p_t , the number of old households in period t relative to the number of young households in the preceding period, we use estimates for life expectancy at age 65 divided by 30 years.¹⁹ Figures 1 and 2 plot the demographic series underlying the model predictions.




Figure 1: ν_t for the rich OECD economy (black, “o”), the rich European OECD economy (red, “e”), the United States (green, “u”), and Japan (blue, “j”).

We set α to 0.3, a standard value in the literature, normalize B_0 to unity, and let $\chi = 1.135$, based on estimates of labor productivity over the life cycle in Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2008).²⁰ To calibrate β, δ, ω and B_1 , we impose model restrictions. First, we fix the GDP-shares of transfers and public investment in the year 2000, $(1 - \alpha)\tau_{2000}$ and $(1 - \alpha)\sigma_{2000}$ respectively, at the values 0.0796 and 0.0727, the corresponding averages in the rich OECD economy.²¹ Second, we fix the balanced-growth-path

¹⁹Demographic data from the year 1950 onward is taken from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (2005, 2007): *World Population Prospects*, New York. Population data for the year 1940 is taken from <http://www.populstat.info>. Data about life expectancy at age 65 is available up to the year 2000. Data for 2010 to 2050 is extrapolated from data about life expectancy at birth. Demographic data for the year 2060 and later is extrapolated under the assumption that p and ν converge to unity in the long run.

²⁰We fit a polynomial to Heathcote et al.’s (2008) estimates for the United States and compute the average values before and after age 65.

²¹We proxy the former by the GDP-share of old-age and survivors pensions and the latter by the GDP-share of government fixed capital formation and (other) government expenditures for education (all




Figure 2: p_t for the rich OECD economy (black, “o”), the rich European OECD economy (red, “e”), the United States (green, “u”), and Japan (blue, “j”).

growth rate and interest rate when evaluated at the year-2000 demographics at the observed values in the rich OECD economy.²² These restrictions imply $\beta = 0.7377$ (0.9899 on an annual basis), $\delta = 0.3968$, $\omega = 1.8638$, and $B_1 = 10.3683$. Finally, we calibrate $m = 2.6413$. This value implies that labor supply along a balanced growth path subject to the demographics in the year 2000 equals $1/3$.

Figures 3–7 display the predicted policy responses to demographic change in the rich OECD economy, the rich European OECD economy, the United States, and Japan. All simulations are based on the calibration described above and only differ with respect to the demographic series fed into the model. As a consequence, the actual budget shares in the year 2000 are exactly matched in the case of the rich OECD economy.

According to the model predictions displayed in Figure 3, τ_t more than doubles in the rich OECD economy between the years 1970 and 2000, flattening out thereafter and increasing further by approximately two percentage points up to the year 2080. Tax rate σ_t increases much slower, rising by slightly more than two percentage points between the years 1970 and 2080. Retirement age ϱ_t , in contrast, rises steeply, corresponding to an increase in retirement age of roughly 9 years, to be compared with an increase in life expectancy at age 65 of more than 15 years.²³ Labor supply of young households (not displayed) rises by about two percent.

If the retirement age were not allowed to rise beyond its level in the year 2000, the tax rate τ_t would rise steeply and σ_t would decline, see Figure 4. Intuitively, with a capped

levels of government). Data is taken from OECD sources.

²²We calibrate γ_H based on the average annual multifactor productivity growth rate of the rich OECD economy between the years 1985 and 2005, 1.0113 (OECD sources), and R based on Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt’s (2008) estimate of the annual gross interest rate in the United States, 1.0483.

²³Starting in the late 1960s and 1970s, many OECD countries introduced early retirement provisions in response to high levels of unemployment among middle-aged workers. Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2004) analyze the politico-economic aspects of early retirement provisions. Our model does not capture these aspects.

ϱ_t the growing number of non-working old relative to young households would require increasingly high social-security contributions per young household and the induced rise in τ_t would render taxation more costly, triggering a compensating fall in the tax rate σ_t . Interestingly, this scenario closely corresponds with fears voiced in the policy debate, according to which demographic ageing leads to a crowding out of productive government investment. While the model encompasses the mechanisms underlying such fears, it predicts a different resolution of intergenerational conflict because of adjustments along the retirement margin.




Figure 3: Predicted policies for the rich OECD economy: τ_t (black), σ_t (red), ϱ_t (green).




Figure 4: Predicted policies for the rich OECD economy if ϱ_t is capped at its year-2000 value: τ_t (black), σ_t (red), ϱ_t (green).

Returning to the scenario where all three policy instruments are free to adjust, the predicted policy responses in the rich European OECD economy, the United States and Japan are similar as far as the public investment share is concerned, see Figures 5–7. The main differences between the three economies concern the budget share for social security transfers on the one hand and the retirement age on the other: the social-security budget

share in the United States and Japan starts out from a lower level than in the rich European OECD economy but catches up during the early years of the simulation; and the retirement age increases much more steeply in Japan than in the rich European OECD economy and the United States.

In broad terms, the model's predictions about the relative performance of the three countries and country blocks are consistent with the evidence. In particular, the model predicts the GDP-share of social-security transfers in the year 2000, $(1 - \alpha)\tau_{2000}$, to be highest in the rich European OECD economy (9.0 percent), followed by Japan and the United States (7.8 percent and 7.2 percent, respectively). In the data, the corresponding shares equal roughly 10, 8, and 6 percent respectively. Similarly, the model correctly predicts that the GDP-share of public investment, $(1 - \alpha)\sigma_{2000}$, is higher in Japan than in the United States and the rich European OECD economy. (The model predicts GDP-shares of 7.8 percent for Japan, 7.2 percent for the United States and 7.1 percent for the rich European OECD economy; the corresponding values in the data are roughly 8, 7, and 7 percent respectively.)

The model also performs well in predicting a sharp increase of retirement age in Japan and a smoother response in the United States.²⁴ It performs less satisfactory in predicting a robust increase of retirement age around the year 2000 in the rich European OECD economy as well. Although several European countries have moved towards delaying the statutory retirement age and reducing the incentives for early retirement (e.g., Galasso, 2006, pp. 23–25), the pace of these reforms appears slower than what is predicted by the model, potentially due to institutional frictions in European countries that are not captured by the model. One should then expect a rapid increase of retirement age and a slowdown of the growth of social security transfers once such institutional frictions are overcome. In summary, the model's predictions regarding differential policy adjustments across countries are encouraging. The main shortcoming of the model is that it overpredicts ϱ in the rich European OECD economy.

Figure 8 displays the predicted annual per-capita output growth rates for the four countries and country blocks under consideration. These growth rates are reported as deviations from the balanced-growth rates subject to the year-2000 demographics. Annual growth accelerates by roughly zero to seven basis points in the year 2000, and 30 to 35 basis points in the longer run. The growth accelerations in the rich OECD economy, the rich European OECD economy and the United States are very similar and exceed the one in Japan. If the retirement age were capped at its level in the year 2000 (such that τ_t would rise steeply and σ_t decline), per-capita growth would essentially remain stuck at its current level.

To understand the sources of these predicted growth effects, we compare the per-capita balanced growth rate along the initial balanced growth path subject to year-2000 demographics with the one along the new balanced growth path subject to $\nu = p = 1$. Recall from equation (5) that demographic change affects long-run per-capita growth γ_H

²⁴In 1994, Japan enacted a rapid increase of retirement age and a reduction of effective tax rates for workers close to retirement (Yashiro and Oshio, 1999). The model captures this rapid increase, but not the precise timing. In the United States, the retirement age increased more slowly than in Japan (following reforms starting in 1983).




Figure 5: Predicted policies for the rich European OECD economy: τ_t (black), σ_t (red), ρ_t (green).




Figure 6: Predicted policies for the United States: τ_t (black), σ_t (red), ρ_t (green).

through several channels:

- i. Lower population growth ν increases the capital stock per young household, holding the savings rate constant. By increasing ψ , it lowers the wages earned by young workers conditional on the capital stock per young household. Finally, it directly affects the savings rate and labor supply.
- ii. Increased longevity p raises ψ , lowering the wages earned by young workers conditional on the capital stock per young household. Moreover, it directly raises the savings rate and labor supply.
- iii. Lower population growth and increased longevity affect κ . The tax rates and retirement age enter directly into the growth rate expression and indirectly, by affecting ψ and z and thus, $1 - x$.




Figure 7: Predicted policies for Japan: τ_t (black), σ_t (red), ϱ_t (green).

Figures 9–10 illustrate how these channels affect γ_H in the long run. In the two figures, the leftmost bar (denoted by “BGP 2000”) indicates the annual per-capita growth rate along the balanced growth path subject to year-2000 demographics, and the rightmost bar (denoted by “ ϱ ”) displays the predicted annual per-capita growth rate along the new balanced growth path. The second and third bars indicate the annual growth rates if only the direct effects of demographic change (listed above under i. and ii.) are accounted for. In particular, the bar denoted by “ ν ” represents the growth rate if the direct effects of lower population growth are accounted for, and the bar denoted by “ p ” represents the growth rate if the direct effects of lower population growth and higher fertility are accounted for. The remaining bars display the growth rate if, in addition to these direct effects, the cumulative indirect effects (listed above under iii.) working through adjustments in the policy instruments τ , σ and ϱ , respectively, are accounted for. In Figure 10, the heights of the bars denoted by “ σ ” and “ ϱ ” are identical since by construction the retirement age is fixed at its year-2000 value.

According to Figure 9, all direct effects are positive, summing to more than 50 basis points of annual growth. In contrast, the indirect effects working through adjustments in policy differ in sign: higher τ and ϱ reduce growth while higher σ fosters growth. On net, the policy responses reduce annual growth by seven basis points, leaving a total growth effect of plus 50 basis points.

Since the bulk of the policy induced reduction in growth is due to the increased retirement age one might conclude that growth prospects would improve if the retirement age could be fixed. Such a conclusion would be wrong, however. As discussed earlier, capping ϱ would result in a very steep increase of τ and decline of σ (see Figure 4), depressing growth much more strongly than if both τ , σ and ϱ are free to adjust (see Figure 8). Figure 10 confirms this result. It shows that, with a capped ϱ , the very steep increase of τ and decline of σ would reduce growth by about 30 and 5 basis points respectively, leaving a net growth effect of only 20 basis points.²⁵

²⁵If ϱ remained fixed at its year-1970 value of zero, the induced increase of τ and fall in σ would reduce




Figure 8: Predicted annual per-capita output growth rates for the rich OECD economy (black, “o”), the rich European OECD economy (red, “e”), the United States (green, “u”), and Japan (blue, “j”) as deviations from the respective initial balanced-growth rates. The flat series at the bottom displays the growth deviation for the rich OECD economy if ϱ_t is capped at its year-2000 value.

In summary, the picture that emerges is only partly consistent with the view promoted by policy makers according to which the political process will implement measures to raise productivity in order to “outgrow” the burden imposed by demographic change. According to the model, demographic ageing indeed induces the political process to raise public investment in order to foster productivity growth. However, the main positive effects on growth arise directly, through capital deepening, a higher savings rate, and increased labor supply and the net effect of endogenous policy on growth is negative, due to higher social security transfers and an increased retirement age. Nevertheless, in politico-economic equilibrium, flexibility along the retirement margin plays a positive role for growth. For with a capped retirement age, social security transfers would increase much more steeply and the induced negative growth effects would be even stronger.

The central predictions of the model are robust to changes in the calibration assumptions. Modified values for the targeted balanced-growth-path interest rate are mainly reflected in adjusted values for β and δ , leaving the simulation results broadly unchanged. Reducing χ renders the predicted increase of retirement age less pronounced and more delayed. The effects on the decomposition of the long-run change in γ_H are small and the growth cost of capping ϱ is reduced. The most important parameter for calibration purposes is the capital share α . Increasing α from 0.3 to 0.35 leaves the net long-run effect on γ_H largely unchanged but amplifies the positive and negative contributions to this long-run change through the different channels discussed earlier. The predicted increase in retirement age is smaller if the capital share is high; as a consequence, the growth cost due to a cap on ϱ is lower than in the baseline simulation. If α is reduced to 0.25, the retirement age steeply increases already before the year 2000. Starting from the high growth by 40 and 16 basis points respectively, completely eliminating the direct positive growth effects.




Figure 9: Predicted annual per-capita balanced-growth rate for the rich OECD economy, around the year 2000 (leftmost bar) and after the ongoing demographic transition (rightmost bar). The bars in the middle decompose the change of growth rate.

base value in the year 2000, the further increase of the retirement age does not depress growth as strongly as in the baseline simulation and the net effect of endogenous policy on long-run growth therefore is positive. With a capped retirement age, the net effect of endogenous policy remains strongly negative.

Importantly, the model predictions are also robust to replacing the endogenous growth mechanism by an exogenous growth specification. As discussed earlier, the long-run growth effects of changes in labor supply, the savings rate, population growth and the policy instruments translate into parallel level effects in an otherwise identical model with exogenous growth. Moreover, the equilibrium policy choices remain *identical* in such a variant of the model since the first-order conditions with respect to κ_t are unchanged.²⁶ The exact specification of productivity growth in the model therefore has no major bearing on the transition dynamics of the economy and no effect at all on the evolution of the policy instruments and the government budget shares in politico-economic equilibrium.

5 Concluding Remarks

We have presented a rich, yet tractable framework to analyze the impact of demographic ageing on economic growth. Building on a standard overlapping generations model, our framework combines various channels discussed in the literature and referred to in the political debate. On the one hand, it captures the implications of rising longevity and falling fertility in general equilibrium, including adjustments in the savings rate, labor supply, factor prices and capital deepening. On the other hand, it captures responses by the political system, in particular adjustments of the size of the government budget and its composition between investment and transfer spending as well as changes in the retirement age.

²⁶This feature hinges on the assumption that households live for only two periods.




Figure 10: Predicted annual per-capita balanced-growth rate for the rich OECD economy if ρ_t is capped at its year-2000 value, around the year 2000 (leftmost bar) and after the ongoing demographic transition (rightmost bar). The bars in the middle decompose the change of growth rate.

Calibrated versions of the model predict that per-capita growth in rich OECD economies will increase by approximately 50 basis points during the twenty-first century, with the positive direct growth effects of demographic ageing partly being reversed by the consequences of endogenous policy responses. The model predictions support the common view that rising longevity paired with falling fertility increases the GDP-share of social security transfers, with negative implications for growth. In contrast, they do not support the common view that rising social security transfers crowd out productive public investment (as a share of GDP). Crowding out only results in an extreme scenario where the political process adjusts tax rates and the composition of government spending, but not the retirement age. In the more plausible scenario where the political process adjusts along all three margins, both social security transfers and public investment as a share of GDP rise, and the increase of the former is much more moderate than with a fixed retirement age. These results are robust to changes in the specification of the growth mechanism.

Throughout the paper, we have assumed that the government runs a balanced budget, excluding government deficits and debt. This assumption is not very restrictive. In our model, unlike in Bassetto and Sargent (2006) who assume commitment, public under investment cannot be overcome by letting voters finance investment expenditures out of government debt. For lack of commitment implies that the economic equivalence between intergenerational transfers and debt policies largely extends to the political sphere.²⁷ We have also assumed that longevity and fertility are exogenous. While this assumption is useful for the purpose of studying the long-run effects of demographic ageing on growth, there are clearly potential feedback effects from the government budget to demographics,

²⁷See Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2009) for an analysis of economic and politico-economic equivalence of fiscal policies.

for example through investments in public health (see Hall and Jones, 2007). We leave an analysis of such feedback effects for future research.

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A Production Efficiency

For generality, productivity growth is specified as $H_{t+1} = B_1 H_t^{\varepsilon(1-\delta)} I_t^\delta$ with $0 < \varepsilon \leq 1$. For $\varepsilon = 1$, the model analyzed in the body of the paper results. For $\varepsilon < 1$, the model does not display endogenous growth.

Consider a path with constant ν and p and let y denote output per worker. Conditional on H_t and aggregate labor supply, we have

$$\ln(y_{t+i+1}) \simeq \alpha \ln(k_{t+i+1}) + \delta(1-\alpha) \sum_{j=0}^i (\varepsilon(1-\delta))^j \ln(I_{t+i-j}), \quad i \geq 0.$$

Starting from the investment policy $\{k_{t+i+1}, I_{t+i}\}_{i=0}^\infty$, consider a sequence of small reallocations of investment spending. This sequence involves, in each period i , a small change in public investment of Δ_i and a corresponding change in physical investment of $-\Delta_i$ (per worker in period i). If this policy change weakly increases output in all subsequent periods, then it amounts to a Pareto improvement and the initial allocation is production inefficient. Formally, the conditions for production inefficiency are given by

$$\begin{aligned} d \ln(y_{t+i+1}) &= -\alpha \frac{\Delta_{t+i}}{k_{t+i+1}\nu} + \delta(1-\alpha) \sum_{j=0}^i (\varepsilon(1-\delta))^j \frac{\Delta_{t+i-j}}{I_{t+i-j}} = \\ &= -\alpha \frac{I_{t+i}}{k_{t+i+1}\nu} \epsilon_{t+i} + \delta(1-\alpha) \sum_{j=0}^i (\varepsilon(1-\delta))^j \epsilon_{t+i-j} \geq 0 \quad \text{for all } i \geq 0, \end{aligned}$$

where we define $\epsilon_{t+i} \equiv \Delta_{t+i}/I_{t+i}$, and where at least one inequality must hold strictly. Since the initial allocation corresponds to a balanced growth path, the recurrent term

$$a \equiv -\alpha \frac{I_{t+i}}{k_{t+i+1}\nu} + \delta(1-\alpha)$$

is time-invariant. The conditions for production inefficiency can therefore be summarized as

$$\begin{aligned} a\epsilon_t &\geq 0, \\ a\epsilon_{t+i} + \delta(1-\alpha) \sum_{j=1}^i (\varepsilon(1-\delta))^j \epsilon_{t+i-j} &\geq 0 \quad \text{for all } i \geq 1, \end{aligned}$$

where at least one inequality must hold strictly.

Intuitively, the term a (multiplied by the amount of physical investment) represents the effect of an infinitesimal reallocation from k to H investment on output in the subsequent period. To increase output in period $t+1$, ϵ_t must have the same sign as a . To increase output in periods later than period $t+1$, the combined effect of the lagged changes in k - and H -investment must be positive.

When $a > 0$, capital is over accumulated in the initial allocation. As is apparent from the above conditions, one can generate a Pareto improvement in this case by reallocating

resources from k to H (corresponding to $\epsilon_{t+i} > 0$). Over accumulation of capital is also present if $a = 0$ and $\varepsilon(1 - \delta) > 0$, corresponding to the allocation in an economy without government intervention, but with markets for the provision of the “public investment.”²⁸ In such a setting, savings is allocated across H and k investment in such a way that output in the *subsequent* period cannot be increased. However, if $\varepsilon(1 - \delta) > 0$, the level of productivity contributes to future productivity growth, and a slight reallocation from k to H investment therefore increases output in all *later* periods, as is apparent from the above conditions. The allocation satisfying $a = 0$ is not Pareto optimal in this case because it does not properly account for the dynamic productivity externality.

When a is negative and large in absolute value, the allocation again is production inefficient. In this case, a reallocation of resources from H to k accumulation (corresponding to $\epsilon_{t+i} < 0$) generates a Pareto improvement. For example, if $a = -1$, a sequence of $\epsilon_{t+i} = \epsilon < 0$ for all $i \geq 0$ increases production in all future periods because the positive effect from additional physical investment, $a\epsilon = -\epsilon > 0$, dominates the cumulative negative effect from reduced productivity growth, $\delta(1 - \alpha) \sum_{j=1}^i (\varepsilon(1 - \delta))^j \epsilon < \epsilon$. To characterize the largest $a < 0$ allowing for a persistent increase in output, we consider a sequence $\{\epsilon_{t+i}^*\}_{i=0}^\infty$ with $\epsilon_t^* < 0$ where $\{\epsilon_{t+i}^*\}_{i=1}^\infty$ is recursively defined by the requirement that $d \ln(y_{t+i}) = 0$ for all $i \geq 2$. If such a sequence is bounded then production is inefficient. For $i \geq 1$, the terms of such a sequence satisfy $a\epsilon_{t+i}^* + \delta(1 - \alpha) \sum_{j=1}^i (\varepsilon(1 - \delta))^j \epsilon_{t+i-j}^* = 0$. This implies

$$\epsilon_{t+1}^* = \frac{\delta(1 - \alpha)}{-a} \varepsilon(1 - \delta) \epsilon_t^*$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \epsilon_{t+i}^* &= \frac{\delta(1 - \alpha)}{-a} \sum_{j=1}^i (\varepsilon(1 - \delta))^j \epsilon_{t+i-j}^* \\ &= \frac{\delta(1 - \alpha)}{-a} \varepsilon(1 - \delta) \epsilon_{t+i-1}^* + \frac{\delta(1 - \alpha)}{-a} \sum_{j=2}^i (\varepsilon(1 - \delta))^j \epsilon_{t+i-j}^* \\ &= \frac{\delta(1 - \alpha)}{-a} \varepsilon(1 - \delta) \epsilon_{t+i-1}^* + \frac{\delta(1 - \alpha)}{-a} \varepsilon(1 - \delta) \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} (\varepsilon(1 - \delta))^j \epsilon_{t+i-j-1}^* \\ &= \frac{\delta(1 - \alpha)}{-a} \varepsilon(1 - \delta) \epsilon_{t+i-1}^* + \varepsilon(1 - \delta) \epsilon_{t+i-1}^* \\ &= \varepsilon(1 - \delta) \left(1 - \frac{\delta(1 - \alpha)}{a} \right) \epsilon_{t+i-1}^*, \quad i > 1. \end{aligned}$$

Boundedness of the sequence and thus, production inefficiency requires $-1 < \varepsilon(1 - \delta) \left(1 - \frac{\delta(1 - \alpha)}{a} \right) < 1$ which simplifies (due to $a < 0$) to the condition $a < -\frac{(1 - \alpha)\varepsilon\delta(1 - \delta)}{1 - \varepsilon(1 - \delta)}$.

In conclusion, if $\varepsilon(1 - \delta) > 0$ (such that $a = 0$ is not efficient), the criterion for production efficiency is given by $-\frac{(1 - \alpha)\varepsilon\delta(1 - \delta)}{1 - \varepsilon(1 - \delta)} \leq a < 0$ for $a \equiv \delta(1 - \alpha) - \alpha \frac{I}{kv}$. If the left

²⁸Boldrin and Montes (2005) and Docquier, Paddison and Pestieau (2007) characterize such an economy; they interpret public investment as public education.

inequality is violated, then the economy accumulates too much H ; if the right inequality is violated, then the economy accumulates too much k .

In politico-economic equilibrium, $\frac{I_{t+i}}{s_{t+i}} = \frac{\sigma}{z(1-\tau-\sigma)}$ and the production efficiency criterion subject to $\varepsilon = 1$ therefore reduces to

$$1 \geq \frac{\alpha' \sigma}{z(1-\tau-\sigma)} > \delta.$$

From the first-order condition for σ tax rates in politico-economic equilibrium satisfy

$$\frac{\alpha' \sigma}{z(1-\tau-\sigma)} = \frac{\delta \alpha \beta p}{(1+\alpha \beta p)z} = \delta \frac{\alpha(1+\beta p) + (1-\alpha)^{\frac{\tau+\psi-1}{\psi}}}{1+\alpha \beta p} < \delta$$

where the last inequality follows from $\frac{\tau+\psi-1}{\psi} < 1$. We conclude that, in politico-economic equilibrium, the economy necessarily over accumulates k relative to H .